




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THE RELIGIOUS WARS

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BOOK I.

THE COUNTER-REFORMATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE.

A. D. 1556-1618.

PLATE I.



Emperor Ferdinand I.

Vienna in the background. Reduced facsimile of the engraving, dated 1556, by Hans Sebald Lautensack (about 1507-1560).

History of All Nations, Vol. XII., page 19.

THE COUNTER-REFORMATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE.

CHAPTER I.

GERMANY UNDER FERDINAND I. AND MAXIMILIAN II.

(A. D. 1556-1576.)

THE progress of Germany as a nation in the beginning of the sixteenth century seemed for a while to owe most of its vigor and promise to the great religious Reformation that was stirring the land. But, under the protection of a foreign chief executive, the old faith offered resistance, and a fatal division took place that crippled the energies of the nation. The Reformers were compelled to resort to princely protectors; these gave their aid indeed, but checked effectively the growth of popular independence. Against the Protestant princes were arrayed emperor, pope, and the numerous spiritual potentates of Germany, to whom all reform, all religious progress, and all manifestations of personal independence appeared more and more dangerous and treasonable. The Peace of Augsburg was concluded (1555), but it only sanctioned the schism in the realm and people, the mutual hostility, and the universal mistrust and suspicion. Protestantism was itself divided between Calvinists and Lutherans; their differences bore mainly on secondary points, and their antagonism seems to have derived from this fact a petty and narrow character, debasing and weakening rather than elevating heart and mind. National interests were wholly lost sight of. The mighty reform movement was followed by a time of lamentable decadence, a deterioration of the German character such as no other epoch has seen. Even the decades following the Thirty Years' War are less discouraging than the period from the Peace of Augsburg to 1618.

When Charles V. practically gave up the administration of the empire to his brother, Ferdinand I. (PLATE I.), all hope of reconcilia-

tion was not yet lost. Ferdinand, born in Spain in 1503, and educated under the eye of Cardinal Ximenes, had, it is true, been in his youth a Catholic zealot more intolerant than Charles himself. Germany had at first proved far from attractive to him, but his views had been largely modified by time. The administration of the hereditary lands of the Hapsburgs, the management of the affairs of the empire, which Charles had handed over to him, introduced him gradually to German ideas and German ways, and taught him toleration. His Austrian estates had obtained, or rather forced from him, the right to the free preaching of the word of God.

Cheerful in temperament, somewhat passionate, fond of pomp and splendor, diligent in work, and strongly opposed to war, Ferdinand I. was not a great ruler, but he was respected and loved by his subjects and the Germans generally. He was accessible to all, ready to listen to requests from even his humblest subjects. Personally a staunch and devout Catholic, he yet hoped by a thorough reformation of the church to be able to win back the seceders; to this end, he labored as his elder brother had done, but in a more gentle and persuasive way (Fig. 1).



FIG. 1. —Thaler (1529), with portrait and arms of King Ferdinand.

His eldest son, Maximilian, who bore the title of King of Bohemia, was much more inclined to religious change than Ferdinand. Born in Vienna in 1527, he had, in spite of his weak constitution, been early trained to war and statesmanship. When twenty-one years of age, he visited his cousin Philip II., and was married to Philip's sister Mary. But he never took kindly to Spanish ways. His difficulties with his relatives predisposed him in favor of the new doctrines. His right to the succession on the imperial throne had first been threatened by Philip's candidature; when this danger was successfully averted, a new struggle arose. Charles V. had transferred to his son Philip, or rather to the

Spanish crown, forever, the imperial rights over Italy—that is, the suzerainty of nearly the whole of Upper Italy and a large part of Central Italy, an alienation from the German empire which he had no right to make. Ferdinand and Maximilian opposed it strenuously, but in vain. The latter thought himself aggrieved by his Spanish relatives in other respects. Though Charles had, on the occasion of Maximilian's marriage to Mary, made numerous large promises, he conferred upon him not a fragment of his Spanish possessions. Philip II. and his favorites had treated the German prince with insulting scorn. Is it a wonder, then, that the latter on all occasions gave free expression to his hatred for everything Spanish, and threatened to ally himself with the French, and, if need were, with the Turks, to avenge himself?

To antagonize his uncle and his cousin, Maximilian began to study Protestantism carefully. His thorough education, his large acquaintance with the history and literature of the chief European races, and his wit, naturally drew him to the side of the Reformers. He had a noble, poetic temperament, and was fond of music and of all intellectual activity. He lacked boldness and resolution, and did not venture to break openly with the official church, but he held aloof from its ceremonies as far as possible; his court preacher, John Sebastian Phauser, taught a doctrine that differed in nothing from that of the Reformers. The papal nuncio at Vienna avoided all conversation and intercourse with him as an open heretic. Calvin and many other Protestants considered Phauser as one of their own number.

The execution of the Peace of Augsburg was at this time the most important duty of the emperor. It was no easy task, for Protestantism had resumed its advance and ever found new pretexts to break through the barriers assigned it by the compact. At the diet of Ratisbon (1556), the evangelical states presented a formal protest against the Ecclesiastical Reservation. Some even went so far as to disregard it, and seized numerous bishoprics after the peace as well as before. Had not bishoprics in Germany always been temporal rather than spiritual dignities—principalities that were elective rather than hereditary? The greater princes had gradually become accustomed to look upon bishoprics as fit endowments for their younger sons, and they were unwilling to give them up simply because they had turned Protestant. A Brandenburg became Archbishop of Magdeburg, and gave the world the spectacle of a lawfully married archbishop. In Bremen, Lübeck, Verden, Minden, and Halberstadt, the bishops were Protestants; in Osnabrück, Protestants and Catholics alternated amicably.

Such was the situation in North Germany. In the south, the chap-

ters, the bishops, and abbots were still Catholic, but their subjects were fast turning Protestant. Innumerable cloisters were deserted, no one caring to occupy them; many priests, calling themselves Catholics, married, and preached Protestant doctrines. Pilgrimages, processions, the exposition of relics, and many other practices of Roman Catholic worship had fallen into disuse. In Würzburg and Bamberg, the estates established the Protestant service. Margrave Charles introduced the Reformed confession into Baden, and the Elector Palatine completed the work of the Reformation in his territories along the Rhine. Albert of Bavaria made important concessions to the new faith, and the larger number of the Bavarian nobility were so devoted to the Reformation that they would have lived without preaching and the sacraments rather than return to the old church.

In Austria, as in Bavaria, most of the nobles were Protestants; they forced the government to allow the free preaching of the new faith everywhere. The Catholic church in the empire was fast disintegrating; no one expected it to be preserved. Canons very generally married; even the orthodox among the bishops selected Protestant counselors. Add to this the prospect of a successor to the throne favorably inclined to the innovations, and it must be conceded that the outlook was dark for the papacy.

Ferdinand was just then engaged in a quarrel with Rome. In March, 1558, Charles V. had abdicated the empire, and the electors had immediately transferred the crown to Ferdinand. But Paul IV., partly out of dislike for the Hapsburgs, partly to make a public and striking exhibition of the claims of the papacy, refused to sanction the election, on the ground that his consent had not been previously obtained. It is easy to imagine the effect of such a claim just then in Germany. It was due solely to Ferdinand's moderation that things did not come to an open rupture. The emperor's relations to his Spanish nephew, the temporal chief of the Catholic party, were no less strained. It was Ferdinand's agency that brought to naught the project of a permanent Spanish supremacy over Italy.

The immediate cause of a change for the worse in the promising prospects of Protestantism arose among the Protestants themselves. After Luther's death, Melancthon had assumed the position of head of the Lutheran church. This was in accordance with Luther's express wish. But he was not able long to hold uncontested this difficult position. His submissiveness to Elector Maurice, and his virtual acceptance of the Imperial Interim, slightly modified by him in the Leipsic Interim, had made him an object of hatred and suspicion for the Lutheran zealots.

When in 1552 the Interim was annulled, and the bold preachers that it had driven out of office and home returned, is it surprising that they looked upon Melanchthon, and the Wittenberg party that followed him, as traitors? Duke John Frederick of Saxony, the deposed elector, gave them his newly founded university of Jena as a rallying-point. The conflict between the zealots and the moderates raged mainly about justification and the Lord's Supper. Andreas Osiander, professor of theology at the university of Königsberg, also a new foundation, originated it. He explained justification as less a divine act of grace than as the imparting of an inner righteousness through a mystic union of the soul with Christ. Around this almost unintelligible formula was kindled a fight which soon divided the whole Lutheran body. It grew hotter when the Wittenbergers, for moral purposes, taught that good works were useful for salvation. This seemed to the zealous Lutherans too much to be borne, and they went to the other extreme and absurdly declared good works positively injurious to salvation. Both sides fought with written and oral arguments, in which, according to the coarse fashion of the day, the devil and hell played an important part. The Protestant population were excited and greatly perplexed, no one feeling quite sure of what was divine and what diabolical, or whether he belonged to the righteous or the damned.

The Lutherans, already at war with the Calvinists, were now also hopelessly divided among themselves. In the year 1557, a religious discussion was appointed to take place at Worms, between the Catholics and the adherents of the Augsburg Confession. Melanchthon (Fig. 2) endeavored to unite all Protestants against their common foe, but a skilful thrust of the Jesuit Canisius exposed the carefully concealed divisions. He asked the Protestants themselves to define the heresies which they would exclude and expel from their midst. At once the followers of Flacius, an extreme Protestant who headed the Jena party, came forward, and, in spite of the warnings of their more prudent colleagues, exposed their views on heresy. Nothing was left but to dismiss from the colloquy these men who threatened to ruin everything.

But the discords among the Lutherans had been exposed to the world. Wise men were dismayed; the doubters were filled with contempt for a church the members of which excommunicated each other like very heathen. From this moment began the decadence of the Protestant movement in Germany. The Reformation, by wasting its strength in conflicts within itself, lost all power of further extension and was easily checked. The negotiations at Worms came to naught.

Amsdorf and Flacius assailed the theologians of Wittenberg and

Warhafftige Abconterfeung des Herrn Philippi Melancthonis.




FIG. 2.—Melancthon. Facsimile of a woodcut by Lucas Cranach, executed after Melancthon's death.

Leipsic, disciples of Philip Melancthon, as "Philippists" and "synergists," because they believed in a co-operation of man with the influence of the divine grace. In Königsberg the opponents came to blows. The ducal court of Saxony at Weimar took sides with the Flacian party, and,

when two colleagues of Flacius—Strigel and Hugel—passed over to the synergists, ten squadrons of the duke's cavalry marched into Jena and led them captives to the Grimmenstein (1559). These troubles broke Melancthon's heart, sadly tried already by domestic sorrow. He longed for death; "for then," he said, "I shall see God and be delivered from the base and merciless hate of theologians." He died thus in heavy affliction on April 19, 1560; his body was laid by the side of his friend Luther. He was a noble, well-intentioned man, but somewhat weak and over-yielding. It was his misfortune, not his choice, to be dragged into these violent religious quarrels.

Meanwhile Flacius and his friends had made themselves intolerable by their mad ragings and their haughty demeanor toward the temporal power. The Elector of Saxony expelled all Flacians from his lands; John Frederick gave them shelter at first, but before long found them unendurable. Strigel and his adherents were liberated, Flacius and forty preachers of his party deposed, and the former expelled out of ducal Saxony (1562). For thirteen years longer, Flacius wandered over Germany and the Netherlands, and finally died in abject poverty at Frankfurt-on-the-Main in 1575. The seed sown by him bore fruit all over the land in a poisonous growth of hate and mutual persecutions.

These sad dissensions among the Protestants encouraged the Catholics. In Rome and Madrid, there was loud rejoicing. Ferdinand I., now that he saw Protestantism robbed of all aggressive power, again drew near to the pope and Philip II. He was as firmly resolved as ever to maintain peace and order in Germany, but he was also determined to maintain Catholicism as far as possible. With a number of states, mostly Catholic, he formed the League of Landsberg. He endeavored, but with little success, to check the progress of Protestantism in his own hereditary lands. He favored the Jesuits, who had succeeded in representing themselves to him not so much as the champions of an exclusive and persecuting orthodoxy as reformers of discipline and education in the church.

When, at the diet of 1559, the Protestants again called for the free election of Protestant bishops when the electing canons were Protestant, Ferdinand met them with a positive refusal. He would rather, he said, take staff in hand and leave the country, than give up the Ecclesiastical Reservation. But, on the other hand, when zealous Catholics urged that the spiritual electors of the Rhine valley, and even the Netherlands and Spain herself, be admitted into the Landsberg League, the emperor drew back and let the matter drop. He was not prepared for a violent Counter-reformation, nor were political affairs favorable for it.

The emperor's attention was occupied with many matters, among others the famous Grumbach feud. William of Grumbach (born in 1503) was descended from one of the oldest families of East Franconia. He had difficulties with his feudal lord, the haughty Bishop of Würzburg: difficulties that were embittered by Grumbach's entering the service of the Margrave Albert Alcibiades of Brandenburg-Kulmbach. The bishop deemed this a sufficient reason for depriving Grumbach of his possessions. The emperor and his council repeatedly declared themselves in favor of the latter, but to no purpose; the bishop refused to give up his booty, and with it so good an opportunity of striking a blow at the arrogant nobles of his land and at the cause of Protestantism. The overthrow of Albert deprived the knight of all hope of help from that quarter. Driven to desperation, he plotted with the nobles of the Würzburg see, raised a force of men-at-arms, and fell upon the bishop. Unfortunately the latter, much against Grumbach's will, lost his life in the fray (April, 1558). The knight, dreading punishment, fled to France, but not long afterward returned to Germany, where he found an asylum with Duke John Frederick II. of Saxony, whom he promised to aid in the recovery of his paternal electorate. Brück, the duke's chancellor, fell wholly under Grumbach's influence, who promised him the co-operation of all the Protestants, of the knights throughout Germany, and even of the King of France.

The hate that the Ernestine branch of the Saxon family felt for the Albertine, that had robbed them of their own, made John Frederick very ready to enter upon such plans. Under his protection, Grumbach raised a force of cavalry, declared war against the new Bishop of Würzburg, and invaded his territory with 800 men (autumn, 1563). The city of Würzburg, having refused to surrender, was taken and partly sacked. The frightened officers of the bishop then concluded with the knight an agreement based on quite reasonable conditions.

Grumbach now thought his affairs would mend; they had really been made worse. Emperor Ferdinand was resolved to preserve quiet and peace in Germany; and fearing Grumbach's new raid would excite other nobles to turbulence, if left unpunished, he declared the Würzburg agreement invalid because extorted by violence, and put Grumbach under the ban of the empire. When the knight fled again to John Frederick for shelter, Ferdinand warned the duke against protecting the culprit and exposing himself to a like penalty. Notwithstanding this, the duke removed his residence from Weimar to the strongly fortified town of Gotha, and proclaimed his intention of defending Grumbach in spite of emperor and empire. Things were fast drifting to open hostility.

ities. The intercession of princes and knights succeeded in postponing the execution of the sentence for a while. At the end of Ferdinand's reign, these matters were yet unsettled.

When John Frederick II. and Grumbach ventured to withstand the empire and the emperor, they relied largely on the latter's being kept busy elsewhere by the war against the Turks, which was not prospering. The emperor's forces were inadequate. Hungary was already half won by the Moslems. The burdens of the campaign bore most heavily on the hereditary German lands, which could be brought to make generous grants only by religious concessions. The soldiers, hastily brought together, were inexperienced and without competent generals. The imperial finances were in a bad plight. Every official, from the humblest subordinate to the minister of state, stole all he could, and the easy-going ruler let them steal. He even made valuable gifts in money and lands to his unworthy servants; in return, they forsook him as soon as they had grown rich enough. Add to this the extravagance of the court, where not less than three hundred noblemen were entertained, each with three or four horses—no wonder that the emperor's expenses were twice his income. The deficit was made up by loans at exorbitant rates, often twenty per cent., or by pawning or alienating church property, an act that did not trouble the conscience of Ferdinand, orthodox though he was, and for which he did not deem it needful to ask the pope's permission. Military capacity the emperor had none.

During the last period of the reign of Charles V., in 1547, a five years' armistice had been concluded between Solymán and the Hapsburgs. This agreement was scarcely honorable for the empire, for, under the name of a "pension," Ferdinand pledged himself to pay a yearly tribute to the Porte. The disturbed condition of affairs in Hungary made it impossible for the armistice to be kept, especially as the Turks, feeling themselves the stronger party, constantly appealed to the right of the sword. It has already been said that John Zápolya had recognized his competitor, Ferdinand, as his successor to the Hungarian throne, leaving to his own son, besides the county of Zips, the whole of the principality of Transylvania. This son was still a minor when Zápolya died; his chief guardian, a monk, Martinuzzi, known as Brother George, concluded an agreement with Ferdinand, by which Zápolya's widow and son, in exchange for some estates in Silesia, were to surrender Transylvania to the king (1551). As a reward for this concession, Brother George obtained a cardinal's hat.

No sooner did Solymán hear of this compact, that threatened to increase so considerably the power of the Hapsburgs, than he began hostilities.

Cardinal George, who wished to make himself secure on all sides, entered into some suspicious negotiations with the Turks, upon which Ferdinand caused him to be put to death, a shameful and impolitic deed that led to the defection of the larger part of Transylvania from the cause of the Hapsburgs.

During the following years, there was a succession of forays and armistices, during which unhappy Hungary was ruined; hundreds of thousands of her inhabitants were led away to slavery. Finally the Peace of Câteau-Cambrésis, by depriving the Turks of the alliance of the French, made them more inclined to come to terms. Ferdinand had in Busbek an excellent envoy, fearless and able, and in 1562 an agreement was reached: an armistice for eight years, the retention by each party of the territory in its possession at the date of the compact, and an annual payment by the emperor of a tribute of 30,000 ducats. Ferdinand was henceforth at rest from the Turks. The war against them had so weakened an already disunited Germany, that Henry II. of France, when summoned by the emperor to restore the three Lorraine bishoprics, thought it altogether safe to return a polite negative answer.

Meanwhile new quarrels had arisen among the Protestants. In 1559, the old line having died out, Frederick of the Simmern line became Elector of the Palatinate as Frederick III., the Pious. This accomplished and learned prince had long shown himself well disposed toward the Reformation, inclining rather to the more logical and definite doctrines of Calvin than to the more timid and circumspect teachings of Luther. Yet he conducted himself with the utmost moderation. He strove, as Zwingli had once done, to bring about a union of all Protestants, leaving the settlement of disputed points to each sovereign for his own subjects. He forbade the theologians of the two evangelical confessions to indulge in mutual insults and recriminations, and had Melancthon prepare a declaration of faith to which each could attach his own interpretation. With his brother-in-law, John Frederick II., and the equally stout Lutheran, Christopher of Würtemberg, he held a colloquy at Halspach, in which he urged them strongly to a policy of peace. The Saxon duke pledged himself to require of his Protestants nothing beyond subscribing to the Confession of Augsburg, to forbid quarrels and excommunications among his theologians, and to come to terms with his most detested opponent, Elector Augustus of Saxony. The three went so far as to call a general meeting of Protestant princes at Naumburg (1561). Everything seemed to promise a peaceful reunion of the German Protestants; and, with this, victory would become possible.

But John Frederick II. again spoiled all these bright prospects by

his intense and stubborn bigotry. His theologians had again worked upon his feelings—Flacius and his friends were still about him—so that he raised a loud protest against all compromise with Calvinists, and departed at once from Naumburg without taking leave of the other princes. The adherents of the policy of conciliation were overwhelmed with reproaches and charges of heresy.

What had been intended to unite the evangelicals had served only to make their dissensions more hopeless and more evident. Frederick III. had Zacharias Ursinus and Caspar Olevianus prepare a catechism of the doctrines of the Reformed church, giving them much aid in their work. In this the differences between the Lutheran and the Calvinistic doctrine were stated as mildly and liberally as possible, but the latter was declared to be alone correct. In 1563, this so-called Heidelberg Catechism was made the authentic rule of faith for the whole Palatinate, and all Lutherans were ordered to leave the country.

The fact that a powerful prince, an elector of the empire, had openly gone over to Calvinism, a doctrine looked upon as damnable heresy by the great majority of German Protestants, produced an immense effect. Lutheranism saw itself threatened, and determined to prepare earnestly for its self-protection. The feeling against all conciliatory half-measures grew more intense. The unfortunate Calvinists who from France and other lands had fled to Germany for shelter had to resume their wanderings. In Frankfort-on-the-Main, the magistrates laid a heavy hand on the foreign Reformed communities, whether Walloon, French, or Italian.

By 1562, the schism between Lutherans and Reformed was already an accomplished fact. It may be looked upon as the most significant event of the reign of Ferdinand I.

The emperor watched these quarrels with joy. Whilst those antagonists were devouring one another, he labored incessantly for the spiritual and moral improvement of Catholicism in his hereditary lands and in the empire. He had already welcomed the Jesuits to Vienna and Prague; he now secured their admission into Hungary, the Tyrol, and Moravia. The three Rhenish archbishops of Cologne, Treves, and Mayence founded Jesuit colleges. The fathers preached, taught, and ruled in the university of Mayence with considerable success. The Bishop of Augsburg, Cardinal Otto of Truchsess, handed over to them his university of Dillingen and erected a residence for them in Augsburg. In Bavaria, besides their college in Munich, they controlled the university of Ingolstadt. Not only was the higher education in their hands, but the Latin schools, the free schools, the catechetical classes saw them working with devoted zeal and unsurpassed skill. Their institutions were considered

as the best, and even Protestant parents sent their children to them. The strict yet kindly discipline, the uniform methods, and the unassuming, winning manners of the fathers drew multitudes to their schools. Their firm and steady demeanor and absolute harmony formed a strong contrast to the fickleness, contentiousness, and pedantry of Protestant theologians. The latter addressed themselves solely to the intellect and reason of men; the Jesuits, children of the Romance countries, appealed to the fancy and the emotions through ceremonials, relics, festivals, and processions—things that did not fail to make an impression on the young. They moved steadily forward, working in close union with the emperor and the Catholic princes.

Next to the question of religion, the interest that lay nearest to Ferdinand's heart was the succession of his son Maximilian, not only to the imperial crown, but also to the hereditary Hapsburg states—of which Bohemia and Hungary possessed the right of free election. In Bohemia his endeavors had been successful. The question of succession to the empire was more complicated. The pronounced leaning of Maximilian toward Protestantism was the greatest difficulty in his way. Mild as he was in other matters, Pius IV. declared most emphatically that he never would acknowledge a heretic as emperor. Philip II. held the same view. The ecclesiastical electors would not hear of a Lutheran ruler. Ferdinand himself, as a true Catholic, must share the same view. He therefore unequivocally proposed to his son the alternative either to persevere in his obstinacy and abandon all hope of earthly preferment, or to conform, externally at least, to the old faith.

It was a critical and decisive moment for Maximilian (Fig. 3). He was already perplexed, not as to his convictions, but as to his policy. No reliance could be put upon the Protestants; in spite of his earnest warning, they had failed to agree in Naumburg; their dissensions had only grown worse, and Calvinism, which Maximilian thoroughly detested, was winning ground among them. Family sorrow was added to his political difficulties. His wife, Mary, Philip's sister, was mourning publicly over the heresy of her husband and the danger to which the souls of her children were exposed; a separation was already talked of. The emperor was unhappy and irritated; he kept Maximilian aloof from public affairs and obliged him to dismiss Phauser. He had never allowed him to visit Bohemia, though Maximilian had for years been the titular king of that country, but had entrusted its administration to his younger son, Ferdinand, greatly to the elder's displeasure. Maximilian held firm for a while, declaring that he owed submission and respect to his father in all other things except religion; he would rather renounce all worldly



FIG. 3.—Maximilian II. Reduced facsimile of the engraving by Martin Rota (fl. 1558–1586).

goods and serve God in retirement. But this praiseworthy resolution did not endure.

Under incessant pressure from his father and from Philip, he finally

yielded; it was not on his part a change of faith, it was a matter of policy. The internal discord among the Protestants had something to do with it, but indirectly; the main cause of his yielding was fear of disinheritance, love of temporal grandeur, and his desire for the crown of the empire and perhaps that of Spain. In Prague, in February, 1562, before the envoys of the spiritual electors, he solemnly and publicly declared himself to be and to intend to remain a faithful son of the church. At the same time, however, he assured the Protestant princes of his evangelical preferences, and promised them, in case he should succeed to the imperial throne, to adopt the Augsburg Confession. By such equivocations he won both parties, for each expected to find in him an ally. He was unanimously elected King of the Romans, at Frankfort, in November, 1562. By permission of the pope, he abstained from partaking publicly of the Lord's Supper according to the Romish ritual. Whatever his real convictions, whatever his attempts to deceive the Protestants, he had taken a step that proved decisive for his dynasty and the empire, and taken it in favor of Catholicism. He sent his eldest son, Rudolf, to Spain, to be educated, having in this an eye to the Spanish succession.

This surrender of Maximilian's was a great victory for Rome. The future emperor submitted to Catholicism unwillingly, as later did the King of France; and to secure the submission of both, Philip contributed largely—nay, mainly. From this can be seen how significant and effective was the part played by this king as champion and protector of Catholicism. The Hungarian question was speedily settled; and in September, 1563, Maximilian was solemnly crowned King of Hungary.

A few months later, July 25, 1564, Ferdinand I. died. Of the hereditary Hapsburg lands, only Austria fell to Maximilian. The Tyrol was given to his next brother, Ferdinand; Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola to the youngest, Charles. It is with the younger Ferdinand that the romantic story of Philippine Welserin is connected. This daughter of an Augsburg patrician, beautiful and accomplished, had so completely won the archduke's heart that he married her secretly in 1550. The emperor was at first incensed at his son's misalliance; and, as the young prince refused to part from his wife, he banished him from his presence. Eight years later, however, Philippine, under a disguise, so succeeded in winning the emperor's heart that he forgave the pair and acknowledged the marriage. Philippine was made Baroness of Zinnenburg, and died in 1580. Her sons, however, were declared unable to inherit. The oldest, Andreas, entered the church and became a cardinal. The second, Charles, distinguished himself in war and was made Margrave of Burgau. Ferdi-

nand of the Tyrol married again, his second wife being Anna of Mantua. No sons were born of this union, and, after his death (1594), the Tyrol went back to the chief branch of the family. This division of the Austrian possessions at the death of Ferdinand I. was a cause of weakness, and the more regrettable since Austria and the empire needed all their strength to resist the aggressions of the Turks.

Maximilian was in his thirty-eighth year when he ascended the throne. Like his father, he was of small stature. Occasionally he suffered from cramps of the heart, so violent as to make him faint; he insisted that these attacks were due to poison administered to him on his leaving Spain in 1555. His countenance was intellectual; he had a Roman nose and large brilliant eyes, but the thick drooping under-lip of the Hapsburg race marred his features. His manners were pleasing. He spoke seven languages, including Bohemian and Hungarian. He was fond of bodily exercise, delighted in military practices, in military engineering, and in artillery. He had in his youth entertained great projects, but he soon proved that he lacked the force to execute them.

Maximilian II. was unquestionably a talented man, perhaps the most brilliantly endowed of all the Hapsburgs; but he had no firmness of character. A Protestant at heart, he sent his sons to Spain to have them brought up as bigoted Catholics; to secure the Spanish succession, he gave the future policy of his house a direction that was in direct opposition to his own convictions. As emperor, his course was equally inconsistent. He carefully avoided breaking with Rome or Philip II. It was under his rule that the German Counter-reformation began its successful course. The world can more easily respect a sincere fanatic than a prince who, for selfish purposes, belies his innermost beliefs and endeavors to promote what his conscience would urge him to oppose as false and pernicious.

During the first part of his reign, he showed himself—at least toward the Lutherans—inclined to perfect toleration, both in his hereditary estates and in the empire at large. The bloody persecutions in the Netherlands excited his indignation. “Religious questions,” he wrote to Lazarus Schwendi, “should not be settled by the sword. Every honorable, God-fearing, and peace-loving man assents to this. The weapons of the apostles were their words, their teaching, and their Christian behavior. Things, alas! have come to such a pass in this world, that one finds little pleasure or peace therein.” And he acted accordingly. He opposed personally the policy of his Spanish cousin by giving friendly refuge to persons expelled by Philip because of their religious views, or, if they sought other lands than Germany, by bestowing pensions

upon them. He entertained friendly relations with the disaffected Netherlanders, like the Prince of Orange and Count Egmont, and, after the breaking out of civil war in the Netherlands, did not interfere with the raising of troops or money for them in Germany. He also sent his brother Charles to Spain, to intercede on behalf of the Netherlanders. In this, doubtless, policy was mingled with tolerance and good-will: he wished to prepare for himself a party in Spain and the Spanish possessions, to support his claims to the succession, and also to ingratiate himself with the German Protestants, whose interests were so closely connected with those of the Netherlands.

Within his hereditary dominions, he put no obstacles in the way of Lutheranism, but sought to deprive it of all features that made it a danger for the state, and in some measure to make it subserve his interests. Sectarianism, and especially Calvinism, which he looked upon as anti-Biblical and seditious, he would not suffer. Soon after his accession, he took the Lutheran divines in Breslau under his protection, forbidding them, however, to teach any other doctrines than those of the Augsburg Confession. Under this condition, he granted full religious liberty to Bohemia. At the diet of Prague, in 1567, he consented to remove the Prague Compacts, which had governed the relations of the Bohemian church since the Hussite days; and, as a consequence, the great Utraquist majority of the Bohemian people openly declared themselves Protestants. The Catholic clergy, however, were left in enjoyment of their rights and possessions.

His dealings in Austria proper were even more significant. He allowed the nobility to establish Protestant worship, according to the Augsburg Confession, in their castles and villages; but they had to pledge themselves not to allow any other form of worship than that enjoined by that confession, or any other ceremonies than such as the new prayer-book prescribed. And this prayer-book was his own work. To prepare it, he summoned from Rostock a Lutheran theologian, Chyträus, one of Melancthon's worthiest disciples; he gave him certain definite directions and overlooked the work, with the express purpose of retaining as many of the old practices as possible. So a Catholic potentate arranged the worship of his Lutheran subjects—certainly a peculiar spectacle. Protestantism in Austria was guided with moderation in the way of loyalty. At the same time, he appropriated much church property, especially that held by monasteries, without troubling himself to ask permission of the spiritual authorities. He exacted contributions from the clergy. The episcopal see of Vienna remained unoccupied for years, and its income went into the imperial treasury. Maximilian saw

very clearly that Protestantism was the best ally of princely power. All over his dominions, indifference toward the Catholic worship grew apace; scarcely one-eighth of the population could be looked upon as genuine Catholics.

Pope Pius V., the zealous defender of the rights of the church, was extremely displeased by the emperor's conduct, and sent him a message full of bitter reproaches. But Maximilian remained firm. He deemed the Augsburg confession, even from a Catholic standpoint, less pernicious than many other sects; and to prevent the spread of these latter, he had allowed the former, thus choosing the least of several evils. Still, the pope's influence had one result: the emperor did not proceed as far as he had purposed. He did not extend freedom of worship to towns and villages independent of the nobles. Their inhabitants were, however, allowed to attend Protestant worship held in noblemen's chapels, and the Austrian Lutherans were authorized to form a church government under the name of "deputation of religion."

The same protection that Maximilian granted to the Protestants was also offered by him to the Jesuits, whom he considered as fitted to promote morality and education among his Catholic subjects. When the estates of Lower Austria, in 1566, as a return for the subsidy they had granted against the Turks, demanded the expulsion of the Jesuits, the emperor replied that "they had been summoned to aid in the expulsion of the Turks, not of the Jesuits." He still retained the hope of reconciling the Lutherans with the more liberal and enlightened Catholics. He ordered that the doctors of the university at Vienna should be pledged no longer to allegiance to the "Roman Catholic" church, but only to the "Catholic" church. Indeed, many Protestants claimed to be genuine Catholics, and called themselves such.

At the beginning of 1566, the emperor convoked a diet at Augsburg, mainly to obtain adequate subsidies for the Turkish war, but also to settle, if possible, the religious difficulties of the empire. He was determined to continue to allow entire freedom to the Augsburg confession, but not to suffer other and more extreme sects; also to oblige Frederick the Pious of the Palatinate to give up his Calvinism. In this last matter, he was not wholly successful; still, a decree of the diet was passed, excluding from the religious peace all confessions that did not agree either with the old faith or the Augsburg Confession. In the empire, as in his own hereditary estates, Maximilian sought to strengthen Lutheranism, as more conservative and thereby more favorable to monarchical institutions, at the expense of the other reforming sects.

But the division the emperor had tried to heal only widened con-

stantly. The Calvinists, equally hateful to Lutherans and Catholics, were growing more and more numerous. The Count of East Friesland, the cities of Wesel and of Bremen, pronounced themselves more or less definitely in their favor. Elector Frederick favored them with all his power. He seized upon more than three hundred churches and monasteries, and had all altars and pictures destroyed. He tried by extreme measures to force his Lutheran subjects to abjure their faith and turn Calvinists. Such conduct awakened general wrath among German Lutherans and intensified their detestation of the "sacrament-contemners," as the Calvinists were called because of their symbolical and rationalistic interpretation of the Lord's Supper.

In all parts of Protestant Germany, this sectarian quarrel raged with increasing bitterness. Duke Christopher of Würtemberg, a neighbor of Frederick III., was a champion of strict Lutheranism. He enlarged and improved the university of Tübingen, turned monasteries into seminaries, and founded common schools in every parish. Of the church estates, whatever he did not seize was left in the hands of the higher Protestant clergy, the prelates; but they had to pledge themselves to apply their surplus income to the payment of the ducal debts, which were very considerable. The prelates thereupon appropriated the secular estates to themselves as administrators, and the duke had to consent to this so-called Tübingen Compact. The estates assumed the financial administration of the duchy, and their committee, with officials and a treasury of its own, formed a regular associate branch of government. This was the famous Würtemberg Constitution, which, in spite of repeated attacks on the part of the dukes, remained in force till the time of Napoleon. In Würtemberg, Lutheranism had assisted the aristocracy in securing the victory. Duke Christopher was forced to grant for all time, together with the new constitution, the Augsburg Confession and the Lutheran form of church government, "so that, in case he himself should change, the land should not be obliged to change with him." Thus political and religious questions were settled in Würtemberg, to be undisturbed for centuries.

The influence of Christopher won Brunswick over to strict Lutheranism. When in 1568 Duke Henry, a devout Catholic, died, his only son and successor, Julius, determined to put an end to popery in his domains. He therefore requested Dr. Andrea, chancellor of the university of Tübingen, to prepare a ritual on exclusively Lutheran principles. This "*Corpus Julium*" rests entirely on the Augsburg Confession and Luther's writings. Elector Joachim II. of Brandenburg had acted in the same spirit; his general superintendent, Andreas Musculus, was a staunch Lutheran. In

the Saxon duchies even, as well as in the counties of Reuss and Schönburg, the Flacian party was again getting the upper hand.

In the duchy of Prussia, as in Würtemberg, Lutheranism allied itself with the nobles. These had, with aid from Poland, wrested two important concessions from the weak and aged Albert, which almost amounted to a surrender of authority into the hands of the nobles, who had declared themselves in favor of strict Lutheranism, and therefore opposed to the rationalist Osiander. When the latter died, in 1552, his disciple, John Funk, became court preacher and confessor of the duke, as well as his most influential counselor. Appointed treasurer by Duke Albert, Funk succeeded in setting aside the authority of the nobles and restoring power to his friends, in spite of the opposition of the estates. In the name of the duke, he made levies of taxes and troops. At the same time, the prince was doing his best to enlist the sympathies of the burghers on his side.

This overturning of their supremacy highly incensed the Prussian nobles. They acted according to their wont—that is, they shamelessly betrayed Germany to save the interests of their class, and invoked the aid of the Polish nobility, who readily answered a call that gave them an opportunity to humble a hated German vassal. A Polish commission went to Königsberg and easily restored the power to the nobles. Funk, the foreign upstart, was executed, together with his friends and abettors (1566). All the privileges of the nobility were restored, the duke was deprived of the right of levying taxes on his sole authority, and subjected to a formal supervision on the part of the nobles. He became really a puppet in their hands. The strict Lutherans who had been exiled by Funk were recalled, and Mörlin and Chemnitz were appointed to prepare a new catechism. This was published in 1567, under the name of "*Corpus Prutenicum*," and, like the "*Corpus Julium*," was based wholly on Luther's writings. An oath was prescribed, and no one refusing to take it could hold either a religious or civil office. One year later (1568), Albert, first Duke of Prussia, died and was succeeded by his imbecile son, Albert Frederick.

Still more decisive than any of the successes mentioned above was the bloody but complete victory which bigoted Lutheranism obtained in electoral Saxony. Augustus, who succeeded to the electorate in 1553, was one of those essentially weak natures which as far as possible avoid all disputes and try to compromise, but, when forced against their will into a struggle, lose all control of themselves. Augustus had taken pains to have Melancthon's type of Lutheranism taught in his land. He had had a cannon cast with this inscription:

"The Flacians and zealots
Are the devil's forerunners."

He had shown himself inclined to be accommodating with the Calvinists in the empire, although opposed to their doctrines, and, on the whole, a staunch Lutheran. Relying on these indications, the majority of the Wittenberg theologians ventured to proceed further, and, especially in the matter of the communion, to draw nearer to the Zwinglian doctrine. From the university, these "crypto-Calvinistic" notions spread more and more over the rest of Saxony. The elector's wife was hostile to them, it is true; but the majority of the council, including the famous Dr. Craco, sided with the Wittenberg doctors. Melancthon's son-in-law, Polyhistor Caspar Peucer, also a vigorous opponent of bigoted Lutheranism, was the elector's physician, had large influence at the court, and was, besides, rector of the university.

The crypto-Calvinistic party felt itself strong enough in 1571 to bring out the so-called Wittenberg Catechism as an authoritative rule of faith for the Saxon church. This work has been criticised as inclining to the sacramental view of the Lord's Supper, and not without ground. The elector was displeased by this criticism, the more naturally as the praises the Catechism received from Calvinistic sources seemed to confirm it. He chose, therefore, as court preacher, George Listenius, a man distinguished by his intense hatred of all that was not strict Lutheranism rather than by his learning. A journey to Denmark and another to Vienna (1573) strengthened the elector's purpose to restore Lutheranism as the exclusive form of religion in his state.

Listenius now hoped, with the support of the elector's wife, who was a zealous Lutheran, to be able to turn the elector against the crypto-Calvinists; and in this he was not mistaken. Augustus was as unconscious of the efforts made to lead him back from Melancthon's doctrines to those of Flacius as he had previously been of the endeavors made to bring him gradually over to the Reformed theology. The estates urged the elector to proceed on this new road. Just then there accidentally came into his hands, April, 1574, a correspondence in which the other court preacher, Dr. Schütz, Pastor Stössel of Pirna, and the court physician, Dr. Peucer, expressed their real views on the religious question in Saxony. The letters proved that these men, in spite of their repeated and specific denials, stood absolutely on Calvinistic ground and were trying to proselytize the court and the land on behalf of Calvinism. The elector saw that he had been deceived by men who had for years enjoyed his unlimited confidence. His wrath was heightened by the scornful and contemptuous manner in which the writers expressed themselves concerning

the "old woman," meaning the elector's wife, Anna, the "petticoat government" at the court of Dresden, and the "foolish old man," Augustus himself. These epithets were certainly not treasonable, but they were in the highest degree offensive, especially coming from high court officials.

But in his wrath, kept hot by the urgings of women and clergymen, Augustus thought only of the punishment of the culprits, and had Stössel, Schütz, Peucer, and Craco, who was frequently mentioned in the correspondence as a sympathizer, arrested and tried for their lives. The estates were summoned and the letters were submitted to them. They eagerly favored strict Lutheranism and recommended the appointment of a theological commission and the suspension of the writers from their offices. In accordance with the first recommendation, a number of theologians met at Torgau with a committee of the estates, and, in conjunction with them, produced the so-called Torgau Articles.

In spite of the mild suggestion of the estates, the elector proceeded against the four original culprits with the greatest severity. Peucer was for twelve years dragged from prison to prison, in Dresden, Leipsic, and elsewhere, till in 1586 he was released on the request of the elector's second wife, Agnes of Anhalt. He then entered the service of the prince of Anhalt as court physician, and died at Dessau in 1602. Court preacher Schütz, arrested in his house, was condemned to detention for life, and was liberated only in 1589 by the successor of Augustus, Christian I. Pastor Stössel of Pirna died in prison in 1576. Saddest of all was the fate of counselor Craco. In vain did the estates declare that they found him guiltless and refuse to sentence him. Augustus could not forgive his former friend for becoming a protector of crypto-Calvinism, and the elector's wife, the chancellor's worst enemy, urged her husband to ruthless severity. The unfortunate man, though suffering from a dangerous disease, was, on the flimsiest pretexts, cast into a dark and mouldy dungeon. It was not hate alone that made the elector wish for Craco's death, but also the fear lest, should he become free, he might betray the secrets of the elector's policy. Accused of conspiracy, of treason, of lese-majesty, Craco was subjected to fearful torture. But he remained firm and never acknowledged the false charges brought against him. His death, hastened by the fearful treatment he had endured, released Augustus from a great perplexity. He was coarse enough to indulge in low jests about the death of a man whom he had once kissed and embraced and whom he had been wont to call his "dear, hearty doctor."

It was easier to deal with the defenceless theologians and officials than with the cause for which they had suffered. The theology they

had adopted, in several particulars resembling that of the Reformed church, had struck such deep roots in the electorate that it was long before crypto-Calvinism was completely destroyed in Saxony. Augustus reclaimed his land for pure and strictly orthodox Lutheranism. In Hesse alone did liberalism still have a foothold; thence proceeded again repeated attempts to reconcile the two hostile Protestant confessions; but these attempts were failures.

At this juncture, the Grumbach feud broke out again. It had assumed vast proportions, and threatened nothing less than the complete subversion of the constitution of the empire in favor of the nobility. Grumbach had acquired complete mastery over John Frederick II. by all sorts of goblin stories, prophesyings, apparitions, and the like, as well as by his promise to restore to him his lost estates and the electoral dignity. The duke therefore paid no heed to the emperor's command that he should give up the outlaws, but sought to secure the mediation of the princes of the empire, whom Grumbach threatened with a general rising of the nobles if they did not assume a friendly attitude toward himself. The princes showed such unwillingness to undertake the execution of the ban against Grumbach and his princely protector—partly out of fear of the nobles, partly from a dislike for all that might in any way strengthen or increase the power of the emperor—that Maximilian thought it best to let the matter rest until the next diet. Meanwhile, Grumbach was doing his best to procure by force the money of which he and his duke stood in such need. Being unsuccessful, he comforted John Frederick by new angelic apparitions which announced to him the speedy death of his hated cousin of the Albertine line, Augustus, and the recovery of his electorate—nay, the imperial crown itself.

For such far-reaching enterprises, in which the dissatisfied noblemen and numerous unemployed mercenaries were to assist, vast preparations were made, which excited the fears of the neighboring states, especially electoral Saxony and Hesse. These fears were increased when in 1565 a rising of the Franconian knights occurred, when Grumbach seized the monastery of Banz, and when it became known that a plot existed for a general rising of the nobles for the purpose of doing away with the princes and placing themselves immediately under the emperor's authority. John Frederick and Grumbach went so far as to send the Nuremberg patrician, David Baumgärtner, with proposals of this sort to the emperor. Nothing can better picture the helplessness of the first monarch of Christendom than the fact that he did not dare to reject these offers at once, but referred the impudent gentlemen to the next diet. Emboldened by their impunity, Grumbach, John Frederick, and his

chancellor, Brück, formed the project of suddenly attacking Elector Augustus and either capturing or slaying him. Their plan was disclosed through their own carelessness, and it excited general indignation. In the duke's own territory, preachers boldly denounced Grumbach and his tricks, and even the duke himself, stout Lutheran though he was. Things had gone so far that a catastrophe was unavoidable. Even the Lutheran princes abandoned John Frederick to his fate, convinced that any further delay might lead to another rising of rebellious nobles.

Not even the opening of the diet at Augsburg (1566) could deter Grumbach and his friends from continuing the course of highway robbery which they had practiced undisturbed under the duke's protection. The diet therefore requested the emperor to enforce the ban against the outlaws and their protectors as speedily as possible, especially in Upper and Lower Saxony, in Franconia, and Westphalia. John Frederick was advised to submit, but all remonstrances on the part of his friends, of devoted clergymen, of his own brother John William of Coburg, availed nothing; relying on Grumbach's angels, and blinded by hatred of his cousin Augustus, the infatuated duke defied the emperor's summons and prepared for resistance. But this time the princes were in earnest and determined to make an end of the lawless deeds of the nobles, which recalled the days of Berlichingen and Sickingen (PLATE II.). The Bishop of Würzburg seized Grumbach's estates, and several persons known to have made common cause with him were executed.

Though John Frederick had failed in his endeavor to summon the nobles to his aid and to raise troops, owing to the dread of the emperor's ban, he was not discouraged, for he felt confident that all the resources of the empire would be exhausted in the Turkish war. But no sooner was the campaign ended than Elector Augustus began to make preparations to carry out the decree against John Frederick, which had been specially entrusted to him as commander of the circle of Upper Saxony. On December 30, 1566, the imperial troops appeared before Gotha, in which John Frederick had hastily collected a force of 3500 men. He was entirely destitute of money; still, he defiantly assumed the title of elector and a coat of arms to match.

Reinforcements reached the imperialist camp from all sides, so that the city was closely invested. A sum of 4000 gold pieces, that the duke intended for securing soldiers, fell into the besiegers' hands; and a sally, which was made at Grumbach's suggestion, ended disastrously. Within the city, the temper of both nobles and citizens was growing more and more unruly, as they saw themselves exposed to ruin for the sake of foreign outlaws. On April 4, a general disturbance broke out; Grum-

bach, Chancellor Brück, and a few subordinate officials were seized. On April 13, 1567, the city capitulated, and Elector Augustus entered it as conqueror. With characteristic vindictiveness, he did not deign to look at the duke, who humbly saluted him, but had him taken at once to Dresden. John Frederick's wife and children, whose hereditary rights were not affected, were allowed to remain in the country. When brought to Presburg, the duke was so hopeful and jovial, drank so deeply, and showed so little mental capacity, that it was evident he was scarcely responsible for what had taken place. History cannot make a hero out of him. He had to spend the rest of his life in various Austrian cities, practically under confinement, and died in May, 1596, in Styria. His fate recalls that of his father, but the first John Frederick had suffered for a higher cause and in a nobler manner than his son.

The other prisoners were dealt with much more harshly. Grumbach and Brück were subjected to torture; then, "although deserving a severer penalty, yet, through the elector's clemency, only condemned to be quartered." The sentence was carried out on April 18, 1567. Grumbach was led out of his prison, bound, and his heart was cut out of his body by the public executioner, with these words: "Behold thy false heart, Grumbach!" Then his body was cut into four pieces. William von Grumbach was a man of good abilities, with a keen sense of justice. He never shared in the robberies of some of his adherents nor profited by them. The wrong done him had driven him to crime; but he did not consider his conduct as criminal, since in his day the nobles still considered the right of private war as much theirs as the princes'. Later in his career he was driven by necessity to deceptions and questionable practices of all kinds. His attempt to combine once more the nobles against the princes and the cities resulted in absolute failure, and from his day the nobility accepted the situation and no longer strove to step out of its place in the state.

Feuds among noblemen and the private expeditions of knights against strangers cease after the shameful death of Grumbach and his companions. The princes had won a decisive victory over the nobles. This was undoubtedly a step forward in civilization, a gain for the internal order and peace of Germany. But the country lost, in the bold, independent, and, on the whole, patriotic body of knights, an element of strength and military efficiency which in its way has never been replaced. How different things might have been, had Grumbach and his friends devoted their energies to reconquering for the empire, from the French, the Lorraine bishoprics! However that may be, another relic of the Middle Ages was buried with them.

In dealing with these rebels, Maximilian had energetically exercised and maintained his imperial jurisdiction and dignity. He was less successful when questions of internal policy were involved with foreign interests. The Teutonic Order, which, since the secession of Prussia, had had its seat in Mergentheim, Franconia, had not ceased urging the emperor to carry out the sentence passed in 1531 against the former Master of the Order, Albert of Brandenburg. In this case, however, Maximilian had to consider not only the Lutheran princes, who looked upon Albert as one of their own number and would not consent to his fall, but also Poland, which claimed the whole of Prussia as one of its provinces. The emperor thought it best to quiet the grand master by promising to do the Order justice at some future time, and securing a pledge from the estates that they would help the empire recover lands that had been wrested from it. Maximilian was likewise unable to protect Livonia and the neighboring territory against Russia and Poland. He sacrificed these districts to the enemies of the empire, because he hoped that, after the abdication of Henry of Anjou, the Poles would elect one of his own sons, and that Ivan IV., Czar of Russia, would help him with his influence to secure the prize. But, as we shall see, this surrender of national and imperial interests to promote those of the Austrian house did not have the wished-for result.

In Italy also, he failed to maintain adequately the rights of the Holy Roman Empire. In 1569, the pope, as we have learned, had bestowed upon Cosmo de' Medici the title of Grand Duke of Tuscany. But Florence was an imperial fief, and Maximilian considered himself as alone competent to raise his vassal to such rank. He sent ambassadors to Rome to protest against the pope's action as an interference with the imperial prerogative, but without effect. The pope did not even grant an audience to the German envoys; Cosmo's son, Francesco, compounded with the emperor by paying a sum of money.

It was an almost impossible task to induce the German princes to adopt a common course for the honor and security of Germany. This was the time when thousands of German mercenaries went to France, took service—some with the Huguenot chiefs, others with the king, and fought against each other for foreign gold. The brave Captain Lazarus von Schwendi, in a petition to the emperor, complained of "the excessive license of the German soldiery," by which "German strength and manhood" passed wholly into the hands of foreign potentates, "so that in these times of ours there is nothing cheaper than German flesh and blood!" Maximilian, who knew what was best for the empire, though he often lacked the force to do it, did make an effort to put an end to this

harmful and disgraceful custom. At the diet of Spires, in 1570, he proposed not only that the German officers and soldiers then serving in foreign countries should be recalled, but also that service in foreign countries should be forbidden except by special permission from the emperor, and that, for the preservation of peace and order within the empire, a permanent force be raised, with a permanent commander at its head. These reasonable and salutary measures, however, appeared to the princes a blow at their boasted "German freedom"; the Protestants were unwilling to give up their right to assist the "persecuted Christians" in France; and altogether the opposition to the emperor's proposition was so general and outspoken that he would have given much never to have made it. A permanent military force appeared especially objectionable, though at that very time Germany was threatened with formidable dangers from the East.

Age had not chilled Solyman the Great's love of war; ambitious plans were constantly filling his busy brain. We saw how, to secure a naval base in the western Mediterranean, he had made an attack on Malta, and had been baffled by the heroic resistance of the Knights of St. John and the timely support afforded them by Philip II. To offset this failure, Solyman contemplated new campaigns in Hungary, to reduce to his rule the part of that country which was still unconquered; and then he might again and more successfully attempt what he had tried in vain a generation before—the siege of Vienna. A pretext to resume hostilities with the emperor was readily found in the quarrels that were continually taking place between Maximilian and the protégé of Solyman, John Sigismund, son of Zápolya, and voivode of Transylvania.

There is something grand in this aged sultan, who, though weakened by disease as well as years, and surrounded by all the pomp and splendor of Asiatic sovereignty, places himself at the head of an immense army, to wipe away the disgrace of his generals' defeats and to seek, in the capture of the imperial city, the crowning of his long victorious career and the consummation of the complete triumph of his faith and people. Maximilian cannot be said to have shunned the struggle. It was his wont to overestimate his gifts and abilities, and he thought himself better prepared than his father had been to cope with the Turks. The Hungarian hero, Nicholas Zriny, urged him on to the war. Instead of complying with the summons of John Sigismund and his protector, Maximilian demanded concessions from them.

The German empire proved loyal to its head. Soldiers flocked to the emperor's standard, not from his hereditary lands alone, but from all parts of Germany. Indeed, like the emperors of old, he found him-

self at the head of all Europe. There were to be seen, in his army, Italian troops with the Dukes of Mantua and Ferrara among them; young French noblemen, led by youthful Henry of Guise; Englishmen, Poles, brave men of all nations, eager, under the German emperor, to help the Cross triumph over the Crescent. The forces under Maximilian, who assumed the command himself, numbered 100,000 men—in number nearly equal to Solyman's host, in discipline certainly superior.

But Maximilian proved inadequate to his military task, as he had proved incompetent to deal with political and religious difficulties, and for much the same reasons: a lack of decision. In vain brave Lazarus von Schwendi set him an example of vigorous action by boldly taking the initiative and capturing Tokay, Zethmar, and a number of other places, while another general, Eck von Salm, took Veszprim and Tata, and Nicholas Zriny, one of the most powerful magnates of Hungary, won a brilliant victory at Sielos. Neither these successes nor the support of united Germany and the sympathy and aid of all Christian Europe could stimulate the emperor to energetic measures. He remained entrenched in his camp at Raab, awaiting the enemy; he allowed Solyman to besiege the valiant Zriny in his ancestral town of Sziget, and did nothing to relieve him. Abandoned by the 80,000 imperialists, who looked on without raising a hand to aid them, Zriny and his handful of men defended themselves with heroic valor and beat back all the assaults of the Moslems. At the end of one month, being too few to continue the defence of the town, they withdrew into the fortress.

Once again fate offered Maximilian a chance to secure an overwhelming triumph. On the morning of September 6, 1566, Solyman succumbed to age, the hardships of the campaign, and disappointment at the long defence of Sziget (Fig. 4). The emperor was apprised of it, but refused to believe it, and found in unbelief an excuse for prolonging his disgraceful inactivity. Not so the Turkish vizier, Sokolli. Concealing from his army the death of the great sultan, he led them in his name to a final assault on the doomed town, which, after Zriny and nearly all his men had met an heroic death, fell into the enemy's hands (September 8, 1566).

It was fortunate for the Germans that Solyman's successor, Selim II., was an effeminate and peace-loving monarch, and also that the Janizaries, wearied and incensed by the long and costly siege, demanded not new battles but higher pay. When the Turkish force had withdrawn, Maximilian dismissed his mighty army, which had not once met the enemy face to face.

Sultan Selim was already planning the conquest of Cyprus, and was therefore quite disposed to conclude peace with Germany; an eight years'




FIG. 4.—The Mosque of Solyman in Stamboul (Constantinople). Built 1550-1566. The finest of Solyman's buildings.

truce was agreed upon, February, 1568. As things were left *in statu quo*, it was certainly not unfavorable to Maximilian. He lost Gyula and Sziget, it is true; but he won the northeastern districts of Hungary, which his lieutenants had conquered during the war. He had, however, to continue the payment of the yearly tribute of 30,000 ducats that Ferdinand I. had originally furnished. This must have been humiliating for an emperor who had ever looked upon his circumspect and slow father with considerable condescension.

John Sigismund of Transylvania had vainly protested against the conclusion of the armistice, and then tried to rouse the Hungarian nobles against the emperor. But his treasonable practices were discovered, and the Porte sternly enjoined upon him to keep the peace. He had, therefore, to come to terms with Maximilian at Spire in 1570. He acknowledged the emperor's sovereignty, together with the sultan's, and renounced the title of King of Hungary. Soon afterward, March, 1571, he died—a stroke of good-fortune for Maximilian, for the large personal possessions of the prince reverted to the crown. The Transylvanian diet chose as vaivode Stephen Báthori (Fig. 5), a comparatively young nobleman who had greatly distinguished himself under the deceased prince by his courage and skill. Maximilian would have preferred another candidate; but he confirmed Báthori, with whom he was on excellent terms, rather than run the risk of a new Turkish war.

In 1570 and 1571, the great league against Turkey was formed, which annihilated the Turkish fleet at Lepanto. But Philip II. and Cardinal Commendone, the papal legate, in vain urged the emperor to join the league. He cloaked his lack of warlike courage under the guise of respect for the armistice; he even forbade his subjects from participating in the rejoicings over the victory of Lepanto! During his reign, the tranquillity of Hungary was not again disturbed.

The Protestants had been foremost in aiding him in his campaign against Solymán; yet soon afterward he, who had till then showed himself well disposed toward them, began a more active Catholic propaganda, in accordance with the traditions of the house of Austria. The catastrophe of Don Carlos, in the summer of the year 1568, is largely responsible for this. The death of Philip's son revived Maximilian's hopes that one of his family should ascend the Spanish throne—hopes which had already led him to renounce his Protestantism. Philip II. now informed him that he wished to marry one of his daughters, Anna, and promised him the hand of a Spanish infanta for one of his sons. This son-in-law should, in case Philip had no heir by his second marriage, succeed to the Spanish crown, but only on condition that Maxi-



FIG. 5.—Stephen Báthori. Facsimile of an anonymous engraving, dated 1576.

milian should prove himself a devout Catholic. The Spaniards were indisposed to have foreign masters, and would hardly endure patiently the marriage of one of their princesses with the son of an heretical emperor. Philip himself would not, by favoring such a project, endanger

multitudes of souls. He would rather take a French wife unto himself.

Maximilian submitted to his cousin's conditions, and soon afterward the latter married Princess Anna. Henceforth the emperor's policy was completely changed. Before the death of Carlos, he had opposed the Spanish king and spoken of him in disparaging terms; after 1569, Philip became the pattern of the court of Vienna. Nothing was done, or even spoken of there, that had not previously been approved in Madrid. Maximilian relied on Spanish power to aid him against his subjects as well as against foreigners. Philip chose to keep the emperor in a state of agitation and uncertainty, and for that reason showered honors upon Don John of Austria, as if intending to make him his successor. This only increased Maximilian's eagerness to secure Philip's favor.

A Hapsburg joint policy was thus based on the close co-operation of the two branches of the house, under the leadership of Spain. It is unnecessary to say that its influence was felt in the affairs of Germany. The emperor now began to encourage and support the Catholic party. Another motive led him to this course: he wished to secure the Polish throne for one of his sons; but this could not be done without the aid of the pope. The Hapsburgs were constantly busy with plans for enlarging their dominions, not by conquests or natural power of attraction, but by family connections and barter of all kinds. This purely personal policy it was that brought Maximilian more and more completely under the control of the Catholic propaganda.

The Germans were fully aware of this, and, with patriotic wrath—for patriotism was not yet wholly extinct—they saw the emperor abandon the Netherlanders, related to them by blood and political ties, to their Spanish butchers, and pay no heed to their urgent appeals for help. In former years, the emperor had been little feared, but loved and respected; now men deemed him false and dishonest, and felt they had the worst to fear from him. The Protestants were all ready for the conflict, for, since the Turkish war, they held Maximilian's generalship very cheap. The Catholics had no confidence in him, and feared Spanish despotism. Maximilian's accession to the throne had been welcomed with shouts of joy, for men had hoped to find in him "a good, sincere German heart." Now he was looked upon more as a Spanish vicegerent than as a German emperor.

Some of the princes of the empire sought to profit by this change in the emperor's policy, and set themselves zealously to work a Counter-reformation in their territories. Thus the struggle which had checked the literary and scholarly development of Italy, which had doomed Spain

to bigotry and ignorance, which had brought upon France the horrors of civil war, which had convulsed England and Scotland with bloody tragedies, was now begun in Germany and was ultimately to bring upon it the Thirty Years' War.

The successful and memorable close of the Council of Trent was of signal aid to the Catholic princes. Bavaria, which had previously been an eager champion of the Reformation, then renounced it and declared itself satisfied with the reforms decreed within the church by the council. Not all accepted them—many citizens preferred exile to a change of faith; and in Munich especially whole quarters of the city were deserted. But the aim was reached, and the people of Bavaria, by persuasion or force, were led back to a reformed Catholicism. Duke Albert V., who had himself demanded a fundamental reformation of the church, had been won over by the Jesuits, and still more by Pius IV., who had conceded to him almost complete rule over the Bavarian clergy.

The nobility alone remained in favor of Protestantism. But this was the very time of the last difficulties between the nobles and their prince and of the complete discomfiture of the nobles. The Bavarian knights had in 1563 been persuaded to attempt a conspiracy against their duke, but it was discovered. To escape punishment, the rebellious nobles made an humble submission; the most turbulent were forbidden to appear at the Bavarian diet. As a consequence, religious questions were no longer raised there, and gradually all became again dutiful sons of the church. This was largely due to the Jesuits, who labored with equal zeal for Roman orthodoxy and for the absolute power of their protector, the duke. If Protestantism largely increased the sovereign's authority in the countries which it invaded, it also, by the power of example or the combination of circumstances, contributed to the same results in the countries that remained Catholic. The papacy itself felt obliged to strengthen the temporal power at the expense of the clergy, as this power was in most places its best, if not its only support.

It is noteworthy that a large proportion of the spiritual princes and their counselors who carried on this attack against Protestantism had been born Protestants and were apostates. The first in Germany to undertake a Counter-reformation by violence was the Abbot of Fulda. In this institution, founded by St. Boniface, evangelical doctrines had prevailed for more than a generation. Abbot Philip himself had expressly admitted them in 1542. But about 1567 a new abbot came in—Balthasar of Dernbach, who, although brought up a Protestant, was an eager believer in the reforms proposed by the Council of Trent. On entering upon his office, he had pledged himself to maintain the old privileges;

but his purpose was so to interpret the Peace of Augsburg that it should enable him, in spite of all claims of private persons or corporations, to bring his land back to Catholicism and expel all recalcitrants (1573). Consequently, though he had sworn not to admit any new religious orders without the consent of the estates, he violated his solemn obligations and summoned the Jesuits to his aid; they were henceforth to be his religious and secular officials. Protestant preachers were driven out, and Protestant civil officers dismissed. Neither the remonstrances of the estates nor the warnings and threats of neighboring Protestant rulers availed to check his course. In a few years, the entire administration of the land was in Catholic hands.

The success of the Abbot of Fulda could not fail to encourage more powerful princes to attempt similar changes. Eichsfeld was at this time a possession of the Elector and Archbishop of Mayence; it had become Protestant to such a degree that only a small number of Catholic families were left in the district. But, within one year from Balthasar's crusade, Elector Daniel Brendel—likewise under the guidance of the Jesuits—resorted to harsh measures. A renegade Protestant, Leopold von Stralendorf, was made chief magistrate of Eichsfeld, and set to work with all the zeal of an apostate. In vain did the knights of the district carry their complaints to the elector and even to the imperial diet; in vain did the Protestant states petition this latter body on behalf of their co-religionists. Maximilian II. and his successor, Rudolf II., sided altogether with the elector and his tool, and Stralendorf felt encouraged to proceed with increasing violence. Protestant clergymen were forcibly expelled and replaced by Jesuits. But, at heart and in their private worship, the large majority of the inhabitants of Eichsfeld remained evangelical until the Thirty Years' War.

The Jesuits extended their operations in all directions. They appeared in Paderborn, in Hildesheim, everywhere disturbing the peace between the adherents of the old faith and of the new, everywhere endeavoring to subdue the latter. In Biberach ten times as many citizens belonged to the new faith as to the old, yet the oligarchical Catholic magistrate excluded the former from all offices. In Swabian Gmünd, the Protestants were simply deprived of their right of citizenship.

The evangelical states were too busy with the Flacian and crypto-Calvinistic squabbles, as well as with the bitter struggle between Reformed and Lutherans, to have time to help their oppressed brethren. In Fulda, the chapter, the knights, and the burghers aided themselves; they drove out Abbot Balthasar and transferred the government to the Bishop of Würzburg, Julius, who for a while left Protestantism in peace.

The united duchies of Cleves-Mark and Jülich-Berg formed the predominant state in the circle of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia. Duke William had long tried to hold on religious questions a position similar to that which Charles V. and later Ferdinand I. had assumed: without formally forsaking the Roman Catholic church, he had allowed communion in both kinds, the marriage of priests, and liberty of preaching. He went further than the emperors, in that he had an evangelical court preacher and granted liberty of conscience to every one of his subjects. These concessions could have but one result: the larger part of the nobility, the cities, and the villages went over to Protestantism in fact, if not in name.

At the Augsburg diet of 1566 William of Cleves showed himself inclined to follow the majority of his subjects. But, early in the spring of 1567, the Duke of Alva appeared in the Netherlands, commissioned not only to put down heresy in the provinces, but also to maintain the neighboring states in the right faith, lest the poison of heresy should pass from them into Flanders. This moment was a critical one in the religious history of the Lower Rhine. Duke William feared lest Alva should seize his person as a promoter of heresy. He hastened, therefore, to place himself above suspicion by issuing an edict against Calvinists and all sects forbidden in the empire, and by banishing from his duchies all fugitives from the Netherlands.

Soon afterward there arrived at Cleves a Spanish envoy, who interfered in all the affairs of the duke and played the part of a guardian over him. For a long time, Duke William withstood the threats and commands of the Romish party, and held, with his family, rather to the evangelicals than to the Catholics. But at length, in weakness and sickness, he yielded (1570), and, together with his heir-presumptive, partook of the communion in the Catholic form. His younger son, John William, was brought up a Catholic.

For a while the subjects of the duke paid but little attention to his abjuration; many of his cities became entirely Protestant, and welcomed hundreds of the fugitives from the Netherlands. Even the duke's servants often opposed the old doctrines. But the duke himself did all in his power to restore Catholicism, and, by persistency and an occasional resort to violence, succeeded to a large extent.

The Counter-reformation made slow but steady progress in the duchies. As far as ducal patronage extended, Catholic pastors replaced Protestant, and among civil officers also changes were made as fast and as far as possible. In the smaller towns, the citizens who would not listen to Catholic pastors had to leave with their families. By 1576,

the duke had been so far successful that, except in the larger cities, the public exercise of the evangelical worship had ceased in most of his territories. This was a great victory for Rome, scarcely less than the recovery of Bavaria had been: two great secular states had been saved to her.

But more was yet to come. The most extensive and populous bishopric of Northwestern Germany—Münster—was wholly under the influence of the Duke of Cleves. Till the year 1566, therefore, the bishops, although personally they had remained true to the Catholic confession, had shown themselves favorable to reforms and had allowed liberty of conscience to their subjects. As a consequence, many districts of the see had become almost entirely Protestant, and the new worship had been introduced into hundreds of churches. The bishop, Bernard von Raesfeld, was so completely at variance with the Jesuit, Peter Canisius, sent by the pope to urge the spiritual princes of North Germany to enforce the decrees of the Council of Trent, that he resigned his dignity in 1566.

The revolution accomplished by John William of Cleves proved now of immense importance. As Bernard's successor, the Bishop of Osnabrück, John von Hoya, who belonged to the strictest Romish party, was chosen. Thenceforth all higher church dignitaries and civil officials of the bishopric were chosen from the most zealous Romanists, the chapter were subjected to closer discipline, and the clergy were forced to subscribe to the Trent confession of faith. Evangelical pastors and teachers, who had held their situations undisturbed for years, had to leave them and the country. The Counter-reformation was not yet an accomplished fact in Münster, but in 1574, when Bishop John died, it had made great progress. A struggle of several years over the election of his successor interrupted the work.

This same John von Hoya had in 1568 become administrator of the bishopric of Paderborn, where, according to his own words, he found the majority of the people inclined to Lutheranism. Nearly all the nobles were avowed Protestants and had evangelical pastors on their estates. From the Protestants were recruited the members of the chapter, many of whom enjoyed the communion in both forms; a few of them had even taken service with William of Orange against the Catholic king. In the city of Paderborn itself the churches were empty; even on great festivals only a dozen communicants appeared in them, whilst the citizens went miles to attend Protestant service in the county of Lippe.

During his episcopate of six years, John could not bring about any sweeping change. But after his death the papal nuncio, Gropger, suc-

ceeded in securing the election of Archbishop Salentin of Cologne, a strict Catholic. The new prelate founded the Salentine gymnasium, which proved of the greatest efficiency in maintaining and restoring the Catholic faith in Paderborn.

It will ever be a melancholy proof of the lack of political insight, and of the religious and secular bigotry of the Protestant princes of the time, that they allowed all these things to be done without an effort to prevent them. Yet at this time they were the more powerful party in the empire, and it would only have taken a united and vigorous pressure on the emperor to save their oppressed brethren in the ecclesiastical electorates. Moreover, they had the law clearly on their side, since Ferdinand's declaration at the Augsburg Peace had expressly granted religious liberty to the subjects of spiritual lords.

At length, when Maximilian's illness became alarming and his son Rudolf, a bigot brought up in Spain, was proposed as his successor, the Protestant rulers shook off their apathy. They demanded that the new emperor pledge himself not only to observe the Augsburg Peace, but also the declaration that accompanied it. This was a matter of the greatest importance, as heretofore the Catholics had strenuously denied the binding power of a declaration that the diet had not sanctioned. The three ecclesiastical electors decidedly objected to the introduction of the words "and its declaration" in the formula of election. But, as the Protestants constituted a majority of the electoral college, they could, had they acted unitedly, have carried their purpose through. But they could not remain united. They again split into two opposite factions, the Lutherans under the leadership of Augustus of Saxony, the Calvinists under that of Frederick III. of the Palatinate. These two princes were already bitterly hostile to each other on family grounds. As Frederick assumed the part of defender of religious liberty, Augustus was easily persuaded by the emperor to give up the insertion of the "declaration." Thus it was the Protestants themselves who opened wide the door for the extension of the reactionary work in the ecclesiastical electorates.

At the diet of Ratisbon, in 1576, convoked to obtain aid in money and troops to resist a threatened attack of the Turks, the emperor showed himself willing enough to secure the assistance of the Protestants by granting them the much-desired freedom of religious option for the inhabitants of ecclesiastical estates. But the Catholic princes threatened the emperor that, if he made this concession to the Protestants, they would grant no supplies for the Turkish war. They found auxiliaries where one would least expect it: among the knights, who

PLATE III.



The Great Seal of Emperor Maximilian II.

Dated 1567. Actual size. From an impression in Berlin.

History of All Nations, Vol. XII., page 55.

heretofore had been the most zealous supporters of the Reformation, but by this time had discovered that Protestantism had contributed chiefly to strengthen the princes at the cost of the nobles. Freedom of option, they thought, would before long transfer to the Reformation—that is, to the temporal princes—lands which, with their bishoprics, abbacies, and prebends, had furnished fat livings for the younger sons of noble families. This selfish consideration sufficed to make even the Protestant nobility oppose the granting of religious freedom to ecclesiastical principalities.

Once again had the position of the Protestants been seriously impaired by their lack of unity and their selfishness. Augustus of Saxony, to plague the hated Calvinists and especially the Elector Palatine, declared himself ready to grant the subsidies unconditionally. His adherents followed him. The other Protestants could then offer no resistance.

The emperor got what he had asked for. But it was his last success ; on October 11, 1576, this prince, who had always been feeble in health, died in the faith of the Catholic church. He had never succeeded in winning either respect or obedience, either love or loyalty. Catholics and Protestants alike held him in suspicion. He was despised as a timid and cowardly man. Not one of the high hopes with which he had ascended the throne was fulfilled. The distinction between the policy of the German Hapsburgs and that of the Spanish line which his father had inaugurated, and which he himself had meant to make more complete, had been done away by his own fault in the latter part of his reign, and the imperial line had been chained to the Spanish. The Turks, whom he had expected to drive wholly out of Hungary, were still there, and as powerful and threatening as ever. The pope, whom he had vigorously opposed, had greater influence on the German diet than the emperor himself. He had hoped to unite all Germany and lead her on to moderate reforms ; the religious parties were more bitterly hostile to each other than ever before, and their deadly hatred seemed to foredoom the empire to ruin. This gifted monarch lacked resolution, firmness of character, and persistency of will : qualities far more valuable to a ruler than culture, an esthetic temperament, and brilliancy of wit.

Yet it would be unjust to attribute to Maximilian's (PLATE III.) fault alone, or even mainly, the disappointment of the bright hopes and high expectations which were entertained when he assumed the crown, but were entirely dissipated at his death. After the abdication of Charles V., people had hoped that Germany—rich, warlike, and aspiring—would, under a national and patriotic head, come together in religious and political unity. Everything seemed to favor this hope. Internally it seemed as if Protestantism must soon secure a complete victory. A mild, liberal

emperor, personally convinced of the justice of the cause of the Reformation, would surely have put no obstacle in its way. Externally Germany had no rival to fear; France was crippled by her civil wars, Spain by the exhaustive struggle in the Netherlands. The empire might have become supreme on the continent. Circumstances were more favorable for this at that time than for centuries before or since.

But the nation failed to avail itself of its great opportunity. Two causes are mainly answerable for this: first, the lack of practical political insight, which has so often made the Germans neglect what was of immediate and supreme importance to waste their immense resources on side issues; secondly, the checking of the reform movement and the preponderance of narrow, bigoted, selfish elements within the ranks of the Protestants themselves. They were divided, on the communion question, into Lutherans, Philippists or Melancthonians, Flacians, and Calvinists. They were divided also into the party of princes and the party of nobles. All these parties and factions hated and fought one another most bitterly. Rather than fight for the fatherland, they went and shed their blood for strangers; in all foreign wars, German blood flowed abundantly: the same valor and outlay on behalf of Germany would have made her the ruling power of Europe. A Venetian ambassador wrote sneeringly: "The Spaniard protects and defends his possessions in large measure by the help of the Germans, though the two races are by nature hostile to each other; but the Germans have no enmity for Spanish gold."

Clearly apprehending its aim, with resolution equal to its skill, the Counter-reformation, under the supreme control of Rome and the guidance of the Jesuits, step by step forced back the enemy who already thought himself master of the empire. The Protestants recognized their peril; but disunion, irresolution, selfish interests, and an aversion to an appeal to the sword prevented their meeting it boldly and crushing it, as they might easily have done, on its first appearance. Then the sense of their defeat awakened in them feelings of bitterness which the Catholics were not slow to reciprocate.

It was not the reign of Rudolf II. that was decisive of Germany's doom, but that of Maximilian II.; the Thirty Years' War may be said to date from it. Later circumstances hastened and intensified the development of this struggle, but it had already become unavoidable during the years from 1564 to 1576.

CHAPTER II.

EMPEROR RUDOLF II.

(A. D. 1576-1612.)

RUDOLF was twenty-four years old when he entered upon the government of Austria and of the empire. He was of small stature, but well formed and active. His pale countenance, large eyes, finely formed nose, and curly beard and hair gave him a noble and striking aspect. Yet this prince, of whom good judges said that, whenever he chose to take the trouble, he showed a better understanding of affairs than all his ministers, was so shy and so averse to publicity and to practical activity that his really excellent gifts suffered thereby. He was sparing in his speech, and cold in his manners to such a degree as to make anyone dissatisfied who had dealings with him. His education, received first from a bigoted mother, then from Spanish Jesuits, had inclined him to a strict and intolerant Catholicism; but he deemed it too arduous to take an active part against the Protestants, and left to his ministers any systematic and persistent opposition to them. Yet he was ever complaining that not one of the ministers was to be trusted, that each wore a Spanish diploma under his doublet; still, he did nothing to secure respect and obedience for himself and his interests. He treated them all with offensive arrogance, yet was entirely dependent upon them. They, on their side, judged of everything by their personal advantage; if any course seemed not to promote this, they simply let it alone. Rudolf's best and ablest minister was Wolfgang von Rumpf—an agent of Spain, it is true, but an able and moderate man, brought up at the court of Maximilian II.

Rudolf II. cared even less for the empire than for his hereditary lands; he was really anti-German. He made his residence not in Vienna, as his predecessors had done, but in the Hradschin, the castle of Prague, and never left it willingly. There, instead of attending to government duties, he busied himself in scientific pursuits.

This was an epoch when the rulers of the west stood at the head of literary and scientific culture: Catharine de' Medici, Elizabeth of England, Maximilian II., Cosmo of Tuscany, and numerous chiefs of the European aristocracy. Religious fanaticism had not succeeded in



FIG. 6.—Emperor Rudolf II. Reduced facsimile of the engraving (1603 by Aegidius Sadeler (1575–1629): after the painting by Jean of Aix-la-Chapelle (1552–1615).

throttling the intellectual aspirations which the Renaissance had awakened. Libraries were founded; and savants, poets, and artists found welcome and honor at the courts of princes. Rudolf II. (Fig. 6) was engrossed by these interests. He was an indefatigable collector of curiosities of all

kinds—pictures, antiques, costly weapons, wood and copper engravings, precious stones, and rare woods ; however empty his treasury, he always found money for these things. Besides this passion for collecting, he was possessed with a great zeal for astronomy and chemistry, or rather, according to the fashion of the time, for astrology and alchemy. He thought he had almost discovered the philosopher's stone by which base metals can be turned into gold. The first astronomers of the day were found at his court : Tycho Brahe, who, neglected by his government, had left his native land for Germany ; and John Kepler, Tycho's pupil and successor, much greater than his master. But, to retain the emperor's favor, these savants had to carry on side by side with their astronomical studies the pursuit of astrology, in which, indeed, Tycho Brahe had complete faith.

Rudolf had a lofty idea of his rights as emperor, and was jealous of his powerful Spanish cousin, thinking that the leading part played by the latter in Catholic Christendom rather belonged to himself, since Philip's Italian and Netherlandish possessions were dependencies of the empire. But he did not do anything to make good his claim ; in Austria, Bohemia, and Hungary, he could not check the progress of Protestantism ; in the empire, the Counter-reformation kept on its way independently of him. At the beginning of his reign, he figured as a zealous Catholic : so much so that the Austrians, much excited, attacked and dispersed a Corpus-Christi procession in which he participated, and came near inflicting personal injury on his majesty. Naturally this bitterly offended a man so conscious of his dignity. He collected troops, drove out of the land all foreign preachers, and sought to bring the cities east of the Enns back to Catholicism. In this he was partially successful ; but the towns west of the Enns and all the nobility resolutely resisted his attempts. The emperor at length lost his interest in the matter, and Protestantism regained in large measure what it had lost, even in Lower Austria.

After the year 1588, Rudolf's activity ceased almost entirely, though there was a partial revival of it in 1594, when the peasantry of Austria rose up against the oppressions of their lords and the depredations of the unpaid imperial soldiery, and for three years baffled all efforts to reduce them by force. Rudolf's uncles, who ruled over Styria and the Tyrol, carried on the campaign against the Reformation more vigorously and persistently than their nephew.

When in 1564 Archduke Ferdinand, Maximilian's younger brother, assumed the government of the Tyrol, the condition of that country was much the same as that of most Catholic territories : the church had become

corrupt, the clergy were immoral, and the people, rude and ignorant beyond expression, had lost all respect for the old religion. This state of things had favored the spread of Lutheranism and of some other and more radical sects, the Anabaptists especially. Ferdinand put himself resolutely and with a clear and definite purpose at the head of the Counter-reformation, to carry out which the church authorities lacked both understanding and power. He met with complete success. He completely restored unity of faith and revived and strengthened religious zeal in the church. A thorough soldier, he began, with the aid of Spanish subsidies, to raise forces in preparation for the great conflict against German heretics. At Ferdinand's death, the Tyrol, now thoroughly and genuinely Catholic, reverted to Emperor Rudolf II. (1594).

What took place in Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola was still more important. Archduke Charles, the youngest son of Emperor Ferdinand I., had, on his accession, found his estates in the same condition as his brother had found the Tyrol. In fact, Lutheranism was even more firmly settled in them, because lords and cities had taken pains to have the youth of the land thoroughly grounded and instructed in Protestant doctrines. To meet them on their own ground, Charles invited (1573) the Jesuits into his land, and established and endowed schools and colleges for them. They worked so well that in Gratz alone the number of Catholic communicants increased in a single year from twenty to five hundred. This displeased the estates, and they refused to assist the archduke in his straitened financial situation unless he dismissed the disciples of Loyola. Charles, subject to incessant attacks from the Turks, had to make concessions. To save the Jesuits, from whom he expected great assistance in improving church discipline and the education of the young, he conceded in 1578 to the nobles and to his four largest cities—Gratz, Judenburg, Klagenfurt, and Laibach—complete freedom of worship in the evangelical way, and personal freedom of conscience to all his subjects indiscriminately. But the "preachers" must cease pouring insults upon Catholicism. From this moment, Protestantism again made gains. Nearly all the nobles and the higher officials and dignitaries belonged to it. In Gratz, the capital, things came to such a pass that the right of citizenship was granted only to evangelicals, and attendance at Catholic churches was made a penal offense.

These occurrences in Charles's territory made a painful impression on his relatives, especially his Bavarian brother-in-law William, as well as upon Pope Gregory XIII. The latter took the right way to remedy the evil. Want of money had driven Charles to submit to his subjects; therefore the pontiff offered the archduke large sums of money with

which to carry on the work of Catholic propagandism, as far as the Peace of Nuremberg allowed him. After 1580, and more especially after 1584, Charles labored in that direction. He separated the clergy in the diet from the nobility and the towns, he excluded Protestants from the work of education, he drove out evangelical pastors and replaced them by Catholics, and founded a university in Gratz which he entrusted to the Jesuits. Yet at first Charles met with indifferent success. The Protestants opposed his ordinances by all means in their power, by passive resistance, sometimes even by force; and the greater part of the population remained true to Lutheranism.

Such was the state of affairs when, in 1590, the archduke died. His son Ferdinand, who was born in 1578 and who was afterward to acquire such unhappy renown as Emperor Ferdinand II., being too young to assume the government, his cousin Ernest, Emperor Rudolf's brother, was made regent during his minority. Under Ernest's mild rule Protestantism made new progress; but when in 1595 Ferdinand, then seventeen years old, took the reins into his own hands, a change took place. His mother Mary, a Bavarian princess, had inspired him with a fervent zeal for Catholicism and with an ardent and reckless hate for all heretics. After his father's death, he had, in company with his Bavarian cousin, Maximilian, attended the university of Ingolstadt, and there had become a devotee, not of learning indeed, but of Jesuitism. The fathers persuaded him that his temporal interests demanded the suppression of Protestantism in all his lands, since princely absolutism prevailed in all purely Catholic countries, whilst his cousin, Emperor Rudolf, was having constant and serious difficulties with his evangelical subjects.

The young archduke proceeded with a skill and subtlety which proved him a worthy disciple of his masters. He succeeded in securing the homage and oath of allegiance of the Austrian estates, without confirming the concessions made by his father in 1578. Ferdinand then made a pilgrimage to Rome, to secure the blessing of the pope on the great work he had undertaken. On his way, he vowed to the Madonna of Loretto that he would cleanse his dominions of heresy, even if it cost him his life. He acknowledged the Virgin as his "generalissima." From this we can judge what a mystic and fanatic he was. On his return, he continued his work without delay or hesitancy. Taking advantage of certain disputes between Catholic and evangelical preachers, he declared that all rights conceded by his father to the Protestants were rescinded, and in the autumn of 1598 ordered all their teachers and ministers to leave his provinces within eight days under penalty of death.

Neither entreaties nor remonstrances from the estates could make him

recall this cruel command. Commissioners, accompanied by armed men, visited every city and village; Protestant churches and schoolhouses were razed to the ground, and the inhabitants driven by force to attend Catholic worship. Woe to him who resisted! The gallows erected in every parish was no empty threat. Forty thousand Bibles were burned. Whoever would not turn Catholic had to leave the country. At length the commissioners came to Gratz, where of late scarcely anyone had attended the Catholic church. That the Protestants of Styria and Carinthia, far superior to their prince in power and in wealth, submitted to such treatment without resistance, does no credit to their courage and to their fidelity to their convictions. The most faithful chose to leave the country, abandoning the tenth part of their property to the prince. By these fines and by numerous confiscations Ferdinand grew rich. The prophecies of the Jesuits were fulfilled to the letter: the political power of the estates was broken by religious persecution; ever afterward they were devoted servants of the archduke, who had won a complete victory. He showed himself duly grateful to the fathers, enriching them out of his own treasury and also with numerous monasteries and estates taken from other religious bodies.

Whilst the Counter-reformation was going on with increasing momentum and effect, the large majority of the Protestants in the empire—the Lutherans—were busy not only in combating Calvinism politically, but also in giving their own religious views a more fixed, narrow, and intolerant shape. They were determined to extirpate the last remnants of Melancthon's milder, more conciliatory, and rational doctrines. For this end, their theologians sought to make the Smalcaldic Articles, which Luther had prepared in 1537, the only and invariable interpretation of the Augsburg Confession. On the basis of these articles, Jacob Andreaë, chancellor of the university of Tübingen, composed the "Swabian Concord," intended to serve as a foundation for the dogmatic unity of all Lutherans. But it found little acceptance outside of Württemberg, Lower Saxony, and Brunswick. The university of Helmstedt was founded in 1575 to promote it.

Elector Augustus, who had put so harsh an end to crypto-Calvinism, was determined not to stop half-way, and summoned Andreaë to his side to carry on the work of unification. In May, 1576, Andreaë and Martin Chemnitz met at Torgau, together with several prominent theologians of Saxony and Brandenburg, and brought out the "Torgau Book," which distinctly condemns every other authority than that of Luther, and declares Protestantism and Lutheranism to be identical. It found ready acceptance among most of the theologians and rulers of North

Germany. Pomerania, Magdeburg, Bremen, Holstein, Anhalt, Hesse, and the Palatinate alone objected. Encouraged by their success, the authors of the "Torgau Book," in conferences held at Bergen, near Magdeburg (spring of 1577), gave it a still more definite and rigid form in the "Bergen Book." The doctrine of the Lord's Supper especially was explained more definitely than before, in the transubstantiation sense, and it was expressly taught that man, in consequence of Adam's fall, has lost the divine image, is spiritually blind, disabled, dead, and even hostile to God, and can contribute nothing toward his conversion, which is the work of the Holy Spirit alone, through the means of grace.

Thus modified, the "Form of Concord" was accepted in electoral Saxony, electoral Brandenburg, Lower Saxony (with the exception of Bremen), Ansbach, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, Würtemberg, and numerous districts of Upper Germany. By its acceptance, these states broke not only with Holstein, Pomerania, Hesse, the Palatinate, and others of their German brethren, but also from all Protestants outside of Germany. The union of Protestants was definitely and hopelessly broken, just as Rome was preparing its most deadly assault on Protestantism.

Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel, Prince Joachim Ernest of Anhalt, and the imperial city of Nuremberg formed a league (1579) for the maintenance of the old Protestant Melancthonian confession against the Neo-Lutherans. This did not prevent the adherents of the "Torgau Book" from publishing it in a more popular form (1580) under the name of "Concordia," which was accepted as the confession of faith of the new Lutheran church. So the evangelicals of Germany were arrayed in three camps: the Calvinists or Reformed, the Lutherans, and, midway between these two, the Old Protestants or "Philippists," who followed Melancthon. They assailed one another so bitterly in pamphlets, books, and satires that they came to hate one another more than they hated the common foe, and all co-operation on their part became impossible. The Catholics naturally rejoiced at the divisions among their opponents, and felt encouraged to proceed against them by force. The conduct of the Protestants was the more imprudent in that it brought more and more into question the ambiguous and vague declarations of the Augsburg Peace.

The Ecclesiastical Reservation had expressly declared that an ecclesiastical prince who went over to Protestantism should forfeit his dignity. But what if the chapter, that was not hampered by such restrictions, should become mainly or wholly Protestant and should choose a Protestant bishop? There were several such already, and they claimed a seat and a vote in the diet as legitimate princes of the empire. The case of the see of Magde-

burg was especially important, for its "administrator," Joachim Frederick, was a Protestant prince of the house of Brandenburg.

A second point of dispute was the case of the imperial city of Aix-la-Chapelle. Ostensibly every imperial town had a right to accept the Reformation; but the cities of Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle, lying so near the Netherlands, had once pledged themselves to Ferdinand I. to remain Catholic. Now numerous fugitives from Flanders, escaping from Alva's persecutions, had settled in Aix-la-Chapelle and had won the majority of the municipal council over to their views. The city no longer looked upon itself as bound by its promise to Ferdinand, and put an end to the bishop's jurisdiction. Thereupon the Catholics of the town, of whom there were a considerable number, complained to the emperor. He sent a commissioner, Philip of Nassau, who imperiously and with harsh threats ordered the restoration of the former order of things. The evangelicals drove him out of the city, and many Catholics chose to accompany him. There is no doubt that the Protestants, who at first had the right on their side, had by these violent deeds put themselves in the wrong.

Both cases were discussed at the diet which Rudolf, only partially recovered from a severe sickness, convoked at Augsburg in 1582. He wished only for aid against the Turks, but naturally everyone brought forward his own grievances. The Catholics denied the right of Joachim Frederick of Magdeburg and Protestant bishops generally to sit in the diet, on the ground that they had not been constitutionally confirmed by the pope. Had the Protestants stood their ground, they would undoubtedly have won, for the emperor could not do without their financial aid. But once more they proved disunited and weak; and the Elector of Saxony, according to his wont, again allowed himself, for the sake of selfish advantages, to enter into a compromise with the Catholics and the emperor. The Protestant bishops did not indeed renounce their claims, but were prevented from enforcing them. This was a severe defeat for the evangelicals, who lost thereby all prospect of securing a majority in the college of princes. The result in the Aix-la-Chapelle case was equally unfavorable to them. When, in defiance of the emperor's command, a representative of the evangelical city council of Aix-la-Chapelle took part in the sittings of the college of cities at the diet, the college was not asked to give its consent to the grant of money for the Turkish war; it was absolutely ignored.

Thus the Catholics had brought it about that, whilst the electoral college was evenly divided between the three Protestant and the three Catholic votes, the majority in the college of princes was assured to them by the exclusion of the Protestant ecclesiastical princes, and the

college of cities, which was overwhelmingly evangelical, was not consulted at all. They had thus a majority in the diet at large. But their victory was not yet beyond question.

The Swabian Baron Gebhard Truchsess von Waldburg had in 1577 succeeded Elector Salentin in the archiepiscopal see of Cologne. He had shown himself a firm friend of Rome, and, at the Augsburg diet, had voted solidly with the Catholics. Already notorious for his licentious conduct, he had contracted an intimacy with the fair Agnes, Countess of Mansfeld, whose brothers, apprised of it, forced him to promise to marry her. As a Catholic, he could not redeem his pledge; so in November, 1582, he went over to Protestantism, and three months later married Agnes. The laity of his see, the nobles particularly, were in favor of the change; but the majority of the chapter and the city council of Cologne opposed it. Pope Gregory XIII. also, who recognized the great importance to the church of the archbishopric and electorate, hastened to the assistance of the orthodox by summarily deposing Gebhard. The chapter chose, as his successor, a Bavarian prince, Ernest, who had already, as Bishop of Freising, given proofs of his zeal for the Counter-reformation. This was a case of the greatest importance, as it would settle the question of the majority in the electoral college and in the diet, and also that of the validity of the Ecclesiastical Reservation. Even the Hapsburgs' hold on the empire would have been loosened if by acquiring the electorate of Cologne the Protestants had obtained a majority of the electoral votes. "Four Lutheran electors," writes Duke William of Bavaria to Archduke Ferdinand, "would decide affirmatively the option question, depose Austria, and before long give us a Lutheran or Calvinist emperor, under whom the Catholics would have a warm time."

Everything depended upon the material forces of the two parties. It proved of decisive weight in the balance that Gebhard, in order to secure the aid of the Protestants of the Netherlands, adopted the Reformed (Calvinistic) faith. This furnished to the Lutheran electors the desired pretext for doing nothing to aid him, whilst William of Orange, hard pressed by the victorious Alessandro Farnese, could give Gebhard no succor. The only friend that hastened to his aid was the adventurous Count Palatine, John Casimir. But he cared more for plunder and booty than for religion, and brought more disgrace than advantage to the cause for which he fought.

Far otherwise was it on the Catholic side. With the sanction and aid of the pope and under the leadership of William of Bavaria, there was gathered a formidable army. The threat of Rudolf, that he would put under the ban all who took up Gebhard's quarrel, made it easier to

raise orthodox soldiers. The troops of the Count Palatine and of Gebhard refused to fight, and deserted in large numbers. The Spaniards marched from the Netherlands into the territory of Cologne, and Stephen Báthori of Poland sided with Ernest of Bavaria, at least diplomatically. Gebhard had to succumb, and flee with his wife first to the Netherlands, then to Strasburg, where he was dean of the cathedral, and where he died in the year 1601.

Catholicism triumphed in his electorate. All evangelical canons were deprived of their charge, evangelical preachers were expelled, and evangelical laymen obliged to attend Catholic worship. Colleges and churches were founded for the Jesuits, and the whole electorate, which had been so nearly won for Protestantism, was reconquered for the old faith.

Gebhard Truchsess' predecessor, Elector Salentin, had, as we have seen, been Bishop of Paderborn. He resigned in 1577, and was succeeded by John of Saxe-Lauenburg, Archbishop of Bremen, an opponent of the Spanish policy and of intolerance. He allowed his subjects complete liberty of conscience, and Protestantism spread rapidly, notwithstanding the antagonism of the cathedral chapter. The city of Paderborn was so exclusively evangelical that in 1580, when Jesuits came thither, they found scarcely a dozen believers and dared not appear in the streets in the garb of the order. The same state of things existed in Osnabrück, where John of Saxony was likewise bishop. But in 1585, just as the victory of the Catholic reaction in Cologne was being decided, he died from the effects of a fall from his horse, and both his bishoprics fell a prey to the zealots.

The new Bishop of Osnabrück, Bernard of Waldeck, a former Protestant, had to subscribe to the Trent Confession. In Paderborn, Theodore of Fürstenberg advanced the cause of the Counter-reformation with equal zeal and perseverance. He surrendered the Gymnasium Salentinianum to the Jesuits, and cast into prison all the priests of his diocese who administered the communion in both kinds. Thereupon his nobles and the city of Paderborn renounced their allegiance, and it came to an open war between prince and subjects. The latter had to yield finally; Paderborn was carried by assault in 1604, forced to renew its allegiance, and deprived of its rights and liberties. Protestantism was extirpated, and the city and its territory became the home of intolerant Catholicism. So in Münster, where most of the inhabitants inclined to Protestantism. In 1585 Ernest of Cologne, the conqueror of Truchsess, became its bishop. At his election he pledged himself to suffer no sects, no heresies in his diocese, and he was as good as his word. In a few decades the whole district had been won back to Catholicism.

It was not violence alone that lost so many hundreds of thousands to Protestantism, but also the strengthening of the old church by the Council of Trent, the restoration of piety and purity among the clergy, and the firm and confident deportment of the Catholics, which stood in so striking a contrast to the miserable quarrels and weakness of the Protestant princes and theologians. We must not pass over the devoted, if shrewd and subtle, activity of the Jesuits, their superior educational methods, and their eloquent preaching; they contributed largely to the restoration and reformation of Catholicism. Their schools, which from the mouth of the Rhine to the mouth of the Vistula formed a long line encircling heretical lands, and whose excellence the Protestants had to acknowledge even when deploring it, turned multitudes of young people into zealous Romanists.

The issue of the Cologne war had its influence on the great territory of Cleves-Jülich. Duke William had succeeded in restricting the Protestants more and more, and, by a skilful use of favors and patronage, in alienating most of the nobility from the Reformation. After his death, his son John William soon proved himself incapable of discharging the duties of a sovereign, in consequence of permanent insanity (1595). The Catholic party then got control of the government by arresting and imprisoning, on a charge of adultery, Duchess Jacoba, who had exercised great influence on her unfortunate husband. Two years later, she was put to death. The emperor sanctioned this *coup d'état*. The systematic expulsion of evangelical ministers followed as a matter of course.

In South Germany, affairs took the same direction. When at Strasburg, in 1592, Bishop John of Mandersheid died, the evangelical members of the chapter elected as his successor John George, a Brandenburg prince; and the Catholics, on their side, Cardinal Charles of Lorraine. Here again, as at Cologne, the Catholic influence finally prevailed, and in 1604, for a definite compensation, John George was obliged to yield the bishopric to the cardinal. Thenceforth the see of Strasburg was zealously Catholic, though the city itself remained liberal and exerted its influence to bring the country to the same views.

A still more important case was that of the great and rich bishopric of Würzburg, where scarcely one-third of the inhabitants were loyal to the old faith. It had been governed, since 1573, by Julius Echter of Mespelbrunn. He never was, as has been claimed, personally inclined to Protestantism, but remained a zealous Catholic. Ambition, however, had led him to enter into an alliance with some of the evangelical states, and he had aided the Protestants of Fulda in expelling their enemy, the Abbot Balthasar. A few months after his lieutenants had undertaken

the administration of the abbey, it was sequestered by the emperor, and his representative, the Grand-master Henry of Bubenhausen, in spite of all remonstrances, proceeded to carry through by force the very measures in which the abbot had come to grief. Finally the latter was reinstated, and nobles, citizens, Bishop Julius himself, had to pay to him large sums of money for damages.

After the issue of the Cologne war, it became still clearer to Julius, who had sided against Gebhard, that he should lose his see if he continued to occupy an ambiguous position in politics. He had become an object of suspicion to the Catholics; he sought to regain their confidence and favor by redoubled activity. He unhesitatingly violated Ferdinand's declaration, which had induced the Protestants to accept the Ecclesiastical Reservation, viz., that the subjects of an ecclesiastical prince should have liberty of conscience. Not only were all evangelical preachers and officials dismissed, all evangelical churches and schoolhouses closed, but not even private adherence to Protestantism was suffered; whoever did not habitually attend mass must leave his house and the bishop's territory. Many recalcitrants were thrown into prison. Thousands of families went into exile rather than deny their faith. About that the prince cared little, for he was in the meantime receiving commendatory letters from the emperor and lucrative privileges from the pope.

In a single year, 1586, fourteen cities and boroughs, and over two hundred villages, with a population of 62,000 souls, were won back to Catholicism. The capital itself, with half of its inhabitants evangelical, had to yield to the bishop's commands. As a memorial of his victory, he erected three hundred new churches, all characterized by tall and pointed spires that rose like triumphal columns. The university, which Julius had restored in 1582, was entrusted to the direction of the Jesuits and became the headquarters of the Counter-reformation in Franconian lands. He was imitated by his neighbor, Neithard of Thüngen, Bishop of Bamberg, whose territories were nearly all Protestant. Neithard, assured of the support of the Catholics in Germany, acted with great vigor. He repeatedly, after 1595, issued decrees enjoining the communion in the Catholic form or expatriation. The fact that the richest of his subjects went into exile, and that powerful nobles sometimes offered armed resistance to his commands, did not stay his course, and ultimately his will prevailed.

In Aix-la-Chapelle, the evangelicals were unable to hold their own. On the complaint of the Catholic inhabitants who had been driven into exile, the emperor put the city under the ban, and an imperial army, strengthened by Spanish troops, forced its way into the city. The

Protestant city council, all the Protestant preachers, and one hundred and twenty citizens were expelled and their property confiscated. A Catholic city government was established and Catholic worship restored. From a stronghold of the new doctrines the city became a bulwark of the old (1598).

Great were the rejoicings among the Catholics at the success of the Counter-reformation. A majority of the seceders had already been regained; the rest were sure to follow, they thought. A papal bull, issued in the year 1597, forbade all marriages between Catholics and Protestants, and by vexatious limitations rendered the residence of Italian merchants in evangelical lands impossible. Rome was doing its best to intensify antagonisms in Germany.

For the losses the Protestants had suffered, Saxony was mainly responsible. Her bitter antagonism of Calvinism and her absolute submission to the emperor's will had brought them about. An attempt was made to modify her course, but in vain.

In February, 1586, Elector Augustus I. had died. He had been an able and wise administrator of his own states; had added Meissen, part of the county of Mansfeld, Voigtland, and Osterland to his patrimony, and in 1572 had given his subjects an excellent code and constitution. As a consequence, the prosperity of Saxony had grown and its population had increased to nearly three millions. But his religious and his foreign policy had been exceedingly mischievous. In his later years he had become the most zealous champion of the Hapsburg interests, and was called "*Protector domus Austriae*;" Rudolf addressed him as his "*father*," and subscribed himself his "*devoted son*."

His son and successor, Christian I., on the contrary, gave his entire confidence to his chancellor, Nicholas Crell, a man of penetration and sagacity, who saw clearly the need of opposing the encroachments of a triumphant Catholic reaction, and of making a strong evangelical alliance. To this end, he wished to modify the stern Lutheranism of the Saxon church, and effect, if possible, an arrangement with the Calvinists. The obligation to subscribe to the Form of Concord of 1580 was removed, and the most bigoted adherents of the old regime kept, as far as possible, out of civil and religious offices. But Crell's work was far from complete when, in 1591, Elector Christian I. died, still a young man.

His son and successor, Christian II., was only eight years of age; and the regency fell into the hands of a relative, a strict Lutheran, Duke Frederick William of Saxe-Altenburg, son of John Frederick II., the patron of the notorious Grumbach. The regent was strongly opposed

to Crell's policy, and, readily yielding to the pressure of the Saxon nobles whom the chancellor's high-handed proceedings had greatly offended, arrested and imprisoned Crell for ten years. No sufficient ground could be found for Crell's execution, yet in 1601, on the most trivial charges, he died on the scaffold—a case of outrageous judicial murder. Saxony reverted to her former policy of strict and intolerant Lutheranism, of hostility to Calvinism, and alliance with Catholic reactionists.

In Switzerland also, religious quarrels were rife. The five central cantons—Schwyz, Uri, Unterwalden, Lucerne, and Zug—together with Solothurn and Fribourg, were Catholic; the “four cities”—Bern, Zürich, Basel, and Schaffhausen—with their territories, were Reformed. In Glarus and Appenzell, a turbulent Catholic minority opposed the Calvinistic majority, Glarus leaning toward the four cities, Appenzell toward the five cantons. In 1571, the evangelicals, hard pressed by their enemies, formed a defensive alliance. In 1575, a papal nuncio came to reside in Lucerne and assumed the leadership of the Catholic interests. It was the time when in Germany the Counter-reformation was making steady progress; when in France, the League, with the Guises at its head, was threatening not the Protestants alone, but royalty itself; when Spain was preparing for a desperate attack on heretical England; when the Duke of Savoy was plotting the seizure of Geneva. The nuncio organized, in October, 1586, among the Swiss Catholics an offensive alliance which was called the League of Borromeo, after a famous Italian cardinal recently deceased. Officially, it aimed only at the protection and preservation of the orthodox religion among the allies; but the members also pledged one another to aid all friends and co-religionists against the malevolent and arrogant “step-brothers,” meaning thereby the evangelical Swiss.

Thenceforth mutual fear and hatred reigned in the confederacy, so that the sittings of the Swiss diet, like those of the German, were largely spent in religious quarrels and recriminations. But the Swiss evangelicals were more determined than their German brethren. They raised an army of 2000 men, fell upon Mühlhausen, and reinstated its Protestant council. Zürich and Bern formed a close alliance with Strasburg (1588). As the Catholic cantons supported the League, so did the Protestant cantons aid Henry IV. With this king's triumph, their own importance increased, so that they stood on at least an equal footing with their antagonists.

During all these commotions, Rudolf II. lived in retirement, absorbed in his favorite studies and pastimes. About the Turkish war, which again

ravaged Hungary, he cared just enough to ask and obtain from the empire large grants of money, which he wasted as soon as received. At the other extremity of Germany, the dignity and security of the realm were no better maintained. Cologne had become a battlefield for Spaniards and Netherlanders, who, on the pretext of fighting on behalf of Truchsess or against him, plundered its territory and seized its fortresses. In the year 1598, a Spanish army from the Netherlands invaded Westphalia, took possession of it, and committed frightful excesses. The protests and remonstrances of the emperor were of no avail. The Westphalian troops raised to drive out the intruders dared not attack them, and soon, being unpaid, disbanded. What disgrace to Germany!

If Rudolf retained an interest in any one thing, it was in religious matters. He carried on the work of the Counter-reformation in his dominions slowly and with apparent apathy, but yet with a definite plan. He followed the drift which was carrying on the Catholic princes. He obeyed the behests of the papal court and made the imperial chamber an almost exclusively Catholic body; the second great imperial court, the Aulic council, it is unnecessary to say, was already such, its members being appointed by the emperor alone. The Protestants saw before them the prospect of having no legal standing against their opponents. Catholics already ventured to assert that the Augsburg Confession was inconsistent with right, and the Augsburg Peace was consequently invalid. At the diet of Ratisbon, 1603, disputes over these questions grew so hot that, had not Rudolf's brother, Matthias, interposed, this body would have separated without accomplishing anything.

German politics could not continue in this way without a crisis being reached, and the mental condition of the emperor rendered the prospect still more gloomy. The melancholy which he had inherited from his female ancestors—Isabella of Castile, Joanna, and his own mother—assumed, toward the end of the century, the form of insanity. His habit of seclusion, his studies protracted late into the night, and his excesses had contributed to this result. He knew, also, that he was hated by all his subjects: by the Hungarians because he never appeared among them and would have none of them about him; by the Bohemians, because he had violated their rights; by the Austrians, because he failed to give them adequate protection against the Turks; by the evangelicals and their friends everywhere, because of his hostility to Protestantism. The predictions of an astrologer (cf. Fig. 7) had led him to expect a violent death; to avoid this, he shut himself up in the castle at Prague, spending day after day in his well-guarded rooms, in his art galleries, or in his laboratories, where no one, except his few servants and assistants,

had access to him. He no longer ventured even to attend church. Subordinates and menials, like the notorious Philip Lang, were allowed full control till some new whim of the master hurled them from their position. From time to time, he realized that his condition made him unfit to reign, and the fear possessed him that his subjects plotted his down-




FIG. 7.—The mandrakes of Emperor Rudolf II. Vienna, Royal Library. "The larger of these two roots was supposed to be the male, the latter female: they were named respectively 'Marion' and 'Thrudacias.' Both had coats of red silk, and are said to have formerly lain in coffins. According to the legend, they had to be bathed at each new moon; and when this bath was forgotten, they wept and screamed like little children, until they received attention." (Guido List.)

fall or even his murder. Then a wild rage possessed him, and he struck madly at all that came in his way.

His brother Matthias and the Spanish government looked with great concern upon this state of affairs. They knew how many rivals the Hapsburg house had in Germany and in Europe, and what efforts would be made to wrest from it the imperial crown. They urged Rudolf to choose a successor, who should—this, however, they kept secret—even in his lifetime relieve him of the cares of government. But, with the penetration so common in madmen, the emperor saw through their design

and refused to fall in with it. His ministers, Rumpf and Trautson, fell into disgrace in consequence of it, and he refused to receive the Spanish envoys and made a show of going over to the French party.

What increased Rudolf's disinclination to withdraw from the direction of affairs was that just at this time his armies in Hungary were obtaining greater successes than had fallen to the share of a Hapsburg before. The greed and vacillations of Sigismund Báthori, Prince of Transylvania, had enabled the imperial general, Basta, to conquer that country on behalf of his master, in 1603. In Hungary proper, Rudolf was scarcely less fortunate. Proud of these victories, and without reflecting for a moment whether his resources were at all adequate for the undertaking, he determined to strike decisive blows at Protestantism and at the power of the nobles and cities in his hereditary lands. In 1602, he had already revived the old laws against heresy in Bohemia, but without attempting to enforce them. But the city of Troppau in Silesia was put under the ban because it had forcibly resisted the expulsion of its Protestant preachers and the closing of Protestant churches. In Moravia, all offices, whether high or low, were filled with Catholics, and the cities were forced to adopt the Catholic worship. In 1604, the emperor, in violation of the Hungarian constitution, issued on his sole authority an ordinance which made the Catholic religion the only lawful one in Hungary, and threatened with the severest penalties all departures from it. Imperial troops began to carry these intolerant edicts into execution and to repeat their favorite occupation of demolishing churches and driving families out of their homes.

But the Hungarian magnates were not ready to allow such an illegal subversion of their liberties and of their faith. All imperial Hungary was soon in rebellion, and a Transylvanian nobleman, Stephen Bocskay, led the rebels to victory over the unpaid and almost mutinous forces of Rudolf. The Turks joined the insurgents, and their wild hordes overran the German and Moravian frontiers, burning and plundering as they went. The emperor—inactive, unconcerned, more inaccessible than ever—remained in the Hradschin. When his brothers urged him to entrust the oldest of them, Matthias, with the management of Hungarian affairs, he threatened to marry so as to have an heir of his own body. Thereupon the grand dukes, seeing the whole power of the Hapsburgs threatened with ruin, met together in Vienna, and, on April 25, 1606, agreed to recognize Matthias as head of the family and as Rudolf's successor. They secured the support of Spain.

Matthias availed himself of the authority entrusted to him to conclude the Peace of Vienna with Bocskay (June, 1606). He acknowledged this

chieftain as Prince of Transylvania, and yielded to him all of Hungary on the left of the Theiss and some districts on the right of it. Rudolf's insane policy, therefore, had resulted in reducing the imperial possessions beyond the Leitha from 3300 German square miles to 1200, scarcely more than one-third. In what was left of imperial Hungary, political and religious matters were placed again on the old footing, as they had been before Rudolf began his violent and unstatesmanlike policy. Peace was also concluded with the Turks at Zsitwa-Torok.

Rudolf was still more incensed at the presumption of his brother than at the failure of all his own plans, and he positively refused to ratify any of Matthias's agreements. He prepared again for war, and this at a time when he was heavily in debt and had not money enough to defray his court expenses. To procure means to carry out his purpose, he decided to turn once more to the German nation and to convoke a diet at Ratisbon (1607).

But the moment was ill-chosen, for just at this time Henry IV. of France was making busy preparations to put an end to the Hapsburg supremacy and to unite the Protestants in a firmer league. His agent in this attempt was Prince Christian of Anhalt-Bernburg, an ardent Protestant and a man of experience and many accomplishments. Born in 1568, he had fought by Henry's side against the League and the Spaniards, and had traveled all over Europe as far as Constantinople; on his return to Germany, Elector Frederick IV. had appointed him governor of the Upper Palatinate. He was to try to secure two distinct ends for his master and Henry IV.: to introduce division among the Hapsburgs by opposing to Matthias, as candidate for the empire, Archduke Maximilian of the Tyrol, who was known to be an enemy of the Spanish policy, and to bring about a close union among the Protestant princes. Christian and Frederick were convinced that only such a union could put a permanent check on the progress of the Counter-reformation. Anhalt succeeded in finding adherents to his plan, even in the Austrian duchies, and in securing considerable influence among the Protestant nobles of Austria.

The circumstances were therefore quite unfavorable to Rudolf's designs. Yet, in his insane infatuation, he selected, as his representative at the diet, his cousin Ferdinand of Gratz, for whom the Protestants entertained a deadly hatred. The occurrences at Donauwörth, which will be mentioned hereafter, showed them the nearness of the danger that threatened them. It is no wonder, then, that they demanded first of all a removal of religious oppression, a restriction of the operations of the imperial chamber, that had proved so injurious to them. When,

under the lead of Ferdinand, the Catholic majority denied the request and proceeded to take measures that the evangelical party deemed intolerable, the Protestants, with the exception of the Elector of Saxony, declared "that it was useless, inadvisable, and unworthy of the German nation, to submit to such treatment any longer," and on April 27, 1608, they left the diet. The division, which had been avoided by the mediation of Matthias in 1603, was now accomplished, and the peace of Germany—in fact, the very existence of the empire—was endangered by it.

The departure of the Protestants did not bring Rudolf nearer to the realization of his plans, for the diet closed almost immediately afterward. The "ruler of Christendom" was left helpless against the increasing discontent in his own dominions and the not altogether unjustifiable resentment of his brother Matthias. The latter received, in his ambitious schemes, much encouragement from his principal adviser, Melchior Khlesl, Bishop of Wiener-Neustadt.

Born in 1553, the son of a Protestant baker, and brought up by the Jesuits, Khlesl had advanced rapidly owing to his extraordinary gifts and his powerful will. Because of his zeal against the evangelicals, he was selected by Ferdinand of Gratz as a member of his council; in consequence of his services in bringing about the agreement of April 25, 1606, Matthias had taken him into his service. Henceforth his principal object was to enlarge the power of his new master and his own influence. To secure this, he, the persecuting Catholic zealot, did not hesitate to seek an alliance with the Austrian Protestant nobles, whose leading spirit was a man of surpassing eloquence, a ready and skilful writer, and a firm and fearless champion of religious and political liberty, Baron Erasmus of Tschernembl. In Moravia, the foremost liberal was Charles of Zierotin, a man of equal ability, but of more moderate views. He was, however, ill adapted to the turbulent time in which he lived, which failed to recognize him because he was in advance of it. But at this moment, 1608, Zierotin was as determined as his Austrian friend Tschernembl to put an end to the mad and violent rule of Rudolf. Catholics were scarcely less eager than Protestants to bring about a change.

Relying on his numerous and powerful adherents, Matthias, of his own accord and without authorization from the emperor, summoned a meeting of the Hungarian diet at Presburg in January, 1608; deputies of the Austrian estates soon appeared on the ground, and an agreement was reached to maintain the very treaties of Vienna and Zsitwa-Torok which Rudolf had expressly rejected. This was equivalent to a declaration of war between the two brothers. The prospects of Rudolf were gloomy enough.

Whilst the emperor wavered between submission and violent resistance, Matthias, supported by Spain, raised an army of 20,000 men and entered Bohemia, where not a hand was lifted for the emperor. At the same time, Rudolf learned that the diet of Ratisbon had broken up without granting him any supplies, and that the electors, far from offering any assistance, were unwilling even to allow him to take refuge in their dominions. Then, realizing for the first time his desperate condition, the mad emperor wept and lamented, complaining that all forsook him, that not one of his servants or advisers could be trusted! He was ready to yield Austria and Hungary to Matthias, but wished to retain Bohemia. He therefore summoned the Bohemian diet, which he succeeded in winning over by granting extensive liberties and religious toleration. Matthias could not hope to rule the Bohemians against their will, and, as Rudolf surrendered Moravia to him, he consented to conditions that were signed June 25, 1608. Matthias obtained control of Austria, Hungary, and Moravia, as well as the reversion of the succession in Bohemia. The emperor pledged himself to assist the Hungarians against the Turks.

Matthias had deprived his brother of half of his dominions, but the house of Hapsburg was rather weakened than strengthened by the act. By the Peace of Vienna and the diet of 1608, the Hungarians and Bohemians had secured large political and religious liberties; Protestantism really had triumphed. This success excited the envy of the Austrians and Moravians, who had risen against Rudolf to promote not the ambitious designs of Matthias, but the interests of the nobility and of evangelical freedom. Their leaders entered into a secret agreement to refuse allegiance to Matthias unless he assured to them the free exercise of their religion.

While Protestantism was boldly making gain after gain in the Hapsburg dominions, it had also at length assumed a manly attitude in the empire itself. For forty years, through its weakness, inconsistency, and dissensions, it had lost one position after the other to the Counter-reformation. Christian of Anhalt had seen long since that, in view of the downright hostility of all the officials of the empire to Protestantism, the only way left to the Protestant states to better their condition was to form a close union and avail themselves of their superiority in material resources. The success of the Smalcaldic League, three-quarters of a century before, was an encouragement and incentive to the formation of such a league. But such were the selfish ambition of the princes and their mutual distrust, as well as their want of confidence in the King of France, who offered to assist the proposed "Union," that Christian at

first (1606 and 1607) secured the co-operation of only the Palatinate and of Würtemberg, and obtained only dilatory answers from the rest. But several things occurred soon afterward to open their eyes to the danger that threatened them and to prove to them that any longer delay would be suicidal.

The Catholic movement in the empire had now secured in Maximilian I. of Bavaria an energetic, able, and clear-purposed leader. He had been educated by the Jesuits at Ingolstadt, and had imbibed from them a bitter hatred of the Reformation. When nineteen, he had gone on a pilgrimage to Rome, and had edified the court of Clement VIII. by his zeal and his piety. In his frequent correspondence with the young prince, not yet twenty-five, the pope urged him to consecrate himself to the service of the church: above all, to restore harmony and unity among the Catholic princes of Germany. Maximilian scarcely needed such urgings. Within his dominions, he first applied himself solely to the task of remedying the evils caused by his father's administration, going to work prudently, relying always on the co-operation of the estates, and thus laying the foundation of a prosperity that would admit of his playing an effective part in the political world. Unweariedly he labored at his task from four in the morning till late at night. His favorite maxim was: an army, a full treasury, and strong fortresses are the only foundations of a prince's power. He did his best to live up to it, and for his time it was certainly not a bad principle.

Having built up, in accordance with this maxim, a firm foundation to stand upon, he cherished the project of uniting the Catholic princes for bold and aggressive action, not under the auspices of the emperor or the Hapsburgs, but under the guidance and for the advantage of Bavaria. Of true patriotic intent, there was in those days just as little among the adherents of the old faith as among those of the new; neither was there any pure zeal for religion. Self-aggrandizement entered largely into all plans of action.

In the year 1607, an occasion was offered Maximilian to fight at once for Catholicism and the house of Bavaria. The little city of Donauwörth, ages before, had belonged to Bavaria; but, as early as the beginning of the fourteenth century, it had become a free city of the empire, and had maintained its liberty in many weary conflicts. Endowed by the emperor with many privileges, it had prospered exceedingly, and at last, like so many other free cities, had adopted the Augsburg Confession. Within the city was the monastery of the Holy Cross, dependent immediately upon the empire. For fifty years, the relations between it and the Protestant citizens had been perfectly amicable; but, at the beginning of the seven-

teenth century, Catholicism, supported by a Fugger as imperial officer, began to show an aggressive front. Processions paraded the streets, greatly to the indignation of the Protestant citizens. Neither remonstrances nor warnings from the magistrates did any good, for Abbot Leonard was bent on provoking a struggle which might furnish the imperial courts a pretext for suppressing the new doctrines in the city. In 1606, a mandate of the imperial council forbade the city, under penalty of the ban, to disturb the abbot and the Catholics in the performance of their religious ceremonies.

The abbot had now what he wanted. On April 25, 1607, the monks, with as many of the faithful as they could collect, marched through the city streets in solemn procession; they came to blows with the citizens, and the procession had to return to the monastery by side streets. The affair was not in itself of much importance; the city authorities at once humbly begged the emperor's forgiveness, and the Protestant princes offered full satisfaction. But the plan of the Catholic party had long been considered. The imperial council placed Donauwörth under the ban, and gave the execution of the sentence not to the Swabian circle, to which the city belonged, but to Maximilian of Bavaria. A strong Bavarian force soon reduced Donauwörth to unconditional surrender. The chief magistrates were punished as severely as if they had been guilty of a great crime; the evangelicals were deprived of all their churches; and finally Maximilian, under the pretence that the city must defray the cost of the war by the enormous contribution of 400,000 florins, retained possession of the town as security.

This outrage against the rights and liberties of Donauwörth, which had been scarcely veiled under the forms of law, excited the gravest apprehensions among Protestants. Under such flimsy pretexts, any evangelical state could be attacked and ruined. It was feared that this was but the beginning of a course of similar acts—a test of what the evangelicals would endure. This fear was well founded. Maximilian, in his joy, thus wrote to Rome concerning the Donauwörth affair: "Great help and furtherance has been given by it to the Catholic religion; the like thing would be of great advantage in many other places. The Protestant heretics have got from it a demonstration they little expected."

Maximilian's conduct at the diet just convened at Ratisbon was also highly aggressive. He carried through the college of princes his interpretation of the Augsburg Peace: "that it should be ratified only on condition that all ecclesiastical foundations that had since then become Protestant should revert to the Catholic church." This was a direct menace against the evangelical princes, and they threw aside all hesitancy.

In August, 1607, the Elector Palatine and the Duke of Würtemberg met at Heilbronn and formed a league, intended from the first to be enlarged. On May 11, 1608, therefore, Frederick IV., Elector Palatine, young John Frederick of Würtemberg, the Count Palatine of Neuburg, the Margraves of Baden, Ansbach, and Bayreuth, as well as the Princes of Anhalt, met together, and, after a few days, signed an agreement which provided for the organizing of a common treasury and army, and assigned the chief direction of affairs to the elector. The differences between Calvinists and Lutherans were not removed, but they agreed to practice mutual forbearance and to cease from all accusations and recriminations. Definite offensive measures were not contemplated; the alliance was for mutual defense. But even this was a great gain for the Protestant cause. Christian hoped to bring the princes to a more aggressive policy. Soon afterward electoral Brandenburg, Hesse-Cassel, and a number of South German imperial cities joined the Union.

The success of the party of action among German Protestants emboldened their brethren of Moravia and Austria to demand of Matthias religious freedom. The Moravians were satisfied with his promise that no one should be persecuted on account of his religion, and his concession to the nobles of the right to Protestant worship, which was still denied to the cities. But the people of Upper Austria took the government into their own hands till Matthias should grant them full religious freedom, and in Lower Austria the evangelical majority of the nobles set up at Horn a formal rival government till the same concession should be made them. To the Hungarians, Matthias had to accord the complete practical independence of the nobles and of the imperial cities, so that he retained scarcely more than the title of king over them. On November 19, 1608, he received under those humiliating conditions the crown of St. Stephen.

Following the advice of Spain, Rome, and his minister Khlesl, Matthias held out for ten months against the Austrians' demand. At last, however, he had to yield; the Austrians were beginning to raise troops; Hungary and Moravia appeared inclined to assist them; and the Protestant Union threatened to give them support. Matthias saw himself compelled, therefore, on March 19, 1609, to grant freedom of conscience to his subjects, and, to the nobles, liberty of worship; the tribunals were also to consist of members of both faiths. To the cities, a verbal promise was made that they should not be disturbed in their forms of worship. Thus, in all the Hapsburg provinces, Protestantism and the estates had won a decisive victory over the old religion and the sovereign. If things went on at this rate, the overthrow of Catholicism in the dominions of

Matthias and Rudolf, and the establishment in them of a confederacy of nobles and cities, could hardly fail to take place.

The Bohemians would not remain behind the Hungarians, Austrians, and Moravians. It is true, the emperor had in general terms promised them religious liberty, but they wished him to give this promise a definite and binding form. The meeting of the Bohemian diet, convoked by Rudolf because of his financial needs, gave them an opportunity to press their case. Rudolf was just as unwilling as before to satisfy the demands of his heretical subjects, but he found himself in a strait. His other lands, his brothers and relatives, the empire, Spain, and Rome, all had forsaken him; money, which he desperately needed, he could get only from the Bohemian diet, whose majority was Protestant; in the background loomed up the threatening form of the greedy Matthias, resolved to resort to all means to possess himself of Bohemia. At first, under the influence of the fanatical chancellor, Popol of Lobkowitz, and of Martinitz and Slawata, Rudolf acted with considerable vigor, and, at the beginning of April, dismissed the diet before its work was half done. But, as the emperor did nothing to enforce his will upon them, the Protestant nobles of Bohemia were rather incensed than dismayed by this dissolution. Contrary to the constitution, they gathered in Prague without the king's authorization, appointed directors to conduct measures of resistance, and called upon the Protestant princes, as well as upon Matthias, for assistance.

After many useless negotiations and wranglings, the emperor was at length induced, on July 9, 1609, to sign the so-called Royal Charter (*Majestätsbrief*) which conferred on all inhabitants of Bohemia full liberty of conscience, but limited the right of erecting churches to the higher nobility, the knights, and the royal cities. At the same time, the emperor approved of an "agreement between Catholics and Protestants" which gave the latter this same right of erecting churches on the royal estates; the Protestants concluded from this that the right extended to the ecclesiastical estates, which in Bohemia were legally reckoned with the royal domains. Slawata himself acknowledged this to be the case. By union and resoluteness, the Bohemians had accomplished even more than their Moravian and Austrian brethren.

The most powerful Catholic princes resolved to form a league of their own to withstand by force, if necessary, the steady progress of Protestantism. The first positive suggestion of such an alliance had come shortly before the diet of Ratisbon in 1608, from the Elector and Archbishop of Mayence. Soon afterward the proposal was taken up in earnest by Maximilian of Bavaria, but he had to struggle a long time against the

lukewarmness and timidity of the ecclesiastical princes, who dreaded their powerful Protestant neighbors. He had at first to remain satisfied with the co-operation of the bishops and abbots of Augsburg, Passau, Ratisbon, Constance, Kempten, and Ellwangen, with whom he subscribed at Munich, July 10, 1609, the agreement that laid the foundation of the German League. This League was nominally only a defensive alliance for the protection of the Catholic religion and the peace of the empire; at its head, very naturally, stood the Duke of Bavaria, with very comprehensive rights and authority.

The beginning was modest enough; and, for a while at least, the Catholic alliance could scarcely venture to attack the Protestant. But Maximilian, who was encouraged and zealously supported by the pope and by the sagacious and energetic Spanish ambassador at Prague, Don Balthasar de Zuñiga, felt confident that the League would receive large additions. The Catholic powers could not fail to see that in Germany things pointed to a decisive struggle between the old faith and the new, and that the only hope of the partisans of the former lay in thorough union; also that the leadership in the struggle would fall not to the incapable and disunited Hapsburgs, but to the active Wittelsbach in Munich. This conviction became apparent when at the end of August, 1609, in Mayence, the ecclesiastical electors joined the League on condition that Bavaria should share the political leadership with Mayence—a condition that Maximilian accepted without hesitation. An imposing gathering of representatives of the League was held at Würzburg in February, 1610, and a large grant of money for the raising of an army was made. The accession of Austria, which several states desired, was prevented by the persistent opposition of Maximilian, who was unwilling to share with the Hapsburgs the leadership of the League; he was determined to lord it independently in Catholic Germany and to meet the Hapsburgs as an equal.

All Germany was now divided into two hostile camps, the Union and the League, and the two hostile armies, with hand on sword, surveyed each other with mistrust and hatred. On neither side was there any disposition to tolerance or to respect for the others' convictions. Loyalty to the empire, to the great German fatherland, patriotic sentiments such as had appeared now and then in the preceding century, had wholly departed. In vain Saxony, with its traditional policy of moderation and consideration for imperial rights, urged mild and conciliatory measures; the time for compromise was past.

The death of the Duke of Cleves-Jülich without issue, in the spring of 1609, was the signal for a struggle over his rich inheritance. We

have already noted (see Vol. V., p. 694) that Henry IV. of France interfered in the contest by taking part with the two Protestant pretenders

who had jointly seized the land, Elector John Sigismund of Brandenburg (Fig. 8) and Count Palatine Wolfgang William of Neuburg. This joint occupation was clearly in violation of the constitution of the empire, especially as the emperor had referred the case to the regular imperial courts. But Protestants knew too well that these always decided in the Catholic interest and according to suggestions from the imperial councilors. The occupation, therefore, although not legal, was clearly an act of self-defence.

But Rudolf was urged by one of his young and ambitious relatives to seize the occasion offered by the high-handed course of the two Protestant occupants, to improve the fortunes of the house of Hapsburg. Archduke Leopold, the emperor's cousin, had for a long time endeavored by all means in his power to turn the quarrel between Rudolf and Matthias, and the latter's unpopularity in Germany, to his own aggrandizement and toward the securing of the imperial crown for himself. To this end, he had allied himself with Maximilian of Bavaria, and, in the interest of the Catholic party as well as that of the emperor, now wished to drive out



FIG. 8.—Gold medal with portrait of John Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg. Original size. (Berlin.) On the margin are the Hohenzollern colors, black and white in enamel. The eagle from which the three chains hang is black in front for Prussia, and red behind for Brandenburg.

the joint occupants of Cleves-Jülich; at the same time, he would secure for himself there a very important independent position. In full sight of the heretical Netherlands and North Germany, he would stand forth as one of the principal leaders of the loyal sons of the church; and Spain, he felt certain, would give him her support.

As soon as he had brought Rudolf over to his plans, he made his way in disguise to the Lower Rhine and prevailed upon Rauschenberg,

the commander of the garrison of Jülich, who had long before been won for the Hapsburgs by the gift of a Spanish pension, to deliver to him this strong fortress (July, 1609). In the emperor's name, he now claimed the administration of the duchies and enlisted troops to enforce his authority.

The consequences of this bold act were recognized all over Europe. An overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the territory in dispute were Protestants; the principal claimants were Protestants; the selection of a member of the imperial family, and that one a bigoted Catholic and a partisan of Spain, to execute the decree of sequestration, proved that the emperor had resolved to conquer that rich Lower Rhine district for Catholicism, and more especially for the house of Hapsburg. A letter from Leopold was intercepted, in which he declared it to be his mission to snatch the Jülich lands out of the jaws of heresy, and so destroy the power and courage of the heretics.

All the opponents of the Hapsburgs, all the friends of Protestantism, were stirred to action. England, Holland, and France particularly promised armed assistance to the occupants, who thus checked all further attempts of Leopold. At the beginning of 1610, the princes and cities of the Union concluded with France a treaty by which a common army of more than 20,000 men was to be raised and used to recover the fortress of Jülich. In addition to these, the Netherlands were to send 12,000 men, and England 4000. What forces could the emperor and Leopold bring to meet this formidable array? Rudolf turned for aid to the Catholic princes, and in April, 1610, summoned them to a conference in Prague. He proposed to submit to their consideration, first of all, the Jülich question, but also that of the choice of a King of the Romans; for Rudolf had not ceased to hope that he might deprive the hated Matthias of the succession to the empire.

Rudolf's orders dissolving the Union, and his investiture (July, 1610) of the Saxon Elector Christian II. with the Jülich lands, disturbed nobody. A combined force of German Protestants, French, English, and Dutch laid siege to Jülich, which fell into their hands in September. Brandenburg and Neuburg, supported by the active elements among the Protestants, had thus secured a victory over official imperialism and the opposition of the four most prominent electors. Rudolf's career was closing most lamentably; the dignity of the empire had sunk until nothing was left of it but a name.

The meeting at Prague had failed also to bring about a better understanding between the emperor and Matthias. The former was bent upon the complete submission of his hated brother, and all suggestions of a

compromise threw him into such rage that he overturned his dining-table and threatened his servants with his sword. He was seriously considering an alliance with the Union against Matthias. He obtained of the princes at Prague a promise to consider the question of electing Leopold as King of the Romans, instead of Matthias.

But Leopold rendered such an event impossible. With the consent of the emperor, he had assembled in his city of Passau, during the spring of 1610, an army of 12,000 men, with which to carry out his ambitious designs. If he had brought this force in good time to Jülich, he might have saved that stronghold; but his attempt to use it to strengthen his position in Bohemia and the Tyrol, perhaps even to attack Matthias, ruined his prospects.

After the surrender of Jülich, he wished to dismiss his troops; but he lacked the means to pay them, and they at once became mutinous. Consequently, Leopold and the emperor decided to send the troops into Upper Austria, which belonged to Matthias; there they committed the worst excesses (latter part of 1610). But they could not hold the land against the determined opposition of the inhabitants, and so turned to Bohemia. But here their reception was equally warm; the Bohemian diet compelled the emperor to make a general levy to repel the unwelcome guests.

General indignation prevailed, not only against Leopold, but also against Rudolf, who behaved most dishonestly, secretly urging the invaders to march upon Prague and secure the capital. With Leopold at their head, they stormed the region on the left bank of the Moldau, the Catholic inhabitants giving them aid. But their attempt to carry the old city, on the right bank of the stream, was repulsed; here the monasteries were plundered and the Catholics were attacked by the angry inhabitants.

Although the emperor openly took sides with Leopold, the estates assembled in the old city remained firm in their opposition to him, and drew in reinforcements and supplies from all sides, whilst Leopold was wasting precious time. All Bohemia rose against rulers who had thus without provocation brought a plundering and murderous band of mercenaries upon their own subjects. The enemy were forced to withdraw from Prague, March 11, and Leopold, now the object of universal condemnation, sought refuge in his wasted see of Passau, and could no longer hope to play an important part in the empire.

With Rudolf also, and his duplicity, the Bohemians would have no more to do, and invited Matthias to take charge of the government. The emperor's reckless and underhanded attempts to avenge himself on Matthias now met their punishment. Rudolf was held a prisoner in

the Hradschin, whilst the King of Hungary made his entrance into Prague in the midst of universal rejoicings. The Bohemian diet elected him King of Bohemia, Silesia, Moravia, and the two Lusatias ; he was crowned in the cathedral of Prague, May 23, 1611. Rudolf had to be satisfied with the usufruct of the royal domain of Pardubitz and an annual pension of 300,000 florins. This was all that was left to the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire !

But Rudolf had not long to endure it. Grief and anger brought upon him an illness of which he died on January 20, 1612, at the age of fifty-nine. For Germany, his rule had been the most pernicious conceivable. By favoring everywhere to his utmost the Counter-reformation, yet without being able to secure for it decisive victory or even preponderance, he raised between the two religious parties a spirit of bitterness which seemed to make peaceful relations between them an utter impossibility. In the midst of the incessant feuds between Catholics and Protestants, the constitution of the empire fell to pieces, the diets regularly adjourned without accomplishing anything worth while, the last remnant of imperial authority disappeared. The Reformation, which at first had given the German nation a new impulse, great strength, and high purposes, had, by the fault of people and rulers alike, become a curse for the land. At the death of Rudolf, a religious war was already in sight. The Protestants looked forward to it with confidence ; during the last year of Rudolf's reign, they had obtained important advantages over their opponents.

The intellectual decay of the nation during Rudolf's reign was as pronounced as the political. Ferdinand I., and especially Maximilian II., were many-sided, highly endowed, forcible rulers. They had been surrounded in their German territories by a number of equally gifted princes. In Brandenburg, Joachim II. was distinguished for his love of pomp and his fondness for brilliant festivities, yet withal labored with zeal, if not always with success, for the welfare of his house (Fig. 9). His successor, John George, did not share his father's taste for external show, but surpassed him in zeal for the improvement of all departments of administration, of popular education, and of the unsettled finances of the state ; so that, under his rule, Brandenburg reached a high degree of material prosperity. Of artistic and literary culture, there was then little enough.

The Saxon electorate was at this time much more powerful and important than Brandenburg. We have already spoken of the great services rendered to agriculture, industry, and the organization of the state by

Maurice's successor, Augustus. In Würtemberg, Duke Christopher was an altogether attractive character, uniting great penetration of mind with unwearying industry and a sense of duty based upon genuine religious principles. His youth had been spent amid sad and difficult circumstances. While his father—Ulrich, a dethroned fugitive—was wandering from land to land, Charles V. had tried to take the son to Italy or Spain—there, in all probability, to place him in a monastery for life. But, thanks to the devotion of his faithful teacher, Tiffernus, Christopher had escaped, and had remained for a while hidden among his Bavarian kinsmen. When, with the aid of Philip of Hesse, Ulrich had recovered possession of his duchy, Christopher went back to Würtemberg, but found such cold welcome with his father, a gloomy and tyrannical man, that he sought military service in foreign lands.

After Ulrich's death in 1550, his heir assumed the government of Würtemberg under extremely unfavorable conditions. The Smalcaldic War had laid waste the country, and, in punishment for Ulrich's alliance with Hesse and Saxony, Würtemberg was threatened with incorporation with Austria. It was largely the prudence and firmness of the new duke that kept the Würtembergers true to their land and to their faith. He granted his subjects a liberal constitution, improved legislation by the publication of a new code, and prudently and intelligently promoted the material interests of his duchy. He was beloved by his subjects, respected by other rulers, and fond of playing the part of mediator, for which the internal quarrels of the Protestants afforded him frequent opportunities.

In the neighboring Palatinate, we find likewise a succession of able princes. Since 1556, it was ruled by Otto Henry, one of the few really art-loving rulers of Germany at this time. The portion of the castle of Heidelberg which he built, a work in the noblest style of the Renaissance, will ever remain a glorious monument to his memory. He was equally interested in learning, improved the university of Heidelberg according to Melanchthon's suggestions, and enriched its library by the gift of many precious manuscripts. His successor, Frederick III. the Pious, is famed as the champion of the Reformed church, which he served with unwavering loyalty and admirable courage, though not without intolerance and harshness. His family fought valiantly for Calvinism, even beyond the borders of Germany; his second son, John Casimir, was to be found wherever its cause was in danger, and his third son, Christopher, found a hero's death in the battle of Mooker Heath, in the ranks of the Dutch Protestants. Besides his religious interests, Frederick III. sought by all means in his power to foster the growing university of Heidelberg and to improve the common schools of the Palatinate.

Begnadung vnd befreyhung des Druckers.

Wir Joachim von Gots gna-
den Marggraff zu Brandenburg ꝛc. vnd
Churfurst ꝛc. Thun hiemit kund vnd
zu wissen/ allen vnd jeden/ vnsern Prelaten/ Gra-
ffen/ Herrn/ denen von der Ritterschafft / Auch
Vnsern Landvoigten/ Wambtleuten/ Amptman-
nen/ Castnern/ Rethen der Sted / Vnd sonst al-
len andern Vnsern Vnterthanen / vnd verwand-
ten/ Nach dem Dans Weis/ itziger zeit Vn-
ser Buchdrucker / auff vnser gnedigs erfordern
vnd begeren/ mit seiner druckerey / sich anher be-
geben / vnd mit sonderm auffmercken des druck-
kens besleissigt / Das wir in erwegung dessel-
ben/ auch aus sonderm gnaden vnd vrsachen / im
dagegen/ vnd zu bessern seinem enthalt / folgend
begnadung vnd freyheit gethan / vnd gegeben
haben / Die wir im auch hiemit in gegenwertli-
ger krafft thun vnd geben / Also/ das er allerley
bücher / so Christlichen glauben / guter Pollicey
vnd der Erbarkeit/ nicht vngemess oder zugegen
sein/ in vnserm Churfürstenthum vnd Landen
alle dieweil er darinnen ist/ drucken / seyl haben/
vnd verkauffen lassen mag / Vnd so lang solche
bücher/ so er itzt/ vnd forthin drucket vnd drucken
wird/ bey im in zimlichem kauff/ befunden wer-
den/ Sollen dieselben von im gekaufft / Vnd kei-
nem

FIG. 9.—Facsimile of a page of the license issued to the printer of the "Kirchen-Ordnung in Churfürstenthum Brandenburg" by Elector Joachim II., in 1540.

In Bavaria, Albert V. labored effectively to restore the supremacy of Catholicism without sacrificing the interests of the temporal power and the sovereign. In love of splendor and devotion to the arts, he even surpassed Otto Henry of the Palatinate, and under his reign, as

three centuries later, Munich became a centre of many-sided artistic activity. Albert, notwithstanding his religious zeal, was no bigot, and was averse to needless persecution. He was really a pure and devout prince, whose court, in spite of its pomp and luxury, was yet a school of morality.

Thus it is seen that those times reflected to some extent the vigorous and varied intellectual development which had made the first part of the sixteenth century so full of promise for Germany. But, under the reign of Rudolf, petty religious intolerance and mad sectarian hatred stifled free thought and noble endeavor. Politics and literature were exclusively devoted to mutual accusations and persecutions; of German national sentiment, there is scarce a trace. Under such conditions, letters and poetry could not thrive. In other lands, they had reached their highest point of perfection: Italy had Ariosto and Tasso; Spain, Cervantes and Lope de Vega; Portugal, Camoëns; and England, Shakspeare. But, in Germany, patriotism was dead; and with it, every high impulse in arts and in letters had disappeared.

Only in church hymns, in folk-songs or tales in verse, and in satire, was anything done worth mentioning. One of the few scholars who remained true to the mother-tongue, and wrote their verses in it, was Paul Melissus Scheede, whom Emperor Ferdinand made poet-laureate and raised to the nobility. Though a Franconian by birth, he lived mostly in Heidelberg at the court of Elector Frederick III. In his German poems, he pointed out the way in which national poetry might have been revived, by availing himself of popular songs and endeavoring to bestow upon them suitable artistic forms.

Undoubtedly the most brilliant intellectual work of the second half of the sixteenth century in Germany was that done by John Fischart (Fig. 10) of Strasburg, a man of active mind, extensive and varied learning, and firm, energetic character. In the midst of the little men of his day, he stands in solitary grandeur. Freedom was his motto, and in religion he came out a zealous Protestant, in politics an ardent republican. His learning he used as a foundation for his political activity on behalf of what he considered as the true and the good. He clung with genuine affection to the people, made them the chief object of his study, and depicted their manners, thoughts, and feelings with painstaking and loving care. Proportionate to the depth of his nature was his scorn for everything evil and false. He had a masterly command of the German tongue, which he used with wonderful originality, and knew how to adapt to all the demands of poetry as well as of prose. As a lyric poet, he has left us but little. His satirical poems are aimed at the growing arrogance

of the Counter-reformation, and are clever and crushing attacks on the mendicant orders and the Jesuits. Of his epic poems, by far the most important we have is the "Lucky Ship of Zürich," which relates in a highly poetic and impressive form the voyage of the Zürichers to Strasburg.

IOHANNES FISCHARTVS
Iurisconsultus & Philosophus.



*Sim quamvis Iuris consultus clarus in arte:
 Metamen & Sophia plus capit unus amor*

FIG. 10.—Portrait of John Fischart. From the "Ehezuchtsbüchlein," published at Strasburg in 1607.

But, however excellent Fischart's poetry is, it is far inferior to his prose, especially to his "Historical Serawl" of the doings of Gargantua and Pantagruel, a most original recasting of Rabelais' great work, overflowing with fancy, wit, and imagination. Fischart's enlightened mind

recoiled from the astrological inanities of his time, which he attacked in his little book, "*Aller Praktik Grossmutter*." We cannot enumerate all his many writings; we must, however, insist on the real greatness of a man who, under more favorable national circumstances, would have marked and opened a new epoch in literature. His books were eagerly read, new editions were called for as late as the middle of the seventeenth century; but Germany had sunk too low to be revived by any purely intellectual impetus.

Notwithstanding all theological quarrelings and political divisions, the German people had not altogether lost their ancient strength of imagination and their sound humor. It was at this epoch that most of the folk-tales received the shape in which they have reached us. Many of them are imitations of the French, but some are the direct products of the poetic faculty of the German people. Most prominent among these last is the story of Doctor Faustus, a necromancer who seems actually to have been living in the first half of the sixteenth century. Even in these wonder-stories, there is manifest a distinct anti-Catholic spirit, and the papacy is represented as the work of the devil. The Faust legend, as it appeared for the first time in 1587, shows forth its hero in the same general lines as those Goethe subsequently developed; he is a highly gifted scholar, who, with a sinful thirst for knowledge, endeavored to overstep the limits assigned to the human intellect, and, to this end, enters into a compact with the devil; the latter, on his part, does his best to overreach his human partner. Though the form of the work is simple enough, and its style altogether popular, yet there lies within it a genuine and profound conception. Of less moral significance, but superior in execution, is the folk-tale of the "*Schildbürger*" (simpletons), which even to-day has not altogether lost its power to attract and amuse.

It is noteworthy that the German theatre received at this epoch an impulse from the same source which, two hundred years later, was to affect it so strongly; an impulse which the untoward conditions of the time prevented from becoming so far-reaching and permanent. The English dramas of Marlowe, Greene, and others were translated into German and given by English actors in Northern Germany. Within a short time there were organized, after their example, traveling troupes of German actors, who, as they played by preference English dramas, were likewise called English actors. Landgrave Maurice the Learned, of Hesse-Cassel (1592-1607), himself a dramatic writer and composer, took the English players into his pay for several years, allowing them to play in different portions of Germany. He erected for them in Cassel the Ottonium, the first permanent theatre in Germany.

German poets, like Jacob Ayrer and Henry Julius, duke of Brunswick, wrote tragedies and comedies in the English style. They show the same qualities and defects as the English dramatists before Shakspeare; they are rude and awkward, but their treatment of their themes is large and natural. Later, Shakspeare's own works were produced in poor German translations. The horrors of the Thirty Years' War and the subsequent preponderance of France caused these first attempts to found the German drama on an imitation of the English to pass into oblivion.

In nothing, perhaps, does the decadence of the national and political spirit of the Germany of that day appear more clearly than in historical writing. No works are then produced fit to be compared with those of Aventin, Sebastian Franck, or Tschudi. The most remarkable of the historians of the day is Neocorus of Ditmarsh in Holstein, who wrote the story of his people in a loyal and patriotic spirit and in his native idiom. By interspersing his book with old folk-songs and with poems of battles and victories, he gave it a more interesting and living color.

In one field alone of intellectual life do we find hopeful and encouraging activity and development—that of education. Luther, and, in a still larger measure, Melancthon, had given the most effectual impulse here; but we must not forget, on the other hand, that the Jesuits, following the example of the great Protestant leaders, had done noble work, especially in the higher education. It was at this epoch that the preparatory course for the university, usually denominated “gymnasium,” was established. It came midway between the common Latin school and the university. It was a result of the period of the Renaissance, that, in this new educational movement, mediaeval compends and helps were thrown aside and the student was set to work on the classics and classical antiquity.

The universities were doubly benefited by the creation of these gymnasia: they were relieved of the burden of elementary instruction; and the cloister-like seclusion of the students, as practiced in the Middle Ages, was given up and replaced by that academic freedom which, though it may lead to excess, has, on the whole, ultimately fostered self-reliance of character and independence of thought. The aim of education was sharply distinct from what it had been before and from what it has become recently. It may be comprehended in the term “eloquence” (*Beredsamkeit*)—that is, the art of presenting and developing in a convincing manner and in a noble form what the mind has correctly conceived; “*res et forma*,” or “what to say and how to say it,” is the principle which lies at the foundation of all pedagogical writings of the sixteenth century.

The famous Sturm of Strasburg expresses the opinion of all humanists when he says: "Knowledge, without the power of tasteful presentation, is barbarous: nay, harmful." This principle, though exaggerated, is yet not wholly false; unfortunately it was applied solely to Latin "eloquence," and the mother-tongue, the "foul speech of barbarians," was relegated to those destitute of taste. Greek, as the language of the New Testament, was held in honor. Teachers put into the hands of schoolboys Cicero, Demosthenes, and St. Paul; they could not understand them, that was certain, but they should from their earliest years become familiar with the highest forms of literary expression.

The Latin of the Jesuit teachers was perhaps a little less classical than that of the Protestants, and more calculated for daily use; they subordinated the "res" to formal culture and to polemic skill. On the whole, we must say that the second half of the sixteenth century did more for the development of the higher education in Germany than any age preceding, and that the two great divisions of the church fairly vied with each other in promoting its advance. But, after all, this vigorous educational movement had no enduring results for the nation at large, because the learned held themselves aloof from the people and public life; the common schools remained essentially religious, or rather, we should say, sectarian.

After the great revolution in jurisprudence which had taken place under Charles V., one would naturally look for great progress in that branch of learning. For that emperor had put an end to the long dispute between German customary law and the Roman law, which for centuries had disturbed and complicated all German legal science, by giving his verdict in favor of the Roman law. A committee of learned jurists, at the head of which was John of Schwartzemberg, compiled a new penal code, which, in honor of the emperor, was called the "Carolina." In spite of the severity of the penalties it decreed, it was a decided improvement on the unjust and arbitrary methods formerly used. It remained in force for centuries, but it could not bring forth a school of great German jurists, such as was then flourishing in France.

In the department of mathematical astronomy, on the other hand, Germany produced a creative and epoch-making genius. It is her boast that, after having given birth to Copernicus, she gave him a worthy successor in the person of John Kepler. His appearance is of the greater importance, because astronomy was then threatened with a reaction against Copernicus's great discovery, led by the famous Tycho Brahe. This great man's fame rests on his own astronomical observations, on the discoveries he made among the stars, and on his improvements in

astronomical instruments. But with him science as a whole rather retrograded, because he again made the earth the centre of the planetary system, a theory which he tried by the most ingenious combinations to reconcile with recent experiments.

It is Kepler's great merit to have victoriously reaffirmed the Copernican system against the high-born and renowned Brahe, and, by means of most thorough and original demonstrations, to have established it beyond controversy. He changed Copernicus's assumption of the circular path of the planets into that of an elliptical one, with the sun in one of the foci. With the aid of logarithms, recently invented by the Scotchman Napier, he prepared the famous Rudolfine Astronomical Tables, which should bear his name rather than that of his imperial patron. It is well known that Kepler's mother was persecuted by her neighbors as a witch; this circumstance led him to publish a number of essays, which were the first rational attacks on the cruel superstition then accepted alike by high and low, learned and ignorant. Unfortunately Kepler shared the lot of so many great German thinkers and poets: he had to struggle all his life with poverty and its cares. What a pathos there is in the fact that this great astronomer owed his maintenance not to the science he has so greatly advanced, but to astrology, of whose fallacy he was fully convinced. Kepler died in his fifty-ninth year, worn out before his time by want and overwork.

Painting suffered, as did literature, from the general retrograde movement in Germany. While in the Netherlands, recently lost to the empire, this art was reaching its highest point of power and grandeur in the works of Rubens (1577-1640), and while the elder Breughel and the elder Teniers were creating a homely but technically masterful representation of popular scenes, in Germany art was languishing. The single honorable exception to the pitiful mannerism of a few wretched German painters was Adam Elzheimer, who painted miniature-like landscapes, tenanted by mythological or historical characters; he wrought charming effects of light and shade, which Rembrandt studied with profit. But this single original German artist could not support himself in Germany, and wandered to Rome, there to die in the debtors' prison when scarcely forty-six years of age.

The kindred arts of architecture and sculpture fared much better, for they were closely related to the splendor-loving character of the age. The free and unaffected style of the early German Renaissance, the noblest work of which was the castle of Heidelberg, gave way about 1570 to the first attempts in the Baroque style. Cities were adorned with richly decorated public and private edifices, which gave them a noble,

imposing aspect. Nuremberg (PLATE IV.), Augsburg, Dantzic, Paderborn, vied with the princes themselves in architectural activity.

Sculpture was largely used to adorn funeral monuments and public fountains. Bronze was frequently employed for this. But, for these various works, German artists were seldom thought skilled enough; foreigners were generally preferred, either Italians like Nosseni and Boselli, or more frequently Netherlanders, like Adrian de Vries and Peter de Witte. The work of German artists, such as Benedict Wurzelbauer and Jerome Hack, was of little worth.

At the beginning of the century, Germany was enjoying a remarkable degree of material prosperity. It was one of the foremost commercial nations of the world; while the Fuggers and the Welsers were the bankers of all European princes, the merchants of South Germany and the Rhine provinces brought to northern nations the products of the East and of Italy, and the Hanseatic fleets ruled the Baltic Sea and the German Ocean, making the Scandinavian countries, and Britain itself, their tributaries. But even then a change was visibly taking place. The discovery of America and of an ocean-route to the East Indies robbed Germany of the favored position she had till then enjoyed for the carrying trade between Asia and Northern and Western Europe, and shut her off from the great commercial routes of the world. Lindau, Ratisbon, Augsburg, and Cologne were already beginning to lose their population, though the accumulated wealth of those cities retarded their decadence for a while.

From the reigns of Maximilian II. and his successor dates the beginning of the breaking up of that powerful and glorious league of cities that during three centuries had secured to the German merchants the commercial and even the political control of the North. At first it was political circumstances which deprived the Hansa of one after the other of its influential ports. Its Livonian and Courland members, which had opened to it the vast Russian empire—Riga (Fig. 11), Reval, and Dorpat—fell into the hands of the Russians, the Poles, and the Swedes, and their connection with the league ceased. All colonization in these countries, which had been a rich market for the league, passed over to foreigners. And just at this time the Englishman, Richard Chancellor, entered into negotiations with the Czar of Moscow, the London Muscovy Company was founded, and a commercial treaty concluded with Russia.

The English found it easy to dispossess the Hansa, for the Muscovites preferred to deal with distant England rather than with their dangerous German neighbors. The Scandinavian states were likewise disposed to rid themselves of the frequently oppressive tutelage of the

Hanseatic league. Formerly the Hanseatic colony at Bergen had laid all Norway under contribution; now, deprived of its privileges and means of defence, it was being reduced to insignificance. To ward off a similar fate in Sweden, Lübeck carried on (1563–1570) a bitter naval warfare; and once more, as in the earlier times, Lübeck warships ruled the Baltic Sea. The city built the “Eagle,” the wonder of that time—one hundred and twelve ells long, manned by a thousand sailors, and carrying numerous cannon. But, though Lübeck won glory in that war, she could not carry it on alone; and, as her allies forsook her, she was obliged at length, in the name of the Hansa, to surrender all her privileges. The once




FIG. 11.—View of Riga, about 1550. From Sebastian Münster's "Cosmographia." Printed at Basel by Henricus Petri: in 1550.

formidable league had grown so weak that a few years later the Danes seized the island of Bornholm without difficulty.

The Hansa fared no better in the west than in the north and east. In 1598, Elizabeth of England closed the Steelyard, which the German merchants had occupied for five centuries in London, and in which they had carried on business under most favorable conditions. This was a fatal blow to the intercourse between England and the Hansa. In Germany, there was no emperor, no national government, able or willing, by using the nation's power, to prevent this heavy injury to the prosperity and greatness of the land.

But, one may ask, did the Hansa do nothing in self-defence? The

explanation of the conduct of the league lies in the complete decay of German burgher enterprise, a consequence of the disappearance of public spirit, of the increasing power of the princes, and also, in no small share, of the prevalence of religious disputes and discords. The conviction that the paths of the world's commerce had become changed, and been removed from Germany, also tended to dishearten the league. Most of its members withdrew from the association. Those that were left seldom attended the gatherings or councils (*Tugfahrten*), and were even more delinquent in paying their contributions and sharing in the common enterprises of the Hansa. All attempts to establish a new league miscarried, and, at the end of the sixteenth century, out of seventy cities, only thirteen remained, and most of these were members in name only.

The separation of the Netherlands from the empire by Charles V. was one of the hardest blows struck at the league. Antwerp and Amsterdam were changed thereby from allies into competitors, and the ever increasing prosperity of the Netherlands made the competition ruinous for the Hansa. The mouths of the Rhine and the Meuse, the natural outlets for West Germany, were shut against it, and all the great commercial cities of the interior were cut off from the sea and from the great commercial highways. The southern provinces of the Netherlands became a Spanish possession, hostile to Germany on both political and religious grounds. The northern united with the republic of the Seven Provinces, which, with wonderful enterprise and boldness, gathered into its hands the commerce of the world, founded colonies in Asia and America, secured more and more complete control of the oceans, and seized the carrying trade of Europe, that had once made the Hanseatic league so prosperous. Deprived of its relations with the east, which it owed to the Livonian cities, of its connection with the western seas which the Netherlands had once furnished, driven out of Scandinavia and England, pressed hard by the superior enterprise and resources of Holland, and abandoned by the emperor and the empire, the German Hansa was hastening to its end.

What trade was left suffered new diminution by the financial policy of the German princes, who, without understanding or caring for the development of the national commerce, imposed increased duties, denied free passage of goods, and, by such selfish measures, intended to fill their own treasuries, hampered general commercial intercourse. Another blow was struck at it by the frequent debasement of the currency, entailing heavy losses and an unnatural rise in prices.

Still, it would be a mistake to represent the prosperity of Germany as entirely on the wane. If commerce and industry had seriously suffered, agriculture was making rapid progress. This is the epoch during




FIG. 12.—Dancers. From a woodcut by Hans Sebald Behaim (1500–1550).

which Germany assumed that character of a predominantly agricultural nation, which it retained until very recent times. The nobles (Fig. 12), barred out of political life and no longer allowed to indulge in mad feuds and in plundering raids, and taught a lesson by the fearful experiences of the Peasants' War, eagerly devoted themselves to agriculture. They had the means and the opportunity of studying and applying the new and more rational methods of agriculture that Italy and France could teach them. Even princely personages took a lively interest in such pursuits, and, among other things, became intelligent promoters of cattle-breeding. The first ordinances for the protection of forests also date from this period.


Still the nobles could not wholly give up the old rough ways. Their favorite pastime was the chase, and, when large game-preserves were formed, the complaints of the peasants over the ruin of their fields received scanty heed. Then, too, the nobility were addicted to excessive drinking, and strangers agree in describing drunkenness as the national vice of Germany of that day. The younger sons of the nobility, who had no estate or property of their own, turned soldiers or went to court. Ignorant and inexperienced in affairs as they were, they became at court merely the boon companions of the prince, whose private counselors were recruited among the burghers. To the end of the sixteenth century, we rarely find a minister of a German prince who does not belong to the citizen class.

But here also a change gradually took place. The princes, who felt themselves almost independent of the emperor, and had made dutiful subjects of their nobles and of their cities, began with an increased sense of their dignity to have also a heightened sense of the obligations of their office. The strong theological bent of the age had this good result, that it impressed their responsibility upon them and led them to a quieter and more moral mode of living. They became excellent administrators, and the sciences and arts, neglected elsewhere, found welcome at their courts. They made valuable collections of curiosities of all kinds; they held disputations in Latin with their theologians; they vied with one another in calling the most renowned European scholars to their universities. So rich and varied was the life of the German people that, even in periods of general decadence, there were circles in which the good and the beautiful were cultivated.

The courtiers were compelled to follow in the way marked out by the princes. They sent their sons to the universities or else to foreign countries, there to become acquainted with the languages, manners, institutions, and advantages of other nations. When these youths



FIG. 13.—Patrician lady of Basel. Drawing by Hans Holbein the younger (about 1497–1543).



returned from their travels, they enjoyed high consideration among their companions and were often chosen among the trusty advisers of their prince. So Spanish costume, French taste, and Italian elegance were introduced into German courts; allegorical entertainments, operas, and ballets replaced wild orgies.

The example of the court was followed by the county nobility. At the beginning of the seventeenth century, one could find, in every district of the land, individual proprietors who had collected a library, could turn out a respectable Latin distich, or could make in the same tongue a learned oration largely interspersed with quotations.

The condition of the masses of the people was sad indeed. Since the disastrous issue of the Peasants' War, the landlord had become the almost absolute master of the peasant's person, time, and property. Regardless of ancient rights, he forced them to work in his fields, to act as beaters in his hunts, or to serve as menials in his castle. The

FIG. 14.—Armor of Emperor Rudolf II. (Vienna). Designed by the Munich painter, Christopher Schwarz (1550-1597), the Labors of Hercules being represented. The armor of a dull-gray steel, with much gold chasing.

peasant's fields were laid waste by the game preserved for his master's amusement, and by the huntsmen in pursuit of that game. He had to give his lord a share of all his produce. He was bound to the soil; he could not marry without his master's consent. And yet, in most parts of Germany, the soil was so generous that the material condition of the peasants was not altogether wretched, and not a few of them were even prosperous.

The inhabitant of the town (Fig. 13) was, on the whole, in a comfortable situation. We do not refer here to merchant princes like the Fuggers, who lived in a palace which was so large that the emperor, with all his court and the diet besides, could have been lodged in it, and which had a turret covered from the top half-way down with good bright dollars. In humbler circles, people loved to live well and sumptuously; often they would invite to weddings and other festivities



FIG. 15.—Armor of Emperor Maximilian II. (Vienna). For use at tournaments: differing from armor used in war only in the helmet, the strengthened piece on the left elbow, and a brace for the small shield on the left breast.

from one hundred and fifty to two hundred guests, and the entertainment would last two or three days. Far and wide, the burghers of friendly cities met together for shooting-matches, which were attended not so much by the lower classes as by the city aristocracy, and in which noblemen and even princes of the neighborhood gladly joined. These associations promoted the sense of union, and practice in arms increased the courage and self-reliance of the people. The manufacture of arms and armor was then flourishing in Germany, and the swords of Suhl, in Thuringia, were in great renown. The precious metals were still mined in considerable quantities; the silver mines of the Harz, of the Erzgebirge, and of the Tyrol being fairly productive. (Figs. 14, 15.)

One of the shadows of the German life of that day was the prevalence of the belief in the devil and in witches (PLATE V.). Luther himself had contributed to this not a little. Born of the people, he shared their ideas of the omnipresence of the evil spirit and his innumerable allies and servants. Everything evil on earth—disease, fire, failure of crops, war, accidents, temptations—everything proceeded from the devil. He was seen by day and night, in all sorts of places, under all shapes. The impetus to the belief in the evil one that Luther had given was by no means confined to Protestants. Luther's mode of thought, his speech, and his home life were scarcely less characteristic for the Catholic Germans than for their Protestant neighbors. They, too, saw the demon everywhere, and the clergy of both faiths spent their best skill in exorcising him.

This fantasy affected women more especially; and among them, irrespective of age, rank, or education, belief in witches was universal. A terrible persecution against witchcraft broke out about the middle of the sixteenth century, and it raged equally in Catholic and in Protestant communities. The only difference was that in the latter the magistrates, and in the former the ecclesiastical authorities, conducted the trials. The most absurd grounds of suspicion sufficed to depopulate villages; a mere accusation—caused, it may be, by personal enmity or sheer love of evil—was equivalent to a sentence of death. The only method of proof was torture; this could never fail, for, if the accused would not confess, it was concluded that the devil made him insensible to pain. The delusion was so universal that many of the victims considered themselves as really guilty. By moderate computation, at least 100,000 persons, the vast majority of them women, were consigned to the flames by this most horrible of all superstitions, which was unfortunately common to all Christian countries.

In Germany, then, we may say, in summing up, that the high and

Ein erschütterliche geschicht / so zu Derneburg in der Graffschafft Reinsteyn am Hartz gelegen von dreyen Zauberin vmb zwapen Maßen / Ist etlichen tagen des Monats Octobris Im 1 5 5 5. Jare ergangen ist.



was aber von geystlichen sachen in allem mit witten dain lebte / als ob der Teuffel vor langit gestorben sey / vnd kein Got / kein gericht oder straff / vorhanden were / Der Almächtigt Got vnd vatter / onfers Herren Jesu Christi / wölle dem grimmigen seine wehren / sein armes heufflein vor im vnd seinen gildern schützen vnd handhaben / seinem vnd der seinen wütten vnd toben / einmal ein ende machen / durch Jesum Christum Amen.

I Solget die geschichte / so zu Derneburg in der Graffschafft Reinsteyn am Hartz gelegen / ergangen ist / Im October des 1 5 5 5. Jars.

A Vff den Dinslag nach Michaelis / den ersten Octobris / sind zwu Zauberin gebandt / die eine Giöbische / die ander Gifflersche genaht / vñ bat die Giöbische bet andt / das sie Zylff jar mit dem Teuffel gebüet habe / vñ wie man dieselben Giöbischen zu der Sewerstat gebracht / vnd an die saul mit Ketten geschlagen / vnd das Sewor angejündt / ist der bäl / der Sathan kömen / vnd sein lüfften sichtiglich vor yeder man weck gefürt. Am Donnerstag / nach dem die Giöbische vñ die Gifflerschin am Dinslag zuuor sind gerichtet worden / das ist den 3. Octobris / sind dise bede Strawen auff den abend in der Gifflersche hauff kömen / vnd der Gifflerschen man zur thür hinauff gesossen / das er nider gefallen vñds sevor gedangt / welches ain Nachbaur gegen ober geböret / vnd zu gelauffen ist / durch die thür gesehen / das zway weybet bede eytel sevorige / vñds sevor gedangt / welches ain schin man aber / tag vor der thür vnd war todt. Am Sonnabend nach Dionisij / das ist der 12. Octobris / ist der Giöbischen man gerichtet worden / vñds sevor gedangt / welches ain Montag wille / das er bey seines weybs schwester geschlafen hat / welche er zuuor zum weybe gehabt / vñ darnach die Giöbischen genömen / des Montags darnach / das ist der 14. Octobris ist ain weyb die Gifflerschen genandt / auch verbrant worden / der vrsach / das sie des Herren Adhams von Veldthaym des Stiffts Halberstat Hauptstat weybe vergeben hate / vnd ainem man zu Derneburg ain Krotten vnter die Schwollen begraben / daruon der man erlernet / vnd im das vilhe vmb kömen ist.

Wie sibet man wan der Teuffel an ainem orth einnistet / vñ begündt zu Regieren / wie wußt er mit seinem giff vñ sich sticht / wie vil personen komen die vmb / in wenig tagen / vñ soll vns solch gewulich exempel billich rayhen zur büß / vñ zur forcht Gottes / auff das wir vns mit dem wort Gottes vñ gebette / wider den gemelten seyn schüngen / vñ mag dise Zylff den sichern gotlosen Epicurern vñds Zaubern / wol ain erinnerung sein / diu ewyl sie sehen / das der Teuffel noch lebt / vñds das daß hellische sevor noch mit erlöchen ist / Der Almedchtig Got wölle sie auch zur büße bringen / vñds vns alle inn / vñds bey seinem raynen wort erhalten / vñds mit seinem hayligen Gays regieren / auff das wir leben inn aller Gotseligkayt / Zucht vñds Erbarlayt / zu ehren seinem hayligen Namen / Durch vnsern Herren Jesum Christum / Amen.

I Getruckt zu Nürnberg bey Jörg Merckel / durch verleg Endres Zentzel Botten.

Facsimile of a broadside, issued in 1888, representing the burning of witches at Dernburg in Regenstein.

The original, which is highly colored, is in the Germanic Museum at Nuremberg.

History of All Nations, Vol. VII., page 19.

many-sided upward movement of the first part of the Reformation period had given place to relaxation and discouragement. Still, many healthful forces were yet at work among the German people, and among the higher classes there existed a tendency toward a finer and freer development. Then a great war broke out, and left nothing behind but waste and destruction, a land in ruins, and a people almost blotted out. Germany was to struggle and suffer terribly in order to establish for the world the great principle of religious toleration and liberty of conscience.

CHAPTER III.

THE COUNTER-REFORMATION IN SCANDINAVIA AND POLAND.

THE Reform movement had swept like a rushing flood over all the nations of the West, and it seemed for a while as if nothing could withstand its course. But, in the midst of the long stagnant waters of the old faith, there arose a counter-current which grew more and more rapid and powerful until it met the other with strength equal to its own. The struggle which resulted fills the history of the latter half of the sixteenth century. It required a mighty and costly contest before the two hostile elements, neither of which could subdue the other, sullenly gave up the effort and took each its separate course.

In August, 1560, Gustavus Vasa, the founder of Sweden's greatness and of its Protestantism, was succeeded on the throne by his eldest son, Eric XIV. The new king was a dignified man, twenty-six years of age, and a good orator, poet, musician, painter, and linguist. But all these advantages, that would have adorned a private gentleman, did not make of him a good ruler. He lacked discretion, and was now passionate and impulsive, and then weak and discouraged, without strength or steadiness of resolution.

Gustavus had observed this disposition of his eldest-born with profound concern, but the measures to which he had resorted to correct the evil had only made it worse. He had assigned to each of his younger sons a separate duchy: to John, Finland; to Magnus, East Gotland; to Charles, Södermanland. These districts held ambiguous relations to the crown; in internal affairs, they were independent of the king, but in general they were still subject to him and to the diet. These uncertain conditions inevitably led to conflicts between Eric and his younger brothers. The prospect of this was doubly discouraging at a time when the peace of the realm was at best precarious, divided as it was between the still numerous and devoted adherents of Catholicism and the imperfectly organized Protestants.

Eric first sought, and with success, a counterpoise to his brothers in the nobles, whom he set himself to win by all sorts of favors. He established the dignities of "count" and "baron," hitherto unknown in Sweden, and by this means founded that higher nobility which, later

on, was to become so dangerous to royalty. He confirmed the Protestant character of the religious constitution of the realm.

The restless character of this unfortunate prince, who had a decided tendency to insanity, soon manifested itself. At great cost he sent emissaries to Scotland, England, and numerous German courts, to woo him a wife. With inadequate resources, he contended with the Russians and the Poles for the possession of the Baltic provinces, and in 1561 succeeded in gaining the city of Reval and Esthonia; this was the first conquest of Sweden beyond the Baltic, and the beginning of a struggle that extended over a century and a half. Then he began to quarrel with his brothers. He caused the oldest of them, John of Finland, to be condemned to death for high treason, and imprisoned him and his wife (1563) in the strong castle of Gripsholm. Magnus of East Gotland, whom Eric had compelled to assist him against John, went mad with excitement and regret. Charles of Südermanland was saved from a similar fate only by his extreme youth; he was only in his thirteenth year. Rid of the fear of his brethren, the king now gave full course to his tyrannical and cruel temper, urged thereto by the ambitious and bloodthirsty Göran Persson. He was constantly surrounded by spies, who supplied him with victims. Within five years, 232 persons were executed for political offences, many of them on absurd charges brought against them by Persson as public prosecutor.

Eric XIV., considering himself now firmly established on his throne, renewed the war against Denmark (1563), where King Frederick II. (1559–1588), with the aid of his minister, Peter Oxe, was giving the people an excellent administration, affording wise and generous protection to commerce and industry, and managing public finance with great skill. Numerous fugitives from the Netherlands had settled among the Danes, and brought them an increase of industrial prosperity and of trained ability. Frederick II., a peaceable and not very forcible prince, was hardly able to cope on equal terms with warlike Sweden and her excellent fleet. But Eric insisted on conducting the campaign in person, and proved to be equally cowardly and incompetent, so that the war degenerated into a series of ruthless plundering expeditions, in which Norway and the frontier districts of Sweden suffered terribly.

The discontent already existing in this country was increased by the insane cruelty with which the king, who thought himself constantly beset by conspirators, proceeded against suspects of high and low degree. In May, 1567, he caused the first lords of the realm, and among them the patriotic Sture family, to be cast into prison and there murdered. He showed ever increasing signs of insanity. Soon afterward he

liberated his brother John from his captivity in Gripsholm on certain conditions, one of which was that he should recognize Eric's mistress, Catharine Manstochter, as queen, and her children as legitimate. In 1568, he actually married this woman, the daughter of a corporal. Such a misalliance, together with the disgraceful defeats Eric had suffered at the hands of the Danes, roused the Swedish people to open rebellion. Dukes John and Charles put themselves at the head of the malcontents; and in September, 1568, Eric, abandoned by nearly all his servants, had to surrender. The estates of the realm, in the beginning of the year 1569, deposed him and condemned him to be kept for life in royal imprisonment; his children, as base-born, were excluded from the succession.

John cruelly misused his authority. The unfortunate Eric was kept in the harshest captivity, separated from his wife and children, and, in the case of a rising in his favor, threatened with immediate death. No wonder that Eric, whose mind had long been diseased, had frequent attacks of delirium. Finally John had him poisoned, February, 1577, in the forty-fourth year of his age.

Contrary to his agreement with his brother, Charles of Södermanland, John received homage as sole king (John III.), and his son Sigismund was acknowledged as his heir and successor (1569). Like Eric at the beginning of his reign, he sought to lean upon the nobles, whose authority over the peasants he considerably enlarged, giving the higher nobility complete jurisdiction over their subjects. As the Russians were threatening war, John concluded, at Stettin in 1570, a peace with the Danes, which imposed considerable money burdens on Sweden. Hostilities with Russia were carried on without definite results.

John attempted to bring Sweden back to Catholicism. Many circumstances favored this undertaking. Gustavus had never expressly severed his connection with the Catholic church, and he had retained the episcopal organization and much of the old ceremonial. Great confusion had arisen out of this ambiguous attitude; church estates had been plundered, the priesthood had been recruited in part from unworthy elements, and preaching and the care of souls had been greatly neglected. Many might properly ask themselves whether the change of religion were really for the better. John was urged also to oppose Lutheranism by his Polish wife, Catharine, of the Jagellon family, who had been brought up a Catholic, and who, as she had voluntarily shared her husband's captivity, exercised considerable influence over him. She corresponded regularly with the Polish cardinal, Stanislaus Hosius, a learned, pious, and zealous prelate, who had done much to win back the nobles of his

country to Catholicism, and who desired to render a like service in Sweden. He showed the queen how, under the pretence of giving instruction in Lutheranism, they might gradually bring back clergy and people to the orthodox fold. He sent her the Jesuit, Stanislaus Warszewicz, who (1574) reached Stockholm in disguise, and afterward two more, who had been trained in Louvain, one a Netherlander, the other a Norwegian, who stole into Sweden as evangelical preachers. The year before (1575), Laurentius Petri Gothus, a pliable man, had been appointed Archbishop of Upsala, and had declared himself in favor of the restoration of convents, the worship of saints, and the resumption of the old ceremonial.

They proceeded step by step in this reactionary work; for it did not seem prudent, considering the temper of the people, to try to accomplish it at one stroke. Under the guidance of his Jesuits, John and his ministers prepared a liturgy in Latin side by side with Swedish, based as a whole on the missal of the Council of Trent. Finally, when an embassy was sent to Rome, the pope sent to Sweden, under the protecting title of "imperial legate," the Mantuan Jesuit, Antonio Possevin, one of the most talented and learned members of the order. It was about the time of Eric's murder; Possevin seized upon this and impressed upon John's mind that only by a penitent profession of the faith of the only true church could he escape eternal damnation for that fratricide. Therefore John secretly embraced Catholicism at Wadstena in 1578.

After this, the Counter-reformation went on at a more rapid rate. Favored by the king, the Jesuits obtained many pupils, and Catholicism made startling progress among the clergy. Those who resisted were deprived of their places; canon law was declared to be binding on the Swedish church.

John mourned over the fate of his father Gustavus, condemned to eternal woe because of his recreancy. Still, he deemed certain concessions advisable, such as allowing priests to marry, administering the communion in both kinds, the celebration of public worship in the national tongue; they had to do with forms merely, not at all with the doctrines of the church. To obtain the pope's sanction for them, Possevin went to Rome; he was entrusted by John, besides, with messages to the most powerful sovereigns of Europe.

A few months later, the Jesuit returned, clothed with the dignity of apostolic vicar for Scandinavia and the adjoining countries. He was authorized, on behalf of Philip II., to make to John the most brilliant promises, if he would publicly acknowledge Catholicism as his religion and that of his realm. On the other hand, Possevin was to report to the king that the pope could not, under any circumstances, agree to the con-



FIG. 16.—Polish armor. Beginning of the sixteenth century. In the Tsarskoi-Selo collection. (From Gillé.)

cessions he had proposed. John, who looked upon these as necessary to gain Sweden, was not a little displeased by this. Political difficulties were added to his troubles. He had hoped, by the aid of the pope, to make good the claims of his wife to certain domains in South Italy. He had also—a matter of much more consequence—requested the pope's intercession on behalf of Sweden at the conclusion of a peace between Russia and Poland. But now he learned that the Italian duchies were out of the question; and Possevin himself brought about, in 1582, a peace between Russia and Poland (Fig. 16), in which the latter renewed her claims even to the Swedish possessions in Esthonia.

When the Jesuit returned to Stockholm, he was received in a friendly way at first; but the wind had shifted. With the death of the queen (1583), the Jesuits lost their last support as well as their most influential protector, and were banished from the kingdom. Yet John, like Henry VIII. of England, wished to hold an intermediate ground, and sturdily retained his Catholicising liturgy, in the face of all opposition. He quarreled, moreover, with his brother, Charles of Südermanland. Once John had been the zealous defender of ducal rights; now that he was king, he sought to limit Charles's independence as much as possible. Charles assumed the part of champion of orthodox Lutheranism against John's Counter-reformation, and declared himself intensely opposed to the king's "red book," as he called the new liturgy. His duchy became the refuge of all loyal Protestants who fled from John's persecutions. The clergymen deposed by the king were sure to find good positions with the duke.

The sympathies of the majority in Sweden were undoubtedly on Charles's side. Uprisings against the king's religious measures had already taken place in Stockholm. These things induced John to proceed more guardedly. Meanwhile the house of Vasa was called to ascend one more step to power and greatness. The Poles offered their royal crown to Sigismund, John's son. This meant, it must be acknowledged, but little real authority. In the second half of the fifteenth century, the power of the nobles had so increased in Poland as to leave the crown only a personal influence. The diet of Piotrkow (1496) had completed the humiliation of the crown by excluding commoners altogether from the higher ecclesiastical dignities and reducing all non-noble countrymen to actual serfdom.

The king was bound in every political decision by the advice of the council of 146 dignitaries who made up the senate. The former general meetings of the nobility had been replaced by a representative diet. But what in other countries had had a most beneficial influence was to Poland

only a source of new evils. For every palatinate (district) in its special diet (*diätine*) enjoined upon its nuncios or representatives an imperative mandate, for the faithful carrying out of which they were to render strict account on their return from the national diet. The federal character of the Polish state was kept up until its downfall, especially as Prussia and Lithuania kept aloof from the Polish diet.



FIG. 17.—Muscovite warriors. Reduced facsimile of a woodcut in Herberstein's (in Moscow, 1526) "*Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii*," Vienna, 1549.

A policy of compromise, conciliation, and a fair consideration of the rights of the minority, was made altogether impossible by this mandate system. The minority, therefore, helped itself by assuming the "right of confederation"—that is, of banding together to resist the diet and its decisions. Force, in the form of civil war, had then to decide; the con-

federates did not consider themselves as rebels, nor were they so considered by others. The crown lost the right to decide on peace or war. This caricature of a constitution was to have results the more




FIG. 18.—Russian weapons, saddles, boots, etc. Reduced facsimile of a woodcut in Herberstein's work, cited p. 110.

disastrous, as the Turks on the south, and the Muscovites under Ivan III. and IV. on the east, were pressing upon Poland. Nothing but the wild valor of the Polish nobles could temporarily heal or conceal

the deep wounds which their unlimited lawlessness inflicted upon their native country.

In the year 1506, Sigismund I. had ascended the throne. He was a wise, clear-minded, active, and just ruler, and a valiant warrior, the very king needed by Poland, threatened as she was by numerous enemies. The name of "Great" bestowed upon him is certainly not undeserved. At the outset, he was involved in a war with Russia—a war which, with occasional interruptions, was to last two centuries; he also had to repulse the Tatars, who made a devastating raid into Poland. He held his own against both his foes. The Tatars he defeated so completely at Wisnowietz (1512) that they are said to have left 24,000 on the battlefield. Over the Russians he won a brilliant victory at Orsza (1514) (Fig. 17 and 18).

A new antagonist arose in the Teutonic Order, eager to free itself from the burden of Polish suzerainty. But the knights were unsuccessful, and their grand-master, Albert of Brandenburg, was glad to conclude with Sigismund (Fig. 19) the Peace of Cracow (1525), by which East Prussia became a temporal duchy, a fief of the Polish crown, and Albert, as its hereditary duke, was given the foremost place among the Polish senators.



FIG. 19. Seal of King Sigismund I., as Duke of Glogau. On a document dated 1506. In the four fields of the shield, at the centre of which is the royal eagle, are the arms of Lithuania (1, 4) and Austria (2, 3), the latter as the family arms of Sigismund's mother Elizabeth of Austria.

This same year, Sigismund obtained still another advantage. The Piast branch of the Dukes of Masovia became extinct, and their important territory, embracing Warsaw, Plock, Pultusk, was united to the Polish kingdom, of which it had hitherto been independent. Poland was rid of the Tatars by the pressure of the Turks upon them, and a treaty which Sigismund concluded with the latter ensured him security against

those robbers (1546). With the Russians, in spite of occasional armistices, the struggle was continued; but, on the whole, it resulted favorably to the Poles.

In the midst of all these military enterprises, Sigismund found time to foster learning, to encourage agriculture and industry, to free the navigable streams of tolls, and to redeem numerous royal estates and

sources of income that his predecessors had pawned. It was he who gave a permanent organization to the Saporogian Cossacks along the rapids of the Dnieper, and made of these bold warriors an excellent defence against the Tatars. It must be said, however, that the peasantry—the Cmetes—were more completely enslaved under his reign than before, and deprived even of the right to send their children to school or to have them taught a trade. In his old age—he died at 82—he fell entirely under the influence of his wife, Bona Sforza, a daughter of the ducal house of Milan, who provoked many uprisings by her intrigues and her fierce attacks against the rights of the nobles.

Sigismund I. died April 1, 1548, in the midst of general discontent. His only son, Sigismund II., increased the dissatisfaction of the nobility by ratifying publicly a secret marriage he had contracted with Barbara Radziwill, and thus, in appearance at least, assigning to her family a position far above that of the other nobles.

By this time the great Reformation movement had reached Poland. It had won adherents among the German burghers of West Prussia

immediately after Luther's first open declarations. In Dantzic (Fig. 20), as early as 1524, there had been an uprising of the Lutherans, who had driven out the old city council and forcibly suppressed the Catholic worship; for this conduct, they had been cruelly punished by Sigismund I. But this prince had not otherwise interfered with the evangelicals, whose number



FIG. 20.—Gold coin (ducat) of Dantzic, under Sigismund I. of Poland. (Berlin.) Portrait of the king, and arms of Dantzic.

was steadily increasing. He was rather indifferent in matters of religion, satisfying himself with the mere show of zealous orthodoxy. "I am," he used to say, "king of the sheep as well as of the goats." The Hussite ideas, that had taken firm hold of many Polish minds; the abuses of which the Catholic clergy were guilty, in Poland no less than elsewhere; the universal intellectual movement, which, since the latter half of the fifteenth century, had from Italy spread over all Europe; the desire of a numerous and greedy nobility to possess themselves of the estates of the church; and the dream of a national Polish church, had all contributed to forward the Reformation movement. Sigismund I. gave his consent to the establishment of a Protestant university in Königsberg (1544), and it soon flooded Poland with Bibles and polemical writings in the national tongue. Luther's works were openly sold in the university of Cracow and everywhere greedily read. The confessor of Queen Bona




FIG. 21.—Tomb of Sigismund I., in the Cathedral of Cracow. Red marble.

Sforza, Lismanini, took pains to circulate all anti-papal books published in Europe. Other foreign clergymen became apostles of the new faith and of even bolder doctrines, which found ready acceptance among the impressionable Slavs.

A Netherlander, Pastoris by name, taught, quite independently of Lelio and Fausto Sozzini (Socinus), the rejection of the Trinity, and a community of Unitarians was secretly formed in Cracow. Numerous students went to the German universities and returned confirmed Lutherans. Even Polish priests and theological professors in the university of Cracow preached, under the protection of the nobles, against Catholic dogmas. The Moravian Brethren, driven out of their country, won over to their doctrine a considerable portion of Greater Poland, including the most distinguished noble families. Such was the situation of affairs at the death of Sigismund I. (Fig. 21).

Transylvania also, Poland's neighbor, had almost wholly ceased to be Catholic; its inhabitants were either Lutherans or anti-Trinitarians. The Reform found its way even into Russia. Not in Moscow alone, but far beyond this capital, along the Volga and in the distant north, it found ardent adherents.

This religious movement was quickly suppressed in Russia proper, but in Poland it grew more and more powerful. Sigismund II., Augustus (Fig. 22), a brilliant and accomplished sovereign, was openly inclined to Protestantism. Lismanini brought him a copy of Calvin's "Institution," which the king and his friend, Francis Krasinski, Bishop of Cracow, set themselves eagerly to study, together with the works of Luther and Melancthon. Sigismund even corresponded with the Genevese reformer. But he was too politic and not sufficiently devout to declare himself outright for Protestantism before the majority of his people had done so. His attitude, however, encouraged the innovators, and, in the first years of his reign, noblemen banished Catholic priests, monks, and nuns from their estates and established the Protestant worship.

Such a state of things was extremely unwelcome to the Polish clergy. In 1551, they assembled together as a national council, under the presidency of the Archbishop of Gnesen as Primate of Poland. Here for the first time appeared prominently the man that was to be the stay of Catholicism in the east, Nicholas Hosius, son of a burgher of Cracow, who, after a brilliant course of study at Padua, had been appointed Bishop of Ermeland and had succeeded in keeping his see free from the inroads of heresy. He was a man of great learning, spotless life, profound convictions, and judicious moderation. At the synod of 1551, he



FIG. 22.—Sigismund II., Augustus, King of Poland. Reduced facsimile of the engraving (1554) by Virgil Solis (1514-1562).

introduced a confession of faith, to which all clergymen were required to subscribe.

Under the influence of the papal court, the synod determined to assume an aggressive course and to cite before ecclesiastical courts all

heretical noblemen and clergymen (Fig. 23). Such violent measures only provoked the spirit of independence among the nobles, whose representatives at the national diet of 1552 appeared with the sharpest arraignment of the higher clergy. A pronounced and zealous favorer of the reform, Raphael Leszczynski, was elected president of the diet. The king and he agreed that henceforth all authority to impose any kind of temporal penalties should be withheld from the clergy.




FIG. 23. Court of the University of Cracow, founded by the Jagellon kings.

The cause of the Reformation found two prominent champions in the highest circles of the state—John Laski and Nicholas Radziwill. The former, a nephew of the Primate of Poland, had formed intimate relations with Erasmus and the Reformers during his journeys in Europe, and, when once won over to the new doctrines, had renounced the most brilliant prospects of ecclesiastical preferment, to devote him-

self to evangelical work in England and Germany. He loved, above all, the moderate views and the noble ritual of Anglicanism, and sought to found in his native land a national church after its pattern. Nicholas Radziwill, cousin of the queen, was chancellor of Lithuania, Palatine of Wilna, and a man of enormous wealth. His conversion exercised a most powerful influence on the Lithuanian nobility, so that they, almost without exception, left the church of Rome. His early death (1565) alone saved the old faith from total extinction in that province.



FIG. 24. Lithuanian seal of King Sigismund Augustus. On an impression attached to a document dated 1556. The figure represented is the Lithuanian knight, bearing a shield with the new arms of the Jagellons.

A measure intended by Pope Paul IV. to bring Poland back to Romanism had exactly the contrary effect. He sent thither as nuncio one of the most virulent church zealots, Lippomani, who was, above all, to prevent the convening of the impartial national council which the Polish nation so much desired. This blow in the face of public opinion embittered the Polish nobility to such a degree that the nuncio was received at the diet with insulting remarks. Some bloody persecutions




FIG. 25.—Tomb of Sigismund II., Augustus, in the royal chapel at Cracow.

initiated by Lippomani, with the aid of some fanatical grandees, increased the wrath against him to such a pitch that his life was in danger and he had to leave the kingdom (1556).

It is evident that if Sigismund II. had placed himself at the head of the Reform movement, he could easily have established a Polish national church after the pattern of that of England, and thus given his people and his state increased firmness and stability. But he did not possess the required strength of character to take so important a step. With his philosophic skepticism, he let things have their course, and allied himself to the party which seemed for the moment to offer him the greatest advantages. Then Paul's successor, Pius IV., fulfilled at last the wish of all devout Catholics by reassembling the Council of Trent.

In 1563, the year of the final closing of the Council of Trent, the Polish diet renewed its request for an impartial Polish national synod, and the primate, the Archbishop of Gnesen, Uchanski, a favorer of the Reformation, was inclined to concede that demand. But then came the shrewd Commendone as papal nuncio, and in private conversations depicted to the king the dangers that would arise from the meeting of a synod at which the most various and opposite sects would have a hearing; it could lead to nothing short of general confusion. He called his attention to the steadiness and uniformity that prevailed in the Catholic church—to the principle of authority that controlled it.

Sigismund had another reason still to court favor with Rome. His second marriage had been barren, as well as his first, and threatened the Jagellon dynasty with extinction; he wished to obtain a divorce from Barbara Radziwill, so as to contract a third marriage. To this end, he needed the pope; hence his sudden return to Catholicism. How like, in selfish lack of principle and conscience, to his contemporary, Maximilian II.! He and Commendone secured official recognition in Poland for the decrees of the Council of Trent. At first, this was simply on paper; in reality, perfect religious liberty still prevailed. Sigismund, however, reaped the fruits of his subserviency to the nuncio: the church granted him a divorce from Barbara, and he contracted a third marriage with Catharine, widow of the Duke of Mantua.

The Protestants were not dismayed by this change on the part of the king, but sought safety in closer union. In 1555, the Moravian Brethren or Waldenses in Greater Poland, who differed from the Calvinists only with regard to the consecration of priests, had united at Kozminek with the Reformed, to the great joy of the Genevese reformer and his principal disciples in Europe. Then these two sects, now acting in common,

sought to effect a compromise with the Lutherans, who were numerous, especially in the German portions of West Prussia and in Greater Poland. The Lutherans, with their bigoted literalness and complacency, resisted a long time, but finally yielded in 1570. Then, on April 14, the representatives of the three Protestant confessions, the foremost ecclesiastics and most influential nobles, came to an agreement at Sandomir—the so-called “*Consensus Sandomiriensis*,” which, by allowing each one his special form of faith and only aiming at embracing all Protestants in a spiritual communion, doubled the power and influence of the Reformers.

Several bishops now openly expressed their adherence, a matter of very great importance, as the bishops had a seat in the senate—the diet of Poland—where already most secular members were either Reformed or Greek Catholics. This epoch is the climax of Polish Protestantism. It had then two thousand churches. Most of the nobility belonged to it. Its schools and printing presses spread far and wide its doctrines, besides an abundance of information on other subjects. Numerous foreign religious fugitives from Germany, France, Italy, and even Scotland, settled in this promised land of freedom. The final victory of the new faith in Poland appeared almost certain, even to its opponents.

While the religious parties were fighting their quarrels, Sigismund II. had obtained important diplomatic and military successes, which make his reign one of the most memorable in Polish annals. He won brilliant victories over the Hospodar of Wallachia, and forced him to surrender considerable parts of his territory; his conquests in Livonia, on the Baltic Sea, were far more valuable (Figs. 24 and 25).

The Teutonic Order, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, held the former possessions of the Order of the Sword—Livonia, Esthonia, and Courland, which it entrusted to the administration of a special commander. At the time of the Reformation, this commander was the heroic Walter of Plattenberg (Fig. 26), who, on the secularization of the Order in Prussia, separated from Prussia, and, in spite of the inroads of Protestantism into his territory, remained loyal to the old faith. He succeeded in repelling the attacks of external foes; but, with his death, the prosperity of the Order passed away.

In 1554, freedom of worship had to be conceded to the Protestants, and by this act the connection with the rest of the Order in Germany was sundered. In the states of the Order, the ruling caste of Germans was but a small minority in the midst of a mass of Finns and Lithuanians, who lived in servile degradation. The knights were far from really controlling the whole country. The Archbishop of Riga and his four suffragan bishops enjoyed virtual independence in their sees. The



FIG. 26.—Walter of Plattenberg.

important cities of Dorpat, Riga, and Reval, members of the Hanseatic league, constituted little republics of a pronounced Protestant type. Moreover, the country gentry, in each of the three lands, formed a corporation of their own, which still further curtailed the power of the nominal masters.

Such a loose structure must break down at the first serious attack. In the year 1558, Czar Ivan IV., the Terrible, attacked and defeated the forces of the Order and overran their territory. It seemed as if it was to remain a prey for the Muscovites. The grand-master, Gotthart Kettler, tried to save for himself what could still be saved from the general wreck, and, following the example of Albert of Brandenburg, concluded at Wilna a treaty with Sigismund Augustus, which surrendered Livonia to the Poles; the master himself laid aside the habit of the Order, and became, as a Protestant, Duke of Courland and Semgallen, under the suzerainty of Poland (1561). But the Lithuanian nobles of Esthonia, who would have nothing to do with the Catholic Poles, transferred their allegiance to Sweden, together with the town of Reval.

Sigismund dreaded these adversaries far less than he did the czar, whom he had robbed of his expected prey. To guard against him and retain his new conquests, he created a standing army, which was called the Quartians, because it was maintained and paid by means of one-fourth part of the royal revenues. The war with Russia broke out immediately; but, in spite of a few losses, the Poles maintained themselves in their new conquests till 1568, when an armistice put an end to hostilities for a while. Sigismund had thus made the largest addition to the Polish territory which it had ever received. It extended from the shores of the Gulf of Finland to the Dniester, and from the mouth of the Netze in the west to the Desna in the east.

Sigismund Augustus, whose third marriage also was childless, and who looked forward with dread to the dangers to which the extinction of his dynasty must expose his vast empire, sought to provide against them as far as possible by strengthening it internally. Till then, the two great divisions of his realm, Poland and Lithuania, had been bound together only by *personal* union; he labored with laudable zeal to bring about between them a *real* union, and also to induce the Prussian nobility to attend the diet. He met with decided opposition in this endeavor; Prussia was unwilling to surrender the independence which the treaties ensured to her in all internal affairs. Neither the Catholic nor the Protestant Lithuanians were disposed to renounce a glorious record of national existence extending back over centuries, and the numerous Russians in the grand principality, who were members of the Greek church, were reluctant to accede to the king's wishes on account of the important question of religion. The king succeeded in overcoming the opposition of the Lithuanians only by a skilful mixture of cunning, intrigue, and disguised force.

The diet of Lublin (1569) is one of the most glorious in Polish

history, for there the permanent union of the two countries was declared. This made it sure that, after the death of Sigismund, the same person would be elected as king by Poles and Lithuanians. The two diets were also united; the Lithuanian senate—consisting of bishops, vaivodes, palatines, and the great crown dignitaries—was merged with that of Poland. Beyond this the union did not go.

In what concerned military matters, administration, and justice, the two countries remained distinct. There were as many Lithuanian dignitaries as there were Polish. If we consider that these high officials and commanders, though appointed by the king, were appointed for life and were irremovable—that they enjoyed, therefore, complete independence within their sphere, and, once appointed, paid absolutely no attention to the crown, it will be seen that out of the new order of things there must result even greater confusion than existed before. What availed resolutions in common, if afterward the Lithuanian high treasurer or the Lithuanian commander-in-chief had the power to pursue an entirely different course from that of his Polish colleague? It was from a sense of this that attempts were made at the Lublin diet to strengthen Poland proper, which was vastly smaller than the grand principality, by separating from this latter the provinces of Volhynia and Podolia and adding them to the crown.

At any rate, by the Lublin Union, Sigismund had secured external unity for his kingdom, and thereby rendered Poland an immense service. One cannot fairly deny him the glory of a brilliant and useful reign, marked, moreover, by a considerable growth of learning and letters, and forming a striking contrast to the disastrous times that followed. He died July 14, 1572, and with him passed away the prosperity which Poland owed to the Jagellon dynasty. The unfortunate country fell a prey to the disorders and uncertainties of an elective monarchy.

A special meeting of the diet was convoked to prepare for an election. The Protestant nobility attended it with all the influence of its numbers, its wealth, and the unity that the Sandomir agreement had secured. It was through its agency that a law was passed (1573) that no one should be either harmed or slighted on account of his religion; the dissidents, to use the official Latin designation, were to be put in every respect on a par with the Catholics. This was the first formal, authoritative recognition of the equality of the different confessions in Poland, the first legal breach in the religious unity of the realm (Fig. 27).

But the Catholics had not remained idle. Bishop Hosius of Ermland, clad with increased authority on account of his efficient services as one of the presidents of the Council of Trent and adorned with the

dignity of cardinal, had in 1565 brought Jesuits into Poland. They began at once to work in their energetic yet prudent manner. About this time, Cardinal Commendone returned to Poland under the pretext of urging on the war against the Turks, but really to participate in the forthcoming royal election. He became the rallying-centre of the Catholics, and directed their choice to a member of the orthodox house of Hapsburg—Ernest, son of Maximilian II.

Von dem kunigreich Poland
 das in Sarmacia auch begriffen wirt sampte
 andern lenden disem kunigreich zugehörig.



FIG. 27.—Map of the Kingdom of Poland, from Sebastian Münster's "Cosmographia," 1550.

The Reformed, on their part, wished to place on the throne a native nobleman of their own faith—John Firley, grand marshal of the crown. Thereby they not only excited the jealousy of the other great families, but also that of the Lutherans, who were not willing to concede pre-eminence to the Calvinists. Here then, as we have already seen so often, and as we shall see again, the lamentable divisions between Lutherans

and Calvinists crippled the progress of the Reformation, prevented its victory, and paved the way most effectively for the Catholic reaction.


The opposition of the Protestants to the candidature of Archduke Ernest was so universal and pronounced that the Catholics became convinced of the impossibility of his election. They and Commendone, therefore, began to turn to a claimant for whom the French ambassador had long been actively at work—Henry of Anjou, brother of Charles IX. of France. It is true that the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Eve seemed to make him quite unacceptable to the Polish Protestants, but the duke's friends so positively asserted that the massacre had had purely political causes, and the duke himself declared so solemnly that he had taken no share at all in it, that the Protestants yielded at last, on the condition that they should be allowed to enjoy full religious liberty, and joined with the Catholics in electing Henry of Anjou to the throne of Poland (May 9, 1573) (PLATE VI.).

He reached his new kingdom early the following year. The Protestant nobles forced him by direct threats to confirm by oath the religious liberties of the land. Yet he had already begun to favor the intrigues of the Catholic clergy, when the death of his brother called him back to France, where he ascended the throne as Henry III. (1574).

For over one year the Poles waited in vain for the return of their king; then they proceeded to a new election. This time the Protestants seemed to obtain a complete victory. The choice fell on Stephen Báthori, Prince of Transylvania, an able warrior and a well-known friend of the Reformation. Among the twelve magnates that were sent to him to announce his election, there were eleven Protestants. But they had made a double mistake in imposing upon the newly elected prince too burdensome an election agreement (*pacta conventa*), and in imposing upon him also the obligation of marrying the sister of Sigismund Augustus, Anna Jagellonska, then fifty-two years of age. The sole Catholic member of the embassy, Solikowski, promised Báthori the assistance of his brethren in setting aside the burdensome conditions, and called his attention to the fact that Anna, a zealous Catholic, would never marry a heretic.

These representations prevailed, and it was as a Catholic that Stephen Báthori came to Poland, to the great disappointment of the Protestants. It is true that, during the eleven years of his reign (1575–1586), he never persecuted them; but he allowed himself to be entirely won over by the Jesuits, who represented themselves to him, as they had done to Emperor Ferdinand I., as zealous friends of learning, of general culture, and especially of the intellectual and moral elevation of the clergy.


Landtafel des Vngerlands / Polande



Facsimile of a part of Sebastian Münster's "Cosmographia."

History of All Nations, Vol. XII., page 126.

uiffen/ Littaw/ Walachei vnd Bulgarci.



O: Hungary, Poland, Russia, Lithuania, Wallachia, and Bulgaria.

Under his reign, the Jesuits penetrated into Poland proper, and soon a close network of their colleges extended over the whole realm. As everywhere else, they neglected the education of the common people, but took extreme pains to draw the sons of the nobility to their establishments, and successfully. These establishments were munificently endowed by Stephen, as was also the university which he founded at Wilna in the midst of a population partly of the Protestant, partly of the Russian Greek faith. They penetrated into Lutheran Livonia also, and founded colleges at Riga and Dorpat, in spite of the opposition of the inhabitants.

At the suggestion of the Jesuits, Stephen allowed the papal nuncio to summon before his tribunal Protestant bishops, to condemn them as heretics, and to depose them; Catholic bishops were appointed in their places, and thus the whole ecclesiastical portion of the senate was assured to the old church, and there were no more Protestant bishops in Poland-Lithuania.

Yet neither the disfavor of the king—on the whole a prudent and moderate man—nor the efforts of the Jesuits would have proved fatal to the Protestants, if troubles had not arisen in their own midst. The Lutheran clergy, tired already of the Sandomir compact, had begun anew their attacks against the Calvinists and the Moravian Brethren, declaring outright that these “sacramentists” were worse than Jesuits, and that to join them was worse than to go back to Catholicism. These quarrels, proceeding as nearly always from the blind arrogance of the Lutherans, had for one of their results the return of a large number of noble families—among them, a son of “Black” Radziwill—to the bosom of Romanism.

Many more felt themselves inclined to such a step by the ever increasing radicalism of certain sects. As early as 1546, the first Unitarians, who denied the Trinity, had met in Cracow. Later the Sienese nobleman, Lelio Sozzini (Socinus), after whom the whole sect are often called Socinians, came to the same city and gave them increased stability. A Polish scholar, Peter Goniondski or Gonesius, boldly acknowledged himself an adherent to his doctrines before the Reformed synod, and founded a regular anti-Trinitarian church, which soon had many disciples among both nobility and commoners, possessed numerous churches and schools, and organized a synod of its own. Its confession (1574) declared Christ to be the highest and most perfect of prophets, and the Holy Spirit a gift which God had made to this prophet. Baptism was to be conferred only on adults; the Lord’s Supper was explained symbolically as in the Calvinistic church. This Unitarian community taught and practiced, besides, the greatest tolerance and abstention from all sorts of violence.

The progress of Unitarian sentiment in Poland, and the religious liberty that prevailed there, attracted thither the nephew of Lelio, Fausto Sozzini, a man equally learned, lovable, and conscientious. For twelve years, he had been a favorite of the Grand Duke of Tuscany; but, in order to be free to follow his religious convictions, he left his fatherland, and, after many wanderings, settled in Poland, where he remained and worked until his death (1607). At the synod of Brzesc in Lithuania, in the year 1588, he gave the Unitarian church of Poland its final shape. It cannot be denied that the maintenance of doctrines that were then considered as godless and criminal all over the western world offended many of the weaker minds among the Protestants and led to their rejoining the Catholic church.

Meanwhile, Stephen Báthori had obtained important successes in his foreign policy. With the aid of German mercenaries, he drove the Russians out of Livonia and took from them the entire principality of Polotzk. Hard pressed, the cunning Ivan IV. applied to the Jesuit, Antonio Possevin, who was then in Poland on behalf of the pope, giving him to understand that, if he would use his influence in Ivan's interest, he would open Russia to the order and favor the conversion of his people to Catholicism. Possevin was prevailed upon by this promise, and, under the influence of the Jesuits, peace was concluded in 1582. It was decidedly advantageous to Poland, which was secured in the possession of Livonia, though it had to surrender its conquests in Russia proper.

Possevin betook himself to Moscow, with some other members of the order, to reap there the fruits of his mediation; but his great expectations were speedily dispelled. Ivan refused to allow the Jesuits to remain in Russia, but did agree that the German noblemen and burghers, whom he had taken prisoners in Livonia, should not be allowed to return; then there would be so many heretics the less in Livonia, and its conversion to Catholicism would be the easier. These prisoners founded the German *slobode* (suburb) of Moscow, which was afterward to have so great an influence on the destinies of Russia.

In his attempt to free the crown from the control of the great families, and thus restore to it its former independence and power, Stephen was wholly unsuccessful. Worn out by this fruitless effort, Stephen Báthori died on December 12, 1586, at the age of fifty-four (Fig. 28). He left no direct heirs.

The question of the succession arose again. In the last decade, the Catholics had made such gains that only Catholic candidates were mentioned. There were two: Archduke Maximilian, brother of Rudolf II., and the Crown Prince of Sweden, Sigismund, whose mother was a Jagellon

and therefore a zealous friend of the Jesuits. Sigismund himself was a loyal pupil of the fathers, and his election was favored by the pope, who expected through him to recover Sweden and Poland to Catholicism.




FIG. 28.—Tomb of Stephen Báthori. In the royal chapel at Cracow.

Public opinion also in Poland was favorable to the descendant of the Jagellons, so Sigismund obtained a majority of the votes. The minority, however, would not yield, and a civil war ensued. It was not till Maxi-

milian had suffered a defeat at Pitschen (1588), and had been taken prisoner by Zamoyski, that Sigismund was universally acknowledged as king.

This prince surrendered himself entirely to the control of the Jesuits. Though as a ruler he had little to do with the kingdom as a whole, his personal influence was very great. He not only made appointments to all great offices and dignities, but he had also to assign the domains (the starosties) to nobles, who kept them for life and paid to the crown a very slight rent for them. In all, he had twenty thousand positions to bestow. The king entrusted all these bribes and baits to the Jesuits. Father Skarga distributed dignities, revenues, and starosties at his own good pleasure, and it is to such means that Pope Clement VIII. himself attributed the progress of Catholicism in Poland. And he was right; in order not to lose the advantages held out by the king and a seat in the senate, Polish and Lithuanian noblemen went back in crowds to the Roman Catholic church. Their example was contagious, and secession from Protestantism became almost universal. Every great nobleman drew after him the numerous lesser nobles who were dependent upon him; on his estates, Protestant churches were restored to Catholic worship; Protestant pastors were expelled; and the peasantry and small burghers were obliged to submit to the change. The Radziwill family was one of the first to adopt this course; therefore one of its members was rewarded with a cardinal's hat. Everywhere Jesuit colleges were erected, and the children of the nobles imbibed in them the most bitter hatred for all heretics.

In the cities, the decisions of partial judges robbed the Protestants of their parish churches and gave them to the Catholics. Jesuit missionaries, surrounded by great pomp and protected by the Cossacks of the great nobles, traveled all over the land, winning souls by persuasion or by terror. By such means Protestantism was almost entirely eradicated in Poland proper and in Lithuania; not by direct persecution, be it remembered, but by the skill of the Jesuits and the base greed of the nobles, with whom material interests counted more than moral and spiritual. "A short time since," wrote a papal nuncio in 1598, "it did seem as if heresy would entirely supplant Catholicism; now Catholicism is driving heresy to its grave." And, with the new religious doctrines, the culture and intellectual life of Poland declined.

The fate of the Greek church, to which most of Lithuania, together with the dependent provinces of Little Russia and White Russia, belonged, was like that of the Protestant confessions. The old Lithuanian princely families of the Czartoryskis and Sanguszkos, the Russian

families of note—the Oginskis, the Wielhurskis, the Sapiehas, and even descendants of Rurik himself, like the Princes Ostrogski and Wisznowiecki, forsook their inherited faith for the religion of the Polish court. And thus they became renegades, not to their religion alone, but also to their race; for they assumed the Polish nationality and Polish speech, together with the faith of the Latin church.

Soon, however, the Jesuits succeeded in inflicting a still more serious blow on the Greek church of Lithuania, by inducing the king to threaten that he would henceforth admit to the senate only such great prelates as had made their submission to Rome. At the synod of Brzesc-Litewski, therefore, in 1594, most of the Lithuanian bishops expressed their assent to the union formulated by the Council of Florence in 1438; they recognized, among other dogmas, purgatory and the supremacy of the pope, but they retained the Slavic tongue for public service, as well as the rites and hierarchy of the Greek church. They were received into the communion of Western Christendom under the name of “Greek United” church. This was one of the most signal victories of Rome in the sixteenth century. After so many irrecoverable losses, it had at last one new conquest to show. Nowhere else did the Counter-reformation and the Jesuits work so quickly and so comprehensively as in Poland-Lithuania in the reign of Sigismund III.

The policy of religious restoration adopted by Sigismund had the most pernicious consequences for the power and greatness of Poland. It can be said that this reign spread the seed of all the destructive agencies that were, with such startling rapidity, to cause the complete dissolution and ruin of the kingdom. The venality which had been encouraged in the nobles was soon to serve the purposes of foreign, and even of hostile powers, as readily as it had served those of Rome. The nobleman who had begun to serve the church for pay was easily persuaded to become the paid servant of Austria or Russia. The suppression of Protestantism alienated the population of East Prussia and paved the way for the loss of that important Baltic province. The Poles proceeded by violent measures to introduce Catholicism into Livonia, installing Catholic priests and bishops, handing over the schools to the Jesuits, and doing their best to do away with the German element. Is it a wonder that the Livonians turned longingly to Sweden for help?

Finally the union of the larger part of the Lithuanian church with Rome excited the wrath of the Cossacks, who were intensely attached to the Greek church. These plundering hordes of the Middle and Lower Dnieper had been organized by King Stephen Báthori as a barrier against the Turks and the Muscovites, and their country had for this reason

received the name of Ukraine (borderland). Their numbers had increased rapidly, and they now formed an army of 40,000 warriors, distributed into twenty regiments. When an attempt was made to force them into the United church, they rebelled; and, though quieted for a while by the concessions of the government, they remained dissatisfied and hostile to the Poles, a state of things that later had disastrous consequences for the kingdom.

The Polish policy of Sigismund caused intense dissatisfaction in Sweden; and thus the accession of the Vasas to the Polish throne, which was to have effected the union of the two great monarchies, was the very thing that led to permanent hostility between them.

Before leaving Sweden, Sigismund and his father, King John III., subscribed the so-called Statutes of Kalmar (September, 1587). These provided for a perpetual union between Sweden and Poland, but with a distinct national government and administration for each of the two countries. However strongly these statutes endeavored to ensure Sweden's independence, it soon appeared that that country was threatened with becoming a mere appendage to the larger Polish realm; when hostilities broke out between the Poles and Russians, King John also declared war against the czar (1590). This campaign was exceedingly burdensome for Sweden, which was then suffering from a failure of crops and from pestilence, and impoverished by the extravagant expenditures of John. The war proved unfortunate, so that already in John's reign the Swedes were dissatisfied with the Polish union.

John died November 17, 1592, and Sigismund, then twenty-six years old, inherited the throne. The Catholics were triumphant, expecting that in Sweden, as in Poland, heretics would be forced to submit. Considering the temper of the Swedish people at this time, it is scarcely conceivable that a violent attempt at reaction could have succeeded; it would probably have led to the deposition of the Vasa dynasty, had there not been a scion of it willing and able to keep the nation in the way traced by Gustavus.

Charles of Södermanland, then forty-two years of age, had, with some trifling exceptions, and barring their different religious opinions, been a faithful vassal of his older brother. He was already the preferred favorite of the people. While John was half Catholic, and his son wholly so, Charles had remained true to his inherited Protestantism. While John ruled tyrannically and incapably, foolishly wasting the resources of his realm, Charles managed his dukedom and its finances with admirable order, and was a mild though firm ruler. Why should the nursling of the Jesuits leave Warsaw to come to Sweden? Did not

the Swedes already have a genuine son of Vasa among them—one who had remained true to his ancestor's ways?

Charles at first behaved with great circumspection, adopted moderate and safe measures, and conducted the government by the authority and with the full assent of Sigismund. But the latter could not help being jealous of his uncle; to weaken his influence, he appointed noblemen devoted to his own cause, who were independent of Charles's authority, as governors and commanders in Esthonia and Finland. This gave serious offence to the duke, and led him to take the first step toward a rupture with the king; he entered into a covenant with the council "to conduct the administration without prejudice to their fealty to Sigismund, under conjoint responsibility—each for all, and all for each." He gave his opposition to the king a still more pronounced character by convoking a diet, and at the same time a church synod, at Upsala, in 1593. "Religion and liberty," he said to those assembled there, "are my father's gifts to our country; it is our duty to preserve them, now that we have a foreign king whose conscience is under thralldom to the pope." He stirred up all the patriotic and religious sentiments of the Swedes. Well could the Protestant Bishop Petrus Jonä say joyfully: "Now Sweden has become one man, and we all have one God."

All of John's religious innovations, the Red Book included, were abolished, and Luther's doctrine restored in its purity. All accepted this step voluntarily; there was no violent reaction and no persecution to mar the national victory. This Upsala assembly of 1593 rendered impossible any future attempt to Catholicize the country; it established Protestantism in Sweden on an immovable foundation, and it prepared the way for the great work of Gustavus Adolphus.

Charles had proceeded with great prudence. He had simply set things in motion, and, as soon as he saw they were moving as he wished, he had stepped aside, merely subscribing to the decisions of the diet and assembly. Thus, without making himself prominent or assuming an attitude of direct opposition to the king, he had become the leader of the national Protestant movement, which carried with it the overwhelming majority of the Swedish people.

A few months later, in September, 1593, Sigismund arrived in Sweden to be crowned. He was received with great distrust, and, as he refused to ratify the Upsala resolutions, matters soon reached a crisis and blows were exchanged between his Polish followers and the burghers of Stockholm. Charles kept himself in his duchy. But, when the estates refused to acknowledge Sigismund unless he first ratified the resolu-

tions of 1593, the duke came to Upsala with 3000 soldiers and put himself and his force at the disposal of the estates.

Sigismund had to yield, in appearance at least, and was thereupon crowned as king. But he at once proceeded to violate his pledge in hundreds of instances; he favored the Catholics everywhere; he set up Catholic worship; and when, on his return to Poland, he had to appoint Charles as his vicegerent, he bestowed such extensive powers on provincial governors as to make centralization impossible. The governors acted as they pleased, and openly resisted the commands of the duke.

Charles resorted once more to the means that had succeeded so well before: he summoned the estates. Before they began their deliberations, he addressed the people in the public square, and they enthusiastically promised him their aid in the maintenance of the resolutions passed and to be passed under his guidance. The estates were forced to follow the popular opinion, though the nobility had shown an inclination to side with the distant king rather than with the near duke, thinking that they might thus be freer to do their own pleasure. But the enthusiasm of the people and the clearly expressed opinions of both burghers and peasants in the diet prevailed over such selfish calculations. The Statutes of Söderköping confirmed and strengthened those of Upsala. An end was to be put to the last remnants of Catholic worship; all Catholic clergymen—and, in fact, all sectaries opposed to the evangelical church—were to leave the land within six weeks; even the ancient and renowned monastery of Wadstena was suppressed.

Sigismund was beside himself at the revolutionary conduct of his uncle. He forbade the people to pay the taxes imposed by Charles, urged the council to withstand the duke, and promised protection to all who should rise against the resolutions of Söderköping. But the people were well pleased with the duke's course, and stood faithfully by him. Charles offered to resign the regency, but summoned another meeting of the estates (1597), this time at Arboga. There the higher and more conservative classes, the nobility and the clergy, separated from him; but the peasants, brandishing their clubs and axes, exclaimed that they would defend the duke as long as "their blood was warm." The nobles who opposed him had to leave the country; the bishops who refused to acknowledge him were deposed, and, in some cases, imprisoned. Under the pressure of the excited multitude, the decisions of the diet were wholly in accord with the duke's desire; his enemies were declared to be enemies of the country. A civil war ensued, but ended soon in the complete triumph of Charles; several of the king's adherents were executed, in accordance with the decrees of Arboga.




FIG. 29. Charles IX. of Sweden. Original painting in Gripsholm.

Sigismund, fearing that he might lose even the semblance of authority in Sweden, appeared in that country in the summer of 1598 with a force of 5000 Polish soldiers. The moment was a critical one. The royal name had clearly not lost all its power, and many disapproved of the duke's revolutionary proceedings, so that nearly the whole of Southern Sweden, including Stockholm, declared for the king. But the north, out of which the Vasa dynasty had arisen eighty years before, remained true to Charles. A decisive battle was fought at Linköping, southwest of Stockholm, in which Sigismund was completely routed (September 25, 1598). Three days later, he concluded a treaty with his victorious uncle, in which he basely betrayed his most devoted partisans, but according to which he was to administer the government himself and promised to convoke the national diet within four months.

Instead of fulfilling his pledges, he placed Polish garrisons in a few cities and sailed for Dantzic; he still hoped to be able to make a more successful effort to recover his hereditary kingdom. But he had underestimated the opposition of Protestant Sweden. As it had been agreed in the treaty of Linköping that the estates should have the right to oppose any party that violated the treaty, the diet of Stockholm, on July 24, 1599, deposed Sigismund and transferred the government to Charles (Fig. 29). This was the end of Sigismund's rule in Sweden; it was also the final triumph of Protestantism in that country, an event of the greatest significance not only for the destinies of the Swedish people, but also for the general religious history of Europe, for it was on the Swedish rock that the mighty waves of the Counter-reformation broke and were driven back.

The difficulties in the way of the new ruler were many. He did not venture at once, though repeatedly urged by the estates, to assume the royal title. Sigismund's party was not yet powerless in Sweden; it still held Kalmar and other fortresses. Charles proceeded with great vigor, and, it must be confessed, with severity. The Finns, who strongly supported Sigismund, were beaten, their strongholds destroyed, and the royalist leaders were executed. Nearly all the adult members of the higher nobility fell by the executioner's sword or were driven into exile, while their property was confiscated.

Meanwhile Sigismund had induced the Poles to declare war against the usurper. But the weak and cowardly king was no match for Charles of Südermanland, any more than the disorganized and selfish Polish nobles were a match for the Swedish people, filled as they were with religious and patriotic ardor. In the summer of 1600, Charles conquered nearly the whole of Livonia. On his return, he set himself to

work with consummate skill to secure still more completely the people's favor. He repeatedly offered his resignation to the estates; he consulted them frequently in the choice of his counselors.

His opposition to his brother Eric and to his nephew Sigismund proceeded not so much from personal ambition as from a desire to preserve for the house of Vasa a kingdom which their madness threatened to destroy. He repeatedly offered the crown to Sigismund's younger brother, John, who as often refused it; as late as 1604, when, in answer to the persistent request of the estates, he finally accepted, as Charles IX., the kingdom for himself and his descendants, he still offered to resign his dignity in John's favor. He labored earnestly to improve the judicial system of Sweden, which had as yet no code; he reorganized local administration and the levying of taxes; he favored commerce and industry with all his power, especially mining and iron-working. In his reign, Sweden exported a considerable quantity of cannon and cannon-balls.

Just at this time the Polish-Swedish contest was complicated by Sigismund's interference in the affairs of Russia, and by the adventures of the pseudo-Demetrius.

At the close of the Middle Ages, Ivan III. had inaugurated a new epoch for the Russian empire. This remarkable man, with his cool, refined cruelty, without a single sympathetic trait in his character, was the creator of modern Russia. He put an end forever to Tatar rule and brought to a close the destructive wars against the small, half-independent princes, thus securing the independence and unity of Russia. But he did more. He asserted his claim to all lands that had once been Russian—a claim that was to lead to the destruction of the Lithuanian kingdom; and he declared himself the protector of the Greek Orthodox church in foreign lands, a step that forced Russia to assume an aggressive policy against Turkey and Poland. This same prince built up a strong absolutism within his dominions, secured quiet and order to his subjects, framed laws, and founded a standing army; he was a Peter the Great at the close of the fifteenth century!

He was succeeded by Vasili IV. (Fig. 30), Ivanovitch (1505–1533). As his father had put an end to the independence that Great Novgorod had enjoyed for several hundred years, Vasili deprived Pskoff of its liberty, and, at the same time, of its prosperity. He conquered Smolensk, then a city of Polish Lithuania. His father had entertained close relations with the German empire; Vasili kept up this friendship, and Maximilian I. sent as envoy to Moscow the Baron of Herberstein, author of the extremely interesting "*Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii*."



FIG. 30.—Grand Prince Vasili IV., Ivanovitch. Reduced facsimile of the etching by Augustin Hirschvogel (about 1503-1552) in the first edition of Herberstein's "Rerum Moscoviticarum Commentarii" (Vienna, 1549).

Vasili's son, Ivan IV., surnamed the Terrible (1533–1585), was a prince of far greater ability and power than his father. To understand and appreciate justly his reign, we must take into consideration the state of affairs in Russia after Vasili's death. Grand Prince Ivan was only three years of age when he nominally succeeded to the throne. His near relatives perished in the struggle for the regency, and the boyars, the nobility of office in Russia, seized control of the government and treated the young prince with insolence. They were unable, however, to establish their rule firmly; disorder, intrigue, murder, and all sorts of violence prevailed all over the land: there were even risings among the common people, long-suffering and submissive as are the Russians of the lower classes.

Such was the school in which Ivan grew up; he learned in it dissimulation, hardness, and cruelty. These seemed to him the only means by which to maintain the power of the crown and the unity of the empire. When fourteen years of age, he seized with a firm hand the reins of government, remorselessly put to death all the leaders of the nobility, and assumed—first of all Russian princes—the title of czar (1546). Full of contempt for the rudeness, barbarism, and ignorance of his people, he strove to attract to his country foreign scholars, artisans, and mechanics, and by their means to secure for Russia the advantages, wealth, and power of western civilization. An English merchant-fleet having found its way to the White Sea, Ivan gave them a ready welcome and entered into friendly relations with their country. He published the first systematic Russian code of law. By the side of the irregular levies of the lesser nobility and their retainers, he organized a permanent guard, the *streletsi*. To remedy the evil of varying religious views and practices, he convoked at Moscow in 1551 a council, the decrees of which—the *Stolavnic*, or Book of the Hundred Chapters—form to this day the basis of the Russian ecclesiastical polity. They bear upon the discipline and elementary instruction of the clergy, deal with superstitions and crimes, and present Russian faith and Russian morals in a definite and intended contrast to those of the West. This did not interfere with the civilizing efforts of the czar and his advisers; Ivan had a printing press set up in Moscow, and the first book printed in Russia appeared there in 1564.

He had been reigning long and wisely, when he fell severely ill; and the boyars, who thought him near his death, turned openly against him and went back to their old practices. This awakened in Ivan memories of his sad childhood; he became a prey to incessant suspicions and vindictive rage, and determined to crush the least show of independence; he decimated the higher nobility, and even his very best friends, killing


many of them with his own hand. Whole cities were ruined; on the calumnious charge of a worthless knave, Novgorod was almost wholly destroyed, and thousands of its inhabitants were tortured to death. In a fit of frenzy, he slew his eldest son, who resembled him in many ways. In short, he suffered from that tyrannical mania that affected so many Roman emperors: the Roman people rid themselves of such monsters by assassination; the Russians, more servile, submitted and suffered, but they called him Ivan the Terrible.

Meanwhile, however, the czar was prosecuting his wars. But fortune had forsaken him; neither against the Poles nor against the Crim Tatars was he successful. The former and also the Swedes drove him out of the Baltic provinces; the latter came and burned down Moscow (PLATE VII.), the Kremlin alone escaping. On the other hand, some Russian adventurers, unsupported by their government, made the beginning of a very important conquest. Two brothers named Stroganoff, large dealers in salt and peltries, determined to seek a market beyond the Ural Mountains, which at that time bounded the geographical knowledge of the Russian people. They entrusted the leadership of the expedition to a Cossack, Jermak, who collected a number of companions and crossed the mountains in 1579. They took an active part in the quarrels of the Transuralian princes and possessed themselves of the land of Khan Kutschum and his capital, Sibir, situated on the Irtysh. From this city, the whole territory beyond the mountains was called Siberia.

Jermak went back to Russia, and the two Stroganoffs hastened to convey their unexpected conquest to Ivan and to extend their discoveries farther and farther eastward. Such were the insignificant beginnings of the vast Asiatic empire of Russia.

Worn out by excesses of all kinds, Ivan IV. (Fig. 31) died in 1585, in the fifty-fifth year of his age. His son and successor, Feodor, was weak in body and mind. His father had for that reason appointed a council of regency, consisting of five boyars, foremost among whom were Nikita Romanovitch, brother of the young czar's mother, and Boris Godunof, brother of Feodor's wife. But these regents quarreled. At last, Boris Godunof treacherously seized the supreme authority by overthrowing his opponents, putting some to death, and banishing others. It was then that Siberia began to serve as a place of exile.

Godunof was now virtual master, though he left Feodor the title of czar. As the latter was childless, Boris conceived the bold plan of exterminating the relatives of the legitimate ruler and securing the crown for himself and his descendants. Feodor's younger half-brother, Dimitri (Demetrius), was secretly murdered and his mother shut up in



Facsimile of a Plan of Moscow in

One of the oldest pa

ТОРЪ БѢ МѢШЪ ПѢРЪ



Benevole Lector, in hac tabula VRBIS MOSKVÆ quadripartitam sectionem, aut murorum quatuor munitiones vidis quorum interna KITAYGOROD dicitur, ipsaque est VRBS. Huius proximæ adiacet Castellum, aut Krezia, muris seclusa, appellatur, KREMLÉNAGRAD, quæ duæ mure cinguntur Lapideæ, nemini tam materia adhectâ Civitas quæ ab Oriente, Septentrione et Occidente has cingit TZARGOROD dicitur. Casarea civitas: muro ex albo lapide cingitur, sed materiâ terrea aggestâ. Extrâ circumcingsens has SKORODVM nominatur, murum habet ligneum sine ullis ternis; pars huius Meridionalis, ultra flumen Moskva sita, etiam STRELZKA SLABODA dicitur, quod domos istas milites inhabitant, et custodiam Magni Domini Caesaris, et Magnæ Ducis, et ipsæ ab unâ et Martis

In KITAYGRAD, idest, univrsâ Vrbo, numeris suis hæc notata loca designantur

1. Troyts; Templum S. Trinitatis, cuius etiam Hierosolymis dicitur, quod Palmiarum folio Patriarcha sine insidens, a Casare introducitur.
2. Turris symbolaria templi prædicti.
3. Nôlebo meci; Conclave, seu concubium i latere extructum, in quo Patriarcha diebus supplicatiorum nonnullis canit cantus, etiam servit publicis promulgationibus.
4. Plossot, plantities supplicis ductæ.
5. Porta Nigra, quæ et Portalemus nemina.
6. Porta ad flumen Moskva.
7. Officina orreas vendentium.
8. Tomosno, Templum quo omnes mercæque importantur vestigial pendunt.
9. Mercatorum taberna, ubi omnes mercæ venduntur.
10. Taberna prelorum.
11. Hospitium, quo Russiæ circumiacentibus urbibus hospitio excipiuntur, ut mores suas vendant.
12. Officina menturaria.
13. Aula Anglorum Moskva negotiantium.
14. Venerende Templum Sacrosancti Christi cuius turris circumcinctum decoratur.
15. Aula dilecti Romanensis, quibus etiam Hierosolymis Casaria Mahadala dicitur.
16. Aula Bulgæ et novorum.
17. Aula Logatorum.
18. Aula Metropolita Novogradensis.
19. Aula Stephani iaculantis Godunoff.
20. Turmen, Carceres sunt.
21. Uvarovskij vorod, Porta est.
22. Porta Clinichia.
23. Porta Nicolai.
24. Typographia.
25. Aula Islamidis dilecti Romanoffia.
26. Aula Mahadala dilecti Romanoffia.
27. Aula Kneze Patri Bussiffia.
28. Aula Kneze Andrei Tristarka.
29. Aula Petro Mahadala dilecti Romanoffia.
30. Aula Kneze Boris Terkaite.
31. Armamentarium, quod ornamenta bellica adferuntur.
32. Aula tribunalis, quæ lances curules decorantur et doli vorodis circumambos ubique sunt, quæ et supplicia auribus.
33. S. Nizhny; Monasterium, quæ curis basilicas, formâ aurum et fave, ut dicitur omnia solvantur.

In TZARGRAD, notata sunt hæc

1. Casaris epule.
2. Porta ad aquas ducons, ut inservi at stabulis.
3. Hortus berbyfor Pharaonici Casari.
4. Novissimum Curia.
5. Nasocomium.
6. Domus quæ limenta bellica custodit.
7. Forum apuarum.
8. Aula Mercatorum Polonorum, cui conliga Mercatorum Armeniarum et India.
9. Nasocomium, ubi sultet Piscei venditur.
10. Brashnik turmes, Carcer christianorum.

Nômina portarum sinexlerioribus Urbibus

1. Tzartoffskie.
2. Orbatshka.
3. Nikitskie.
4. Tverskie.
5. Dmitroffskie.
6. Petroffskie.
7. Oustrelentskie.
8. Petroffskie.
9. Iauskie.
10. Xerpegeffskie.
11. Kolushie.
12. Fradiffkie.

Duodecim porte in muro lapideæ, decimo et undecima sunt sunt sunt in ligno muro. novæ in ligno muro Belzariste vorod dicitur, eas proximæ adiacent septuaginta Germanis.

SKORODVM hæc notæ habet,

1. Magni Ducis hortus.
2. Aquæ calidæ sen Therma.
3. Forum lignarum.

last third of the sixteenth century.

Moscow now existing.



FIG. 31.—Ivan IV. Reduced facsimile of the engraving by Hans Weygel (died 1590).

a convent. The few relatives of the czar disappeared one after another, in a way that could scarcely be called accidental. Godunof then set himself to secure the favor of the clergy. He made the Russian church independent of the Patriarch of Constantinople by declaring the Metro-

politan of Moscow patriarch of the whole North. He won the nobles by depriving the Russian peasants of the right of migrating freely, thus making them real serfs bound to the soil (1592). The influential classes having thus been secured, the way to the throne was prepared for him when Feodor died childless (1598), and the ruling house of Muscovy ended with him. No one thought of offering the crown to some other one of the numerous descendants of Rurik.

It was an easy thing for the grateful clergy to induce the people to call for the coronation of Boris Godunof. The great national assembly (Duma) of bishops, boyars, princes, and representatives of the city merchant guilds approved the choice. For some time, Boris, for form's sake, refused to accept the proffered crown; at length, however, "he submitted to God's will," and was solemnly crowned in September, 1598.

He had reached his goal; but, as is wont to be the case with usurpers, he met with great difficulties as soon as the people had had time to take a calm view of the situation. The peasants could not forget or forgive the loss of their liberty of migrating; the boyars would not forget that Boris had been one of their number. The usurper, full of suspicion, dealt harshly with both classes. The Romanoff family, that had once stood so near the throne, were deprived of their possessions and banished; their chief, Prince Feodor Nikitsch, was shorn and shut up in a monastery as a monk, under the name of Philaretus. All the higher nobility were soon embittered against the new czar. But his worst foes were the very clergy whom he had lately so favored. The cause of their estrangement was Boris's endeavor to encourage intercourse with foreign nations, to attract strangers to Russia, and, last and worst, to found in Moscow a university after the western plan, and invite to it learned men from other parts of Europe. A terrible famine added to the universal discontent.

Under these circumstances, there suddenly appeared a youth claiming to be Dimitri, Feodor's younger brother. Who he really was, no one could tell; but his speech and general appearance rendered it probable that he was a Pole, a tool of the Jesuits, who wished with his aid to establish Catholicism in Russia. No one now doubts that Dimitri was an impostor. It is an established fact that a groom of the Polish Prince Wisznowiecki, in an alleged severe sickness, asserted while confessing to a Jesuit that he was the real Dimitri; he said that some one else had been slain under his name; and, to prove his identity, he showed a gold cross adorned with diamonds, and various papers (1603). His master and his master's family believed his assertion. The Jesuits were naturally much interested in him, and had him enter a Jesuit college, to be

taught the truths of the Catholic religion. King Sigismund III., as a dutiful pupil of the fathers, at once acknowledged him as Czar Dimitri, gave him a pension of 20,000 marks, and granted permission to all Poles to join the "Great Prince" in his attempt to recover his empire.

Dimitri solemnly pledged himself to make Catholicism the state religion of Russia, to marry Marina Mniczech, daughter of the voivode of Sandomir, and to surrender various provinces to the republic of Poland. He then started on his expedition in August, 1604, accompanied by many thousand Polish nobles. As soon as the invading army reached Russian soil, the general dissatisfaction with Boris, the veneration entertained for the old legitimate dynasty, and, besides, the force of example, brought multitudes of Russians over to the pretender. Boris died suddenly on April 13, 1605, having, it is supposed, poisoned himself in his despair. His widow and his son Feodor were strangled by the populace.

On June 20, 1605, the false Dimitri made his solemn entrance into Moscow, in the midst of rapturous manifestations of joy. The mother of the real Dimitri was released from her imprisonment in a convent, and, full of vindictiveness against the Godunofs, did nothing to expose the impostor, though she did not formally acknowledge him as her son. The banished families, especially the Romanoffs and Shuiskis, returned, and the new czar began his reign wisely and mildly. But his past rose threateningly against him. He had to reward the greedy Poles who had accompanied him, with Russian gold and Russian estates. Polish customs and Polish influence prevailed at his court. He entertained close relations with the hated west, and allowed the Jesuits to hold Catholic worship in the Kremlin. Finally Dimitri wished to organize a standing army of foreigners, which was to be maintained, in large measure, at the expense of the church. Marina, a Polish woman and a Catholic, was betrothed to Dimitri, and—a thing never done before—solemnly crowned as czarina.

The fanatical hatred of the Russians against everything foreign, and especially against the Roman Catholic church, now broke out in all its intensity. They, the only orthodox believers, saw themselves delivered over to heretics and to their hated Polish neighbors. Prince Vasili Shuiski, whom Dimitri had unwisely pardoned for a former conspiracy, gave able leadership to the general discontent, and strengthened it with his armed retainers. On May 17, 1606, a terrible riot broke out in Moscow, in which the pretender and his most prominent adherents, many Germans among them, were slain by the enraged mob. Other Poles—the czarina, the Mniczechs, and the Wisznowieckis included—were arrested and distributed among various Russian cities.

Thus ended the reign of the impostor Dimitri, after less than a year's duration.

The throne was now vacant, and no legitimate claimant was on hand. As an attack on the part of Poland was expected, the boyars, with the approval of the people, made Vasili Shuiski, leader of the insurrection, czar. He at once did away with all of Dimitri's innovations, made important concessions to the boyars, and, to prevent the imitation of the impostor's attempt, caused the body of the true Dimitri to be disinterred and publicly exposed. It began at once to work miracles, and Dimitri was added to the saints of the Greek calendar.

It was unavoidable that the elevation of Shuiski should excite the envy and jealousy of many great nobles. They sent to Poland to secure there a new false Dimitri, and the Poles were quite ready to encourage civil war in Russia, and thus weaken a rival at whose expense Poland might grow rich. The new adventurer, as to whose origin nothing certain is known, maintained that he was Dimitri, and that he had escaped from the May massacre in Moscow. Accompanied by numerous Polish volunteers, he entered Russia in June, 1607, and penetrated as far as the gates of Moscow, where he intrenched himself in the hamlet of Tuschino; hence he is known to Russian tradition as the "thief of Tuschino." Many Russians joined him, and Marina, having escaped from confinement, shamelessly acknowledged him as her husband.

Shuiski, threatened by danger so near, turned for assistance to Sigismund's enemy, Charles IX. of Sweden. Five thousand Swedes, under the able generals, de la Gardie and Horn, came to his relief, and easily routed the undisciplined mob of rebels (1608). When Sigismund saw that the "thief of Tuschino" was making no headway, he deemed it best to turn the civil troubles of Russia wholly to his own advantage, declared war against that empire (1609), and, after a long and heroic resistance, took the important fortress of Smolensk. The second false Dimitri and Marina withdrew to Kaluga, where they carried on a plundering warfare till he was assassinated (December, 1610).

These disturbances gave rise to a profound dissatisfaction with Shuiski's rule. The discontent broke out in open rebellion when, in June, 1610, a Polish army under Stanislaus Zolkiewski won a brilliant victory over the czar, at Moshaisk. The Muscovites rose against their ruler and forced him to submit to the tonsure and enter a monastery. The rapid approach of the Poles forced the council of boyars to acknowledge Wladislaw, son of Sigismund, as czar, but not before he had pledged himself to protect the Greek church—indeed, to join it—as well as to admit the co-operation of the boyars in legislation and in the levying of taxes. The

newly elected czar did not abide in Russia long, but soon returned to Poland; his father seemed disposed to make use of his son's new dignity for the purpose of plundering and robbing Russia, and a Polish garrison kept Moscow in order by fire and sword.

Complete anarchy now (1611) prevailed. Marina Mniecech proclaimed as czar her son by the "Tuschino thief." A third pseudo-Dimitri arose in the person of the deacon Isidore, who found adherents in Pskoff. De la Gardie and his Swedes seized the fortress of Kexholm, in Russian Finland, and forced Novgorod the Great to recognize a Swedish prince, Charles Philip, as czar.

Russia seemed lost, a helpless prey to foreigners. She was saved by the patriotism, the courage, the resolution of the common people, that "multitude" which the worthless and selfish nobles loved to consider and to treat as slaves.

A butcher of Nishni Novgorod—Cosma Minin—summoned first his fellow-citizens, and then, when these had readily answered his call, all true Russians, to deliver their country from Polish heretics. Crowds came together to accomplish this task. The inhabitants of Great Novgorod were easily induced to renounce their Swedish prince. The citizens of Pskoff likewise drove out the priest Isidore. The Russians, once more united, attacked the Poles near Moscow, and, after a fierce battle lasting four days (August 20 to 23, 1612), won a complete victory. Two months later, the Polish garrison of the Kremlin surrendered after a brave defence, and, with the exception of Smolensk, all Russia was now rid of foreigners.

The question of supreme moment now was to place the nation under the rule of an able and legitimate chief. The nobles, the higher clergy, and representatives of the cities and circles met together. After long deliberations, Michael, the son of that Feodor Romanoff whom Godunof had thrust into a monastery, was elected czar (February 21, 1613), because he was the youngest and least powerful of the candidates, and had, moreover, formally acknowledged the right of the boyars to co-operate in the government.

During the following years, the Romanoff dynasty established itself more and more firmly on the throne, and the year 1613 may be considered as having put a final stop to the confusion that had prevailed in Russian politics. The Romanoffs are to-day the ruling dynasty of Russia.

Charles IX. had been unable to do anything to maintain the claims of his son, Charles Philip, to the Russian throne. He already had on his hands hostilities with Poland and with Denmark (1611). In this latter country, the peaceable Frederick II. had, in the year 1588, been

succeeded by Christian IV., then only eleven years of age. As soon as this prince became his own master (1596), he manifested a most ambitious spirit. He wished to acquire military fame, and turned upon Sweden, which he thought occupied in the Baltic provinces, and whose king he deemed weak and sickly. He found a pretext for war in certain disputes about the Lapland boundaries. His plan was at first successful; he defeated the Swedish king and took the important fortress of Kalmar.

Before Charles IX. could make that loss good, he died (October 30, 1611), at the age of sixty—a strong, energetic, and even passionate man, of great sagacity, and with deep and lofty feelings. He had succeeded in directing the destinies of his people according to his purpose, because he understood that people, recognized their needs and desires, and helped them to realize them.

He was succeeded by his son, Gustavus II., Adolphus, who was born on December 9, 1594. This young prince had been most carefully educated by his father; he spoke Latin, German, Dutch, and French fluently, and had a fair knowledge of Greek, Polish, and Russian. When yet a lad, he had taken part in state affairs, as a listener mostly, but now and then called upon for advice. In the campaign of 1611, he had played a not inglorious part.

For a youth of seventeen, the situation presented great difficulties. Charles, with his peculiar conscientiousness, had left to the estates the choice between Sigismund's brother, Duke John, and his own son, Gustavus Adolphus. The choice fell on Gustavus, but John, as compensation, received all of East and West Gotland as an almost independent duchy. The young king's brother, Charles Philip, obtained Südermanland, together with Norike and Wermland. Thus the unity of the nation was once more broken; besides, the nobles took advantage of the youth and insecure position of the new prince to impose upon him their co-operation by means of the royal council. The young king's chancellor was Axel Oxenstiern, only twenty-eight years of age, but already an experienced statesman and an indefatigable worker.

Bloody and costly wars were part of the inheritance which Charles IX. had left to his son, and one of the first cares of Gustavus was to put a measurably satisfactory end to them. It was clear that, in spite of their heroic valor, the Swedes could not face their foes on both the east and the west. It was fortunate for Sweden that the Danish nobles did not look favorably on their king's military successes, fearing lest "he might grow proud thereby and destroy them and their liberties." So Christian IV. was disposed to listen to overtures of peace, though the terms he granted the Swedes were quite severe. By the treaty of Knäröd (January,

1613), Gustavus renounced his sovereignty over Lapland and redeemed Elfsborg, the only Swedish port on the North Sea, at a cost of a million *rex thalers*, no inconsiderable sum for the times.

To guard against the return of such humiliations, Gustavus contracted an alliance of fifteen years with the States-General of the Netherlands, but, with a keen eye to the future, stipulated that it should in no wise affect "the supremacy and control of the Baltic Sea." The Dutch envoys describe the young king as "slender in figure, shapely, with a pale complexion, somewhat long features, light hair, and a pointed blond beard." Great things were even then expected of him, and men praised his kindness, his prudence, and his eloquence.

Gustavus, having no longer anything to fear on the side of Denmark, determined to profit by the confusion prevailing in Russia, and met with some successes, though he failed to retake Pskoff. In February, 1617, a peace was concluded at Stolbowa, by which Sweden obtained possession of Ingermanland and Carelia. This was an acquisition of the greatest importance, as Russia was now shut out from the Baltic Sea. Ingermanland and Carelia were bulwarks not only for Finland, but for Sweden herself. How wisely the king had judged was shown a hundred years later, when those provinces were restored to Russia. "I hope to God," Gustavus said, as the treaty was passed, "that the Russians will not now find it easy to cross this brook" (the Baltic).

Gustavus made it one of the first aims of his reign to secure for Sweden the Baltic Sea and its shores. A good beginning was this setting aside of his Russian rivals. Sweden now stood forth bold and powerful, full of Protestant zeal and faith, the shield of the Reformation in Europe, and especially in Germany. The efforts of the Catholics had proved utterly unavailing; they had resulted in utterly eradicating from the people's hearts all attachment to the old doctrines and intensifying their hatred of Catholicism.

For a few years longer, Rome flattered itself that, with the aid of Poland, it might win Russia to the Catholic faith. To this end, the Jesuits had applied all the means of deceit, falsehood, and violence so characteristic of their order. But the Russian people, grown conscious of their own strength, had broken the net woven about them, and Poles and Jesuits had been ingloriously driven out of the land.

The Counter-reformation in the northeast retained only one of its conquests—Poland. This was a misfortune for that noble country. Catholic bigotry worked the same ruin for the Poles that it wrought in Spain and in Italy. The lands where Rome prevailed were doomed to decay and sometimes utter ruin, whilst Protestant countries grew more and more

powerful and enterprising. Whether one looks upon it with joy or with regret, it cannot be gainsaid: at the beginning of the seventeenth century, Protestant nations were steadily growing in power, greatness, and prosperity; the nations over which Jesuitism and Romanism had control were showing signs of rapid and apparently irretrievable decay.

To revert to Poland: how successfully, how smoothly had the transition seemed to be made from the old dynasty to the new order, whilst neighboring Russia, after the extinction of its hereditary house, sank into apparently hopeless confusion! And yet the heroic firmness of the Russian people had extricated them out of this confusion and had laid the foundations of a mightier and larger development, whilst in Poland the germ of decay that lay in its very vitals was rapidly destroying the body politic. The clergy kept the lower classes in subjection, whilst themselves serving the interests of a rude, selfish, and dissolute nobility.

But in Germany the momentous question was—into which of the two camps, that of Protestantism or that of the Counter-reformation, the nation would pass. Not the German people alone, but the whole west, was profoundly interested in the issue.

BOOK II.


THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

(A. D. 1618-1648.)



Procession at the Coronation of Em

Facsimile of a



or Matthias, in Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1612.

porary anonymous engraving.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

CHAPTER IV.

THE EMPEROR MATTHIAS AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE GREAT WAR.

(A. D. 1612-1619.)

IN the whole course of her history, Germany had never passed through a crisis so momentous as that which marked the beginning of the seventeenth century. There had been, in earlier times, revolts of individual princes against the emperor; there had been bitter conflicts between church and state. But, at the close of the reign of Rudolf II., the situation was altogether novel: the two religious parties, as such, stood in array against each other, ready to fight to the death. The continued existence of the Holy Roman Empire and the unity of the German people were at stake. Both parties saw and deplored the disasters impending over their country, but both contributed to bring them on. Would the Hapsburgs, who now stood almost by hereditary right at the head of Germany, be willing and able to avert the threatening evils? This was a question of vital importance.

A peculiar fate attended the sons of Maximilian II.: Rudolf II., the eldest, although in many respects highly endowed by nature, was obstinate and unsound in mind; but a part of the blame for his failure is to be attributed to his own brother, Matthias, a man of great ambition and promise. Very adroitly, without compromising his own Catholicity, he had made use of the discontent of the Austrian, Hungarian, and Bohemian Protestants to obtain possession of the hereditary lands of the Hapsburgs. In the empire, also, the adherents of the new faith were by no means ill-affected to Matthias; for he had repeatedly negotiated with them with a view to adjusting all differences. Therefore they united with the Catholics for the purpose of securing his election as emperor, and Matthias had little difficulty in carrying out his plans and in being unanimously elected as emperor (June 13, 1612) (PLATE VIII.).

He had now reached the goal of his ambition, and took infinite delight in appearing in mediaeval pomp, surrounded by the electors



SERENISSIMVS POTENTISSIMVS INVICTISSIMVS PRINCEPS DOMINVS
DOMINVS MATTHIAS DEI GRATIA ROMANORVM IMPERATOR SEMPER
AVGVSTVS GERMANIAE HVNGARIAE BOHEMIAE DALMATIAE CRO-
ATIAE SCLAVONIAE ETC: REX ARCHIDVX AVSTRIAE DVX BVRGVN-
DIAE ETC: COMES TYROLIS ETC: P P P P.

Sacrae ejus Caesaris Majestatis Sculptor Egidius Sadeler de facie expressit et in deuoti animi signum humilis obtulit Pragae Anno Christiano MDC XVI. S. C. M.

FIG. 32.—Emperor Matthias. Reduced facsimile of an engraving (1616) by Aegidius Sadeler (1575–1629).

and princes of the empire. But, at the very summit of his good-fortune, he seemed to have exhausted his energy and power. The hope that he was destined to re-establish completely the imperial authority, and to unite the two opposing religious parties, disappeared entirely. Like his brother Rudolf and the contemporaneous Spanish Hapsburgs, he fell into a state of mental lethargy, finding his chief enjoyment in the pleasures of the table, in music, and in childish spectacles. His one deep and strong feeling was a superstitious piety, that filled him with continually increasing hatred of the Protestant estates of the empire and of his own evangelical subjects. And from this came his severest trials. In his eagerness to wrest the family lands from his eldest brother, he had made the most sweeping promises to the Protestants; but now, though he preferred peace, he wished to check the hated Reformation in the empire and to suppress it altogether in his own lands.

In the beginning of his reign, Matthias (Fig. 32) was regarded as a discreet and moderate prince after the pattern of Ferdinand I. and Maximilian II. For this reputation, he was chiefly indebted to his adviser, Bishop Khlesl of Vienna, who endeavored by a conciliatory policy to maintain the unity of the empire and to elevate the imperial power above the strife of parties. His plan was that Saxony and all the evangelical estates which were loyal to the emperor should unite with the Catholic League, with the emperor himself at its head, so that the imperial authority and the peace of the empire might be placed on a secure foundation and counterbalance the aggressive party among the Protestants; at the same time, the most urgent demands of the Protestants must be satisfied. The empire, thus united, would then take energetic action against the Turks, who, profiting by the struggles for Transylvania, had renewed their attacks on that part of Hungary which was still in possession of the Hapsburgs.

Under existing circumstances, it was very difficult to carry out such a plan; for Catholics and Protestants differed too decidedly on a large number of questions of vital importance. In the first place, the Catholics would not admit the right of the Protestant administrators of ecclesiastical foundations to a vote in the diet; for, if this claim were conceded, the Protestant estates would have the majority in the college of princes and in the diet itself. Secondly, the evangelicals were not admitted as members of the imperial Aulic council, for this would result in the decision of all cases in accordance with their views, and in the subjection of the imperial power to Protestant interests. At no price would the Catholics, though in the minority in the empire, give up their artificial majority in the diet and the council.

In March, 1613, the Catholic League assembled at Frankfort-on-the-Main, and, under the leadership of Maximilian of Bavaria, determined to resist to the uttermost the demands of their opponents; to risk, in case of need, even life and property against them, and to call on the foreign Catholic powers for aid. Somewhat later, the Protestant Union met at Rothenburg on the Tauber, and decided that the Protestants should appear at the diets of the empire, but should take no part in their deliberations or decisions until the Protestant grievances were redressed. Better that Transylvania should be lost than the freedom and religion of the German estates. The Union, also, relied on foreign help. Its leader, Elector Frederick V. of the Palatinate, had recently married Elizabeth, daughter of King James I. of England, and niece of King Christian IV. of Denmark. The Union could in no way be induced to break up, in accordance with Khlesl's plan; but, on the contrary, it concluded a defensive alliance for fifteen years with the United Provinces of the Netherlands.

Under such threatening auspices, the diet met in Ratisbon, in August, 1613—the last diet that held its sessions in the traditional manner. The emperor asked for help against the Turks, but the Union and its adherents handed in a written statement of grievances for which they demanded redress before they would grant any money. Finally, however, they yielded to some extent, insisting for the moment only that the proceedings against the Protestants in matters of religion before the imperial courts should be suspended, and that the deputation to visit the imperial court should be composed of Catholics and Protestants in equal numbers.

But even these moderate demands found a hearing neither with the Catholic majority nor with the intolerant emperor, whose real sentiments were now revealed in such a way as to deprive the plans of his minister Khlesl of every prospect of success. The efforts of the latter to deceive the Protestants, and again, as at the imperial election, to win them over by lying promises, failed completely. Thereupon the Protestants, led by the Elector Palatine, carried out their threat and no longer took part in the diet. The Catholics, however, without their participation, granted a considerable sum of money to be used against the Turks, but it was never collected.

For the second time, the diet had broken up without coming to any result, owing to the religious disputes, and there was no reason for believing that any later meeting would have better success. On account of the partisan attitude of the emperor, an accommodation appeared impracticable. Everything tended toward a frightful religious war.

This conviction weighed heavily on every spirit. The anxiety of the Protestants was increased by the division which the unfortunate dispute about the Jülich succession had caused among themselves, a division which was daily becoming wider. This dispute had, as its immediate consequence, led to the defection to Catholicism of one of the joint occupants, Wolfgang, Count Palatine of Neuburg, son-in-law of Maximilian of Bavaria, who hoped by this step to win over the emperor, the Spaniards, and the League to the support of his claims to the whole Jülich territory. Thus, from being an ally, he became an enemy of Brandenburg and of the Union.

Fresh commotion was caused by Elector John Sigismund of Brandenburg (Fig. 33), who passed over from Lutheranism to Calvinism (Christmas, 1613). His new subjects on the Rhine were indeed, for the most part, of the Reformed confession; but what he gained with them by this change of faith, he lost with his subjects in Brandenburg, who were strict Lutherans, and with the Prussians, who became from that time still more hostile to the Hohenzollerns than formerly. Nor was he any more sure of the aid of the Dutch, who were actuated not by religious, but solely by political motives. In one thing, John Sigismund did not follow the uniform practice of all other German princes: he made no attempt to compel his subjects to change their faith in conformity with his own; but he strove to bring about a union between Lutheranism and Calvinism in the electorate, and became the forerunner, at least, of the evangelical union in the Brandenburg states. His conversion and his policy were of great importance; for they announced the deliverance of the Reformed church in North Germany from the cruel persecutions of Lutheranism, and they established the equality of the two religious confessions—the best feature in the internal administration of Brandenburg-Prussia. By abstaining from the attempt to



FIG. 33.—Medallion with portrait of John Sigismund, Elector of Brandenburg.




FIG. 34.—John George, Elector of Saxony. Reduced facsimile of the engraving by Samuel Weishun (1635).

compel his Lutheran subjects to go over with him to the Reformed church, John Sigismund set aside the illiberal principle, *cuius regio, eius religio*—"as the ruler, so the religion"—which at that time prevailed in all the rest of Germany.

But the immediate consequences of these events were unfavorable for Brandenburg and Protestantism. In political matters, they drove electoral Saxony completely into the arms of the emperor and the aggressive Catholics. In this electorate, John George I. (Fig. 34), a drunkard and a glutton, but a fanatical Lutheran and a bitter foe of the Reformed faith, had reigned since 1611. The conversion of John Sigismund to Calvinism had filled him with fury against him and his allies, the Unionists. By the accession of John George, the majority in the college of electors was secured for the Hapsburgs and the League. The Union, moreover, suffered severely under the great burdens imposed upon it by the Jülich war—burdens for which, on the whole, there was no adequate return. Financial exhaustion and feelings of disgust and despondency paralyzed the energies of most of its members.

In March, 1614, the now Catholic Count Palatine of Neuburg and the Elector of Brandenburg came to open strife. The Dutch entered the country to help John Sigismund, and occupied the fortress of Jülich; the Spanish general, Spinola (Fig. 35), appeared in favor of the Neuburg claimant and took the important city of Wesel. So the decision of the Cleves-Jülich succession devolved mainly on foreigners. And now there arose a still more momentous question: that of the succession to the throne of the empire.

It was not until the Emperor Rudolf II. had sunk into complete impotence that Matthias, already in his fifty-fifth year, married, in 1611, his cousin, the Archduchess Anna of the Tyrol. But the marriage was childless, and this circumstance filled the Catholics of Austria with anxiety. They desired that the emperor should nominate a successor as soon as possible, and that he should select a man who would not only render unnecessary all apprehensions for the future, but would also, in the present, support the feeble monarch in his conflict with the new doctrines.

From two quarters, claims were advanced to the imperial succession and to the succession in the hereditary territories of the emperor. King Philip III. of Spain believed that he had the best claim through his mother, a sister of Matthias, since the emperor's two brothers, both well advanced in years, declined the burdensome dignity. But the Bohemian and Hungarian law of inheritance, and, above all, the wishes of the German Hapsburgs and of all the German Catholics, summoned



*Ambroise Spinola Marquis de Seste Duc de Sanseverin
General de L'Armee du Roy d'Espagne.*

B. Moncornet exca

FIG. 35.—Ambrosius Spinola. Reduced facsimile of an engraving by B. Moncornet.

to the throne the emperor's cousin, Ferdinand of Styria, an active man and a zealot for the Catholic cause. He had the support of the ecclesiastical electors, who besought Matthias to designate as his successor a reliable man and a strict Catholic. It seemed as if the brilliant inher-

itance could scarcely escape Ferdinand's grasp, when he unexpectedly found a powerful opponent. Bishop Khlesl, the most influential favorite of the emperor, fearing that his influence would suffer by the nomination of a co-regent of such eminence and zeal as Ferdinand possessed, exerted himself to the utmost against him. He instilled into the mind of his sovereign the apprehension that Ferdinand harbored the darkest designs against him, and that he even aimed at restraining his power and his personal liberty; the result was that for a long time the archduke came no nearer his goal.

Then, without the knowledge of the emperor and his minister, Ferdinand came to terms with his Spanish rival. In the thoroughly unpatriotic way which characterized this future head of the empire, Ferdinand not only held out to Philip III. the prospect of all the vacant fiefs of the empire in Italy, but also promised (February, 1617) to cede to him Alsace, which the Spaniards had long coveted as a connecting link between their territories in the Netherlands and in Franche-Comté.

The Spanish claims being thus disposed of, Ferdinand remained the only candidate. Peter Pázmán, a Protestant renegade like Khlesl, who had risen from the position of a simple Jesuit priest to be Archbishop and Primate of Hungary, and who possessed great influence with the emperor, worked for Ferdinand; and at last the emperor, afflicted by a severe illness, yielded to the pressure from all sides and determined, contrary to Khlesl's advice, to summon the Bohemian estates to meet on June 5, 1617, for the election of the Styrian archduke as their king.

The Bohemian Catholics regarded the royal charter (*Majestätsbrief*) of Rudolf II., which placed the Protestants of Bohemia on a certain equality with themselves, as extorted by force and as an encroachment on their ancient privileges. From the first they had exerted themselves to impair the rights conferred by this charter, and, if possible, to annul them. Relying on a provision of the old Bohemian law that placed ecclesiastical possessions on the same footing with the royal domains—on which the Protestant inhabitants had the right of building churches—the Protestant subjects of the Abbot of Braunau had taken steps toward erecting a church without receiving his sanction. The Catholics objected, insisting that the Protestant claim that ecclesiastical lands were technically crown lands was based on a misinterpretation. When the case reached the emperor, he, to the surprise of the Protestants, decided in favor of the abbot. But this decision had at first little effect. The charter had formed, for the protection of the Protestants, the college of defenders out of the three higher estates. These defenders at once called an assembly of their fellow-believers, which declared in favor of the

people of Braunau and made it possible for them to complete their church and to employ a minister.

Matthias, however, troubled in conscience on account of his earlier promises to the evangelicals, resolved, in utter disregard of the charter, to set on foot a sweeping Counter-reformation in Bohemia. He began by forcing Catholic priests upon the Protestants on his own estates, while, as a result of his direct encouragement, the evangelical church at Braunau, and also one at Klostergrab, a small town belonging to the Archbishop of Prague, were closed and their ministers expelled (toward the end of 1614).

The discontent in Bohemia, especially among the nobility, became all the greater on account of these acts. The province had at that time a population of 2,500,000 vigorous and generally well-to-do people, distributed in 782 towns, 36,000 villages, and 150,000 peasant homesteads. Nine-tenths belonged to the new faith, while, of the 1400 families of the nobility, not more than 130 members—not a fortieth part—were Catholics. At the head of the opposition stood Baron Leonard Colonna von Fels and Count Henry Matthias von Thurn, of the ancient and renowned Milanese family of the Della Torre. In his youth he had served valiantly against the Turks. About religion as such, he troubled himself but little, regarding it only as a means for attaining the goal of his ambition, which was far beyond his mediocre abilities. He had placed himself at the head of the Protestants of Bohemia, and for that reason had received from King Matthias the rich appointment of Burgrave of Karlstein. But, now that the new emperor had reversed the policy of his predecessor, Thurn opposed him with all his influence.

But Matthias, guided by Ferdinand and encouraged by a few successes at the outset, persevered in the path on which he had entered. The Protestants saw plainly that the emperor, disregarding all his earlier pledges, was carrying out a systematic plan for their gradual suppression, and that they must now begin a life-and-death struggle against the Catholic propaganda. But on legal ground they suffered defeat; when the Bohemian diet met on June 5, 1617, the government manipulated it adroitly, warning the nobles that no one ought to join the opposition unless he had two heads. In addition to such threats, there was no lack of pledges, of persuasion, and of promises of personal favors. By such means Ferdinand was almost unanimously acknowledged as King of Bohemia, and on June 19 was crowned—the last coronation in accordance with the ancient ceremonial. With some reservations, he confirmed the ancient privileges of the land; but, at the same time, he induced the emperor to deprive of their lucrative offices Thurn and the others who had persisted with him in the opposition.



Ladislaus's Hall of Homage



in the Imperial Palace at Prague.

g (1607) by Aegidius Sadeler (1575-1629).

All things seemed to promise a prosperous issue for the reactionary political and religious plans of the new king. In the spring of 1618, the emperor, now a mere puppet in the hands of his advisers, was made to ask the Hungarians also to accept Ferdinand as their king, while at the same time the electors were approached with a view to his election as King of the Romans. To this, however, the Elector of Brandenburg and the Elector Palatine were opposed; and the latter even endeavored, but in vain, to induce Duke Maximilian of Bavaria to offer himself as a candidate. The Hungarian estates, unlike the Bohemian, compelled the recognition of their right to the free election of their king; after this, they were induced to elect Ferdinand, May 16, 1618.

This election improved decidedly the position of Ferdinand; but, just at this time, the disturbances so long threatening in Bohemia burst forth. Ever since Ferdinand's coronation, the Counter-reformation in Bohemia had been vigorously pushed forward. The peasants on the royal domains were driven to mass by force; obstinate Protestants were expelled from the country; the royal free cities saw themselves compelled to admit numerous Catholic burghers; and Prague, the capital, was placed under the unconditional sway of royal officials and threatened with a demand for the restitution of all the property once belonging to the church (December, 1617).

Who can blame the Bohemian Protestants if they thought now of offering forcible resistance to these revolutionary measures of the government, which were in direct violation of the solemn royal charter? The ten regents left by the emperor in Prague gave orders that the Protestant church at Klostergrab should be torn down; the inhabitants of Braunau bravely defended themselves with arms. The spirit of determined resistance that inspired these peasants, when the attempt was made to rob them of freedom of conscience, soon filled all the Protestants of Bohemia. Carried along by the general opinion of their co-religionists, the defenders summoned one hundred representatives of the Protestants from all the districts of the land to meet in the capital, March 5, 1618.

This Protestant assembly came to the moderate resolution of presenting their grievances to the regents, and, when these declared that they had no authority to grant redress, to the emperor himself. Pending Matthias's decision, the assembly adjourned until May 21. (Cf. PLATE IX.)

The answer of the court was a threat to institute legal proceedings against the Protestant representatives, accompanied by a strict prohibition of any further meeting of the Protestant assembly. This answer stirred up once more a most bitter feeling among the Bohemians. They cursed the authors of this decision, who, they supposed, were to be found among

the regents at Prague, although in reality it had proceeded from Cardinal Khlesl and the emperor himself.

The government, underestimating the strength of the opposition, went its own way. It attempted, through the energetic intervention of royal officials, to induce the free cities to give up the Protestant cause and to send up loyal addresses to the emperor. But only in Prague and some other places, where the Catholics either were in the majority or formed a strong minority, did the attempt meet with any success. As little successful was the crafty endeavor to stir up dissensions among the members of the new faith by awakening reminiscences of the Hussite wars. No commands from the court, no threats could move the defenders to revoke their summons for a second Protestant assembly.

This met on May 21, but only to be called into the castle to hear the reading of an imperial ordinance commanding its immediate dissolution. The leaders—Thurn, Fels, and Count Schlick—determined to pay no attention to the order, but rather to push things to extremes. They excited the members of the assembly by the announcement of a plot, which was said to have been devised by the regents against the freedom of the estates. To remove this suspicion, the regents, contrary to custom, allowed the representatives to appear in the castle fully armed. The extreme party among the defenders took advantage of this permission to make, by resorting to violence, an irreparable breach between the government and the Protestants. Inspired by a passion for revenge against the emperor and Ferdinand, whom they regarded as their personal enemies, they aimed at nothing less than the overthrow of the rule of the Hapsburgs in Bohemia.

Under the pretext of delivering to the regents their answer to the imperial ordinance, on the morning of May 23, the defenders, along with all the members of the Protestant assembly, set out for the castle. They were not only armed themselves, but they were also attended by many armed servants. The small castle-guard permitted them, according to orders, to enter unopposed. They found but four regents present: the chief burgrave, Adam von Sternberg; the grand prior, Diepolt von Lobkowitz; the Burgrave of Karlstein, Jaroslav von Martinitz; and the chief justice, William von Slavata. The others had probably got wind of the intended violence, and with various excuses had left Prague.

The four saw themselves surrounded by hundreds of armed men in the greatest excitement. They were at once, with threats, called on to declare who had instigated the emperor to his unrighteous decision. At first, they declined to answer; but, when the infuriated multitude rushed at them with drawn swords, they denied having had any part in the

imperial missive. Yet no one believed them. Sternberg and Lobkowitz—men respected for their moderation—on their refusal to separate themselves from their colleagues, were thrust out of the hall. Then arose the cry that, after the old Bohemian fashion, the two others should be thrown out of the window. First, Martinitz was thrown head foremost into the ditch, eighty feet below. “Noble gentlemen, here you have the other,” cried Thurn, and the struggling Slavata was hurled from the window, sustaining injuries in the hands, head, and left hip. The regents’ secretary, Fabricius, drew attention to himself by his frightened manner, and he too followed his superiors on the perilous journey.

Wonderful to relate, all three escaped with their lives, and, excepting Slavata, without serious injury from their fall of eighty feet, although neither a bush nor a dust-heap, as Schiller reports, broke their fall. Even the numerous shots sent after them missed their mark. Undaunted servants carried them away. Fabricius escaped to Vienna, where he was raised to the nobility with the well-earned title of “von Hohenfall.” A few days later, Martinitz also escaped in disguise. The wounded Slavata was so mercifully treated by the insurgents that he was simply shut up at the watering-place Teplitz, whence in the following year he disappeared over the Saxon frontier.

After this decisive act, the estates proceeded to the establishment of a new government, although they still nominally acknowledged the royal authority. Thirty “directors,” ten from each estate, were appointed for the conduct of public affairs. An army of 20,000 men was to be formed, with Count Thurn at its head. In June, he opened the war by compelling the surrender of the imperial fortress of Krumenau; Pilsen and Budweis held out valiantly against the insurgents, but everything else in Bohemia appeared to go on in accordance with the wishes of the directors. So universal was the indignation against the arbitrary measures of the court, that the Catholics worked loyally in concert with the Protestants. The proud Bohemian spirit of the Hussite wars seemed awakened anew.

The emperor, at the tidings from Bohemia, was at first inclined to make concessions; and his faithful Bohemian regents, as well as Khlesl, urgently advised him to do so. But Matthias was no longer at the helm; he was already superseded by Ferdinand. This docile pupil of the Jesuits would hear of no concessions, and, backed by 300,000 Spanish gulden, he carried the day for the war party at court. Armaments were set on foot, and the Bohemians summoned to submission by threatening manifestos.

As the emperor seemed still inclined to adopt peaceful measures, Ferdinand and his adviser—the wily, energetic, and unscrupulous Span-

ish ambassador, Count Oñate—ventured on a decisive stroke. Without the emperor's knowledge, they seized (July 20) his confidant, Cardinal Khlesl, and placed him in close confinement. Matthias was at first highly indignant; but, weak, powerless, and imbecile, he had not the resolution to liberate him. Fate now avenged on the peace-craving dotard the outrages practiced by him on his brother. "The Bohemians," he exclaimed, "have tried me sore; brethren and cousins make my case still worse."

Ferdinand believed that he could satisfy the religious and political interests of the Hapsburgs only by crushing the Protestants. Princely authority and the salvation of his subjects could be purchased at no other price. War was therefore declared, and both parties looked around for allies. Formerly nothing had so much promoted the cause of the German Protestants as the alliance of France, the constant rival of the Hapsburgs. It was their misfortune that this state was now under a weak and bigoted government. After the sudden death of Henry IV., his widow, Maria de' Medici, undertook the regency for her nine-year-old son, Louis XIII. Her guiding principle was to maintain the power of the monarchy in unimpaired integrity, and, therefore, in view of the semi-independence of her great nobles, to avoid every external complication, and even to bring about more friendly relations with its former rival, Spain.

This view was in accord with her feelings as a devoted Catholic, which from the first inclined her to desire a good understanding with Rome and Spain. She at once removed the Huguenot Sully from the government, and he never again succeeded in entering public life; he lived, however, until 1641. For two Florentines—her lady-in-waiting, Leonore Galigai, and the husband of this woman, Concino Concini—she showed a favoritism far from commendable, raising the latter, a most unworthy man, to the dignity of Marquis of Ancre and even to the rank of marshal, although he had had no experience in war. Such a favorite could offer only a weak support against the refractory nobles, who vied with one another in taking possession of cities and provinces and in shamelessly plundering the treasury. The worst, because he was the most distinguished, among them was Condé, who had returned to France after the death of Henry, and who now was conspicuous among the opponents of the "Florentine banker's daughter."

Under these circumstances, Maria took up a plan formerly cherished by her husband, which would assure to her a strong support in all emergencies—that, namely, of a double marriage between the royal houses of Spain and France. In April, 1611, the contract was concluded which

fixed for the near future the marriage of Louis XIII. with the eldest infanta, Anna, as well as that of Philip, the Prince of Asturias, with Louis's eldest sister, Elizabeth. The importance of this alliance is self-evident. If the reciprocal relations of the two powers should correspond to the bonds of close relationship between their rulers, the whole political system of Europe would be changed. Hitherto this system had rested on the rivalry of France and Spain. If they became allies, it seemed inevitable that they would exercise a despotic ascendancy over all other lands.

The Protestant states naturally were most alarmed at this prospect, for up to that time they had found in France their only protection against the powerful reactionary policy of the Hapsburgs. Foreign Protestants found a ready hearing in France, both with the Reformed party and with the nobility in general. Moreover, the masses were discontented with the increasing burden of taxation—a result of the greed of the princes—and with the Florentine favorites. Therefore the leaders of the higher nobility raised the banner of revolt (January, 1614). But, by their own folly and selfishness, they lost the favor of the public, while the queen-regent managed matters adroitly and caused her son to be declared of age (September, 1614), so that her acts were henceforth clothed with the royal authority.

Then she summoned the States-General of the kingdom to meet in October, 1614. A majority of the deputies were favorable to the royal cause; but all three estates at once began to talk of reforms, of reduction of taxes, and of the abolition of the sale of offices. But the effect of recent occurrences was soon felt. The Third Estate antagonized the nobility by demanding the abolition of the pensions exacted by the nobles; and there were also other proofs that in the last two decades the French bourgeoisie had been drawing nearer and nearer to the side of the monarchy.

The Third Estate proposed to declare that the crown derived its prerogatives from God alone, and that therefore no one, not even the ecclesiastical power, had the right of releasing its subjects from their oath of allegiance. This enraged the clergy, and they formed a close alliance with the nobility against the Third Estate. The result was that this assembly, of which so much had been expected, fell into strife and recrimination, without being able to reach any harmonious conclusions whatever. The queen-regent, however, took advantage of the situation to obtain from each of the three estates separately an approval of her plans for the Spanish marriages. When this point had been gained, she suddenly closed the assembly (February, 1615).

Thus ended the eagerly expected meeting of the States-General of 1614, the last until the ever memorable assembly of 1789. It had been made clear that the social organization of France at that time was incapable of developing either an aristocratic or a popular power, able to limit or control the monarchy. Isolated revolts might still occur, but, on the whole, France had now entered on the path which led to absolute monarchy.

The bourgeoisie, dissatisfied with the negative results of the States-General, the Parlement of Paris and the Huguenots all joined in complaints against the queen-regent and those about her. The princes put themselves at the head of the opposition. When Maria, in November, 1615, carried out on the Spanish frontier the double marriage, the court was surrounded on all sides by a popular, aristocratic, and Gallican uprising. All the fruits of the reign of Henry IV. seemed lost.

Negotiations, conflicts, treaties of peace, new revolts, followed one another in quick succession. But the very greatness of her cares inspired Maria with unwonted energy. It was decided to make prisoners of all the malcontent princes at one blow; but, with the exception of Condé (captured in September, 1616), all the leaders escaped to the provinces, where they were defeated by the royal troops and shut up in Mezières and Soissons. Marshal d'Ancre, whose palace had been plundered by the rabble, returned in triumph to Paris and took a bloody revenge on his opponents. But a few more moves in the game, and he and Maria might regard their unpopular sway as assured.

But failure came upon them from a quarter whence they least expected it. The young king had spent a joyless youth. His mother had little love for him, and treated him with severity; and many a time, during his minority, he had smarted under the lash. Although possessed of some capacity for mechanics, mathematics, and engineering, he was destitute of the qualities necessary for a king. His bringing up had made his body, his mind, and his character alike weak. He was always in need of a confidant, to whom he might entrust the management of affairs. Such a one he found in his sixteenth year in Charles de Luynes, a poor nobleman who had entered his service at first as falconer. He had risen through the favor of Concini; but, when he was once sure of the young king's favor, he began to plot the overthrow of the marshal, in order himself to step into his place. In league with many malcontents of high station, he sought to convince the king that Ancre had designs on his kingdom and on his life; and he and his accomplices, by an adroit mixture of truth and falsehood, inspired the king with such terror that his customary timidity was overcome, and Louis gave secret

orders that the marshal should be made prisoner, and, if he resisted, shot.

On April 24, 1617, de Vitry, the captain of the king's guard, carried out this commission in the spirit in which it had been given to him. His followers murdered Ancre on the spot, without anyone daring to defend him. "Now I am king," exclaimed Louis, joyfully, at this intelligence; but, in reality, he had only changed one master for another. The queen-mother was deprived of all influence and held as a prisoner until she agreed to retire to Blois. The creatures of Ancre were at once deprived of their offices, and Villeroy and Jeannin, the servants of Henry IV., were recalled to power.

The people of all classes hailed the change with joy. The insurgents laid down their arms, which they had taken up only against the Florentines. Peace and concord seemed to have returned under the son of Henry IV. In foreign affairs, also, the policy of the late king was imitated. Bounds were set to the further progress of the Spaniards in Italy, a French army defending Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy, against their attack. But this prosperity was as short as it was sudden. Luynes thought only of retaining and strengthening his own power, and of enriching himself and his friends. He could not afford, therefore, to defy the powerful clerical party, who were in alliance with Spain.

In vain did the Bohemians beseech the French government for support; it showed itself more inclined to favor the imperialists. When the papal nuncio begged Louis XIII. to come to the help of the latter, the French king dissuaded his German friends from giving any assistance to the Bohemian "rebels." The Bohemians, as well as the Union, found that they were exhorted to submission by the very king to whom they looked for succor.

The emperor fared little better in seeking support among the Catholic powers. Spain was occupied in Italy. Archduke Albert, in Brussels, promised five hundred, and Sigismund III. of Poland several thousand horsemen. On the other hand, the Catholic League could not be induced to help the emperor. Maximilian of Bavaria had been for several years at variance with the Hapsburgs, who had wished to wrest from him the leadership of the League; and he would not, for their sake, engage in conflict with the Union. The head of the latter body was the young Elector Palatine, Frederick V., who, despite his political and military incapacity, was possessed of the most ardent and restless ambition. Urged on by his English wife, Elizabeth, he held out to the Bohemian directors the prospect of assistance.

The situation was still more serious for the imperial government,



ERNESTO PRINCIPI ET COMITI MANSFELDIAE, MARCHIONI
CASTELLI-NOVI ET BUTIGLIRIAE, BARONI AB HELDRVNGEN
GENERALI ETC

Ant. van Dyck pinxit

Robertus van Voerst sculpsit

FIG. 36.—Count Ernst von Mansfeld. Reduced facsimile of the engraving by Robert van Voerst (1596-1669), from the painting by Van Dyck (1599-1641).

because it had nothing to look for from its Protestant subjects. On the contrary, the estates of Upper Austria denied a passage to its troops, while the Lower Austrians were absolutely hostile. The Silesians even sent 3000 men to aid the Bohemians. Hungary and Moravia still

remained quiet, but the first decisive victory of the insurgents would surely carry them over to the side of the Bohemians.

Notwithstanding the gloomy aspect of affairs, Ferdinand, who, in the utter helplessness of the emperor, had the sole direction of the war, did not let his courage sink. An army of 14,000 men was levied, and Bucquoi, an experienced Belgian commander, placed at its head. He was the first of those numerous foreigners—chiefly Walloons and Italians—who, to the exclusion of Germans, commanded the imperial armies of the seventeenth century. In August, 1618, one of Bucquoi's generals, Count Dampierre, also a foreigner from Lorraine, invaded Bohemia and made no inconsiderable progress. But this was only a brief gleam of sunshine for the Hapsburgs; for now Frederick V. of the Palatinate, already looking toward the crown of Bohemia "in the event of a vacancy," stepped briskly on the scene and sent a division of troops into Bohemia under the able leadership of Count Mansfeld.

Ernst von Mansfeld (Fig. 36), the illegitimate son of one of the most distinguished of the Belgian nobles, was one of those talented adventurers so frequently met with in the Thirty Years' War—men of energy and restless ambition, always full of great designs, but destitute of deep convictions, of moral principles, and of stability and foresight; often vanquished, but never at a loss for resources by which to rise again. Without inherited property, his career had been full of vicissitudes and not always honorable, until, in 1615, he entered the service of Charles Emmanuel of Savoy.

The Duke of Savoy, a bitter foe of the house of Hapsburg, which was closely connected with him by marriage, had resolved, in June, 1618, to place Mansfeld with 2000 men at the disposal of the Union for service in Bohemia. In return for this, the Elector Palatine promised to aid the duke, who was nominally a prince of the empire, in his efforts to obtain the imperial crown. Mansfeld and Thurn now drove Bucquoi, with heavy loss, out of Bohemia, and took the important town of Pilsen, which had hitherto held out loyally for the emperor (November, 1618).

Thurn had it in his power to annihilate Bucquoi's small and discouraged army; but, instead of this, carried away by a desire for glory, he left a detachment under Schlick to watch Bucquoi, while he himself made a devastating inroad into Lower Austria, and scoured the country up to within a few miles of Vienna. "I hear that my Bohemians are taking a ride in my land," said the imbecile emperor with perfect equanimity. "Yes, but they are coming a little too near," was the warm reply of the irritated Ferdinand. The imperial coffers were empty, Matthias himself despondent, inactive, and yet unwilling to surrender

formally the conduct of affairs to Ferdinand. What situation could be more hopeless than that of this king and of the Catholic war-party at the end of the year 1618?

They were saved by the want of decision and harmony among their enemies. The Austrian Protestants needed but to take an active part, and the imperial cause would be ruined. But, since Zierotin held back the Moravians from aiding the Bohemian "rebels," the Austrians also remained quiet. This was a heavy blow for the Bohemians; and a heavier one still was the course pursued by the father-in-law of the Count Palatine, James I. of England, who could in no way be led to active interference, but flattered himself that he could successfully play the part of a mediator.

A renewal of the war became necessary; but, before this began, the Emperor Matthias died (March 20, 1619), leaving to King Ferdinand, and to the most determined and reckless party among the Catholics, the settlement of the conflict with the Protestants of Bohemia.

CHAPTER V.

EMPEROR FERDINAND II. AND THE WAR UP TO THE EDICT OF RESTITUTION.

(A. D. 1619-1629.)

ALL zealous Catholics entertained the greatest hopes of King Ferdinand, whose task it now was to direct the destinies of the German-Hungarian lands of the house of Austria. His devotion to the cause of his religion was as much beyond question as his firm trust in the divine assistance, which in the most threatening dangers caused him to cling tenaciously to the resolutions which he had once adopted. In other respects, however, he was far from justifying these great expectations. A very considerable portion of his time was spent in religious exercises, and he also devoted many hours, and even whole days, to music and the chase. Therefore he had little leisure for business of state, and, in so far as he took part in this, he showed an indolence and want of self-reliance that increased with his years. He allowed himself to be wholly guided by those about him, and especially by his Jesuit confessors, among whom Father Lamormain exercised the strongest and most enduring influence.

This emperor's most trusted minister was Baron—and later Prince—Hans Ulrich von Eggenberg. Descended from a rich burgher-family of Styria, Eggenberg had early turned from the Protestant to the official church, and had attached himself as a devoted servant to the young Archduke Ferdinand. Though himself indifferent to religion, Eggenberg met the views of this prince by counseling the sharpest measures against all religious and political opponents.

On Matthias's death, Ferdinand (Fig. 37) found the coffers empty. The Moravians also, making now common cause with the Bohemians, chose thirty directors, confiscated all the property of the monasteries and other ecclesiastical foundations, and equipped an army to aid the Bohemians. Both Lusatias followed the example of Moravia. All the lands of the Bohemian crown had thus declared themselves against Ferdinand. The Upper Austrians refused to acknowledge him as their prince, the Lower Austrians entered into open alliance with Thurn. At the most, Ferdinand could rely only on his former territories of Styria, Carinthia,



FIG. 37.—Emperor Ferdinand II. Reduced facsimile of an anonymous engraving.

and the Tyrol. He was not able to hinder Thurn from appearing for the second time, in the beginning of June, 1619, in the neighborhood of Vienna. The city contained only a small garrison, and could easily

have been taken by a *coup de main*. But here again Thurn showed himself no general. He delayed so long that he let the capital, and, with it, the king and victory, slip out of his hands.

The Lower Austrian estates actually urged the king to subscribe to an unconditional peace with the Bohemians. Deserted by his own counselors, Ferdinand defended himself with wonderful tenacity, until the sudden arrival of four hundred cuirassiers who had been summoned to his aid set him free from his extreme difficulties (June 5). A few days later, Thurn disappeared from before Vienna.

In the meantime, Bucquoi's little band had, by means of Hungarian and Walloon auxiliaries, been increased to the number of 12,000 men. Issuing with these from Budweis, he fell upon Mansfeld's corps near Zablat and completely annihilated it. This affair, unimportant in itself, filled the troops of the insurgents in Bohemia with terror; for Thurn still tarried in Austria. Bucquoi pursued the fugitives into the neighborhood of Prague, seizing all the towns in his way. Thurn now returned in haste to Bohemia. The whole situation had been changed by one blow. As the Bohemians but lately stood before Vienna, the royalists in their turn now stood within fourteen miles of Prague. The moral preponderance was now on the side of the Hapsburgs.

These successes were also of especial importance for the imperial election, which was to take place in Frankfort-on-the-Main in the month of July. In vain had the Elector Palatine sought to secure the Duke of Bavaria as a candidate in opposition to Ferdinand; he would not accept the crown from the hands of the heretics. The Duke of Savoy had at last likewise declined the barren and costly honor. Thus the Elector Palatine and the Elector of Brandenburg, who were decidedly opposed to Ferdinand, found themselves in the greatest perplexity in determining whom they should bring forward as a rival candidate. The foreign powers, not only Spain and Poland, but also France and even England, were working for the King of Hungary. Nevertheless he could not have been elected, if the three evangelical electors had remained united. But Elector John George of Saxony failed to stand by them. It was partly his envy of the Elector Palatine's pre-eminent position, and partly his hereditary attachment to the house of Hapsburg, that now drove this Lutheran prince to support Ferdinand. Thereupon Brandenburg, and finally, with reluctance, the Palatinate, fell in with the choice of the majority, and on August 28, 1619, Ferdinand was elected emperor at Frankfort, and was crowned there September 9.

But the Hapsburgs still had serious difficulties to overcome; for Thurn in the meantime had driven Bucquoi's weak contingent com-

pletely out of Bohemia, and the insurgents again took courage. The Lower Austrian estates, assembled at Horn, entered into an alliance with the general diet—then sitting at Prague—of the five lands pertaining to the crown of Wenceslaus; and this body, on August 19, declared that Ferdinand had forfeited the Bohemian crown. Three candidates were proposed for the succession: the Duke of Savoy, who, as a foreigner and a Catholic, found little support except from his mercenary captain, Ernst von Mansfeld; the Elector of Saxony, whose election was desired by those more inclined to a conservative policy and to Lutheranism, under the leadership of Count Schlick (but John George had shown at every opportunity his aversion to the Bohemians); and finally, the head of the Protestant Union, Frederick V. of the Palatinate (Fig. 38), who was supported by the extreme Calvinists, led by Ruppa, Kinsky, and Thurn, and on August 26, 1619, was chosen by an overwhelming majority to be King of Bohemia.

For a full month, Frederick, warned by all prudent friends, wavered about accepting the election; but the alluring lustre of a kingly crown, the exhortations of his consort, and the promises of support from the princes of the Union led him at last to an affirmative decision, to the immeasurable injury of himself and of his land.

For a time, fortune seemed to smile on the new king, who entered Prague with great pomp. The superior force of the Bohemians was able once more to press forward against Vienna; while, at the same time, the emperor was menaced with danger from the east.

Gabriel, the last Prince of Transylvania of the house of Báthori, had taken into his service the son of a poor Calvinist nobleman named Gabriel Bethlen—or, in the Hungarian form, Bethlen-Gabor. This daring and adventurous man soon became discontented with his subordinate position, and betook himself to Constantinople, where he entered into such intrigues against Báthori that the sultan placed an army at his disposal against the Transylvanian prince. Bethlen gained the victory; and, when Báthori entered the Turkish camp to treat with the pasha in command, he was murdered (October, 1613). Bethlen-Gabor was thereupon proclaimed Grand Prince of Transylvania, under Turkish suzerainty. Both the emperor and the Bohemians had lately sought his favor; but his religious leanings, as well as his desire to make conquests in Hungary, drew him at last to the side of the insurgents. With 60,000 men, he invaded Upper Hungary and subdued the greater part of it. Everywhere he was enthusiastically received by the Protestant Magyars, his election as King of Hungary was arranged, and Presburg fell into his hands.



FIG. 38.—Frederick V., Elector Palatine. Reduced facsimile of the engraving by Peter Isselburg (about 1580–after 1630).



FIG. 39.—Elector Maximilian I. of Bavaria. Reduced facsimile of an engraving by Johann Sadeler.

Thus the emperor was beset by German, Slavic, and Hungarian foes, and there was no lack of malcontents even in Vienna. Twelve thousand Hungarians joined the Bohemians and Moravians under Thurn, who by an assault on Vienna might have brought about the fall of the

Hapsburg power. Again Thurn hesitated, alleging the cold and want of provisions as his excuse, and for the third and last time withdrew from before Vienna, while Bethlen was called away to Hungary by an inroad of the Poles (December, 1619).

The dissensions and vacillation of the allies encouraged the emperor. The Austrians risked no open attack on his troops. The Protestant Union, indeed, spoke out in menacing terms; but, through sheer parsimony and indecision, did nothing to make good its threats. Frederick himself was a good-natured, insignificant prince, who was in no wise equal to the difficulties of his position and who inspired respect in no one. On the other hand, a mighty Catholic alliance was now being formed in favor of Ferdinand.

Maximilian of Bavaria (Fig. 39) had held back from affording the emperor support until Ferdinand was forced to purchase his assistance at any price. When Ferdinand was ready to make any concessions, Maximilian concluded a treaty with him (October 8, 1619), in accordance with which the duke promised to revive the Catholic League, and to fight at its head against Bohemia and the Palatinate, the emperor guaranteeing to recompense him, and, in the event of victory, to procure for him the forfeited electoral dignity of Frederick and a part of his territories.

The League forthwith equipped an army of 25,000 men, and, in addition to this, help came to the emperor from outside of the empire. The pope paid him 20,000 gulden monthly and caused 100,000 to be contributed to him by the congregations. Paul V. also gave 200,000 scudi yearly to the League, which was really equivalent to giving it to Ferdinand. Spain came to his help with large contributions in money, and also sent from Italy, under the command of Don Balthasar of Marrádas, several veteran regiments, both infantry and cavalry—in all, 16,000 men. Finally Sigismund III. of Poland supplied several thousand Cossacks, who frightfully devastated the evangelical districts of Lower Austria.

While the emperor's power was thus supported, his opponents did not proceed beyond empty words. The insurgent Hungarians chose Bethlen-Gabor (Fig. 40) for their king. The Union talked, but did nothing. Abandoned by England, counseled to submission by France, and threatened by Spain, the states comprising the Union became altogether disheartened. Finally, through French mediation, they concluded at Ulm, in July, 1620, a treaty of peace with the League, by which the latter was pledged to keep its hands off the Palatinate, but, as a compensation, was left free to deal as it chose with the Bohemians, as Spain also



FIG. 40.—Bethlen-Gabor (Gabriel Bethlen). Reduced facsimile of a contemporary anonymous engraving.

was left free to deal with the Palatinate. This shameful treaty was the death-sentence of the Union. With justice, men said afterward that only the Treaty of Ulm rendered possible the imperial victory at the White Hill (November 8, 1620).

Already the imperial army, reinforced from all sides, had set forth

to attack the famishing, discontented, and poorly commanded Bohemian army, while Bethlen-Gabor was wasting time in fruitless negotiations. In February, 1620, the corps under Mansfeld, the ablest among the Bohemian leaders, was defeated, with great loss, at Langenloys. Colonna von Fels was killed in a cavalry engagement. The new commander-in-chief, Prince Christian of Anhalt, proved himself utterly incapable. From no quarter was help in sight. On the other hand, the time had now come when the cautious and calculating Maximilian, protected by the Treaty of Ulm from any attack on the part of the Union, deemed it convenient to hasten with his excellently equipped army of 30,000 men to the aid of the emperor, who had been forced to promise him such a brilliant reward. His chief in command, John Tserclaes, Baron Tilly, was one of the foremost strategists of the age. He was born in Brabant, in 1559, of an illustrious family, and had trained himself as a soldier in the wars of the Netherlands, then the great school for generals. Entering the imperial service under Rudolf II., he distinguished himself in the wars against the Turks. After the peace of Zsitwa-Torok, he placed his experience and ability at the disposal of the Elector of Bavaria, and raised and admirably organized an army for him. Modestly and unselfishly he served the cause for which he cared more than for anything else—the Catholic faith.

The Bavarian army now inspired terror by its approach, causing the population of Upper Austria to submit almost unconditionally. Maximilian took their land as a pledge until the emperor should make good to him the cost of the war, and plundered it thoroughly for his army. Then he joined the imperial troops under Bucquoi. The united host, 50,000 strong, marched by Tilly's advice directly on Prague, capturing all the smaller towns on the way. Mansfeld, who was quartered in Pilsen with 12,000 men and was at variance with King Frederick (Fig. 41) and also with the Prince of Anhalt, entered into traitorous negotiations, and, in return for 300,000 gulden which were promised him, engaged to remain neutral for a time. Freed from care about him, the imperial army continued its march on Prague. Discouraged and without confidence in itself or its leaders, the main army of the Bohemians was driven back to the White Hill, close to Prague on the south.

On November 8, 1620, this army of 21,000 men was attacked in its half-finished entrenchments by more than twice its number. The fight was short. The Lower Austrians, Silesians, and Moravians stood their ground well, but the Hungarians in the Protestant army straightway gave the signal for flight, and the Bohemians were not slow in following their example. Of the imperialists and Leaguists, only 400 fell; of the

evangelicals, 5000, while 2500 were made prisoners. A hundred flags and ten pieces of artillery constituted the booty of the victors.

Resistance, as Thurn maintained, was still possible, especially as 8000 Hungarians, sent by Bethlen-Gabor, were on the march to Prague. This strong city might have been defended until the cold of winter and scarcity of provisions in the frightfully exhausted country compelled the enemy to retreat. But Frederick, after giving proof of his utter incapacity for the task he had undertaken, now showed himself destitute of courage and honor. He not only gave up his crown and the cause for

Deß gwesten Pfaltzgrafen Glück vnd Englück.



FIG. 41.—Reduced facsimile of a cut illustrating a satirical broadside against Frederick V., Elector Palatine, the "Winter King" of Bohemia: printed in 1621. The German verses which accompany the illustration set forth the changes in Frederick's fortunes.

which he had fought, but shamefully abandoned his army and the Bohemian people. Leaving behind him all his jewels and documents, he fled to the Netherlands with Thurn, Ruppa, and Hohenlohe, never to return. Without hindrance the imperialists and Leaguists occupied the Bohemian capital.

The astounding catastrophe of Frederick, the "Winter King," found a counterpart in Lusatia. The court preacher of the Elector of Saxony, Doctor Hoë von Hoënegg, had set the elector entirely against the Bohemian Calvinists, the zeal of Hoë being stimulated by a valuable gift of money from the emperor. As in the case of Maximilian of Bavaria, John

George's religious convictions coincided, in a remarkable way, with his political interests. In return for his support against the Bohemians, the emperor made over to him Lusatia, as a pledge of indemnification; this was the price for which John George fought the hated Calvinists. When the Lutheran capital of Lusatia, Bautzen, did not submit at once, he cannonaded it so unmercifully that soon three-fourths of its buildings lay in ruins. This was the achievement of a Protestant prince!

And now the Palatinate must expiate the follies of its fugitive lord. The Treaty of Ulm, indeed, had debarred the League from an attack on this land, and it observed it faithfully; but, while it devoted its whole strength to Bohemia, the Spaniards, 25,000 strong, came, under the great Spinola, from the Netherlands, to chastise the unfortunate people of the Palatinate. The strong army of the Union, encamped near Worms, looked on, while Spinola subdued the greater part of the Lower Palatinate.

By the end of 1620, the emperor had won a most brilliant triumph. Of all his foes, only Bethlen-Gabor, who still ruled in Hungary, and the adventurer Mansfeld, who held Pilsen, remained to be dealt with. On the other hand, his Austrian enemies were once more reduced to subjection; Bohemia was almost entirely in his hands; his most stubborn opponent, the head of the hated Calvinism—the Count Palatine—was an exile. There was scarcely a fortress on the Rhine over which Frederick's banner continued to float. Ferdinand followed up his victory with that unmerciful severity against heretics that had been instilled into him by his Jesuit teachers. The Elector Frederick, with his most eminent counselors and servants, was put under the ban of the empire. The imperial soldiery was allowed to make frightful havoc in Bohemia. The estates of the most prominent insurgents were confiscated and bestowed on the church or acquired by Ferdinand's favorites at merely nominal prices. The Calvinist preachers had to leave the country.

In the meantime, four months were spent in dealing out penalties of life and limb, until most of the leaders of the revolt had assembled in Prague in hope of forgiveness. On February 20, 1621, forty-eight of them were suddenly seized; twenty-eight were sent to the scaffold; fifteen others were sentenced to imprisonment for life; and only four were pardoned. In vain had Tilly opposed such cruel proceedings. His generous interference served only to bring upon himself the wrath of the Jesuits, the dominant party at the court of Vienna, and of the emperor.

But these bloody scenes, however, were by no means sufficient to satisfy the victorious party. The revolt was to be turned to account for religious purposes. Not only must Protestantism be suppressed, but the

traditional Utraquism as well. The Elector of Saxony and his court preacher were now to learn how far their blind hatred of the Calvinists had benefited Lutheranism. Although the imperial government had, but a short time before, publicly commended the Lutheran clergy for their loyalty, and had promised Saxony that it would exercise forbearance toward them, all the Protestant clergy were driven out of the land, as well as the Protestant professors of the university of Prague, which was now given over to the Jesuits (1622).

Thereupon the old Hussite rites were rooted out; every occupation was closed to non-Catholics. Capuchins, accompanied by bands of cavalry, chiefly Spaniards, traversed the country. Whoever refused to acknowledge the Catholic doctrines was plundered, exiled, thrown into prison, exposed to the most frightful tortures, or summarily cut down. With insatiable cupidity, the clergy extorted from the emperor more than half of the confiscated estates. All the privileges of Bohemia were declared forfeited; the royal charter of Rudolf II. was torn in pieces by the emperor with his own hand. The right of choosing their king, the use of the Bohemian language, and, finally, toleration of non-Catholic faiths, were abrogated.

Five hundred families of the nobility, 36,000 families of burghers, and innumerable peasants left the down-trodden country in those terrible years, and carried their intelligence, their industry, and the remnants of their property into Protestant lands. Bohemia's language, literature, intellectual and industrial activity, and national independence were destroyed for centuries. Up to this time one of the most civilized of lands, inhabited by a nobility that in the promotion of science and art was equaled by that of no other country, it sank now into the deepest intellectual poverty.

After the fall of Bohemia, its associate lands could no longer maintain themselves; already at the end of December, 1620, Ferdinand received the submission of the Moravians. Here, also, he showed unrelenting severity. Apart from sweeping confiscations, twenty-three persons were cast into prison, most of them for life; and fifteen thousand Moravians emigrated, because they were not willing to conform to Catholicism. The Silesians, on the other hand, who still stood in arms, obtained, through the mediation of the Saxon elector, in the "Dresden Accord," in consideration of an indemnity of 300,000 thalers, full pardon as well as a confirmation of their charter (1621). But even here, Ferdinand's Jesuitical morality found many opportunities for faithless acts of violence against the heretics. In the Lusatias, also, the emperor would have gladly punished "some of the heads of the past disorders," but this

was prevented by the Elector John George, who held these lands in pledge.

In both the Austrias, the emperor was free to act according to his own pleasure, and these lands now suffered the penalty which, by their demeanor during the Bohemian struggle, they had well deserved. Instead of supporting with all their might either their prince or their brethren in the faith, they had simply irritated the former without really helping the latter. In Lower Austria, thirty-six nobles were exiled, several burghers imprisoned, and non-Catholic worship was prohibited. In Upper Austria, all Protestant ministers and teachers were compelled to leave the country. A peasant revolt, which broke out on this account, gave to the emperor the opportunity of banishing all inhabitants of Upper Austria who would not openly acknowledge the Catholic faith. Here also Catholicism checked the material and still more the intellectual advance of those lands; but undoubtedly it strengthened the power of the state. Now, for the first time, the Hapsburgs could regard themselves as the actual masters of those broad provinces.

In the face of such events, the Union felt more deeply its own weakness. In February, 1621, it assembled at Heilbronn, but only humbly to make intercession for the Count Palatine; failing of success in this, it broke up completely (April 24, 1621). Such was the end of the Union, which had been founded thirteen years before with so great a flourish of trumpets, but whose cowardice was now the subject of ridicule in Germany.

Meanwhile the contest was going on with Bethlen-Gabor in Hungary, and, at Neuhäusel, the brave imperial general, Bucquoi, lost his life. In the Bohemian lands, in the midst of the general defection and fear, only two men still upheld the standard of Protestantism—John George of Brandenburg-Jägerndorf, and especially Ernst von Mansfeld. The former issued flaming proclamations and occupied Glatz and Neisse, until, in July, 1621, the imperial troops compelled him to march away into Hungary; the latter resumed his marauding operations against the imperialists, because the promised price of his treachery had not been paid. When Tilly forced him to leave Bohemia, he marched first to the Upper Palatinate, and then to the Lower, effectually clearing the latter of Spaniards. The Upper Palatinate, on the other hand, fell finally into the hands of the Leaguists, and Duke Maximilian was able to take permanent possession of it for himself. The Catholics were now completely free to act as they chose in Germany; for Bethlen-Gabor sacrificed for his own pecuniary gain both

the Count Palatine and John George, and in January, 1622, concluded with the emperor at Nikolsburg a dishonorable peace.

After the dissolution of the Union, the League no longer considered itself bound by the Treaty of Ulm, and sent its army into the Rhine Palatinate, which was at the same time menaced from Alsace by the 11,000 troops of the Archduke Leopold. But now two unexpected defenders of the evangelical cause suddenly made their appearance. The one was Duke Christian, younger son of Henry Julius of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, born in 1599, and evangelical Bishop of Halberstadt—a strong, passionate youth, inflamed with a desire for great achievements and for war. Already he had passed through the school of war in the Netherlands; and now his romantic spirit was charmed by the opportunity of drawing the sword for the unfortunate Count Palatine, and especially for Frederick's beautiful consort, Elizabeth Stuart, who was daughter of James I. of England. He was, besides, embittered on personal grounds against the emperor, who would not confirm him in the possession of the bishopric of Halberstadt. In vain did the estates of the circle of Lower Saxony endeavor to dissuade him from this step; he received the Count Palatine's authority to levy troops, and then advanced with a small band to form a junction with Mansfeld on the Main. Here, however, he was repulsed by the forces of the League, whereupon he invaded and easily conquered the bishopric of Paderborn. Its Protestant inhabitants he at first spared, but churches and clergy he plundered unscrupulously. His booty was to supply those sinews of war which his own possessions denied him. From the melted silver images of the saints, he caused thalers to be struck with the inscription: "God's friend; the priests' foe" (Fig. 42). No wonder that the rich booty soon attracted to him 15,000 men. In the spring of 1622, he entered the bishopric of Münster, which was not treated with any greater indulgence. The capital alone had to furnish a contribution of 150,000 thalers. The emperor did not dare to send troops against him, for fear that such an act might rouse the whole circle of Lower Saxony against the Catholics.

And while, in Duke Christian of Brunswick, old Saxon defiance and rugged manliness once more rebelled, as so often in the Middle Ages, against the head of the empire, in the extreme south of Germany the ever-zealous Protestant margrave, George Frederick of Baden-Durlach, was likewise making ready to bear arms for Frederick of the Palatinate. At the beginning of the year 1622, he had 16,000 men at his disposal. The cause of the Protestants looked more hopeful. Their strength now amounted to between 50,000 and 60,000 men. They

needed only a commander who could combine the corps of north and south, and then lead them against the main imperial army.

This task fell naturally to Mansfeld, the most experienced among their leaders, although morally and intellectually quite unequal to this high mission. He continued to move to and fro in Alsace, where he hoped to found a principality for himself. He had always his own personal advantage in view.

Who could blame the Elector Frederick for cherishing fresh hopes, when such considerable forces so unexpectedly took the field for him? By the advice of his uncle, Maurice of Orange, in which James I. of England concurred, he returned to the Lower Palatinate, once more to cross arms with the Hapsburgs. Even Bohemia did not intend to give



FIG. 42.—Thaler of Christian of Brunswick. Silver. Said to have been made from the melted church utensils or statuettes of saints in Paderborn. (Berlin.)

up the easily elated, easily disheartened prince. He was received by the people and the soldiers with universal acclamation.

The opening of the new campaign was promising enough. The Margrave of Baden-Durlach advanced into the Palatinate with his army. Tilly was entrenched at Mingolsheim with 20,000 men. But Mansfeld enticed him out of his lines, and, in April, 1622, defeated him with considerable loss. It was only necessary to unite the various forces of the Union in order to crush the Catholic general. But now folly and apparently jealousy in regard to the chief command caused Mansfeld and the margrave to delay in uniting their forces. Tilly was allowed to escape to Wimpfen and to entrench himself there, where the Spaniard Cordova with 6000 troops joined him. George Frederick, proud of his military science, attacked the far superior foe on his own account, near Wimpfen, on May 6. After a most valiant combat, the explosion of four powder-wagons threw his troops into confusion and panic, and they fled.

The flower of the nobility of Baden and of the Palatinate was left dead on the field of battle.

Yet, though defeated, the margrave was not annihilated. In order to retain Baden in the possession of his family, he had before this made it over to his son. He now put himself, with 10,000 men, under Mansfeld's command. The combined forces relieved Hagenau, besieged by the Archduke Leopold, and scattered his army. Mansfeld then started for the Main, while Christian of Brunswick, laying Fulda under contribution, set off to form a junction with him. The union of the two Protestant armies appeared imminent. Tilly, who was in the rear of Mansfeld's troops, seemed unable to prevent it. The issue of the whole war in Western Germany was at stake.

Tilly, relying upon Mansfeld's ignorance of strategy, skilfully made a feint against Mannheim; and Mansfeld, unwilling to give up this important city, turned in haste southward to go to its aid. Tilly then left Cordova to engage the attention of Mansfeld, while he himself, with his forces increased to 26,000 men by the addition of imperial troops, marched directly against Christian, who lay encamped, with 15,000, near Höchst. After a stubborn fight of many hours (June 19), the duke was routed by Tilly's superior force. He fled across the Main by a narrow bridge of boats, and, had not this been secured by the garrison of Höchst, the whole army would have been destroyed. As it was, Christian was able to bring together some 9000 men, and, with an army now reduced by one-half, to form a junction with Mansfeld.

Mansfeld had now 30,000 men, and was in numbers fully a match for the troops of the League. But the impression made by the recent defeats on the minds of the Protestants was too powerful, especially after all the misfortunes which they had suffered for two years past. The margrave set the example of desertion, and, after dismissing his troops, fled secretly from the camp. A panic, as after the battle of the White Hill, again took possession of the Elector Frederick. Decoyed by the emperor, through the mediation of the King of England, with hopes of peace if he would only lay down his arms, with the selfishness of despair he suddenly announced to his two generals that they were no longer in his service (July, 1622).

Outlawed and homeless, without a commander, and without a cause for which to fight, the two generals stood in the midst of hostile bands, while Frederick fled to Sedan, to his uncle, the Duke of Bouillon, and there led a life of ease. In their extremity, Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick accepted the invitation of the States-General of the Netherlands to enter their service. Their way lay through hostile territory,

through Lorraine and the Spanish Netherlands, yet no other course was open to them. At Fleurus, where they routed the Spanish army that attempted to block their way, Duke Christian lost his left arm; but from the silver among the booty he caused thalers to be coined bearing the significant inscription, *Altera restat*. Mansfeld took up boldly his winter-quarters in the neutral country of East Friesland; Christian, in Westphalia.

If the Count Palatine had expected to obtain peace for himself and his unfortunate land by his moral and material sacrifice, he had thoroughly deceived himself. On the contrary, Tilly now began in earnest the subjugation of the loyal Palatinate. It was at this time that the library of Heidelberg was sent by the Bavarian duke as a gift to the pope.¹ The plundering of Frederick's land was continued till the beginning of 1623, and full vengeance was taken for his acceptance of the Bohemian crown.

Maximilian seemed now to have reached the goal he had long striven for, and to be on the point of transferring the electoral dignity, that for centuries had belonged to the Palatine line of the Wittelsbach house, to the Bavarian and Catholic line. Neither the remonstrances of John George of Saxony, nor those of the Elector of Brandenburg, availed to turn Ferdinand from his purpose. On the deputation-day at Ratisbon, in February, 1623, Maximilian was solemnly proclaimed archsteward and elector of the empire; and the Catholics thus obtained an unconditional majority in the electoral college, which had hitherto been equally divided—Bohemia being represented there only at the election of the emperor.

The Counter-reformation was now taken in hand. In the Lower Palatinate, the troops of the League had re-established the Catholic worship and driven the Protestant professors from Heidelberg. In the Upper Palatinate, which had passed wholly into his possession, Maximilian, as was to be expected, completely prohibited the exercise of Protestant worship. After prolonged legal proceedings, Upper Baden was awarded to the Catholic margrave, William, but he was obliged first to promise to Catholicise it. Everywhere in Western Germany the Counter-reformation gained the upper hand, even in districts that had had nothing to do with the political movements, and especially in the bishoprics. Finally the same process took place here as in Bohemia: the more the inhabitants accustomed themselves to regard the changed condition of affairs as permanent and final, the sooner they became reconciled to it and to Catholic rites and convictions.

Great was the progress the Counter-reformation had already made,

¹ This explains the fact that the library of the Vatican contains a large number of "Palatine" manuscripts even at the present day.—Ed.

although it had been at work in Germany scarcely half a century. Austria and Bohemia had first fallen victims to it, and then the states of the Palatinate. It stretched its arms also toward the north of Germany. Already the Spaniards had won the upper hand on the Lower Rhine, so that, as far as the Rhine flowed within the empire, it was in Hapsburg-Leaguist hands.

But all this did not satisfy the pious zeal of Ferdinand II. and Maximilian. They formed an alliance, in order to continue the struggle against all who refused to acknowledge unconditionally the latest changes in the empire. First, in June, 1623, Tilly set out to drive Christian of Brunswick from the Lower Saxon circle. Deserted by the Protestant estates of the circle, the duke gave up his bishopric of Halberstadt and his other ecclesiastical preferments—in order, as he said, to live henceforth only by his sword—and then sought to escape to the Netherlands. Tilly eagerly pursued and overtook him near Stadthohn on the Berkel. Numbers, training, and the certainty of victory were all on the side of the Leaguists, and they nearly annihilated their enemy's army (August 6, 1623). Six thousand Brunswickers lay dead on the field, and four thousand were captured, including the Dukes of Saxe-Weimar and Saxe-Altenburg. Only four thousand escaped with their leader over the Dutch frontier.

But Duke Christian was not a man to be long discouraged. He soon led his sadly thinned ranks to Mansfeld, who remained inactive in East Friesland, living at the expense of the unfortunate land. Tilly, in his restless activity, was again in motion to attack this last Protestant army on German soil, when a power intervened that neither in diplomacy nor in war was so easily to be overcome as the German Protestants—namely, the Dutch. They regarded East Friesland as an outpost of their own republic, that on no account must be allowed to fall into the hands of the Hapsburgs. As they came to the aid of Mansfeld not only with provisions, but also with a strong body of troops, Tilly (Fig. 43) retreated and took up his winter-quarters in Hesse.

In the last four years the aged general had truly gained enough merit and renown, and had won for himself a place among the foremost commanders of his age. His lightning-like advance on Prague in 1620, the defeat of three strong armies in 1622, were masterstrokes in tactics and strategy. Not undeservedly had the emperor rewarded him by raising him to the rank of count. As regards his much-talked-of cruelty, he was neither better nor worse to the peaceable population than other generals of the Thirty Years' War; indeed, he was by no means one of the worst.

Tilly might well have reckoned that Mansfeld, even without any attack on his part, could not have held out much longer in the impover-



ILLVST^{VS} IOANNES. COM. DE. T^{ER}CLAES. DOM. TILLI BARO.
DE M^{OR}BAYS. DOM. DE. BALLAST. MONTIG. HOLERS,
HEESWYCK. DYNTER. ETC

Pet de Ioden sculp

Ant van Dyck pinxit

Cum privilegio

FIG. 43.—Tilly. Reduced facsimile of the engraving by Peter de Ioden (1570–1634), from the painting by Van Dyck (1599–1641).

ished district of East Friesland. After Tilly's withdrawal, the States-General took possession of the county, advanced to Mansfeld and Christian the money requisite to pay off their troops, and in return received

the five most important fortresses in the land, except Emden; and the land thus came into the power of the Netherlands. Mansfeld betook himself with his higher officers to The Hague, where these unprincipled adventurers easily consoled themselves, by feasting and debauchery, for the overthrow of the cause which they had ostensibly served.

While the northwest of Germany was being thus devastated, matters were no better in the southeast. In the autumn of 1623, Bethlen-Gabor became enraged on account of the refusal of the emperor to give to him his daughter in marriage and because of the oppression of Bethlen's brethren in the faith in Austria and Bohemia. His wrath was little more than a pretext for plundering. He pressed into Hungary with 60,000 Transylvanians, Wallachians, Tatars, and Turks, and, within a few weeks, subdued the whole land with the exception of a few fortresses. His bands then carried fire and sword through Moravia and Lower Austria, and carried off thousands of victims into slavery. But finally the flood retired as quickly as it had advanced. Cold and wet weather in the devastated land afflicted the Transylvanians, who, besides, were constantly attacked by the imperial garrisons in the still unconquered fortresses. Bethlen was soon ready for an armistice (January, 1624), and in the following May this armistice was, in Vienna, converted into a peace.

The emperor might now regard peace and authority as secured. Along with imperial absolutism, the Catholic religion had triumphed in broad lands that once seemed to have been fully won over to Protestantism. No arm was any longer raised in the empire for the cause of the evangelicals. From the Ems to the Leitha, there were no armies but those of the emperor and the League. The daring princes and generals who had opposed them were wandering as fugitives in foreign lands or were expiating their rashness in imperial prisons. Without the concurrence of the most powerful electors, the emperor had deposed one elector from his dignity in order to confer it on another prince.

Pope Gregory XV. saw in the party of the emperor and the League the special champion of the Counter-reformation, and was in fullest accord with it. Even England might have to submit to the influence of the Hapsburgs and to Catholicism; King James I., who had in 1620 left his son-in-law of the Palatinate in the lurch, now in 1623 sued eagerly for the hand of a Spanish princess for his only son Charles. Jesuits and Catholics entered Britain to push on the great work of restoring the island to the bosom of the Roman church. But now the old dissensions among the Catholic powers were again revived; France renewed once more her traditional policy of energetic opposition to the Hapsburgs.

Luynes had met many difficulties in conducting the internal affairs of France. His policy of clerical restoration had deeply offended the Huguenots, and, in the south, had even aroused to arms the Calvinistic province of Béarn. His thirst for power, his avarice, and his incapacity caused great disappointment and discontent in the whole land. This the queen-mother, the king's cousin, the Count of Soissons, as well as seventeen dukes and great dignitaries, took advantage of to organize a great revolt against the rule of the favorite. The royal troops, indeed, conquered the insurgents at Pont-de-Cé, on the Loire; but Luynes thought it wiser to come to terms with them (December, 1620), and again it was at the cost of the state coffers. Above all, a complete reconciliation took place between the king and Maria de' Medici, through the shrewd mediation of her trusted counselor, Richelieu, Bishop of Luçon. The immediate consequence of this was a strengthening of the Ultramontane tendency, to which Luynes was much inclined. The royal army was sent to fall on and disarm the Béarnese and to strengthen Catholicism and the clerical influence among them. A new victory for the Counter-reformation!

But the Huguenots were far from being contented, and assembled in La Rochelle. But now they had not to deal with weak personages like Louis XIII. and Luynes, but with the whole Roman party, with its unyielding energy. The king himself marched against them; Luynes, although as yet altogether untried in war, received the command of his strong army with the lofty title of constable (April, 1621). But the members of the Reformed party had long ago lost the courage, born of faith in their cause, that had inspired them fifty years earlier. The whole nobility and all the persons of rank, formerly their stay and pride, submitted cravenly to the royal host. Everywhere Louis left religious liberty untouched, but he leveled the walls of their strong places. Calvinism ceased to be a political power in France. From that time, it lost its most influential adherents, self-interest and fashion prompting the Huguenot nobles to return to the religion of the kingdom and the court.

In this general defection, the burghers of only two towns held manfully out—La Rochelle in the west, and Montauban in the south. In vain did the incapable Luynes endeavor to capture the latter stronghold; in spite of his 30,000 men, he was forced at last to raise the siege. General indignation was rising against him, and even the king was growing weary of him, when he died suddenly of scarlet fever, December 14, 1621. The king had only a feeling of relief at the death of his favorite and master.

The Huguenot war was continued with varying success. In the

field, the royal troops were everywhere the victors; but, behind the walls of their larger towns, the Reformed party defended themselves with heroism. Montpellier, in 1622, won no less fame than Montauban the year before. But, besides all this, the French government began to be uneasy in regard to the growing preponderance of the Hapsburgs. The king, therefore, concluded, on October 19, 1622, a peace with the Reformed party, that left their religious freedom untouched, but abolished their political and military organization, depriving them of their strongholds, with the exception of Montauban and La Rochelle. Thus that which Henry IV. had in vain striven to attain through friendly measures was attained through force. The royal authority needed no longer to dread the power of the Huguenots.

And now France began to oppose the policy of the Hapsburgs, at least in Italy. Austria had there laid hands on the Valtelline, the Engadine, and the pass of Chiavenna, all of which, belonging to the Grisons, had hitherto interrupted the immediate connection between the German and the Italian lands of the house of Austria. The interests of the church had again furnished the pretext for such an act of violence. The fruitful valley of the Upper Adda, the Valtelline, with its population of Italian Catholics, was subject to the Protestant Grisons. At length, the zealots in this Catholic population, urged on by the Spaniards in Milan, openly rebelled against their heretic rulers, and, within two weeks from July 19, 1620, murdered all the Protestants in the valley. This is the so-called "massacre of the Valtelline," whose terrors rivaled those of the night of St. Bartholomew.

Spanish and Austrian troops now entered and occupied the Italian districts of the Grisons, as well as the Engadine, and even the capital, Coire, apparently in order to secure the work of the pious assassins. Their permanent occupation would have strengthened so much the position of the Hapsburgs in Italy, that Venice, Savoy, even Rome itself, would have feared for their independence; and France was ready, in February, 1623, to enter into an alliance with the first two of these powers, to compel the restitution to the Grisons of the lands thus wrested from them.

Pope Gregory XV. now intervened and effected a settlement by which the lands in dispute were placed provisionally under his administration. But the pope soon died, in July, 1623; and—far more important—out of the chaos of French politics emerged the powerful form of Richelieu, who quickly became unconditional master of the king and of the state.

Jean Armand du Plessis de Richelieu, born in 1585, was a younger son of an old but impoverished family of Poitou. When but little more

than twenty years old, he received the bishopric of Luçon, which was hereditary in his family, but was too little to satisfy his ambition. By his services to the government, at the States-General of 1614, he commended himself to the queen-regent, who selected him, in 1616, as one of her ministers. A year later, he followed her into exile. But he knew how, by his efforts for reconciliation and peace, to make himself acceptable to the court; and the dignity of cardinal, which the government procured for him after the death of Luynes, as well as his readmission to the ministry (1622), was the reward of his adroit conduct. Here, by his great talents, he at once won the most authoritative position, which was formally recognized, in August, 1624, by his appointment as prime minister.

After he had thus reached the goal of his personal ambition, he devoted himself with all his soul to the greatness and glory of the state. For the people, as such, he had no care. In the service of the state, he thought it justifiable to employ the wiles of diplomacy, deceit, harshness, and cruelty. To render the French monarchy all-powerful at home, and predominant abroad was his twofold aim. Personally a faithful and pious Catholic, he ever showed the greatest toleration for other convictions, and in no way permitted religion to interfere with politics. Above all, he was firmly resolved to take up again the interrupted plans of Henry IV., and, with the help of Savoy, Venice, the Protestants, and even the Turks, to break down forever the predominance of the Hapsburgs.

While Richelieu was again arraying France against the house of Austria, a breach occurred in the good relations between the English king and Spain. At the last moment, the Anglo-Spanish marriage-project fell through, and James I. went over to the side of the French. In September, 1624, these two powers concluded a treaty at St. Germain with Venice and Savoy, for the support of the Protestants in Germany. This alliance was all the more dangerous to the Hapsburgs, because, since the expiration of the Twelve Years' Truce, in 1621, the war between the Catholic king and the United Provinces of the Netherlands had been renewed.

In the constitution of the United Netherlands, as the burden of the long war had been borne chiefly by the cities, these possessed the decisive power in the land; only in the eastern provinces had the nobility still retained some influence. The communes, however, were ruled by an exclusive city patriciate. These oligarchical magistrates, as well as the nobility in smaller numbers, sent deputies to the provincial estates, which possessed the actual sovereignty and maintained a salaried minister—the grand pensionary.

The common affairs of the whole republic were entrusted to "their high mightinesses," the States-General, who in turn were deputies from the provincial estates. But their "high mightinesses" could adopt important resolutions only by a unanimous vote, and were bound most strictly by the will of their constituents. Thus, in every important matter, they were obliged to refer to the city magistracies, who were, in this way, the real rulers of the republic, but at the same time were extremely jealous of one another, as well as of the central authority. This patrician and particularistic party received the name of the "Patriots;" and at their head stood the grand pensionary of Holland, John of Olden-Barneveld, the most influential statesman in the Netherlands. On the other hand, the idea of a centralized government was represented chiefly by the general stadtholder, at that time Maurice of Nassau, Prince of Orange. He was the commander of the army and fleet, and, as such, appointed the officers. Besides this, from the lists of candidates presented to him by the city magistracies, he selected the new members of these bodies. Soldiers, seamen, preachers, and the common people were enthusiastically devoted to the house of Orange.


But Maurice had already fallen out with his former friend, Olden-Barneveld, on the question of the truce with Spain; Maurice had been opposed to the truce, and, from that time on, regarded Barneveld as a political and personal enemy. At length ecclesiastical contentions put it in his power to get rid of his adversary. A violent controversy had broken out, in 1604, between two professors of theology at the university of Leyden, Arminius and Gomarus. Arminius sought to mitigate the severity of the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination; Gomarus upheld the doctrine in all its rigor. This dispute soon stirred up the passions of the whole people, even after Arminius's death in 1609.

The aristocracy of the cities, together with Barneveld, favored the Arminians and their liberal views, while the lower classes, who were zealous Calvinists, were on the side of the Gomarists. Prince Maurice, though quite indifferent to the theological aspect of the question, very naturally attached himself to the latter party. In 1610, the Arminians presented to the Dutch provincial estates a "remonstrance" in which they begged for peace and toleration. This was opposed by the Gomarists, and from that time the two parties were known as "Remonstrants" and "Anti-remonstrants."

An edict of peace, promulgated by the estates of Holland at the advice of Barneveld and the renowned publicist, Hugo de Groot (Groetius), was of no avail. The Anti-remonstrant populace stormed the churches of the Arminians and molested them in every way. For their

PLATE X.





King Christian IV. of Denmark.

Reduced facsimile of the engraving by Hendric Hondius (1588-1658).

protection, the estates decreed the formation, in 1617, of a city police, the so-called *waardgelders*. In this measure, however, the general stadtholder saw an encroachment on his military prerogatives, discharged the *waardgelders*, changed of his own accord the magistrates of several cities, and, through the majority of the smaller provinces, caused a national synod to be summoned, to meet at Dort (Dordrecht).

But, before this assembly met, the stadtholder, altogether contrary to law, ordered the arrest of Barneveld, Grotius, and Hogerbeets (city pensionary of Leyden), as well as of Ledenberg, secretary to the estates of Utrecht. Through armed force, Maurice acquired unconditional authority over the States-General. Ledenberg took his own life, Grotius and Hogerbeets were condemned by partisan judges to perpetual imprisonment, and Barneveld was unjustly condemned to death as a heretic, conspirator, and traitor, and executed on May 13, 1619. Grotius escaped from prison, concealed by his wife in a chest of books, and fled to France; and Hogerbeets was released in 1626.

In May, 1619, the synod of Dort finished its work. It had, as a matter of course, condemned the Arminians as innovators and schismatics, confirmed the Calvinistic dogma in its strictest interpretation, and pronounced the deposition of all preachers who taught otherwise. Maurice undertook the execution of this enactment, compelled the recalcitrant cities to submission, and drove those who were publicly known to be Arminians out of the country. It was a victory for religious intolerance, but at the same time also for the authority of the stadtholder.

All opposition was silenced when, in 1621, the war with Spain broke out anew—at first, to be sure, without any decisive results, for Spinola showed himself more than a match for the Prince of Orange. But now, in the autumn of 1624, French troops suddenly entered the Valtelline, drove out the Spanish garrisons as well as those of the pope, and in this way took these important mountain passes from the Hapsburgs. French agents traversed the German empire, everywhere seeking recruits against the emperor. England granted a considerable subsidy to the ever zealous anti-Austrian, Maurice of Hesse-Cassel. The Venetians stationed an army on the Tyrol-Milanese frontier, the command of which was entrusted to the old Bohemian rebel, Count Thurn.

The Scandinavian states also took up a position against Austria—Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus, and Denmark under Christian IV. (PLATE X.). Gustavus, indeed, was busied with the war with Poland, which since 1621 had been again in progress; but Christian of Denmark showed himself ready for action. He resolved to endure no longer the oppression of his co-religionists in Germany and the menacing proximity

of the troops of the League. His plan was that in this struggle his foreign allies should furnish liberal subsidies, but entrust the direction of the war to Denmark alone, to the exclusion of his hated Swedish rival.

In December, 1625, by an agreement at The Hague, England and the Netherlands promised liberal subsidies to the Danish ruler, while he pledged himself to organize an army of from 28,000 to 30,000 men for the restoration of peace in Germany and for the defence of the Lower Saxon circle. Richelieu, too, guaranteed to the Danes some support.

The Catholic politicians of Germany had early noticed the storm-clouds that were gathering over them. Tilly had driven Maurice of Hesse-Cassel out of his land, and himself had occupied it and laid it under contribution. From Alsace to the Weser, his troops were to be found. A diet of the League at Augsburg (1624) had resolved to maintain this army at the cost of all the estates, and besides "to execute something terrible against all the foes of Your Majesty." The League already regarded itself as the only legitimate authority in the empire. Tilly received the commission to invade and disarm all "refractory" districts (1625). Spain promised to aid with about 8000 men—on the selfish condition, however, of being allowed to occupy some harbors of the North Sea or the Baltic, whence operations could be carried on against the commerce of the United Provinces.

But still more important for the emperor was the fact that now for the first time in many years a considerable imperial army appeared in the field, under Wallenstein. Albert Wenceslaus Eusebius von Wallenstein was born September 14, 1583, at Hermanceiz, of a distinguished Old-Bohemian noble family. After the death of his parents, a zealous Catholic uncle removed him from the training of the Moravian Brethren, to whom he had been entrusted by his Protestant relatives, and brought him to the Jesuits at Olmütz. They knew how to take complete possession of him, and, although the memory of his Protestant origin never fully left him, yet he freed himself from the religious traditions of his family and of the overwhelming majority of his Bohemian-Moravian peers, in order to go over to Catholicism. The greater part of his student days he spent at the orthodox university of Padua. According to the custom of the cavaliers of the times, he passed from the university to the war and fought in Hungary against the Turks.

The young Wallenstein had now completed his apprenticeship. Outwardly conforming to Catholicism, he was at heart tolerant in religious matters, of refined demeanor, with a touch of scholarly culture, yet none the less delighting in the rude military life and without sympathy for the sufferings which this brought upon citizen and peasant. Poor,

but with good connections—and, above all, of most intense ambition—he determined to use every means to rise to eminence. His marriage in 1609 with a wealthy widow, who after a few years left him heir to an immense property, laid the foundation of his fortune, for he was thus

25. Gegen dem rechten Fuß ewern Spies fellei/vnd die Wehr von Leder ziehet
25. Pólez la picque contre le pied droit, & tirez l'espée.



FIG. 44.—Soldiers of the Thirty Years' War: 1. Lancer, in defensive attitude; the spear is braced against the right foot, while the sword is drawn by the right hand. (From Jacob de Gheyn's "Waffenhandlung," Frankfort, 1609.)

able to commend himself to Ferdinand II., by aiding him in his war (1617) against the Venetians, at the head of troops levied by himself.

When soon afterward the Bohemian troubles broke out, he separated himself in religion and in politics from his countrymen and raised for the emperor a regiment of cuirassiers, which fought with renown in

Bohemia and Hungary. After the battle of the White Hill, he profited by the debasing of the coinage which took place by the command of the emperor, and by the sales of the confiscated estates of his former friends and fellow-nobles; for seven million gulden, he bought, little by little, properties worth three times the money, which by careful management and constant acquisitions he raised to the value of fifty millions. He

23. *Emér Kohrladet.*
23. *Chargez'l Harquebuse.*



FIG. 45.—Soldiers of the Thirty Years' War. 2. Load musket! (*Ibid.*)

was now richer than the crown of Bohemia. His marriage with the Countess Elizabeth of Harrach, the daughter of a favorite of the emperor, and a relative of the prime minister, Eggenberg, increased his influence, and in September, 1623, he was raised to the dignity of Prince of Friedland.

In the spring of 1625, a great league seemed to be forming against the Hapsburgs. Christian of Denmark entered the territory of Bremen, and Mansfeld and Brunswick again advanced with their marauding bands from the Netherlands into the electorate of Cologne. The imperial coffers were entirely empty. Wallenstein judged it a favorable

2. *Auffewer Schultet das Kohr wol halt vnd marchiert.*
 1. *Tenez bien l'Harquebuse sur l'épaule & marchez.*



FIG. 46.—Soldiers of the Thirty Years' War. 3. Shoulder arms, and march!
(Ibid.)

opportunity to offer to the emperor the gratuitous equipment and maintenance of an army of 24,000 men. Ferdinand received at first the proposal of the ambitious Bohemian with mistrust; but the necessities of the imperial court were too great to permit of his not grasping at every possible means of relief.

On July 25, 1625, Wallenstein was appointed captain-general. Since he had cash enough on hand, and service with him promised great advantages, he soon collected more than 20,000 soldiers, the nucleus out of which the Austrian standing army has been developed.

With the most comprehensive plans, the new generalissimo entered

κ. *Marchiert mit der Forchet in der Hand!*
 ι. *Marchez avec la fourchette en la main.*



FIG. 47.—Soldiers of the Thirty Years' War. 4. Musketeer. (*Ibid.*)

upon his task. With him personal and political interests went hand in hand. He wished to unite dismembered Germany and to make the emperor as powerful there as the Kings of France and Spain were in their territories. At the same time, he himself would gain a rich reward at the expense of his opponents. So filled was he with these projects

that he often overlooked the practical difficulties that opposed their realization. The influence of astrology upon his decisions has been often overestimated; yet he took the renowned astronomer, Kepler, into his pay only to have him cast the nativities of all persons with whom he came in contact.

17. *Thut Puluer auff ewere Pfannen.*
17. *Amorçez.*



FIG. 48.—Soldiers of the Thirty Years' War. 5. Musketeer pouring powder on the pan. (*Ibid.*)

Wallenstein, now for the first time an independent commander, bore himself as a born leader. He was the true type of the scientific general, averse to rapid movements and more inclined to skilfully executed strategic manoeuvres than to direct attacks. Only in a case of absolute necessity, or when he had superior numbers, did he offer battle, and then

he almost always remained the victor. He followed up success tenaciously (cf. Figs. 44 to 53).

Meanwhile King Christian IV. had been forced into the war by the irruption of the troops of the League, under the orders of Maximilian of Bavaria, into Lower Saxony, and had (July, 1625) come into collision with Tilly. The Danes forced back, indeed, their weaker opponents, but they obtained no decisive success. Thus an advantageous moment for Wallenstein's attack was lost, but, with the beginning of the new year (1626), Wallenstein's armament gave the superiority again to the Catholics. Tilly stood confronting the Danes between the Weser and the Leine. Wallenstein, whose troops were not provided from Vienna even with the barest necessities, and were, therefore, engaged in pillaging the archbishopric of Magdeburg, had entrenched himself on the left bank of the Elbe near Dessau. In the neighborhood of this town, Mansfeld stormed the imperial general's fortified bridge over the Elbe, but was beaten by Wallenstein's superior force, and escaped with only 5000 combatants (April 25, 1626).

On the bridge of Dessau, the new imperial army had received gloriously its baptism of blood, and Wallenstein, by one stroke, had enrolled himself among the foremost generals of the age. But, unfortunate as Mansfeld was wont to be in battle, he was not less dexterous in redeeming his defeat. Reinforced again to 20,000 men by Danes, Scots, and Germans hired by French money, he resolved to carry the war into the hereditary lands of Austria, and to form a union with Bethlen-Gabor, who once more was lurking on the Hungarian frontier. As Silesia was full of malecontents, and as the Protestant peasantry in Upper Austria and Bohemia had risen in open revolt, the plan offered many prospects of success; but, when Mansfeld advanced into Silesia, the inhabitants dreaded his robber bands, and treated them as foes rather than friends. Then, being pursued by Wallenstein, Mansfeld was forced to evacuate Silesia and throw himself into the Carpathians, whence, supported by Bethlen, he carried on an advantageous guerilla war.

But Bethlen's vacillation lost Mansfeld the game. As the great successes he hoped for had not been realized, Bethlen once more preferred to conclude at Presburg a favorable peace with the emperor, which left Mansfeld in a very critical situation. As his money was entirely gone, he resolved to place his army temporarily under the command of Duke John Ernest of Weimar, and himself to proceed by way of Venice to England, to solicit subsidies. Though consumed by a violent fever, he set out on his long journey at the most unfavorable season of the year. But at Urakowitz, a village in Bosnia, his strength gave way




FIG. 49.—Soldiers of the Thirty Years' War. 6. Mounted lancer and his arms. (From "Kriegskunst zu Pferd," Frankfort, 1616.)

utterly. Here, on the morning of November 30, 1626, he died as a true warrior, standing erect, clad in his armor, his sword in his hand. He was only forty-six years of age. Notwithstanding his abilities and heroism, he remained to the last a heartless, conscienceless adventurer, who, with his wild comrades, inflicted unspeakable misery on the German



FIG. 50.—Soldiers of the Thirty Years' War. 7. Cuirassier and his arms. (The Pappenheimers were noteworthy cuirassiers.) (*Ibid.*)

lands, without essentially benefiting the cause for which he fought. A few weeks after Mansfeld's death, his lieutenant, John Ernest of Weimar, died; and the veteran Thurn, passing from the Venetian into the Danish service, led the remnant of Mansfeld's bands to join the Danish garrisons in Silesia.

Still earlier than his brothers in arms, Mansfeld and Weimar, Christian of Brunswick had died in May, 1626, at the age of only twenty-seven. With him, all desire for action seemed to have disappeared in the Danish camp, although Tilly was much weaker than the army of King Christian. Indeed, the king needed only to engage in earnest the general of the League in order to ensure his overthrow ; for, in his rear,



FIG. 51.—Soldiers of the Thirty Years' War. 8. Mounted lancer. (*Ibid.*)

the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel was equipping an army, in order to take him between two fires. But it was the fate of the Protestants, in the first half of this war—although two or three times as strong in number as the imperialists and Leaguists—on account of their perpetual divisions, to succumb one after the other to their united and energetic foes.

Tilly had leisure to throw himself on the landgrave, and compel him to submit and to surrender his lands to the imperial troops. Meanwhile Christian IV., already quite discouraged, spent the time in fruitless negotiations for peace with the emperor. Tilly, on the other hand, after the reduction of Hesse, conquered the territory of Hanover and the important city of Göttingen. When Christian at length advanced against him, in order to deliver Northern Hanover, Tilly, supported by a body of Wallenstein's troops, was able to accept battle on August 27, 1626, on the Barenberg near Lutter. The Danish king here gave proof of personal courage, and his troops—mostly Germans—stood their ground valiantly.

Then 7000 of Wallenstein's men, falling upon Christian's rear, struck the decisive blow. As was usually the case in the battles of the Thirty Years' War, the conquered infantry were killed or taken prisoners, while the greater part of the Danish cavalry escaped.

The military consequences of Tilly's victory were considerable; still more important, however, was its political effect. Everywhere the battle of Lutter was regarded as decisive in the Danish-imperial struggle. The Duke of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel deserted Christian; the Dukes of Mecklenburg formed an alliance with the emperor; the Hanse towns, and even the king's relatives, the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and the Protestant Archbishop of Bremen, assured Ferdinand of their submission.



FIG. 52.—Soldiers of the Thirty Years' War.
9. Harquebusier. (*Ibid.*)

The Brandenburg and English subsidies to the Danes ceased entirely. Landgrave Maurice of Hesse-Cassel, seeing his land devastated, laid down the government in favor of his eldest son William; and thus one of the most energetic defenders of Protestantism became a fugitive.

While Mansfeld and the Danish king had succumbed to the arms of the emperor and of the League, in France also the Catholic party had important successes to record. The Spaniards, in order that Richelieu might be sufficiently occupied at

home and thus be compelled to give up his enterprises in Italy and in the Grisons, had by secret embassies and remittances of money intensified the discontent of the Huguenots, who beheld the remnants of their political independence systematically restricted by the government. Relying on the support of the Catholic king, the French Reformed arose in January, 1625, with the brothers Rohan and Soubise, of the higher nobility, at their head; and the naval power of La Rochelle forthwith annihilated the small beginnings of the royal navy. At the same time, the cardinal had to face continually the enmity of the zealous Ultramontane party in France. Between these two opposing factions, he

resolved to feel his way, and devised the ingenious plan of making use of his Protestant allies in the subjugation of their French co-religionists, and then of propitiating the clerical party without too great sacrifices.

In both objects he was successful. He was able to win over the English by two devices: first, by marrying Henrietta Maria, a sister of the French king, to their young king, Charles I.; and secondly, by holding out to them the prospect of his intervening in favor of Charles I.'s brother-in-law, the Elector Palatine. The Dutch had been already attached to France by French subsidies. By the help of English and



FIG. 53.—Soldiers of the Thirty Years' War. 10. Cuirassier. (*Ibid.*)

Dutch ships, the fleet of La Rochelle under Soubise was beaten, off the island of Ré; and this island, together with others that defended the harbor of La Rochelle, was conquered by the royal troops (September, 1625).

The threatening demeanor of the Spanish and papal forces in Italy, the victories of Tilly, the preparations of Wallenstein, and the hostility of the Ultramontanes inclined Richelieu to peace with the Huguenots. On January 5, 1626, he concluded an agreement with them, which brought to them fair promises rather than actual advantages, and compelled them to submit to the presence of a royal officer in La Rochelle.

Even after making an end of the Huguenot opposition, the cardinal

thought it best not to enter into a contest with the Catholic zealots, and he was the less inclined to oppose them as they were the more embittered on account of the favorable conditions conceded to the Reformed. In pamphlets of all sorts, he was assailed as "Patriarch of the Atheists," "Calvinistic Pope." His position was still too insecure for him not to fear his overthrow from this powerful party at court, which included the queen-mother.

He at once made concessions to it: first at home, where he sacrificed to them some of his old friends and co-workers, whom, as "enemies of all good Catholics," he put in the Bastille; and then also in his foreign policy, by consenting to the confirmation, with slight modifications, of the treaty concluded at Monzon on March 5, 1626, by the French ambassador at Madrid, acting on his own responsibility. This treaty freed the orthodox population of the Valtelline from the rule of the Grisons, to which they had now only to pay tribute. Both the French and the Spanish were to evacuate those districts. Spain was thus robbed of its prey, the Valtelline; but, on the other hand, the allies of France, the Grisons, had lost the district which had for years been subject to them. Venice, Savoy, and England were as angry as the Grisons at a peace in which they, the allies of France, had not even been consulted.

All these sacrifices of the Protestant anti-Hapsburg party were counterbalanced by success in one direction only. Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, unable to obtain a firm peace from his relative, Sigismund III. of Poland, had, in July, 1621, renewed the war against him. By the end of 1625, he had taken Riga, all Livonia, and Courland from the Poles. He then advanced on Prussia. By this move he intended to make himself master of this important part of the Baltic coast, and it brought him closer to the affairs of Germany. In June, 1626, he landed at Pillau; in July he had compelled to neutrality ducal Prussia, belonging to his brother-in-law, George William of Brandenburg. By autumn he had subdued almost the whole of Polish Prussia, and invested Dantzic. The occupation of Prussia by the Swedes was all the more important, because it brought them into direct antagonism to the maritime schemes of the Hapsburgs.

Meanwhile Christian IV. had been successful in reorganizing his army, but he was no match for Tilly. In August, 1627, he had to withdraw to Holstein. Hereupon the last of his allies in the Lower Saxon circle deserted him, and submitted to the emperor and the League. The Danes, however, still held Silesia and even advanced into Moravia, hoping for the assistance of Bethlen-Gabor. Instead of this, a terrible opponent came upon them.

Wallenstein, in a conference with his friend, the imperial minister Eggenberg, had sketched out a precise military and political plan of campaign. Hungary should for a time be left to its fate; but, on the other hand, all princes of the empire who still remained refractory should be compelled to submission by open hostilities or by quartering troops on them and imposing fines. Every attempt at a Counter-reformation was to be given up, while the political interests of the emperor and the unity of the empire were to be the sole objects aimed at. Grand and patriotic plans, but certain to call down the enmity of the clerical party! In the beginning of July, 1627, the imperial generalissimo entered Silesia with his main army and captured its most important fortresses. The Danish commander, Mitzlaff, soon gave up all resistance and sought only to gain the seacoast. But he was overtaken by Wallenstein's troops at Friedeburg, and the whole Danish host, except one regiment, was killed or captured. Mitzlaff, escaping almost alone to Copenhagen with the news of the complete annihilation of his fine army-corps, was imprisoned as a punishment for his cowardly conduct.

By his rapid reconquest of Silesia, Wallenstein laid at rest the doubts which his hitherto deliberate mode of operations had raised at the court of Vienna. Admirably had he held together and tamed the wild mercenaries who had streamed from all quarters to his standard. He and his troops have been often represented as types of military barbarity and rapacity. But this is much exaggerated. He was compelled to maintain his army at the expense of the districts he occupied; for the emperor, in spite of all his promises, did almost nothing for it; but his army did not, like so many before and after it, fall upon a country like a swarm of locusts, and so devastate the country that the army was obliged soon to go further. He, on the contrary, so ordered matters that he was able to remain four years in eastern North Germany, while soldiers and civilians lived together in peace. Citizens and peasants were obliged to give a half, officials and nobles two-thirds, of their incomes for the needs of the army. Pillaging was severely punished, often by the halter, the Walloons being the worst offenders in this respect. (PLATE XI.)

On the other hand, Wallenstein, on account of his severity, was bitterly hated by a great part of his troops, especially by the Italians, who used to call him *il tiranno*. "Soldiers," he used to say, "must be well fed, well paid, and well hanged." Still more severely than pillaging, he punished cowardice. In general, he punished the smallest offences—in order, as he expressed it, to prevent greater ones (Figs. 54–58). But he was as ready to reward as to punish. He had always in readiness a




FIG. 54.—Military punishments in the Thirty Years' War: death by shooting. Etching by Jacques Callot (1594–1635) in "Les misères et malheures de la guerre."



FIG. 55.—Military punishments in the Thirty Years' War: death by hanging. Etching by Jacques Callot (*id.*). The condemned culprits, on the ladder under the tree, and on the right in the foreground, are attended by monks; on the right, under the tree, two are casting lots with dice on a drum, probably for their turn.




FIG. 56.—Military punishments in the Thirty Years' War: execution on the wheel. Etching by Jacques Callot (*id.*). The executioner with a club breaks the bones of the victim, who is fastened to the wheel.




FIG. 57.—Military punishments in the Thirty Years' War: the tilting-gallows. Etching by Jacques Callot (*id.*). The victim is about to be dropped from the gallows. The execution takes place before the regiment with unfurled colors; one company is ready to fire. In the foreground on the right, a second culprit is led to execution; on the left, four condemned soldiers, astride of a wooden horse, are enforced witnesses of the scene.




FIG. 58.—Military punishments in the Thirty Years' War: burning at the stake. Etching by Jacques Callot (*id.*). Criminals who had set fire to churches or houses were punished in this fashion; their offence is typified by the burning buildings in the background.

large number of gold chains for deserving warriors of every rank ; sums of money also, and promotions, were conferred upon everyone according to his deserts, without distinction of birth or faith.

It was thus that Wallenstein succeeded in controlling an army composed of the vagabonds and lawless foreigners of all kinds. In one single regiment, it was claimed that ten nationalities could be distinguished. Religion was as little regarded as social station ; military ability was alone valued. Evangelical and Catholic, German, Walloon, Italian, and Croatian colonels, descendants of princes and sons of merchants and day-laborers, to the number of 70,000, worked harmoniously for the common interests under the iron discipline of Wallenstein. What wonder that he regarded the army as of his own creation, and often exclaimed : " It belongs to me ! " For his services in this campaign, he was brilliantly rewarded by Ferdinand, receiving the principality of Sagan with the ducal title and the right of coinage.

Wallenstein then hastened to deprive the general of the League of the fruits of his hardly won victory. Quickly he marched from Silesia toward the north. At Lauenburg (September 1, 1627) he ostensibly joined himself with Tilly, the command alternating between them ; but his domineering demeanor soon caused the latter to remain behind for the siege of Pinneberg. This was just what Wallenstein wished, and, when Tilly was wounded shortly afterward, he became sole master of both armies. In his hand lay now the final decision in this Danish war.

The army of Christian IV. was disheartened, suffered from want of provisions, and plundered in its own land. The king was forced to retreat, closely pursued by the imperialists. Near Heiligenhafen, Wallenstein's general, Schlick, compelled a Danish corps of 8000 men, under the Margrave of Baden-Durlach, to surrender. Then, in spite of the protests of the Danish national council that the war concerned only the territories of their ruler within the empire ; but not Denmark proper, Schleswig and Jütland were cleared by the foe. Not until they reached the Belt did the imperialists halt, and then only because without ships they were unable to follow the king to Fünen.

Much against Wallenstein's advice, the emperor had made use of these successes to the advantage of the Catholic party of reaction. " Ferdinand," wrote the papal nuncio Caraffa, " appeared as it were to awake out of a deep sleep. Freed from a great fear, which up to that time had fettered his ancestors and himself, he conceived the idea of bringing back the whole of Germany to the terms of the religious Peace of Augsburg." But first he wished to annihilate heresy in his hereditary lands. Even the nobles, who up to this time had been spared personally, were now

forced to conform. On St. Ignatius's day, 1627, the emperor declared that after six months had gone by he would tolerate no one in Bohemia, not even of knightly or noble rank, who did not agree in faith with himself and with the church. Similar edicts were issued in Upper Austria; then in 1628 in Carinthia, Carniola, and Styria; and somewhat later, in Lower Austria also. From that time on, these lands were wholly won over again to unity of faith. At the same time the freedom of the estates in these lands was completely destroyed, and the princes became all-powerful. The reign of Ferdinand II. marks for the Austrian territories the victory both of exclusive Catholicism and of absolute monarchy.

The overthrow of the heretics afforded to the princes of the League but little consolation for the unforeseen increase in the imperial power in the last few years. In the name of the head of the empire, they had wished to make all Germany subject to their own confederacy, and the emperor a mere puppet in their hands. But now they were forced to see a great imperial army arise under Wallenstein, and Ferdinand entirely withdrawn from their influence. The systematic policy of the general, based entirely on his master's advantage and without any regard to the wishes and interests of the Catholic estates, could only heighten their anger and anxiety. He was careful not to involve his army in operations implying great loss or risk, but kept the main body of it constantly strong and ready for immediate action. Small corps were distributed over all Germany, occupying the territories of the princes of the League no less than those of Protestant princes. It was clear that Wallenstein, and perhaps also the emperor, intended thoroughly to curtail the independence of all the states of the empire.

The extortions of Wallenstein's soldiery led to revolts of the peasantry in Franconia and elsewhere. The Elector of Bavaria, who had ever played the part of a devoted servant to the imperial court, now called a meeting of all the electors, including the two Protestants, at Mühlhausen, for October, 1627. Here the greatest discontent found expression on account of the "exorbitant demands of his majesty's forces." Even John George, hitherto so faithful to the emperor, threatened open insurrection. The emperor and Wallenstein himself were earnestly entreated to remove these grievances and to reduce the imperial army.

In Vienna these representations found deaf ears. The last successes and the Franco-Spanish peace at Monzon had given courage. Wallenstein was enabled to increase his army to the unheard-of number of 100,000 combatants, and his friend Eggenberg formed magnificent plans.

Ought they not to retain the lately won Danish peninsula, and seek to add to it the Danish islands? They would then be able, on the Lower Elbe, to command the whole Lower Saxon circle, and, with the command of the Sound, they would gain the most lucrative tolls in all Europe, cut off from the Dutch rebels the importation of ship-timber, and found a strong imperial naval power.

But here the Austrian branch of the Hapsburgs came into collision with the Spanish branch, which had for years cherished the thought of wresting the Baltic from the sway of the heretic Danes and Swedes. Friendly negotiations with the Hanse towns led to no result, for these towns were inclined to Protestantism; and their commercial interests, besides, gravitated toward the evangelical north and northwest. Force and craft, then, must lead the Hapsburgs to their goal. Wallenstein entered into these plans with all the more zeal since, as was his custom, he straightway associated his own personal interests with them. He wished to make himself master of the principal seaports in Mecklenburg and Pomerania, and to build in these a powerful fleet, the leadership of which would naturally fall to himself, the victorious general. By means of these Baltic plans he hoped to attain to the dignity of prince of the empire.

Wallenstein maintained that in the last campaign he had again advanced three million gulden to the emperor; and for this, and as a reward for his services, he demanded the lands of both the Dukes of Mecklenburg. They had committed the crime of allying themselves for a time with the Dane; but they had been almost the last of the Lower Saxon princes to do this, and the first to desert Christian. Wallenstein demanded of the emperor that the dukes should forfeit their lands on account of their "strange practices," and that these lands should be conferred upon himself. In vain did many councilors at the court of Vienna warn the emperor of Wallenstein's immoderate ambition; in vain did the estates of Mecklenburg, as well as other princes, intercede for the dukes. On January 26, 1628, the Mecklenburg territories, together with the bishopric of Schwerin, were conferred upon Wallenstein in perpetuity, and not merely as security for the repayment of his loan, as it was represented to the public; in April the estates of Mecklenburg had to do him homage.

Never had the constitution of the empire been more shamefully violated than in this wholly lawless expulsion of two innocent princes. Apart from this, however, Wallenstein as a territorial prince ruled not ingloriously. He filled all the more important offices with native Mecklenburgers, and carried out a rational, but at that time very unusual separa-

tion between the judicial and administrative functions. He left untouched the ascendancy of the Lutheran church in the land, although he founded in Güstrow a Catholic academy for young nobles which succeeded in making a few converts. Even while in camp, he was always concerned for the welfare of the land, entered into all the details of administration, and made sacrifices for the promotion of industry and commerce. He had already conceived the plan, which in our own time has been executed, of constructing a canal between the Elbe and the Baltic. His subjects, especially the nobles, showed themselves by no means insensible to the mildness and beneficence of his rule.

Wallenstein now felt that his personal ambition was gratified, and entered with all the greater zeal upon the execution of the plans of the Hapsburgs for universal absolutism. While his army held all Germany in subjection, the Hanse towns of Wismar and Rostock were compelled to receive imperial garrisons. He cast, too, his longing eye on Pomerania. Under the pretext that Duke Boguslaw XV. had, this same year, given passage to the Swedes in their advance against Poland, 24,000 imperialists, under Colonel Arnim, advanced in November, 1627, into Pomerania, and took possession of this country along with the island of Rügen.

Such violent proceedings, as well as his insatiable avarice, aroused against Wallenstein more and more enemies, and made the growing opposition of the princes of the empire dangerous. The expulsion of the Mecklenburgers appeared in these circles as a threatening example of the approaching imperial absolutism; and it was aggravated by the fact that their lands had been conferred not on a man of princely rank, but on a Bohemian subject. They accused Wallenstein of planning to make himself, with the help of his army, emperor after Ferdinand's death. The indignation of the states of the League, and especially of their leaders, the Electors of Bavaria and Mayence, grew all the stronger, the less their complaints were heeded at Vienna. It found expression in the summer of 1628, when the League refused to send its unemployed army either to the support of the Hapsburgs in the Netherlands or against Stralsund. This city was destined to wreck the Hapsburgs' great maritime projects as well as the fortune of Wallenstein and the success of the imperial arms.

King Christian IV., notwithstanding his defeats, was not in despair. In his islands, he felt himself secure. He now thought of resuming the offensive, and, above all, of frustrating the attempt to establish an imperial naval power in the Baltic. In this he was successful. His admiral, Prosmund, burned the warships already built by Wallenstein, and destroyed the dockyards. Detachments of Danish troops landed

all along the coast and often encouraged the inhabitants to revolt against the oppression of the imperial soldiery. It was imperative for Wallenstein to obtain possession of the most important and strongest seaport of that region—the *tête-de-pont* of Rügen—Stralsund. He demanded from this Hanse town, which practically enjoyed unlimited freedom, the admission of 5000 imperial soldiers as well as the breaking-off of all intercourse by sea with Denmark and Sweden.

But the inhabitants of Stralsund, sturdy sailors and zealous Protestants, would neither sacrifice their liberty and prosperity by the admission of the hated oppressors, nor renounce their trade. They were willing only to pay a moderate sum of money. During the negotiations, the imperialists, in an underhand way, took possession of the island of Dänholm, commanding the entrance to the harbor, and fortified themselves there. The city council was already on the point of giving way, but the burghers arose undismayed, strengthened the council with men from their own midst, and declared war by enlisting mercenaries and calling on the Protestant powers for help. They were successful in blockading with their own ships the imperialists in Dänholm, so that the latter were forced to capitulate and to withdraw to Rügen (April 21, 1628).

Not only the Danish king, but also Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden, sent soldiers and stores. The latter indeed could not be indifferent to the imperialists' occupation of Pomerania (bordering on Prussia), nor to their hostile demeanor toward his kingdom, nor to the prospect of an imperial armada in the Baltic; and therefore he began to take an active part in German affairs.

There was no time for delay. On May 23, 1628, Arnim, with 8000 men, had invested Stralsund on the land side. Six weeks later, Wallenstein himself appeared with fifteen fresh regiments before the obstinate city, and, after two days' incessant conflict, captured the great redoubt before the northeastern gate. Although the council again despaired and wished for peace, the burghers as a body held out bravely; for the sea belonged to their friends. Thousands of fresh combatants and new supplies streamed in continually from Denmark and Sweden.

Wallenstein saw 12,000 of his best soldiers fall before these walls. The League maliciously denied him any aid. Discouraged, he left Stralsund on July 25 for his duchy of Mecklenburg. Arnim still made some ineffectual attempts to storm the city; then, on August 4, he also took his departure. Stralsund was saved.

In itself, it was a matter of no particular importance whether Stralsund received an imperial garrison or not. But, as so often in history, the greatness of the indirect consequences was out of all proportion to

the insignificance of the immediate results. All was now over with the Hapsburg plans for the *dominium maris Baltici*, since the fleets of Denmark and Sweden had demonstrated so brilliantly their superiority. The Protestants recovered breath and took fresh courage for resistance; Wallenstein himself renounced all wide-reaching plans and limited himself to protecting and preserving what he had already gained. In short, it was not so much the temporary condition of affairs as the whole current of events that was changed by the gallant defence of the inhabitants of Stralsund.

Stralsund then received a garrison of 5000 Swedes, thus allowing Gustavus Adolphus to obtain a footing on German soil. Wallenstein's whole position was shaken. He had now, on Ferdinand's order, to give way and to issue strict rules for the discipline of his troops, and to allow an imperial commissioner to disband half of his cavalry and execute a large number of his officers and soldiers for their misdeeds.

The year 1629 opened under favorable auspices, for at last a prospect was presented to Germany of ending this eleven years' civil war. Under Saxon mediation and with the assent of Wallenstein, who had suddenly become disposed to peace, negotiations were opened between Denmark and the emperor. The latter was the more inclined to a treaty with Christian IV., as a new war threatened him in Italy.

At Christmas, 1627, the Duke of Mantua had died childless. The nearest heir was Charles of Gonzaga, who, through his mother, was at the same time Duke of Nevers, and therefore a French vassal. Such a ruler the Spaniards would not tolerate in Italy, and therefore they induced the emperor, as the feudal suzerain of Mantua, to refuse the duchy to Charles on the pretext that he had applied too late for investiture. To carry out this decision, the Spaniards from Milan, as well as their ally, Charles Emmanuel, Duke of Savoy, attacked the Mantuan territory. Nevers turned to Richelieu with earnest appeals for help, but the latter was not in a position to comply immediately with his request. When the Huguenots in 1627 had applied to England for help, the Duke of Buckingham had gladly come in person with a strong fleet and landed on the island of Ré, with the purpose of aiding the Huguenots in La Rochelle. But Richelieu was much superior to Buckingham.

In November, the English had to evacuate with great loss their positions on the isle of Ré, having brought only misfortunes on the French Protestants, and especially on La Rochelle, the siege of which the cardinal at once began in the presence of the king, but under his own direction. Against open assault, the city was almost impregnable; therefore Richelieu resolved to starve it into surrender, and built not only



Siege of

Reduced facsimile from J. Valdor's "L'




a wall of circumvallation on land, but also, under great difficulties, a dam across the mouth of the harbor. A great English fleet sent to its relief appeared too late ; it could not break through the dam. The heroic inhabitants of La Rochelle, zealous for their faith, though suffering the pangs of hunger, held out valiantly, month after month, under their mayor, John Guiton (PLATE XII.).

At length, deliverance seemed at hand. At the end of September, 1628, a new English fleet appeared before the dam and made an energetic assault on it. For five days the struggle lasted ; but all the efforts of the English, all the sorties of the citizens, were unavailing against the fortifications of the royalists. The storms of autumn compelled the English to withdraw. A few weeks later (October 30, 1628), after hunger had slain one half of the inhabitants and made the other half unfit for fighting, the glorious stronghold of Protestantism was forced to surrender.

Richelieu acted with mildness, leaving to the citizens their religious freedom and their property ; but their walls were torn down, their privileges annulled, and the Catholic worship was re-established under a bishop. A few months later, the remaining Huguenots submitted. The conditions granted them by Richelieu were in full accord with his cherished views : namely, annihilation of the political power of the Huguenots, but the preservation of their religious freedom. The fortifications of all Protestant cities were to be destroyed, but otherwise Louis XIII. took oath anew to the Edict of Nantes.

So long as the siege of La Rochelle lasted, Richelieu was compelled to allow the Spaniards and Savoyards to lord it at will in Mantuan territory. But scarcely was he done with this city, when he prepared to support Nevers with a strong army, in order to maintain French influence in Italy. Not only Venice, but also the pope, from fear of the increasing preponderance of the Hapsburgs, stood firmly on the side of France. Urban VIII. (1623-1644) (Fig. 59) was much more a secular prince than an ecclesiastical leader. He wished, above all, to free Italy from Spanish bondage, and therefore he was blind to the religious character which the Thirty Years' War bore at this epoch. This was a menacing alliance, and Ferdinand II. was forced to favor the conclusion of a peace in the north, in order to be able to employ his forces in the south. He named Wallenstein and Tilly as his plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Lübeck.

Wallenstein had three objects in view : to set the emperor's hands free with all possible speed ; to drive the League entirely into the background ; and finally, to retain his new principality of Mecklenburg.



VRBANVS VIII. BARBERINVS PONT. MAX.

FIG. 59.—Pope Urban VIII. Reduced facsimile of a contemporary anonymous engraving.

For these reasons he showed himself very accommodating to the Danes, and, without even consulting the commissioners of the League, he came to terms with them at Lübeck at the beginning of June, 1629. The Peace of Lübeck was apparently extraordinarily favorable to the Danes.

They received back all that they had lost, and were not required even to pay the costs of the war. In return for such magnanimity, the Danish king pledged himself to refrain from all further interference in German affairs, i. e., to give up entirely the Protestant cause in the empire. By this agreement he left the Mecklenburg dukes to their fate and indirectly recognized Wallenstein's sovereignty over their former domains. The League was not referred to, except in general terms under the expression "loyal estates." Not a farthing did it receive of the urgently demanded indemnification for its expenses in the war. This was Wallenstein's revenge for its complaints regarding himself.

It rested now with the emperor to grant to Germany the peace so long yearned for and so much needed. If he still desired war, a sufficient field for his ambition was offered to him in Italy, in the quarrel over the Mantuan succession. In Germany he had acquired by his successes a degree of power equaled only by that of Charles V. in his most glorious days. And in religion, as well as in politics, he could be content with what had been attained. Even most of the princes of the League, whom no one could accuse of lukewarmness in matters affecting the Catholic faith, wished for peace and a disarmament. But the clerical party around the emperor did not hesitate once more to scatter firebrands in the scarcely pacified empire, thus rekindling a conflagration that consumed both the prosperity and power of Germany, and at last even the imperial authority. To this party Germany was indebted for the prolongation of this ruthless war for two more decades. Far better would it have been, if Ferdinand had acted in accordance with the plans of Wallenstein.

This great general was little troubled by the increasing hate of his enemies. If only the emperor stood by him, Wallenstein was the strongest man in Germany. His troops were stationed from Pomerania to Swabia; at the slightest signs of open hostility, they could drive the hostile electors out of their lands. Now that his personal ambition was satisfied, he lived and moved in imperialist schemes of the most wide-reaching nature, and wished to adopt the offensive against the enemies of the house of Hapsburg. By supporting the Poles, he hoped so to occupy the attention of Sweden that it would have to give up all interference in German affairs. He sent his most trusted general, Arnim, with 10,000 men, to Poland, where he joined the Polish general, Koniecpolski. Another 10,000, under Octavio Piccolomini, was sent to the aid of the Spanish regent in the Netherlands. But the French were the objects of his most violent rage.

Richelieu, meanwhile, taking his king with him, had, in March, 1629,

defeated the Savoyards in the pass of Susa, forced their duke, Charles Emmanuel, to a treaty of peace and friendship, driven the Spaniards out of Montferrat, and concluded a defensive alliance with the Venetians, that secured Mantua for Charles of Nevers. Wallenstein, beside himself with anger, threatened to invade France and take up his quarters in Paris; in any case, he would tear the three bishoprics of Lorraine from France. Twenty thousand men, all Protestants, marched under Collalto into Italy against Nevers, the French, and the pope. "Rome has not been plundered for a hundred years," jeered Wallenstein; "it must have become rich since then." These troops were to re-establish the imperial authority in all Upper and Central Italy. With his remaining 50,000 men, Wallenstein intended to keep Germany in obedience, and, if possible, to cross the Rhine into France.

These were indeed magnificent plans, entirely in accordance with the tolerant spirit of Wallenstein, who bitterly hated religious bickering and the temporal power of the clergy. The whole project was based on the assumption of peace among the religious parties in Germany; only on this assumption could he send half the army out of Germany. The Catholic princes were now the most decided opponents of the absolute authority of the emperor, while the Lutheran princes, as long as they were not molested in their faith, felt themselves compelled by the monarchical spirit of their doctrine to submit willingly to the power set over them by God.

But now came a tragic change in the situation for Germany and for Wallenstein himself. The foundation of his position and his plans, the support of the emperor, was withdrawn from him; for Ferdinand allowed himself to be persuaded by fanatical councilors and by some of the chiefs of the League to kindle anew the religious war which had just been ended by the Peace of Lübeck.

Since the successes of 1626, the Counter-reformation had gone on surely, though slowly, in Germany. Zealous monks, especially Jesuits, followed the armies of the emperor and of the League everywhere, in order to set on foot at once the conversion or the persecution and punishment of the heretics. But that did not satisfy them. At Mühlhausen in 1627 the electors belonging to the League had demanded the restitution of all the property taken by the Protestants from the church since the Treaty of Passau in 1552, i. e., of almost all the North German bishoprics. Such a restitution was so certain to drive all the Protestants to desperation, that even Ferdinand II., though believing in his right to do so, shrank from actually carrying it into execution. But the Catholic party persisted, and assailed the emperor with all their character-

istic pertinacity. The Jesuits—especially Ferdinand's confessor, Father Lamormain—gave him no rest with their representations and prayers. Finally, after a long struggle on the part of the emperor, he was induced, in the spring of 1629, to publish the Edict of Restitution.

This was the greatest political blunder that Ferdinand could have made. The Edict was unconstitutional, for it should have been issued only with the consent of the imperial diet. It was destructive of the peace of the empire, for it inspired the Protestants with the fear of the entire annihilation of their religious communion, and the Protestant princes in particular with the apprehension of incalculable loss of territory. It did not even satisfy the League, but only encouraged it to insist all the more on the removal of Wallenstein and the disbanding of his army. It was, finally, the death-sentence of all Wallenstein's imperialist and patriotic plans. All his plans for offensive war abroad had to be given up, in order that the undoubted resistance of the Protestants at home might be repressed. For the sake of this, Ferdinand must throw himself still more unreservedly into the arms of those same Catholic electors who were the foremost opponents of his power. In short, the peace and unity of Germany within and its power and prestige abroad were sacrificed to a blind fanatical reaction. Even Tilly had advised against it, but in vain. Wallenstein wrote bitterly to Collalto: "The whole empire will be against us; the Swede, the Turk, and even Bethlen."

Legal conditions that had lasted for seventy years were abolished, and the development of more than a half-century destroyed by a stroke of the pen. The imperial court received instructions to administer prompt justice in conformity with the Edict, and imperial commissioners were named to carry it out in the various circles. In vain did all the Protestant estates and even the Elector of Saxony, hitherto so good an imperialist, remonstrate. Ferdinand remained unyielding. John George could now taste the "gratitude of the house of Austria." His son Augustus was deprived of the administration of the rich archbishopric of Magdeburg, and it was conferred upon the Archduke Leopold, second son of the emperor, who was already Bishop of Halberstadt, Strasburg, and Passau, and Abbot of Murbach. Ferdinand also adjudged to him the archbishopric of Bremen and the abbey of Hersfeld. It throws a peculiar light on the emperor's zeal for the church, that he conferred on this one son, contrary to all ecclesiastical law, two archbishoprics and three bishoprics. Everywhere now the Protestant canons and prebendaries were driven out, and most of the churches restored to the Catholics.

In the Lower Saxon districts, Magdeburg, as eighty years before,

valiantly withstood the Counter-reformation. Wallenstein appeared before the city and demanded the admission of an imperial garrison, but the burghers refused. The skirmishing between them and the imperial mercenaries lasted for months, the latter suffering the greater loss. At length Wallenstein acquiesced in a so-called "accommodation," and, for a bare 10,000 thalers, raised the siege.

This was a fresh disgrace for the imperial arms, and a new encouragement for the Protestants. Besides, they saw now what tyrannical views the imperialists cherished. "All wait for the Swede, as the Jews for the Messiah," wrote Wallenstein with a sigh to Collalto. A general revolt appeared to be at hand. He acted not as a traitor, but in the interests of the emperor, when he assured the North Germans that the Edict of Restitution would not be carried out.

In November, 1629, the Hanse towns met at Lübeck and resolved to equip an army of 20,000 men for their common defence. With their help, the old council of Magdeburg was overthrown and a popular constitution established.

While the Protestant elements united against the emperor's Edict of Restitution, and a new and dangerous foe arose for him in the Swedish king, Ferdinand could not even rely upon the authors and promoters of this work, upon the Catholic electors. They were angry with the emperor on account of his strong army and its insolent conduct. With his usual keenness of vision, Richelieu recognized this, and, with his usual adroitness, turned it to his own account. First, by his gold, he won over the Elector of Treves, Philip Christopher of Sötern, and then Ferdinand of Cologne, by supporting him against his restless subjects of Liège. But most important to the cardinal was Maximilian of Bavaria. The French envoys promised him, in case of need, the support of 50,000 men for the overthrow of Wallenstein and the defence of the Bavarian electorate, and even held out to the ambitious Maximilian the prospect of obtaining the imperial crown.

And now it was seen how much his friendship and loyalty to his imperial cousin were worth. He took up readily with these offers, and sought, in union with the French, to win over to these plans the Elector of Mayence, Anselm Casimir of Umstadt. But the latter positively declined to support Maximilian, and denounced the plot to Ferdinand. Too late did Ferdinand see on what dangerous ground he had trodden, and how he had again hazarded all that he had won in a twelve years' struggle.

Assured of French support, and convinced that after Gustavus Adolphus had landed in Germany the emperor could not get along without

their help, the heads of the League began to put their traitorous plans in operation. What can we think of their zeal for religion and much-talked-of loyalty as estates of the empire, when we see them, in face of the most imminent danger, impetuously demanding the dismissal of a highly gifted general and the disbanding of the imperial army! Ferdinand had summoned the electors to meet at Ratisbon in the middle of June, 1630, in order to carry through the election of his eldest son, Ferdinand, as King of the Romans. The Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg stayed away under protest; thus the four electors belonging to the League had their hands free. Before entering on any other business, they demanded that the command of the imperial troops should be transferred from Wallenstein to some other person who was agreeable to them. Some imperial councilors still insisted on retaining Wallenstein and carrying out his plans. "These electors," they said, "wished to make the emperor like a statue which is terrible to look at, while the flies crawl over its nose." That which had been done eighteen months before could not be undone; the Edict of Restitution had delivered Ferdinand helpless to the Catholic particularists, who strove to increase their own individual power at the expense of the emperor's authority.

Neither regard for his own dignity, nor gratitude for Wallenstein's services, nor the apprehension that Wallenstein might go over to his foes could induce Ferdinand to refuse the demands of the League; and accordingly, on August 13, 1630, Wallenstein was dismissed from command. With affected indifference, the general received, a month later, the long-foreseen announcement, and set out at once for his Bohemian estates. At heart only one idea possessed him: how to regain his power and influence. His dismissal was the most pronounced defeat for imperial authority. With all his might, Ferdinand still struggled against giving up his power to the League, but it was forced from him. The imperial army, at this critical moment, was reduced to 40,000 men and placed under the command of Tilly.

Not only in Germany, but in Italy as well, the Catholic opposition to the imperial power conquered. Richelieu, at the head of the French army, had punished the ambiguous conduct of Charles Emmanuel of Savoy by the conquest of his entire territory, and had then defeated the Savoyard and Spanish troops near Avigliano (July, 1630).

Negotiations were already going on in Ratisbon for a peace with France; and in October, through the mediation of the papal diplomat, Jules Mazarin—who here appears for the first time upon the political stage—an armistice was signed. One result of this was the Peace of Chierasco (June 19, 1631), in which Mazarin had again co-operated, and

that, too, entirely in the French interest, a course by which the young statesman recommended himself highly to Richelieu. The treaty required the evacuation of the districts occupied by the several powers.

The emperor and Spain, knowing well their weakness, carried out the conditions loyally ; but not so France. She had prevailed upon the powerless young Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus I. (from 1630 on), through threats and promises, to cede the important fortress of Pinerolo, and had thus secured for herself an important Alpine pass into Italy. Soon the Spaniards, as they had feared, saw Nevers introduce French troops into his margraviate of Montferrat, while the people of the Grisons chose for their general the Huguenot Duke of Rohan, who was now on the best terms with Richelieu. The Hapsburg duchy of Milan was thus surrounded by foes.

With all his sacrifices, Ferdinand had been unable to purchase the election of his son as King of the Romans. The party of fanatical ecclesiastical reaction triumphed in the whole empire, but their excessive severity was to be their ruin. We stand at the turning-point in the whole war.

PLATE XIII.



ALBERTUS DEI GRATIA DUX FRIDLANDIÆ SACRÆ
CÆSARÆ MAIESTATIS CONSILIARIUS BELLICUS,
CAMERARIUS, SUPREMUS COLONEIUS PRAGENSIS,
ET EIUSDEM MILITIÆ GENERALIS. *Amstelredamij sumptibus Ericus Floriss.*

Wallenstein.

Reduced facsimile of a copper-plate engraving by Heinrich Hondius (1588-1658).

History of All Nations, Vol. XII., page 229.

CHAPTER VI.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS AND WALLENSTEIN.

GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS, King of Sweden, if not one of the most powerful, was certainly one of the most illustrious and influential men of his time. He was not only a valiant soldier and skilful commander, but also an excellent army organizer. He founded a standing army in Sweden; and, among his other reforms, he produced a complete revolution in the artillery: instead of the long cannon, he introduced a short and much lighter piece. He was scarcely less distinguished in the civil administration of his kingdom. Equal distribution of taxes, improved administration of justice, a well-ordered church system, the foundation of new gymnasia, the advancement of the university of Upsala, the promotion of mining, and increased facilities for communication by land and water—for all these benefits, worked out in the midst of the cares of war, his people had to thank him. Only under such discreet and efficient guidance was it possible for his thinly peopled kingdom, numbering only some one and one-half millions of inhabitants, to play a prominent part in European affairs.

So soon as the Hapsburg plans for dominion in the Baltic became apparent, Gustavus Adolphus, against the advice of his trusted chancellor, Oxenstiern, determined to oppose them. He would not wait until the imperialists crossed over to attack the Swedish coasts and shipping, but preferred to anticipate them and to assume the offensive in self-defence. Religious considerations were at first of secondary importance with him; his aim was rather to establish the sovereignty of Sweden over the Baltic. This was the motive that led to his sending aid to Stralsund. His Polish war and the support given to the Poles by a detachment of the imperial army had up this time prevented him from a more decided interference in the affairs of Germany. Wallenstein's (PLATE XIII.) hostility, the rejection of the Swedish envoys at the Congress of Lübeck, and the Edict of Restitution afforded him the pretext he desired for his German expedition; but these were not the real causes of it. He resolved to give up the contest in the wide and desolate plains of Poland, and by an energetic offensive to put an end

once for all to the emperor's Baltic plans, at the same time gaining additional strips of the Baltic coast for Sweden.

In this he had the support of Richelieu, who lost no opportunity of preparing new embarrassments for the Hapsburgs. Commissioned by him, Baron Charnacé arrived (July, 1629) at the scene of war, to undertake the difficult task of mediating between the two belligerent powers. On September 26 an armistice for six years was concluded at Altmark near Stuhm, which gave to the Swedes Livonia as well the most important coast-strips and harbors of Prussia; Poland received back the other conquests of the Swedes.

Gustavus Adolphus returned home and consulted his councilors as to whether he should transfer the inevitable war against the emperor to German soil. After brief deliberation, the majority gave an affirmative answer. Pomerania and Mecklenburg were to be seized as the strongest bulwarks for the security of Sweden and for its sovereignty over the Baltic.

For a time, Sweden had no aid from allies. Richelieu waited to see what success Gustavus Adolphus would have; Christian of Denmark saw in this king a rival, not a brother in the faith; Holland considered it politic to let the eastern powers wear each other out in mutual strife, so that by an advantageous neutrality she might draw to herself the Baltic trade. The only person to offer himself as a zealous ally was Bethlen-Gabor; but he died in November, 1629, and disturbances arose in Transylvania in regard to the succession. Thus Gustavus Adolphus, in his great undertaking, stood utterly alone; he did not even know whether he would find a friendly reception and aid among the German Protestants.


In the spring of 1630, his colonel, Leslie, seized the island of Rügen. The king then issued a fiery manifesto to his people, in which he brought into prominence the religious motive, which in reality was but secondary with him. The government of the kingdom in his absence, as well as his six-year-old heiress, Christina, he entrusted to his council of state. On June 27, 1630, his fleet weighed anchor with but 15,000 combatants on board. But they were well trained and armed, and filled with confidence in their king. Here at last was a Protestant leader, more skilful than Tilly, more energetic than Wallenstein; above all, a man who always followed practical plans. On July 6, he landed on the island of Usedom and took it, together with the neighboring island of Wollin.


The Imperialists in Pomerania, superior in numbers to their opponents, were wretchedly commanded by the incompetent and cruel Torquato Conti. While Conti remained inactive in his strongly entrenched

Schwedischer Aufkufft vnd Fortgang im Reich/

Das ist:

Glückliche Continuation der Göttlichen hüffe / ne-
benst angehefftem Guten der Tyrannen böser Thaten/ vnd Pharisäischen That-
schlägen/ so jeso im Schwange gehen.





Lang sah ich ihm nach / bis ich bin innen worden /
Das Gott durch ihn das A. Weib einführte zur nächsten
Pforten/

So weit das er wieder beim erst B. Engel wird bracht:
Ein C. Mann wolt ihn zu rück halten mit großer Macht/
Den er doch nach sich zog / gleich als mit einer Kette/

Der Held vermahnet E. die / so begreiffen sein Denstand

Für und mit ihm zu Gott zu stehen vmb hilffreich Hand/

Nach sehten die selbst vmb / die ihre E thun nur abwarten/

Wel unversehene G. T hier mochten suchen im Garten.

In dem streiffen / kömpt eben dasselb H. Vrtel/

Welches ihre Brüder bracht in all dieß groß Unheil.

Darauff sagt zum Held das Weib wenn du nicht wilst ansehen
Was dir bezeugen mag / sondern recht lahn recht gehen/
Den fernst so wol / als den nähern Beystand thu.

Dem Klein wie dem Grossen / alles i. Weils anthun.

So weiß ich / Gott wird dich in t seiner Hülffe segnen/

Gnad / Sieg vnd all Ehr / auff dich stels lassen Regnen/

Was du vornimbst / wird dir glücklich gehen von Stadt/

Woll du nicht dir / Sondern Gott zuschreibst all That.

Du wirst mit Fried vnd Ruhm wieder anheim kommen/

Darzu ein gewünschten Erb deiner Cron bekommen/

Gesund in guter Ruhe leben zu aller friest /

Bis dir sterben wird seyn / nützer denn Lebensst.

Æ N D Æ.

camp near Garz, his soldiers scoured the whole seacoast and committed barbarous atrocities. Duke Boguslaw XV. of Pomerania would gladly have remained neutral; but Gustavus, needing Pomerania as a basis for his operations in Germany, forced the duke to conclude an alliance with him and promise contributions to the expenses of the war. Stettin, Rügen, and Stralsund were occupied by the Swedes.

These successes of Gustavus had their effect on the German Protestants, who up to that time had remained quiet from fear that the Swedish intervention would have as disastrous results as the Danish (PLATE XIV.¹). William V., Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, eager to avenge the affront put upon his father and the wrongs inflicted on his land, drove out the Leaguists from his territory and levied an army of his own. In the archbishopric of Magdeburg, the former administrator, Christian William of Brandenburg, who had been expelled on account of his connection with Mansfeld, was again put in possession and levied men; he was reinforced by Swedish troops under Dietrich von Falkenberg.

The badly led, ill-cared-for, mutinous imperial troops in Pomerania had hoped that, according to the custom of those days, the winter would bring to them rest in their quarters. But Gustavus Adolphus declared that the Swedes were warriors in winter as well as in summer, and continued the war without cessation. In despair, Conti gave up the command to Schauenburg, who could not do any better. While the well-cared-for and warmly clad Swedes entered upon the winter campaign—then an unheard-of undertaking—in excellent spirits, and maintained the strictest discipline among themselves and in their relations to the inhabitants, the wretched army of the imperialists became completely disintegrated. By the end of 1630, all Pomerania—except Demmin, Greifswald, and Kolberg—as well as the Neumark, was in the hands of the Swedes. The stately imperial host, that for more than three years had held down these lands under fearful oppression, had melted at the mere appearance of the little Swedish force, like snow before the sun.

¹ In PLATE XIV. the great hall stands for the Holy Roman Empire. At the left, Tilly enters, holding in his hands and dragging the chains which surround the Christian church (Protestant): Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden, conducted by an angel, delivers the church and with drawn sword enters the scene. Before him are kneeling German citizens, who are offering thanks to God and to their deliverer the king, while in the foreground the mutilated bodies of two children typify the tyranny of their oppressors. At the right are groups and single figures, which illustrate the sorrowful condition of the empire—persecution of God's people, robbery and theft, rape, murder and bloodshed, rioting and drunkenness. At the middle a burning church, with a cavalryman attacking it; in the background the representatives of the ecclesiastical estates (Catholic)—the council of the League plotting against the Christian church. Above the imperial double eagle the words of Isaiah (viii. 10): "Take counsel together, and it shall come to naught."

The unexpected success of the northern sovereign created the greatest sensation throughout all Europe. During the summer, Tilly had been obliged to watch the Dutch, who threatened to invade the empire. Appointed imperial commander-in-chief late in the autumn, he at once set out for the east, gathering the scattered divisions of the army from all quarters to himself. His design was to leave Gustavus Adolphus to contend with the imperial garrisons in the northeast, while he himself proceeded to capture Magdeburg, as the key to the Elbe and Lower Saxony. This well-situated city would afford him an excellent base for his defensive and offensive operations, and by its capture the Protestants would receive an impressive warning not to have too much to do with the Swedes.



FIG. 60.—Medal of the Elector George William, with his son, afterward the Great Elector, as Electoral Prince. Silver. Original size. Obverse. (Berlin.)

On the other hand, the success of Gustavus Adolphus determined France to declare herself openly for him. Already, soon after his landing in Pomerania, Baron Charnacé had again appeared at his quarters and had offered him financial support. At that time, the negotiations had not led to any result; but they were renewed at Bärwalde in the beginning of 1631, and this time Richelieu was in earnest. On January 23, 1631, a treaty of alliance for five years was concluded there: everything in the empire was to be restored to its condition before the war; to this end, Sweden was to maintain an army of 36,000 men, while

France was to pay her large yearly subsidies ; and neither of the contracting parties could enter upon peace-negotiations without the other. To such a point, therefore, had the unfortunate religious dissensions brought matters in Germany, that foreigners set themselves up as arbiters over the empire ! In truth, neither France nor even Sweden, in their contest with the Hapsburgs, had religion in view ; but the Edict of Restitution stamped the conflict as a religious strife.

Reason and patriotism had not quite disappeared in Germany, and therefore the attempt was once more made, in opposition to the religious oppression of the Hapsburgs and to the interference of foreigners, to form a third party, which should resist both extreme tendencies and should stand as a mediator between them. The founding of such a party



FIG. 61.—Reverse of the medal of Elector George William, with his son. In the field, a bird's-eye view of East Prussia, with Königsberg and other towns. In the foreground, the Goddess of Peace. On one of the cannon is the date 1639 ; on another, S D. for S. Dadler, the artist.

was a great and patriotic act, on condition that it appeared under powerful and hopeful auspices. In such a case, it would probably have attracted to itself the more moderate of the Catholic princes. Unfortunately John George of Saxony and George William of Brandenburg (Figs. 60 and 61) were not the men to carry through this task with insight and vigor.

In the middle of February, 1631, the Protestant estates met in con-

vention at Leipsic. Many of them, especially William V. of Hesse-Cassel, insisted on unity among themselves and on the assumption of an independent, decided attitude. This was the only way to attain the end in view, for thus they would have compelled respect both from the emperor and the foreigners. But here again John George exercised his baneful influence, declaring that they must approach the emperor in an humble, submissive spirit, and beseech him suppliantly for the removal of the religious grievances, that they ought certainly to arm, but each for himself, and only to unite for common defence in case the Augsburg Confession should be threatened with complete destruction.

Most of the princes present were pleased that their own cowardice and craving for rest received countenance from so powerful a quarter, and seconded resolutions in accordance with John George's views. But Ferdinand harshly rejected these resolutions, although Spain counseled him to suspend the Edict of Restitution, and to unite with Saxony and Bavaria against France and Sweden. Ferdinand replied to the Leipsic resolutions by forbidding every alliance of the Protestant estates as well as all movements of their troops. Of a "German party" there could be no longer any mention. The swords of the Hapsburgs, of the French, and of the Swedes were to decide the fate of Germany.

While Tilly was exerting himself to reorganize the imperial army on the Oder, Gustavus Adolphus had issued an edict to his soldiers—unique, unfortunately, in the Thirty Years' War—enjoining the strictest discipline on officers and men; from the people on whom they were quartered, they were allowed to ask absolutely nothing but lodging, vinegar, and salt; every act of extortion or maltreatment of the inhabitants was severely punished. Thus, while under the tread of other armies the land was wasted, agriculture and trade made undisturbed progress in presence of the Swedes. In the beginning of February, 1631, the indefatigable king, with the larger division of his army, broke camp for Mecklenburg. Here the Duke of Savello was stationed in the strong Demmin, with a superior force, but, after a three days' siege, was forced to capitulate; in return for an unmolested retreat and the privilege of carrying with him the booty he had seized, Savelli gave up to the Swedes this important position, with its immense stores of war-material.

Tilly, by an adroit stroke, won back New Brandenburg, which the Swedes had taken, and slaughtered the garrison of a thousand men, who had defended themselves most gallantly (March, 1631). Then, in the beginning of April, he took in hand his real object, the siege of Magdeburg.

Gustavus Adolphus, who in the meantime had taken the last Pome-

anian fortresses, believed that it would not be safe to follow the Catholic general through a land covered with hostile garrisons. He must first secure the line of the Oder; and further, he hoped, by an attack on the imperial garrisons there, to divert Tilly from his undertaking against Magdeburg. He took Frankfort-on-the-Oder and Landsberg; yet Tilly remained before Magdeburg. Earnestly the king desired to relieve it; but it was some 120 miles from the Oder to Magdeburg, and the way lay through Brandenburg, whose prince had hitherto stood on the side of the emperor rather than of Sweden. To the south of this was the territory of that steadfast Austrian, John George. An advance of the imperialists from Silesia might cut Gustavus Adolphus off from Pomerania and from the coast. Besides all this, his army, on account of continual fightings and hardships, had dwindled in numbers and was in a bad humor.

Under such circumstances, a defeat on the Elbe would have meant the annihilation of his army. Yet he would probably have run all risks for the relief of Magdeburg, had he not been firmly persuaded that the city could hold out for several months yet. With this conviction, he desired first to get possession of Küstrin and Spandau, as strong bases for his widely extended line of operations. Incessantly he urged his brother-in-law, George William, to give these up to him for the good of the Protestant cause. But he did not attain his object until he besieged the elector in Berlin itself. George William, driven by necessity, gave his consent on May 15; but he did not communicate the order for the surrender of Küstrin until it was already too late for Gustavus to relieve Magdeburg.

Ever since the Swedish colonel, Falkenberg, had arrived at Magdeburg, he had worked zealously on the fortifications of the city, the imperialists leaving him three months for the work. Besides the citizens and his Swedes, he had under his command 3000 mercenaries hired by the city. It was not until the beginning of 1631 that Pappenheim appeared before the city, but only with 5000 men, with whom nothing serious could be attempted. Three months later, Tilly with his main army joined Pappenheim. There were now more than 27,000 combatants with eighty-six cannon before the city; 4000 more were stationed at Dessau, to protect the passage of the Elbe there.

The imperialists began the attack forthwith. Pappenheim took in a few days the extended chain of detached works that protected the south and east of the city. In the last days of April, the fortifications on the islands in the Elbe and the great fortified custom-house on the right bank of the stream were captured. Despite their miserable situation, however, the Magdeburgers held out, in hopes of Swedish relief.

They burned down the suburbs, removed their garrisons and inhabitants into the city proper, and rejected all Tilly's summons to capitulate. The latter saw clearly that, with the Swedes close at hand, speedy and energetic action was necessary. On May 17, he opened a violent bombardment, under cover of which the besiegers pressed forward into the moat, made breaches in the city wall, and placed mines under the breaches. Then they deceived their opponents by negotiations and by a partial withdrawal of guns and detachments of troops. When the exhausted citizens, thus deceived, had gone to rest, the assault suddenly began, at 7 A. M., May 20. (PLATE XV.)

Pappenheim forced his way into the city on the north. Here Falkenberg fell. After two hours of butchery, the Walloons and Croats gained the upper hand and opened the city gates. Soon some houses began to burn. Tilly was in no wise answerable for the fire, but tried in vain to extinguish it. In all probability the defenders, in order to check the enemy, had set fire to some houses in the streets immediately threatened with attack. Fanned by the wind, the flames laid almost the whole of the rich city in ashes. In the midst of the flames the soldiers vented their rage, plundering, murdering, and ravishing women. They were maddened by their excessive losses and by the fire, which threatened to rob them of the fruits of their victory. Some 20,000 men and women were here slaughtered, about half as many inhabitants remaining alive. One single day annihilated what many centuries of industry and commerce had accumulated.

The terrible fate of this stronghold of Protestantism, that had so often defended the cause when all others despaired, filled all Protestants in the empire with horror. Gustavus Adolphus's prestige was gone at a blow. The Catholics jeered at him as a second Christian IV. Tilly repaired the walls and left a strong garrison in the city. But instead of marching with his victorious army directly against Gustavus Adolphus, instead of driving him back and securing Brandenburg for the emperor, he lost two precious months in the easy but useless task of chastising the Thuringian princes for arming contrary to the imperial prohibition.

So, contrary to expectation, Gustavus Adolphus gained time to overcome the discouragement which the tragedy of Magdeburg had caused, to force George William to an alliance, to make an end of Wallenstein's sway in Mecklenburg, and to restore the hereditary dukes to their dominions. At Werben on the Elbe, he established a strong camp, whither reinforcements streamed daily—Swedish troops, Germans, and 8000 English under Hamilton. Tilly now hurried thither to frighten



1 S. Michad. 2 Der Dom zu S. Maurice. 3 S. Gargaff. 4 S. Schaffia. 5 S. Nicola. 6 Wifl
7 S. Anna. 8 zum h. Geift. 9 S. Ulrich. 10 S. Johannes. 11 das Rathaus. 12 Berfußer. 13 S.
14 S. Maria Magdalena. 15 Hunenthuen. 16 S. Peter. 17 S. Iacob. 18 S. Augustin. 19
Rathaus. 21 S. Laurentz. 22 S. Peter und Paul. 23 Sudenburg. 24 Newfeld. 25 Zoll

MAGDEBURG.



Magdeburg besieged by Tilly: 1631.

away the king from the line of the Elbe, but he was too late. In the skirmishes which took place, the Leaguists suffered considerable losses, and an attempt to storm the Swedish camp was, after a few cannon-shots, given up as hopeless. Tilly, threatened on his left flank from Mecklenburg, on his right from Hesse, departed at the end of August from the Lower Saxon territories, which he had held for six years, and marched southward.

In all his military career Tilly had never committed so great a mistake as that of not attacking Gustavus Adolphus immediately after the capture of Magdeburg. He had now suffered a strategic defeat so thorough as to efface the impression of that great success. The Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel concluded at once an offensive alliance with the Swede; and still more important, the Saxon elector now took courage to free himself from the pressure brought to bear upon him by the emperor.

Relying upon his former successes against the Protestants, Ferdinand had adopted the sharpest measures against all who took part in the Leipsic convention, in order to put an end to every movement on their part toward independence. The Protestant states of Upper Germany had been quickly forced to submit; the emperor then proceeded against electoral Saxony. From all sides, Tilly directed against this land an army of 60,000 imperialists and Leaguists, admonishing the elector that he must deliver over his whole army to him, along with a considerable war-contribution. At the same time, it was reported that the emperor was about to restore the three bishoprics which Saxony had confiscated.

Of mediation by Saxony, or of a "third party," there was no longer any possibility. Only one of two ways was now open to John George—either to submit to the emperor and to allow his religion to be extirpated and his land dismembered, or to unite with Gustavus Adolphus for a vigorous defence. He chose the latter. He forbade Tilly to set foot in his land, and called on Gustavus Adolphus for support. The latter did not hesitate a moment, for he clearly saw that a great battle must now be fought which would be decisive for the whole course of the war. He marched to Saxony with his main force, leaving Horn with a strong army-corps in Brandenburg, and Ake Tott with another in Mecklenburg and Pomerania to secure his retreat.

The united forces of the king and of the elector appeared near Breitenfeld, to the north of Leipsic, just after Tilly had forced this city to surrender and pay 400,000 gulden. The old general could no longer avoid the battle. He had under his command 35,000 men, all tried veterans. The enemy numbered 27,000 Swedes and 18,000 Saxons, the latter

almost all young and unreliable troops. It was of the greatest importance that the Swedes were far superior to the imperialists in artillery; they had about twice as many guns as their opponents.

Not only in religion and politics, but also in military tactics, two opposing principles strove for the mastery at Breitenfeld, September 17, 1631, viz., the old Spanish principle of operating in masses, and the system introduced by Gustavus of small divisions easy to be moved. The imperialists had the advantage in position on the heights, the allies in superior numbers and a second line of battle arranged by Gustavus Adolphus. Tilly, leaving little more than his cavalry to oppose the Swedes, threw himself with the whole weight of his admirable infantry upon the left wing of the allies, consisting of the raw Saxon levies, and instantly dispersed them, the elector himself being carried away with them in their blind flight. But Gustavus restored the fortunes of battle by leading his second line against the imperialists, and then, assailing them with the cavalry masses of his own victorious right wing, almost annihilated Tilly's wearied and much thinned infantry. Nearly 12,000 Leaguists were killed or wounded, and 7000 taken prisoners, the latter for the most part going to strengthen the Swedish army. Twenty-six guns and ninety flags made up the trophies of the victors. Tilly himself was wounded and barely escaped capture. The combined imperial-Leaguist army, which fifteen months earlier had lorded it over all Germany, no longer existed.

Leipsic, Merseburg, and Halle were captured by the Swedes in rapid succession, and the whole eastern part of North Germany was in their power. His victorious war against the Baltic plans of the Hapsburgs had carried Gustavus far beyond his original goal. He dared not allow the emperor and the League time to recover their breath, but resolved to hurry to the help of his friends in Central and South Germany. The Elector of Saxony was to take up the struggle against Ferdinand in Silesia and Bohemia, while Gustavus Adolphus began his march to the west. His plan of attack was most comprehensive. Tott was to march from Mecklenburg upon Bremen, Banér from Brandenburg on Halberstadt, and the king himself was to direct his march to the Main. The Princes of Anhalt and the Dukes of Weimar concluded treaties of alliance with him; all Thuringia submitted. Then an advance was made into Franconia, and in a few days the whole bishopric of Würzburg was occupied. In the residence-castle, Marienburg, the victors captured immense booty; and, as once the Elector Maximilian had sent the Heidelberg library to Rome, so Gustavus Adolphus sent the costly Würzburg collection to Upsala, where it is still to be seen.

Der arme Pilgrimirende Tilmmer-Till.



T Ch armer Tilmmer-Till! ach was nenn ich mich Tillen?
Ich daß mein Nam und Ruhm mit meiner Geister willen
In tiefften Lethe Fluß schon were diese Grund.
Versündet? wo nicht gar in tiefften Hellen grund.
Ich leb ich / oder nicht? O du verlognes Glück!
Zuweisest du mir so ein süßlich Meisterstück?
Das heit ich nicht gedacht! daß mir es solte thun
Zuvor / an Tapferkeit / ein kaltes Wasserhuhn.
Ich armer Tilmmer-Gott! ich ließ mich heilig preisen!
Ich wolte meinen Dem des ganzen Wils beweisen!
Ich war ein JOSUA und GEDON der Welt!
Da ligt Aem und Gott im beiten Leichenfeld.
Ich weis nicht / wie ich es noch endlich sol verstellen?
Es wil kein Seliger mehr hören auff mein schellen!
Der Teutschen Keger Gott der steht langsam auff!
Vnd kömmt doch noch wol zum besten Jahrmarts Kauff!
Ich armer Tilmmer-Häsel! ich wolte fürsten pochen!
So haben sie / legt das weißche Fett gerochen!
Jest pochen mich die Aecht und Wahren hindern Pfug!
Vnd wischen / ihrer mit nicht einer einen Schuch.
Ich armer Tilmmer-Sack! Ich wolt die Welt umbkehren!
Jest fan ich mich des Luß und Wadme nicht erwehren!
Doch schreib ich billich mich noch hundert taufen stark
Die Aechten / die mit außgerissen Wein und Mark.
Ich armer Tilmmer-Treu! O heit ich lassen wachsen
Den frommen Kauten/Sack und Lindenbaum in Sackten!
So heit auch meine Till und Himmel daßgeschuch!
Die nun bekommen gar/die Schwandvond Schwandelsuch!
Ich armer Tilmmer-Reich! ach was hab ich verlohren!
Daß ich so arm geleist / was ich so reich geschworen!
O Meinnd! du! du hast die Pestilenz!
Din Herdwind verbit mich aus einer fetten Gering.
Ich armer Tilmmer-Bast! ich wolte mich beydchen!
Vnd auch ein liebes Mähl Conck und Zucker lecken!
Vnd Küssen ohne Zeit! so kom ich gleich zum Bad
Daß mir gekewer wird mein altes Rüdgerad.
Ich armer Tilmmer-Mann! ließ mich die VENUS zellen!
Vnd auff gezungne Röth und Keger/Liebe letten!
O Mägo! O weiche Mägo! der Mägo Aeon und Blum!
Mu deinem Blut hab ich verlohren Glück und Ruhm.

Da David auff Befehl Philister Blut vergossen!
Ward er zum Tempel/Baw vndüchig außgeschossen:
Vnd ich vergieß ohn noth / aus lauter Frevelmuth
Gnauß und vngerauß vnschuldig Christenblut.
Ich armer Tilmmer-Klug / heit ich gefolgt vor dessen
Dem seine Weisheit ich zum Schiefer zugemessen!
Vnd mich der jetten auch gemacht aus dem Staub!
So wer ich vnbesaubt und worden nicht zum Raub!
Ich armer Tilmmer-form! ich kante meine Sachen
Neu Glück und meinen Sieg und mich selbst feste machen!
Durch meine Geister Kraft und schönsten Engels/Glang,
Jest ligt Glang und Glück und frile machen gang.
Sag ich / mein alter Krumpff sey Schusterers-Selle?
So scherrey Luthers Vold? sind das die frommen Käffe?
Ist das der beste Aern der Welschen Clertey?
So sind sie hochgeleht in Babels Tauberey.
Ich armer Tilmmer-Fest! ich halte meine Schandey!
So fest ich immer hale / an vnserm Lige/Bande!
Das Ligen/Band bereit! die Union ist ohn:
Des Luthers Teutsche Treu bedelt die Aehren/Kron.
Vnd warlich / wenn ich sol die Teutsche Warheit sagen!
Hät mich zum Luthersbumb mein Keger nie getrag.
Zie sit dem ich bind / daß es Gott und der Welt
Was es gleubt und verspricht / so Teusch und edlich heit.
Ich armer Tilmmer-Keng / ach was sol ich nur sagen?
Daß man den Glauben doch den Leuten wil einschlagen!
Ich gleub es selber nicht / daß einer gleub ein Ding!
Daß er vor Lügen heit / wenn ich dazu ihn zwing.
Ich armer Tilmmer-weich! wo sol ich mich hinfeyren?
Die Teutschen lassen sich von mir nicht mehr beydchen!
Die Welschen scheren schon / weil ich nicht siege mehr!
Ich sey genommen ein mit Teuscher Keger/Lehr.
Die Aechte mahnen mich! die schauter fuhm
Die Feinde lassen mich! die Feinde mit nachsicht!
Die Saren sperren mich ins vnterw Angsicht!
Die Todten schlippen mich vor Gottes Galggericht!
Ich armer Tilmmer-Till! und was nenn ich mich Tillen?
Ich daß mein Nam und Ruhm mit meiner Geister willen
In tiefften Lethe Fluß schon were diese Grund.
Versündet! oder gar in tiefften Hellen grund.

Bedruckt zu Heidelberg / Anno 1632.

Fig. 62.—Facsimile of a satirical broadside against Tilly, 1632.

While Tilly (Fig. 62) was slowly reorganizing his army, the king remained for some weeks in Würzburg. Here it became evident that the attitude which the "liberator" of Germany now assumed was different from that previously announced (Fig. 63). As a suzerain, he imposed upon the Protestant princes the conditions under which they must enter into alliance with him, and compelled them to pay him formal homage. So

Dr Gustaff Adolph von Gottes Gnaden / der Schweden / Gothen vnd Wendens König / Großfürst in Finland / Herzog zu Ehesten vnd Carelen / Herz über Ingermanland /c. Gebieten hienit vnd in Krafft diß / Allen vnd Jeden Vnsern / wie auch Unserer Confederirten, Hohen vnd Niedern Kriegs Officiern, als Generaln, Obristen / Obrist Leutenanten / Obrist Wacht: vnd Quartiermeistern / Rittmeistern / Capitainen / Leutenanten / Fendrichen / Quartiermeistern / Furtern / auch gemeinen Soldaten vnd angehörigen / zu Ross vnd Fuß / daß Sie die Ehrnveste / Fürstliche vnd Heise / Burgermeister vnd Rath des Heiligen Römischen Reichs Stadt Nürnberg / Vnsere besonders Liebe / dero Stadt vnd Landschaft / Städte lein / Märkte / Flecken / Dörffer / Schlösser vnd Häuser / so Ihnen oder den Ihrigen zugehören / wie auch alle vnd jede dero Bürger / Vnterthanen vnd Verwandten / in der Stadt vnd auff dem Land / von allen eigenthällichen Einquartirungen / Musterplätzen / Durchzügen / Brandschagungen / GeldExactionen / Raub / Plünderung / Abnahm / vnd allen andern Kriegs Pressurn / wie die Raimen haben mögen / nichts außgenommen / nicht allein gänglich befreyen / sondern auch auff allen Fall bedürffens / wider alle Feindliche Vergewaltigung / defendirn vnd schützen / die Commerciahandlungen vnd Gewerb / von vnd zu der Stadt / aller vnd jeder Orten vngeshindert vnd vnauffgehalten fortgehen / die Bürger / Inwohner / Vnterthanen vnd Verwandten / auff der Strassen von vnd zu der Stadt / jederzeit vnd an iwas Orten es seyn mag / frey / sicher vnd ohne Gefahr passirn vnd repassirn / vnd Sie also dieser Unserer Salvx Guardiz, welche Wir Ihnen auff ihr Vnterthänigkies anlangen / auß gewissen beweglichen Ursachen / gnädigst ertheilt / würcklich genießsen lassen sollen / bey ernstlicher Straff Leibs vnd Lebens / so der oder diejenige / welche hier wider handeln würden / vnaufbleiblich sollen zu gewarten haben. Zu Trund vnd Bekräftigung / haben Wir diese Salvam Guardiam, deren Vidimus nicht weniger / als das Original selbst gelten vnd in Acht genommen werden soll / mit eigner Hand unterschrieben / vnd Unserm Königlichem Insiigel beglaubigen lassen. Geschehen in Unserm Haupt Quartier zu Würzburg / den 20. Octobris desß 1631. Japrs.

Gustavus Adolphus.



FIG. 63.—Facsimile of a safeguard (*salva guardia*) for Nuremberg, issued by Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden. Dated Würzburg, October 20, 1631.

much of the bishopric of Würzburg as was left after large parts of it had been bestowed on Swedish officers and the lesser Protestant princes was brought under direct royal administration. Then, leaving Horn with a corps in Würzburg, the king, whose army had been considerably strengthened by the excellent Hessian and other Protestant troops, marched toward the lower Main. Everywhere in this part of the

country the imperialists abandoned their positions; only Mayence, the capital of one of the most distinguished leaders of the League, was defended for a few weeks by its Spanish garrison, capitulating, however, on December 23. What a change of fortune within the last eighteen months!

Like Würzburg, the archbishopric of Mayence had to do homage to the king, who installed there a regular military and civil administration. It looked as if he would settle there and never give up again the Franconian and Rhenish provinces. Instead of the 15,000 combatants with which he had landed in Pomerania, Gustavus Adolphus had now, apart from the independent Saxon army, some 70,000 men—Swedish, German, and English troops under his own command, and the soldiers of his allies; and this number he thought to raise during the winter to nearly 200,000—a body of disciplined soldiers such as had never before existed in Germany. Such a host was evidently intended neither for the defence of the Baltic coasts nor for the maintenance of the evangelical religion. After his successes of the last four months, Gustavus undoubtedly contemplated nothing less than a complete revolution in the affairs of Germany, with the view of establishing there his own sway.

Meanwhile Ake Tott had taken from the imperialists the last places held by them in Mecklenburg, and Banér had occupied the whole bishopric of Halberstadt and had frightened Pappenheim out of the ruins of Magdeburg.

The Saxons only had given Gustavus grounds for anxiety. Their army was commanded by General von Arnim, formerly one of Wallenstein's colonels, who after Wallenstein's dismissal had passed over to the service of the Saxon elector, with whose sentiments of loyalty to the imperial power and of moderate Lutheranism he quite agreed. More of a diplomatist than a general, and averse to foreigners, he was the real advocate and founder of the "third party," and was therefore on by no means friendly terms with Gustavus. The Saxons drove the imperial general, Tiefenbach, out of Lusatia, and then, when everyone expected them to invade Silesia, turned aside to Bohemia. Here John George would be nearer to the central point of the imperial states, while, after the conquest of Bohemia, Silesia would fall of itself into his hands.

On the approach of the Protestant Saxons, the Bohemians felt encouraged to rise in rebellion, to expel the new landlords and the Catholic priests, and to slay imperial couriers and a few soldiers. Ferdinand's regiments left one city after another to its fate. Marrádas, governor of the country, did not dare, with his weak garrison, even to hold Prague, where the inhabitants were discontented. He withdrew to Tabor. The

imperial officials and all who favored the Catholics fled in haste. Arnim, not a little surprised himself at such easily won successes, entered Prague without striking a blow, on the tenth day after crossing the Bohemian frontier (November 15, 1631). The elector followed on his heels, accompanied by many of the exiles of 1620, among them the aged Matthias Thurn. In the northern half of the kingdom, the dispossessed proprietors or their heirs recovered their former possessions. Thousands who had been Catholics only by compulsion abjured their new faith and returned to their beloved Protestantism.

Ferdinand was in the greatest difficulties and looked around in vain for help. In the Italian states, his envoys met with a cool reception; the Swiss preferred an alliance with Gustavus. Strangest of all was the attitude of Pope Urban VIII. The sole aim of this man, Maffeo Barberini, was to weaken the too powerful Hapsburgs in Italy. In Rome, besides, the popular voice was loud and imperative against supporting the hated house of Austria. Accordingly Urban refused all financial aid to the emperor. He went even farther, and favored not only France, but also heretical Sweden. He fancied that Gustavus Adolphus, whom he publicly compared with Alexander the Great, would from his tolerant spirit undertake nothing against the Catholic faith. This, however, was a mere excuse to satisfy his conscience. In reality, he dreaded less the progress of the Protestants than that of the Austrians. Imperial statesmen designated him as a downright heretic and friend of the Lutherans. Under these circumstances, even the princes of the League wavered. In their helpless situation in respect to the Swedes, they allowed themselves to be allured by the French demonstrations of a desire to obtain for them a neutral position. Above all, Maximilian showed himself extremely cold to his brother-in-law. In May, 1631, he had already concluded a treaty of alliance with France, which made him independent at least of the emperor. The pope had been the mediator in this.

In this desperate situation, Ferdinand II. adopted a desperate expedient. He begged Wallenstein (Fig. 64) again to take the command. Wallenstein had awaited, in a retirement of truly regal pomp and splendor, the hour when events would recall him to public life. He who never drank a drop of wine, and who in the field submitted to the greatest privations, surpassed now in the luxury of his household and table all the monarchs of Christendom. At the same time he provided, with as much energy as insight, for the welfare of his duchies, Friedland and Sagan. His officials were under strict supervision. But they were liberally and regularly paid, and, when deserving, richly rewarded. We see here the same principles which governed him in the administration

of an army. He peopled his territories with new colonists. Provincial estates were introduced and public education provided for. All kinds of artisans were settled in the country, and money was advanced to merchants for the extension of their business. Prosperity was seen everywhere in Wallenstein's territories. His ducats, thalers, and groats, of full weight, as were those of few princes of that epoch, found ready acceptance in all Germany.

But neither the conduct of a princely court nor the government of his lands formed the chief occupation of this man of fiery spirit. Plans for gratifying his ambition, for taking vengeance on his enemies and on his ungrateful emperor, filled him at every hour. Above all, he wished to avenge himself on the priests and Jesuits (Fig. 65), to whom he ascribed



FIG. 64.—Thaler of Albert von Wallenstein, 1627. Silver. Original size. Obverse: Bust of the duke, below which is a sun, standing for Gitschin, the minting-place. Reverse: a shield with ducal coronet and the Friedland eagle, which wears the Wallenstein arms on its breast.

his fall. Besides, he was urged on by his brother-in-law, Count Adam Trzka, and the whole Trzka family, who secretly cherished Protestantism.

The intellectual head of this family was Count Adam's aged mother, Maria Magdalena, an ambitious, unscrupulous woman, who hated the emperor fiercely. Her daughter had married another rich Lutheran cavalier, Count William Kinsky. All these people were in conspiracy against the conditions which had prevailed in Bohemia since 1621. Gustavus Adolphus's new successes filled them with the most sanguine hopes and induced them to enter into communication with their exiled fellow-nobles, and especially with the old Count Thurn. In June, 1631, they involved Wallenstein also in the negotiations with Thurn, and, through him, with Gustavus Adolphus himself. Wallenstein demanded that the king should send from ten to twelve thousand Swedes under Thurn into Bohemia, whereupon he himself, with his

Der Jesuiten Monarchi.



Sch meynnt/ es hettten nur vier Monarchien Zünfft
 Auß Erden sollen seyn? Wo kömt denn her die
 Zünfft?
 Die fünfft/ die nun gleich so hoch gestiegen ist/
 Daß man der andern Macht vnd Grossseyn gar
 vergist/
 In dem sie stärker viel vnd höher noch ist worden.
 Vnd zwar ihr Ursprung ist aus einem solchen Oeden/
 Der schlecht genug kunte seyn. Jetzt weil das Glück lacht/
 So haben sie es so hoch/ als wol am Tag ist/ bracht.
 Ihr ist die Monarchi. Der Keyser ist nicht Keyser/
 Im fall von ihnen Er die werthen Keyser Keyser
 Erleichen vnd heischen mus. Er hat die meiste Macht
 In Reiches Sachen nicht. Er ist vor nichts geacht
 Nur ihr Vassall ist er. Hat er wol ehe doch müssen
 Von einem stolzen Pabst sich retten lan mit Jüssen/
 Vnd mehr als hündisch seyn. Den Namen fuhr er zwar/
 Was aber der ihn hilfft/ das ist ja offenbar.
 Kein König ist so hoch/ Er mus sich ihnen beugen/
 Vnd vor dem hohen Kom sein Knechtlichs Scepter neigen.
 Dis Ganze wollen sie zu eigen haben ganz/
 Vnd lies so mancher Prinz sein Haupt vor ihrer Schantz


Ihr Reich sol ewig seyn. Doch sieht man wie es gangen/
 Seynd diese Monarchi zu herrschen angefangen/
 Wie mehr als Hündisch noch. So mancher frommer
 Fürst/
 Hat müssen halten her/ nach dem sie hat gedürft.
 Venedig weis es wol/ wie es die Herren karten/
 Drumb heissen sie sie noch von ihnen seyn/ vnd warten/
 Bis gar nichts werde draus. Wie wenig Dertter seyn/
 Da sich das lose Volk nicht hat gedrungen ein.
 Wir solten auch nun dran. Die Thür war schon verredet/
 Ehe sie sie kriegten noch. Es ward vns auch verödet
 So manches schönes Feld. Doch schickte Gott es so/
 Daß sie gelohen sind/ vnd wir noch frey vnd fro/
 Ihr Stiff in Augen/ wir sind doch/ Gott Lob/ geblieben/
 Wie wenig man vns hielt/ ihr würen ist vertrieben.
 Sie stürzen Tag für Tag. Ihr Scepter neiget sich.
 Die Monarchi geht ein/ gedendet nur an mich/
 Vnd trampet auff vnsern Gott. Wie wird/ wie wol zu später/
 Der fromme Keyser doch befehlen ihre Räte/
 Wie sie so falsch gemeint. Wie wird er wünschden doch/
 Daß er die me gesehn/ den er doch folget noch.

Gedruckt im Jahr M DC XXXII

FIG. 65.—Facsimile of a broadside warning the emperor against the Jesuits, 1632.

friends, would rise and induce several imperial regiments to revolt. As a result of these secret negotiations, Arnim, the Saxon field-marshal, to the surprise of his foes and friends, had invaded Bohemia. But the miserable quality of the Saxon troops, the coolness which Gustavus (PLATE XVI.) showed toward Wallenstein, and his ever-increasing distance from Bohe-

PLATE XVI.



GVSTAVVS ADOLPHVS D.G. REX SVEC. GOTH.
ET VAND. MAGNVS PRINCEPS FINLANDIÆ DVX ETC,

Paul Pontus sculp

*Ant. van Dyck pinxit
& H.*

Sam. Jansson del.

Gustavus Adolphus, King of Sweden.

Reduced facsimile of a copper-plate engraving by Paul du Pont (1603-1658), from a painting by Sir Anthony Vandyke (1599-1641).

History of All Nations, Vol. XII., page 244.

mia made Wallenstein less favorably inclined toward his plan of joining the Saxons and the Swedes and leading the revolt in Bohemia.

It was at this moment that Ferdinand, frightened by the result of the battle of Breitenfeld, sent to Wallenstein, offering to make him again commander-in-chief of the imperial army. Wallenstein now had to decide whether he would continue his relations with the Protestants, or accept the emperor's offer. After long hesitation, he finally decided, in December, 1631, to do the latter. It was pure calculation that moved him to this course, and not at all considerations of loyalty or obedience.

The terms proposed by Wallenstein and accepted by the emperor corresponded with the independence which the former wished to secure for himself and his plans. The emperor, driven by necessity and irritated at the pope's hostility, desisted from the execution of the Edict of Restitution. Wallenstein had now the decision in political affairs as well as in matters of strategy; he had the right of appointing all the officers, Ferdinand retaining for himself only the confirmation of the generals; and he was promised rich rewards for his services, with a full equivalent for the loss of Mecklenburg. Wallenstein had imposed hard terms on his imperial master, but he stood by his bargain. Scarcely were his recruiting drums heard, when a powerful band of warriors rallied around him. Within four months he had accomplished the far more difficult task of organizing and disciplining them, providing them with food and ammunition, and arranging for the care of the sick and wounded. By April, 1632, this host of 60,000 men, called forth as if by magic, stood ready for battle.

Wallenstein now began his operations in the field with the energy which he could so well employ when he chose. In the early months of 1632, Gustavus Adolphus had taken possession of the places on the Rhine as far down as Bacharach, and had then determined to subdue Bavaria, the chief state of the League. Tilly (Fig. 66) retired before him, evacuating Bamberg, Nuremberg, and even the Upper Palatinate. His purpose was to defend only Bavaria proper, and, with this view, he took up a strongly fortified position on the Lech, near Rain. Gustavus Adolphus attempted to force the passage of the river, and succeeded (April 15, 1632), after a cannonade of two days. Tilly's right thigh was shattered by a cannon-ball, and on April 30 he died—one of the ablest, and certainly the most faithful and the most disinterested among the Catholic generals.

Maximilian then despaired of further resistance, and besought Wallenstein for aid—the same man whom, two years before, he had declared to be his enemy and whose fall he had accomplished. But Wallen-

stein only heard his request with malicious pleasure and did nothing. Gustavus Adolphus therefore continued his victorious advance unhindered. On May 16, he entered Munich, which the nobility and the officials in crowds had deserted, and seized considerable booty. Every Bavarian city had to send in heavy contributions.

The Swedish monarch stood now at the summit of his fame. He threatened the western frontier of Austria. And yet his prospects were, in reality, not so brilliant as they appeared to be. As the selfish plans of the foreign monarch came ever more clearly to the foreground, his German allies became more and more lax in their support, while the Catholics, who had bent before the blows struck by Gustavus Adolphus, raised their heads again in many places. The brave and imperturbable



FIG. 66.—Medal with the portrait of Tilly. Silver. Original size. (Berlin.) Obverse Legend: IO(hannis) TS(erclas) C(omes) DE . TYLLI . B(aro) MAR (baiensis) D(ominus) BAL(lastensis) ET . MO(ntigny) CAP(itaneus) GEN(eralis). Reverse: A landscape, above which floats a winged globe and cross and crown. Legend: SIC . SORTEM VINCO FERENDO . CM = name of Christian Maler of Nuremberg, the die-sinker. In the exergue C(um) PRIVI(legio) CE(saris).

Pappenheim, after the withdrawal of the larger divisions of the hostile troops from Lower Saxony, had united with the imperial general, Gronsfield, defeated several times the Hessians and Swedes under Baudissin, and captured Hildesheim and the Eichsfeld. In Swabia, Colonel Ossa had organized from the Breisgau an extended revolt of the Catholic peasants, to suppress which the king hurried from Munich to Memmingen. There he was met by bad news, which compelled him to turn back.

Instead of following up the successes they had won, driving the demoralized foe everywhere before them, and arming the Protestants in Bohemia and Moravia, the Elector John George and his field-marshal, Arnim, remained quietly in Prague. Their troops meanwhile indulged

in riot and debauchery, and became an intolerable burden to the "liberated" land. By the end of April, Wallenstein had completed his preparations, and easily drove the Saxons to the frontier. Bohemia was won again for the emperor.

Not the destruction of the Protestant states of the empire, but an equitable and patriotic peace was the aim of Wallenstein. He resumed straightway his negotiations with Arnim, with the purpose of separating Saxony and Brandenburg from the Swedish alliance and concluding a general peace on the basis of religious equality for the non-Austrian lands. John George had long been inclined to such a settlement, and summoned the councils of the electorate of Brandenburg to a convention at Torgau, where he proposed to them that they should come to terms with the Catholics, and, in union with them, effect the withdrawal of the King of Sweden from Germany, satisfying him with a money payment.

In itself the purpose was praiseworthy, only the elector had already in the preceding year made a treaty of alliance with Gustavus; moreover, he did not possess either the necessary capacity or traits of character to lead a great political party. George William of Brandenburg also was too honorable or too weak to renounce his Swedish alliance. Thereupon Wallenstein invaded Lusatia.

This was the news that recalled the Swedish king. He found it absolutely necessary to draw near to the Elector of Saxony, in order to support him against Wallenstein and keep him true to himself. Leaving Banér in Bavaria and Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar in Swabia with adequate forces, he himself set out for the north with 20,000 men, in the middle of June. He made Nuremberg the temporary centre of his operations and established there a large fortified camp. He now announced his proudest plan: the Protestant states were to unite themselves into a *corpus evangelicorum*, of which he himself would be the head, and so become stronger in the empire than the emperor.

But it was too late for such plans. In Wallenstein, Gustavus Adolphus had at last found an opponent equal to himself. Endeavors to enter again into negotiations with him led to no result, although Wallenstein did not exactly reject them. On the contrary, the imperial general broke away from the miserable John George, allied himself with the Elector of Bavaria, in spite of his hatred of the latter, and then marched against the Swedes at the head of 60,000 men. According to his usual tactics, he did not wish to employ this superior force in striking a decisive blow, but in starving the Swedish king. But Gustavus would not retire. In their fortified camps near Nuremberg, the two armies remained facing each other for weeks.

The approach of Gustavus Adolphus had caused the Saxon elector to remain faithful for a time. At the end of July, Arnim invaded and occupied Lower Silesia. On the other hand, the inhuman Holck—a Dane in Ferdinand's service—with 20,000 men, and Gallas, another imperial general, with 12,000, fell upon South Saxony and perpetrated there unspeakable atrocities. Thus one German land after another was turned into a desert. In the beautiful districts on the Rhine, French, Swedish, German, and Spanish soldiers fought with one another. The Elector of Treves had thrown himself into the arms of the French; his canons had thrown themselves into the arms of the Spaniards. At last, with Swedish help, the French became masters of the whole archbishopric. On the Upper Rhine, Horn defeated the imperial general, Montecuccoli, concluded an alliance with Strasburg and conquered nearly all of Alsace and the Breisgau with Freiburg. On the Lower Rhine, only the archbishopric of Cologne maintained itself on the side of the emperor and the League. The whole empire threatened to fall to pieces.

Up to the end of August, Gustavus Adolphus had collected Swedish and German reinforcements, and mustered now a force equal to that of Wallenstein. (PLATE XVII.) It was now necessary to move this numerous army from the camp near Nuremberg, which was surrounded by Wallenstein's soldiers, cut off from all supplies, and visited with hunger and disease. The king determined, cost what it might, to drive his enemy from his strong position near Zirndorf. After a cannonade of several days, the assault was begun on September 3. With the aid mainly of German regiments, Gustavus, himself always in the thickest of the fight, three times carried Zirndorf, the centre of the enemy's position, and three times lost it. On the following morning he had finally to withdraw, after his army had suffered severe loss. But it was not their material loss that was felt the most, but the fact that the Swedish king, in his first conflict with Wallenstein, had, for the first time since he trod German soil, been unsuccessful. Everywhere in the empire the imperialists and Leaguists took fresh courage.

For two weeks longer, the king held out in the hunger-stricken camp near Nuremberg. Then he saw himself compelled, for better or for worse, to evacuate his position. Leaving 5000 men for the protection of the city, he retired toward the south. Instead of pursuing the king, Wallenstein determined to advance on Saxony in order to chastise John George and to procure sustenance and a rich booty for his army in a land that had not been laid waste.

Gustavus Adolphus hesitated as to what course he would now follow. Everything seemed to invite him to make a serious attack on the heredi-



Er Königl. Majest. zu Schweden. Verhalt vñ GENERAL Staathalters in den Grafsen, bey de

Vff die Cavallerie alle 10. Tag.

1. Einem Regiment zu Pferd/ von 12. Compagnien /
Vff den Obristen vñ seinen gangen Staab. 80 R.
2. Einem Obristen vber 8. Compagnien ebener gestalt
für sich vñ die Staabs Personen. 60. R.
3. Also auch einem Obristen vber 4. Compagnien. 50. R.
4. Einem Rittmeister über 12 f. Pferd/ für sich vñ das erste blat. 38. R.
5. Vff jedes Servis Pferd/ so dem Obristen vñ Officirern in der bestellung
außer der Compagnie bewilliget.
6. Vñ dann einem jeden Reutter vnder der Compagnie /
so präsent / gleichfalls alle 10. Tag / vber des Hausmans
Cost / oder die verordnete Proviant.

Vff die Infanterie alle 10. Tag.

Einem Obristen vber ein Regiment zu Fuß / vff
Ihn vñ seinen gangen Staab.

80. R.

Erlangend die Cost / Proviant / oder vivres vñ getränk / für
aus Kön: Gn: zu der Soldatesca besserer Mundirung / vñ keiner Schul-
dettrens vñ Ueberfluß durchaus abgestelt / allein auff die Nothdurfft gesehen / vñ
dero sub dato Brandfurs / den 23. Febr: insiehenden 1632. Jahrs / vñ hierbey ge-
gleiche unterschiedliche Maß beym Getränk / wie auch bey den Habern / der vng-
vñ Klagen bey der Soldatesca vorgefallen. Als wollen vñ bevehlen Ihre Kön:
halten / vñ im Getränk derd verordnete Selbmaß gebrauch / im Weinlandt de-
ein maasß Wein / geliefert werde.

Ingleichen soll auch in außstellung des Habers nicht dem Gewicht / son-
so viel deren in bestellung zugelassen / halb so viel / vñ an den Orten / wo der Ha-

An Hew / vff jedes in der bestellung zugelassene Servis vñ Pagagi Ross /

An Stroh / vff jedliches Servis Ross / alle 10. tag vier Döschel / vñ da es

Wider diese verordnete Verpflegung / haben die Soldat die Soldat vñ deren Wa-
walt / oder vff einigerleg weis noch wez treiben zulassen / da dergleichen auch dur-
ret werden wolte / haben sie gute Nacht vñ erlaubnuß / wie nicht wenigens auch
andere wider den Articuloßtreiff laufende vñ besagmussen anfangen / so gut sie kö-
den / oder andern zur abstraffung zuliefern. Wie dann hiermit vñ zu desto süß-
bfferlegt vñ anbesolhen wird / zu Ross oder Fuß keine Soldaten ohne Paßzettel
schick / einer oder der andere dergestalt ohn richtigen Paßzettel / vñ sonderlich im
befehl / in sein assignirtes Quartir gefallen / gepländert / Viehe oder fourrage abge-
frend / nicht allein die abnahm vñ den schaden den nechsten restituiren / sondern
werden. Wornach man sich zurichten / vñ vor vnaußbleibenden besiraffung

Gustaff Adolph.

**Berpflegungs ORDONNANZ, Wie es hinfüro bero Verordnele
erworbenen Soldatesca, auff den Lauff: Sammel vnd Musterplätzen an-
nen vnd zuverhalten.**

	Einem Capitain.		4 ¹ / ₂ Reichsh.	24 Gr.
	Einem Leutnant.		3 ¹ / ₂ Reichsh.	3
haler.	Einem Jendrich.		3 ¹ / ₂ Reichsh.	3
	2 Serganten/einem a	1 ¹ / ₂ Reichsh.	17 Gr.	ihm 3 ¹ / ₂ Reichsh.
haler.	4 Vnder Befelchhabern	1	49	6
haler.	6 Corporalen a	1	7	6
haler.	3 Spilleuch a	—	84	2 ¹ / ₂
a. St.	Vff nachfolgende, so schon geworben vnd präsent.			
	25 Kottmeißter a	—	77	12 ¹ / ₂
a. St.	21 Vnder Kottmeißtern a	—	63	14 ¹ / ₂
	90 Gemeine Soldaten a	—	36	56
	4 Muster Jungen a	—	42	12 ¹ / ₂
haler.	14 Pallevolansen a	—	42	6

Soldatesca zu Roß vnd Fuß/ soll hierinnen diese obenschribare verordnung geschehen/ weiln
in die 1. o. tägliche Geldier bewilligt/ daß hierinnen/ sonderlich bey den Offitiere/ aller Mißbrauch/ Pan-
arme Mann zur rain, oder vermögen nicht getrieben werde/ zu dem Ende dann Ihr Kön: Majest: es bey
in Ordonnanz, bis vff anderwerliche Verordnung/ bewenden lassen wollen. Vnd nach deme so gar von
in Jahrgäng/ da solcher theils Orten nach/ bald leicht oder schwer befunden worden/ allerhand difficultäten
ist: daß hinfüro/ welcher Orten bero Soldatesca sich befinden / hierinnen ein durchgehende gleichheit ge-
asesca Wein/ vnd in Bierlande/ oder da der Wein sehr schwer vnd vbel zubekommen/ wo maach Bier von
dem verordneten maach nachgegangen/ vff ein Servu Pfadtag vnd nach ein Wech/ vff ein Pagagi Pferde/
thei zubekommen/ halb so viel Gersten geliefert werden.
vnd nach gehen Pfunde.
werlich zubekommen// vff das zugelassene Wagen oder Pagagi Pferde halb so viel.
hamen/sich weder von dem Obristen / noch von deren Offitiere/ oder vntergebener Soldatesca, durch Ge-
offitiere oder gemeine Soldaten ihnen zugewandt/ oder durch betrogung vnd wärfliche thätigkeiten beßere
leichtfertige Gesellen/ so inn oder aussershalb der Quartiren/ vnd vff den Strassen rauben/ plündern/ vnd
vnd mögen/in verhofft zunehmen/ vnd solche dem General- Statthalter nach gelegenheit an Leib vnnnd Le-
abstellung aller exorbitantien dem Obristen / vnd dero nachgesehen hohen vnd nidern Offitiere ernstlich
hren Quartiren mit Ober oder Vnterwehre abkreuten oder außlauffen zulassen/ dann da dergleichen be-
itig erfunden/ wie auch nicht wenigere/ davon eines Regiments oder Compagnia Vold einem andern ohne
men/oder in andere wege ruinirt vnd geschwächt/ da soll der jenige Offitiere/ vnter welchem solche Soldaten
nach gestaltsaithe der Sachen die Thäter am Leib vnd Leben / oder in andere weg Exemplariter abgestrafft
ten wissen wird. Datum im Haupt-Quartier Mosburg/ den 3. Matij/ Anno 1632.

L.S.

tary lands of the emperor. In certain parts of Upper Austria, the peasants, who at heart still clung to Protestantism, had again revolted, mainly in reliance upon Swedish help, which they now earnestly invoked. If this aid was given to them, Wallenstein would be forced to return to the archduchy, and Central Germany and especially Saxony would be freed of the imperialists. The initiative would again have belonged to the Swedes, and their prestige would have been restored. But, in an evil hour, Gustavus Adolphus resolved to clear Swabia of the imperialists before undertaking anything further. Several circumstances delayed him in this work. By the beginning of October, he had advanced to Biberach, when again, as in the spring, he was recalled by bad tidings from the east.

Wallenstein had taken advantage of the king's withdrawal to the west to enter upon the reduction of Saxony, leaving Maximilian behind in Franconia. Being joined by the marauding bands of Hock and Gallas, he took Leipsic, Merseburg, and Halle, and laid waste all the flourishing land between the Elbe and the Saale. At the same time, Pappenheim advanced hither from the Lower Saxon and Hessian districts, and formed a junction with Wallenstein at Leipsic.

Oxenstiern advised the king not to follow the imperialists into devastated Saxony, but to march boldly down the Danube against Linz and Vienna. In this way, he would free Saxony most speedily and effectually of her unwelcome guests and change the situation in favor of Sweden. The king did not see his way clear to adopt this course. He feared that the vacillating John George, alarmed by the devastation of his land, would go over to the side of the emperor. Then, although Wallenstein might set out for Austria with a part of his army, the rest of it could again subdue North Germany and cut off the Swedes from the sea. He also knew that the peasant revolt in Upper Austria had, owing to the non-arrival of Swedish help, been completely suppressed in October.

The foreign powers openly counted on the failure of Gustavus in Germany. The king, therefore, thought that he ought, above all, to spare his army and maintain his connection with the Baltic. His native land and his own Baltic plans lay nearest of all to his heart. Besides, he felt called upon to wipe out the disgrace received at Zirndorf, and, in this very year, to establish unquestionably his superiority over Wallenstein. He resolved, therefore, to march to Saxony. Oxenstiern was appointed his "legate" in Upper Germany and entrusted with the organization of a regular system of defence in those circles. After traversing the Thuringian forest, Gustavus established an entrenched camp at Naumburg, there to await the Saxon army. Impatiently he looked




FIG. 67.—The plundering of a house and tortures of its inmates. Etching by Jacques Callot, in his "Les misères et malheurs de la guerre."




FIG. 68.—The revenge of the peasants. Etching by Jacques Callot (*id.*). Troops returning laden with booty are surprised by the ambuscaded peasants, defeated, robbed, and mutilated.

for it, for he was eager to fight and put an end to this doubtful state of affairs.

But the Saxon help came not. John George beheld with indifference the sufferings of his unfortunate subjects (Figs. 67 and 68) and the eager advance of the Swedes to his and their help. He did not wish by means of his army to make Gustavus Adolphus too powerful. Prevailed upon by Arnim, he sent him only two regiments of cavalry—some 1500 men! But, before they arrived, the decisive battle had been fought, and the fate of the whole war had been decided.

Wallenstein had sent back Gallas to defend Bohemia against a threatened inroad of the Saxons from Silesia, and had still further weakened himself by sending Pappenheim to the west. In order to be near the latter as long as possible, he retired from Weissenfels to Lützen. His army was still some 20,000 strong (November 15). Gustavus resolved to improve this opportunity to throw himself between Wallenstein and Pappenheim, and to attack the former alone.

The imperial general detected his opponent's plan, and determined to prevent its execution at any cost. While he made himself ready for immediate battle, he sent to Pappenheim a message urging him to hurry to him with all his men, so as to be with him early on the morrow.

The decisive battle was now to be fought in the heart of Germany, between two unconquered generals, two unconquered armies, and two religious principles that already for four generations had striven against each other. The forces that stood opposed at Lützen (PLATE XVIII.) were relatively small, but the result of this battle was prophetic of the issue of the Thirty Years' War and of the mighty struggle between the old and new teachings. After demanding the heaviest sacrifices on both sides, it was a drawn battle.

Wallenstein's position was covered in front by the ditches of the highway from Weissenfels to Leipsic, which had been carefully deepened by him, provided with breastworks, and filled with musketeers. To and fro, over these ditches, swayed the deadly struggle from morn till eve of November 16, 1632. Here fell Gustavus Adolphus, not, as some maintain, by the hand of a traitor, but in honorable battle. On the imperial side, Pappenheim, who was just able to bring up his cavalry at the right moment, was mortally, and Octavio Piccolomini severely wounded. Night put an end to the undecided conflict. The imperialists had to retire, for, in consequence of the blowing up of some ammunition-wagons, their supply of ammunition gave out. Pappenheim's infantry arrived at last and covered the retreat of the imperialists. The Swedes captured twenty-one cannon which had been abandoned by the imperial-



Battle of Lützen.

Reduced facsimile of the engraving by Matthaeus Meri

ists, and bivouacked on the battlefield. But they could not follow up their apparent victory. Next day, they too retired to Weissenfels. Each army had lost 7000 men—more than a third of its strength—in killed and wounded.

Severely enough must the imperialists have felt the loss of Pappenheim, only thirty-eight years of age, in many respects their most distinguished general. But, as the dying hero consoled himself with the tidings of the death of Gustavus Adolphus, so the German Catholics forgot their loss in that of their dreaded foe. Not that loud jubulations hailed the event. The mildness, justice, and toleration of Gustavus Adolphus had touched the hearts even of his religious and political opponents. Pope Urban VIII. celebrated a mass for the dead antagonist of the Hapsburg power. On the other hand, Gustavus's ally, Richelieu, was glad to be rid of his too powerful friend, who would not let himself be used as a mere tool. "It is time to set bounds to the advances of this Goth," the cardinal had exclaimed some time before. Now he thought that through his death Christendom was freed from great evil.

It is therefore very doubtful, in face of the lukewarmness of the French and the growing mistrust and defection of the German Protestants, whether Gustavus would have been able to retain the great advantages which he had won. He died at the right time for his own renown; for his self-seeking schemes had not yet been realized. His name thus shines with undimmed lustre as that of the heroic saviour and protector of his imperiled fellow-believers. In fact, his intervention made the triumph of the Counter-reformation in Germany—otherwise so imminent—forever impossible. His body, found plundered and shamefully mutilated, was conveyed to Sweden (Fig. 69).

The king left no male heir, and his crown descended to his eight-year-old daughter, Christina. The command of the main army, now only 12,000 strong, was undertaken by Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Weimar. Born in 1604, he was the eleventh son of Duke John III., and derived from the little duchy nothing save the empty ducal title, a miserable yearly income of 5000 gulden, and the proud consciousness of being a prince of the empire. Early deprived of their parents by death, he and his brothers had to accommodate themselves to the harsh guardianship of the elector, John George, and to see their claims to the rich inheritance of Cleves entirely disregarded. Bitter hatred of the elector and the emperor was thus engendered in their hearts.

Bernhard early distinguished himself not only by his talents and decision, but also by his ambition. But great as this was, the young prince withstood all the threats and allurements by which the emperor

sought to draw him into his service. Everywhere he fought on the Protestant side, under the Margrave of Durlach, under Christian of Brunswick, and, in the Netherlands, under the King of Denmark. On the landing of Gustavus Adolphus, he had forthwith, though in vain, advocated an alliance of the evangelical princes with him, had thereupon attached himself to the gallant Landgrave of Hesse in his spirited resistance to Tilly, and had finally entered the Swedish service, in which he so distinguished himself that he soon received a separate command. When the king fell at Lützen, Bernhard took the command and con-




FIG. 69.—The jerkin of Gustavus Adolphus, in which he fell at Lützen. (Vienna.)

ducted the battle to its victorious close. Now he laid hold of his new and greater task with much energy ; without placing his troops in winter-quarters, by the close of the year he had driven the enemy entirely out of the electorate.

A task more difficult than the conduct of the war was the management of political affairs. Oxenstiern, who took this in charge, was determined to come forth from the great war only with honor. He would hear nothing of a cowardly peace ; yet he did not conceal from himself the dangers which threatened if the war should be continued. Many princes, who had followed even the great king unwillingly, would not submit to a man of lower rank than themselves. John George especially, after the overthrow of Catholic supremacy, again showed his old pride as a prince of the empire, accompanied by the patriotic resolution not to let foreigners control Germany. In Leitmeritz, the elector entered into separate negotiations for peace with imperial plenipotentiaries. On the

French side, Richelieu, it is true, showed himself ready for greater sacrifices than formerly, that he might not see the anti-imperial party in the empire fall wholly to pieces ; but he had other aims. He wished to thrust Sweden into the background, to take the conduct of affairs into his own hands, and to win Alsace, and, if possible, the entire left bank of the Rhine, for France. French emissaries flooded the German courts.

For the middle of March, 1633, Oxenstiern called together an assembly of the non-Catholic states of Germany at Heilbronn, with the purpose of renewing the Protestant alliance on a firmer basis. It was brilliantly attended. English, Dutch, and French envoys were present, promising support. To be sure, the Dutch also, like the Swedes and French, demanded their share of Germany : namely, the archbishopric of Bremen, so favorably situated for their maritime projects.

Oxenstiern finally carried the day in Heilbronn. All the evangelical states of the four upper circles formed a new alliance, April 13, 1633, under the leadership of the Swedish chancellor, who was recognized as "director" of the alliance, and of a council composed of three Swedes and four members of the diet. An "alliance treasury" was founded, to which the estates were to pay annually 2,500,000 thalers. The Lower Palatinate was restored to the heirs of Frederick V., who had died in the previous November. But neither Saxony nor Brandenburg was represented in this assembly ; and soon afterward John George declared himself as completely opposed to the whole tendency of the assembly of Heilbronn. He declaimed against the league with foreigners and exhorted the princes rather to restore internal peace in Germany. But he found little response from the Upper German princes and cities, who allowed themselves to be influenced by a desire for French gold and by the prospect which Sweden held out to them of territorial aggrandizement at the expense of the Catholic states. The war became less and less a war for religion or even for German principles, and more and more a war of foreigners allied with insubordinate princes of the empire against German independence and the remnants of imperial supremacy.

Meanwhile the situation of the Catholics was by no means hopeful. Of the princes of the League, Maximilian alone remained in arms ; Walenstein had retired to Bohemia. In Swabia, Aldringer, a Belgian, maintained some imperial forces. On the other hand, the Protestants had no less than seven armies at their disposal. Arnim occupied Silesia. Duke George of Lüneburg, with Swedes, Hessians, and Hanoverians, annihilated Gronsfeld's imperial corps at the Hessian Oldendorf (July, 1633). With the Swedish main army, Bernhard of Weimar, starting out from Saxony, made himself master of all Franconia, defeated the enterprising

Bavarian cavalry commander, John von Werth (a peasant's son from the Lower Rhine), and then marched into the Upper Palatinate and Bavaria itself, to plunder and lay waste. His further progress was stopped by a mutiny of his higher officers, who had remained for a long time without pay, and on this account wished to share in the general booty. Only by assignments of lands in Germany could they be satisfied. On this occasion Bernhard did not forget his own interests also. In accordance with an alleged donation from Gustavus Adolphus, he caused the Swedish chancellor to make over to him, in the form of a Swedish fief, the two rich bishoprics of Würzburg and Bamberg, as the duchy of Franconia.

This lust for gain on the part of the foreigners strengthened more and more the desire for peace among the German powers. On this point, Wallenstein was, on the whole, in accord with the Elector of Saxony, holding to the opinion that a peace must be made by which all foreigners should be completely expelled from Germany, French and Spaniards as well as Swedes; and that, to attain this object, both Catholics and Protestants ought to co-operate in harmony. At most, Sweden might receive a money indemnity, but not a foot of German soil. The generalissimus hoped to secure such a peace with the consent of the emperor, who had already suspended the execution of the Edict of Restitution.

The Bohemian exiles, with the hot-headed Thurn as their leader, no doubt cherished other plans. Commissioned by them, one of their number, named Bubna, who had risen to the rank of major-general in the Swedish service, betook himself to Wallenstein in May, 1633, in order to move him to betray the emperor, and to offer him the crown of Bohemia as a reward for his treachery. The prince, however, did not enter into this plan. He would, if worst came to worst, adopt forcible measures to influence Ferdinand to peace; but the deposition of the emperor or even his own acceptance of the Bohemian crown was not to be thought of. And yet Oxenstiern, on hearing of these negotiations, agreed with the plans of the Bohemian exiles, and urged Wallenstein to betray the emperor and the League, come over to the Swedes, receive the crown of Wenceslaus from the hands of the Bohemian estates, and restore the religious and political liberties of that country.

On hearing these demands, Wallenstein broke off all relations with Oxenstiern, and advanced into Silesia, in order to be nearer to the Saxon commander there, Field-marshal Arnim. He soon concluded an armistice with him and proposed that the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg and the imperial army should co-operate in driving out the Swedes and in bringing about an equitable peace; and with this in view, he did not hesitate to hold out the prospect of bringing force, if necessary, to

bear upon the emperor. But the two electors would not hear of open hostilities against their allies, the Swedes. Thus these negotiations were broken off, and left behind them only greater ill-feeling on all sides. Wallenstein had, besides, given the emperor information of these transactions, in so far as it suited him, and was also fully instructed in regard to them by Ferdinand and his ministers, who declared themselves satisfied with the year 1618 as the normal year to the *status* of which everything in Germany should be restored. We therefore see that Wallenstein, on the whole, acted only in accordance with the intentions of his court.

Meanwhile Arnim had also made to the Swedes proposals for a general peace, ostensibly empowered to do so by Wallenstein; but there is nothing to prove that he had any such authorization. In neither case were these proposals serious on the part of Wallenstein, for he cherished far different plans in regard to the foreigners. All these negotiations led to no result. It is clear that at that time Wallenstein was no traitor. Swedes, Saxons, Brandenburgers, and Bohemian emigrants all were loud in their complaints that he wished only to weaken, disunite, and harm them.

The general now began to make his clean sweep of the Swedes. In the beginning of October, he surprised and captured their Silesian corps at Steinau. In a few days, he conquered all Silesia and Lusatia and scoured and laid waste the country toward Brandenburg and Pomerania. In South Germany, the Spaniards who had come under Feria for the support of Swabia and Bavaria were put under the orders of his generals. Thus the Swedes were weakened, Saxony itself threatened, and another step taken toward the carrying out of Wallenstein's patriotic plans. He forthwith resumed negotiations with Saxony and Brandenburg.

But these negotiations met with the most serious difficulties. In the first place, George William and John George were in no way to be moved to hostilities against the Swedes. On the Catholic side also, Wallenstein's plans met with little approval. The Spanish king, Philip IV., the emperor's relative and most faithful ally, demanded the Lower Palatinate for himself, so as to connect the Spanish Netherlands and Franche-Comté. This was directly opposed to the plans of Wallenstein, who would put up with no foreigners on German soil; and, since he was only too ready to associate his personal interests with the common interests, thought of claiming for himself the Lower Palatinate with the dignity of elector as an ample indemnification for the loss of Mecklenburg. In this way he converted the Spaniards, who had hitherto been his firmest supporters at the imperial court, into bitter foes.

While Wallenstein was busy with these plans, which had a para-

lyzing effect on his military activity and led him to neglect the Swedish army in South Germany, Bernhard of Weimar had not remained inactive. Making his opponents believe that he wished to relieve the Saxons by attacking Bohemia, he fell suddenly on Northeastern Bavaria, and then took (November 5, 1633) the imperial city of Ratisbon, "the bulwark of Bavaria." Upper Austria now lay open to the Swedish troops.

Wallenstein was not at all sorry to see the Bavarian humbled and weakened, and thus made less capable of resisting his own plans. On the other hand, he could not permit the Swedes to become too powerful. When, therefore, he hurried with a small chosen corps from Bohemia to Bavaria, everyone believed that he would join battle with the Swedes. However, he found the East Bavarian fortresses already in their hands; winter had set in early and with intense cold, and Arnim threatened the imperial corps on the borders and in Lusatia. Therefore, with his usual caution, he led his troops back to Bohemia.

This course could not but increase the mistrust that had for a long time been entertained against him at the imperial court. From the Catholic princes of the Bavarian and Franconian circles, loud complaints reached Vienna that they were designedly given over to the enemy; while the Bohemian and Upper Austrian districts lamented bitterly over the burden of perpetually quartering Wallenstein's army. The discontent at court against Wallenstein grew constantly; and, contrary to the conditions of the agreement with Wallenstein, direct communication was entered upon with certain of his generals and colonels. His differences with Spain also had weight. Ferdinand II., by education and surroundings, by dynastic interests and Spanish subsidies, and also by the influence of his councilors, who had been bribed by that country, was completely bound to Spain; Count Oñate, the energetic, unscrupulous Spanish ambassador at Vienna, was master there.

Wallenstein was well aware of the hostile feelings of the court of Vienna toward himself, and that his deposition was contemplated. But he would not humble himself nor allow the army to be seduced. He gathered around him those whom he counted as his devoted adherents—his brother-in-law Trzka, the Italian Octavio Piccolomini, the Brandenburger Christian Ilow, the Bohemian Kinsky; and all these, together with several of his most energetic colonels, as the Irishman Butler and the Scotelman Gordon, he sought to attach by promotion all the more firmly to himself. At the same time, he began negotiations with the Saxons, with Oxenstiern and Bernhard of Weimar, and with the French ambassador in Dresden—negotiations which soon had for their aim open rebellion against the ungrateful emperor (December, 1633).

Meanwhile the report of the disfavor with which Wallenstein was regarded at court had spread through the army. The discontent on account of this was general, especially among the colonels, who began to fear for their large pecuniary claims, for which they regarded Wallenstein as their only security. He availed himself of this situation most adroitly. He represented his resignation as imminent. To avert this, the colonels pledged themselves at a banquet at Pilsen (January 12, 1634) to more than they were really prepared for: namely, under no circumstances to separate themselves from their general, but to risk for him the last drop of their blood.

Still the emperor and Eggenberg were opposed to proceeding openly against Wallenstein, and continued to correspond with him. But the young King Ferdinand and the Spanish party were working unremittingly against him. Oñate threatened to withdraw the Spanish subsidy, the Elector of Bavaria to go over to the side of France. A strong party among the imperial generals sought to displace Wallenstein, so that they might have a share in his succession. Thus assailed from all sides, at variance with Wallenstein's whole political programme, and doubtful of his loyalty, the emperor abandoned him, secretly removed him from command, and appointed King Ferdinand III. as his successor (January 24, 1634).

Although most of his generals and colonels again pledged themselves at Pilsen to stand by him in bringing about a peace, even against the will of the emperor, yet it was soon evident how uncertain a foothold Wallenstein's authority had, as opposed to that of the imperial crown. When the court held out to the leaders of the army a prospect of their claims being satisfied, partly by ready money, partly by notes, and further of their obtaining promotion and a share in the confiscated estates of Wallenstein, respect for the imperial name and shame at the thought of breaking their oath of loyalty to the emperor predominated. The first of the generals to desert Wallenstein were Piccolomini and Aldringer; most of the others followed their example. At last, on February 18, the decisive step was taken of announcing in a general army-order the treason of Wallenstein and his dismissal, with that of his closest friends and adherents.

Only when driven by necessity had Wallenstein, in contradiction to all his previous views and efforts, thrown himself into the arms of the hated foreigners. They knew this well, and mistrusted him to the last moment, thinking that he was only alluring them into a trap. When, finally, Bernhard of Weimar really started from Weiden in order to join Wallenstein in Eger, it was too late. Here Butler, Gordon, and

Major Leslie had, on the evening of February 25, 1634, assassinated first Ilow, Trzka, Kinsky, and the captain of cavalry, Niemann, and then Wallenstein himself (PLATE XIX.).

The emperor had certainly not directly ordered Wallenstein's assassination; yet his instructions to deliver up the traitor, living or dead, were of such a nature as to promise his approval of such an undertaking, and, after it was done, Ferdinand certainly approved of this "execution." In truth, Wallenstein was overthrown by the all-powerful principle which he had the temerity to oppose. In whom did it seem that he could place more confidence than in the two Scots, Gordon and Leslie, who commanded in Eger? They were strangers, foreigners, Calvinists, who besides owed everything to him; yet, when he gave them their choice, to declare themselves unequivocally either against him or against their imperial master, disregarding their debt of gratitude and their religious interests, they did not hesitate to declare themselves for the emperor and against the rebel. Then fear of punishment from Wallenstein prompted them to the murder. It was not the Catholic Butler, who had already before this been won over by the emperor, but the Calvinist Leslie, who first spoke of killing the general. Wallenstein's rich estates were confiscated; but some possessions were left to his wife and only daughter, Mary Elizabeth, still a mere child. Of his adherents, only the Lutheran colonel, Count Ulrich Schaffgotsch, was executed; the others were pardoned after a year's imprisonment.

After Wallenstein's death, the emperor had no one whom he could match against Bernhard of Weimar, Banér, and Horn. The young king of Hungary and Bohemia, Ferdinand, was nominally commander of the imperial army; but the real commander was a man of very mediocre ability—Matthias, Count Gallas, who, from the spoils of the murdered prince, had received the duchy of Friedland.

But now the dissensions among his enemies operated in Ferdinand's favor. Sweden, a weak power at the outset, was exhausted by the long war. Oxenstiern favored his son-in-law, Field-marshal Horn, distrusted Duke Bernhard, and gave him so little support that he was obliged to remain inactive while Ratisbon fell again into the hands of the imperialists, after a gallant defence that cost them more than 12,000 men.

Now at last Horn joined Duke Bernhard; but both together had barely 10,000 ill-fed and ill-clad fighting men. On the other hand, the 30,000 men of the king were reinforced by 15,000 Spanish veterans under the Cardinal Infant. Before such a superior force, the handful of Swedes had to retreat up the Danube, pursued by the imperialists. At length Bernhard, who had quickly united to himself the nearest Protes-

Eigentliche Vorbildung und Bericht, welcher gestalt der
anderen Obristen und Officieren zu Eger hing



ALBERTI DVCIS FRIDLANDINI, MILITIAE CAESAREANAE GENERALIS
caedes. Eger die 1^a Februa



M. Maestlin del.


Assassination

Reduced facsimile of the engraving

keiſerliche General, Herzog von Friedland, neben etlich
getödtet worden, den 15 Febr. 1634.



ET ALIORVM QVORVNDAM DVCVM ET OFFICIARIORVM
anni 1634. patrata.



Vallenstein.

Matthaeus Merian (1593-1650).

tant detachments and had brought his army up to some 20,000 men, determined to set a limit to the constant advance of the enemy, cost what it might, and by a great battle to relieve Nördlingen, which they were besieging. After a skirmish on September 5, 1634, that resulted successfully for the Swedes, the decisive engagement followed on the next day. But, in spite of the bravery of the German-Swedish host, they were finally put to flight by the superior forces of the enemy. Besides 6000 dead and wounded, the Protestant army lost 200 flags and 3000 prisoners—among them Field-marshal Horn.

With the exception of Lützen, the battle of Nördlingen was probably the most important event of the whole war; at least, no other had at once such significant results. Before this the situation of the Swedes in Germany was very critical. Their own strength, after the exertions of so many years, was weak and exhausted. Their allies were discontented, and some of them actually hostile. Only fear and the hope of acquiring increase of territory through Swedish help had held the Protestant states on their side. But, now that fear and hope were alike removed by this defeat, the defection of the most of their German allies was certain. Then, too, after the almost complete annihilation of its army, Sweden had no longer the ability to create a new army from its own resources. It was thus compelled to throw itself into the arms of France, and with this the war lost its religious character. The politic conduct of the imperialists contributed much to this result; for Ferdinand's extreme zeal for Catholicism had somewhat cooled after his unfortunate experiences in regard to the loyalty of the League and on account of the long continuance of the strife.

The reactionary effects of the battle of Nördlingen were seen also at the assembly at Frankfort-on-the-Main, which Oxenstiern had opened in April, 1634, in order to induce the three circles of Lower Germany to join in the compact of Heilbronn. The negotiations had dragged along for five months without coming to any decision, when the terrible news of the defeat came. Then a conclusion was reached quickly enough; it was clear that the resolutions in regard to the further continuance of the war with the help of the two Saxon circles were intended only for paper. Against Oxenstiern there were loud expressions of discontent and distrust; and the question was discussed whether he ought not to be deprived of the direction of affairs.

All the more eagerly did men throng around the French ambassador, Feuquières, an apparently inexhaustible source of money and of promises of help. France was mistress of the situation. With good reason did Richelieu advise his king to spare at this time neither troops nor

money. On November 1, 1634, the representatives of the Heilbronn confederates signed, in Paris, a treaty with Richelieu, by which France promised to support the Heilbronn allies with 12,000 men under a German prince and a subsidy of 500,000 livres. In return for this, she received a seat and vote in the council of the league, a pledge that no peace should be concluded without her consent, and the possession of the whole of Alsace, with Philippsburg and some other fortresses on the right bank of the Rhine—truly a rich reward for little help, explicable only by the utterly defenceless condition of the Protestants of Upper Germany. Yet with all this, Richelieu absolutely refused to come to an open breach with Austria. He was not willing to begin the decisive struggle with the Hapsburgs—which he recognized as inevitable—as the ally of heretics. As it was, Pope Urban VIII., otherwise so friendly to France, reproached him most bitterly on account of the Treaty of Paris.

The Treaty of Paris caused the loss of Alsace to Germany. Nevertheless the Heilbronn deputies were very eager to have it ratified. It was otherwise with Oxenstiern. He rejected it absolutely, inasmuch as it not only wrested from Sweden important districts which were occupied by her, but also transferred the leading part in the war to France, which had made such trifling sacrifices. And yet how long would the chancellor be able to avoid this submission to the pleasure of France? The imperialists were making constant progress, unhindered by the undisciplined army of their opponents. They took Würtemberg and Upper Swabia. In October, Bernhard of Weimar's duchy of Franconia passed wholly into their hands. South Germany was in their power, with the exception of Alsace and a part of the Lower Palatinate, which were held by the French. Weary as the emperor was of the war, he saw that, in order to end it, he must now make extraordinary efforts. The alliance with Spain was renewed. At the beginning of 1635, the emperor had over 100,000 men under arms. All peoples from Andalusia to Lapland and from Ireland to Poland seemed to meet in Germany, in order to lay it waste.

Who can blame the German princes of the empire, if they wished to be no longer puppets for foreigners, if they strove to set bounds to the terrible devastation, to avert the ruin of their fatherland? Since June, 1634, Saxon and imperial plenipotentiaries had been negotiating, first at Leitmeritz, then at Pirna. The only difficulty was the subject of religion—John George making the most extended claims for his fellow-believers, not only in the empire, but also in the hereditary lands of Austria. But the battle of Nördlingen made the Saxon more moderate

in his demands, and on November 24, 1634, secret preliminaries were signed at Pirna, as the basis for a final peace.

In vain were the remonstrances of France, Sweden, and the West German Protestants; in vain did the French envoys in Dresden scatter abroad "the grain of Peru." John George remained true to his pacific purposes. On May 30, 1635, he concluded definitely with the emperor the Peace of Prague. The emperor granted to the Protestants the ecclesiastical possessions which they had held in 1627, but without allowing them to exercise for these the rights of estates of the empire. The archbishopric of Magdeburg was conferred upon the elector's second son, August, four districts belonging to its territory being ceded fully to Saxony. The imperial cities and the knights of the empire retained religious liberty, but Donauwörth remained in possession of the Elector of Bavaria. The Dukes of Mecklenburg were again recognized. In regard to his subjects in Austria and to the Elector Palatine, the emperor would make no concessions. The Swedes were to be driven out of Germany by an allied army under imperial command.

However praiseworthy the pacific views of John George were, yet these conditions of Prague furnished to sincere Protestants many grounds for complaint. The emperor had made to the Protestants only such concessions as were unavoidable, and their situation was now much more unfavorable than before the war. The year taken as the standard, 1627, was an unfavorable one for them. The right to a seat in the diet, a subject of strife in earlier diets, was to be taken away from the Protestant administrators of ecclesiastical foundations. The Elector Palatine and Donauwörth were sacrificed, as well as the Austrian, Bohemian, and Moravian Protestants. The Catholic majority in the college of electors was tacitly recognized. And for this, Saxony pledged herself to fight against her former Protestant allies! For his own personal interests, the elector had been much more careful. Besides the four districts of Magdeburg, he received now finally the two Lusatias. Even Arnim, the constant advocate of peace, was altogether dissatisfied with the conditions. As a zealous, conscientious Lutheran, he threw up his commission.

And yet, from weakness, persuasion, or dread of the progress of the imperial arms, other Protestant princes soon followed the example of Saxony—first of all, George William, Elector of Brandenburg. The father of this prince, John Sigismund, had died on December 23, 1619, after an eventful reign, in the course of which Brandenburg secured for itself a portion of the inheritance of Cleves and finally acquired the duchy of Prussia. His successor, George William, was a man of fatal indecision and timidity. As long as possible, in the frightful struggle,

he observed a weak neutrality, which, since it was not once defended by any adequate force, exposed him and his land to the violence of all the belligerents. The Swedes took possession of Prussia, the Dutch of Cleves. Brandenburg itself was many times plundered and devastated. Finally George William was compelled, against his will, to ally himself in 1631 with Sweden. After the Peace of Prague, at the urgent advice of his minister, Schwarzenberg, George William acceded to that arrangement, although his fellow-believers of the Reformed faith were not even mentioned in it, and Magdeburg, that had formerly belonged to his brother, was handed over to the Saxons, for whose interests alone provision had been made.

The example of the two electors in accepting the Peace of Prague was followed by Culmbach, Anhalt, Weimar, many of the states of Upper Germany, and the Franconian and Swabian knights of the empire.

The Peace of Prague changed the whole situation, and at first more to the disadvantage of France than of Sweden. Without doubt the defeat of the Swedes at Nördlingen had been highly satisfactory to Richelieu, but now all the Protestants threatened to go over to the side of Austria, and even Sweden seemed inclined to accede to the Saxon compromise. Thus all Richelieu's plans were frustrated, and his recent successes made of doubtful value. If France would not lose all, she must prepare herself for greater sacrifices. In the Treaty of Compiègne, in April, 1635, Oxenstiern introduced essential modifications into the Paris compact in favor of Sweden. Louis XIII. promised to contribute 24,000 instead of 12,000 men to aid the allies (Fig. 70). Duke Bernhard of Weimar, who had recently been appointed at Worms commander-in-chief of the league of Swedes and Protestants, was offered also the command of the French auxiliaries, with the usufruct of Alsace—which was to remain, however, under French suzerainty. To this, Bernhard would not consent.

France now made a pretence of the warmest affection for Sweden. A French embassy sought to induce the Danes to join the alliance, and then visited Stockholm. Here the importance of ending the war which in the meantime had again broken out with Poland was pointed out to the French, for this course alone would make it possible to employ the whole power of Sweden in Germany. The French ambassador hastened at once to the seat of war, and succeeded in arranging at Stuhmsdorf an armistice for twenty-six years between the two powers. The troops destined for Poland broke into Germany under Torstenson and Wrangel. Thus Germany lost all the good results looked for from the Peace of Prague. Oxenstiern, who, owing to the continued successes of the




FIG. 70.—Enlistment of troops. Etching by Jacques Callot (see page 210).


imperialists, despaired of being able to hold the interior of Germany, went to meet the new army on the coast of the Baltic.

From this time on, the war was no longer a war for religion. On each side, imperial as well as Franco-Swedish, both Catholic and Protestant powers fought, although the clerical tinge was somewhat stronger on the former side, and the spirit of innovation on the latter. In the imperial camp were henceforth to be found the representatives of the fatherland; in the opposing camp, the foreigners who would enrich themselves at the cost of Germany, with the support, as usual, of some princes of the empire.

But it would be unjust to condemn the latter without further consideration. The emperor's thirst for vengeance and the Saxon's narrow-mindedness and self-seeking had made the Peace of Prague of such a character that no zealous Protestant could accede to it, and Ferdinand was still able to exclude a number of princes, such as the electoral family of the Palatinate, the Duke of Würtemberg, and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, from the amnesty promised in the Treaty. On the whole, however, the victory of the imperialists would lead to German unity and power, that of their foes to the disruption and despoilment of the fatherland.

The war, however, remained no longer confined to Germany. The victories of the Hapsburgs had compelled the French prime minister to extend it over all Western Europe.

PLATE XX.



Louis XIII., King of France.

Reduced facsimile of a copper-plate engraving by Jean Morin (1612-1660), from a painting by Philippe de Champaigne (1602-1674).

History of All Nations, Vol. XII., page 267.

CHAPTER VII.

THE GOVERNMENT OF RICHELIEU.

AN effort has recently been made to show that Louis XIII. (PLATE XX.) was heart and soul devoted to his great minister; but this effort has not proved a success. Louis had good sense enough to recognize the immeasurable advantages which Richelieu's powerful genius conferred on the monarchy. He did not venture to break the chain that bound him, but he hated the master of whom he neither dared nor was able to rid himself.

In this precarious position the cardinal was assailed by all classes of the opposition. He had overcome the Huguenots and appeased the clerical party for a time by concessions. Then, emboldened by their unpunished revolt under the queen-regent and Luynes, his enemies of the high aristocracy arose in open insubordination and rallied around the king's younger brother, Gaston, Duke of Orleans. As early as 1626 the nobles demanded for Gaston—who, since the king was at that time without issue, was the heir-presumptive to the throne—a seat in the privy council, in order through his influence to get rid of Richelieu. If this was not granted, they were determined to resort to force. Besides Gaston, two natural brothers of the king, of the name of Vendôme, took part in the plot.

But the cardinal did not allow himself to be intimidated. He undertook to maintain the royal authority even against the king's nearest relatives. The two illegitimate sons of Henry IV. were unceremoniously arrested like ordinary mortals. Gaston, relying on the disaffected aristocracy, wished to rise in open rebellion; but his weakness and cowardice led him to delay until Richelieu detected his plans. The prince was then base enough, in return for pardon and a rich allowance, to betray his friends to the cardinal, and to reveal all their plans. The young Count of Chalais was executed; Gaston's tutor and favorite, the aged Marshal Ornano, died in prison. The Duke of Orleans consoled himself for this by marrying the richest heiress in France, the Princess of Montpensier, thereby increasing his annual income to more than a million livres.

A general reaction against the high nobility followed on their dis-

comfiture, and it was clearly shown how completely they had forfeited the respect and love of the nation. In accordance with an often expressed wish of the Third Estate, an ordinance of July 31, 1626, prescribed the demolition of all fortresses not necessary for the security of the frontiers—an order that laid the axe to the root of all feudal independence. The hereditary feudal offices of great admiral and of constable of France were forever abolished. Against duels, which often resembled real battles, Richelieu proceeded with inexorable severity.

Not until then did France break away entirely from the Middle Ages. The confusion of the civil wars, by which for sixty years almost without interruption the peace of the kingdom had been disturbed and citizens and peasants had been impoverished, had inspired the vast majority of the French people with enthusiastic royalist feelings. Even the insurgents no longer dared to struggle against the crown, but inscribed on their banners: "For the king; against the cardinal." The nation stood on the side of the monarch against the higher nobility. Without this powerful ally, it would not have been possible even for the mighty genius of Richelieu, in eighteen years of power, to bring about so significant a revolution. By means of pamphlets and articles in journals, he therefore sought continually to influence public opinion in his favor. But no one of his enemies, however high he stood, could look for forbearance, if he transgressed the laws. For relatively insignificant offences, without regard to the intercession of the first men in the kingdom, some of the noblest heads in France fell on the block.

Richelieu could now venture to summon an assembly of notables, which showed itself thoroughly devoted to the monarchy and to the plans of the great minister. For all traitors—and the cruel administration of justice in those times gave a very wide interpretation to the idea of treason—the severest punishments were fixed. The standing army was to be brought up to nearly 30,000 men, the fleet to forty-five warships and a considerable number of galleys; and this not merely for the purpose of conquering foreign foes, but also to hold in check every rebellion at home. At the same time the finances, as the basis of the whole power of the state, were redeemed from a condition of boundless disorder.

But Richelieu had not yet completed the first part of his self-imposed task, the subjection of all the elements within the state which opposed absolute monarchy, when the opportunity was presented for making progress with the second part, the elevation of France above all other states, and especially the humiliation of both branches of the house of Austria. It was therefore of importance to secure the frontiers of France, then completely unprotected and lying open to every hostile

attack. Lorraine and the free county of Burgundy (*Franche-Comté*) pressed France hard on the northeast. On the north, the Spaniards were close to the *Somme*, distant only three days' march from Paris. On the south, Spain had passed beyond the Pyrenees by occupying the county of Roussillon.

To seize the fortresses that hemmed in and threatened France on all sides, and thus to transform them into bulwarks of his own country, was one of Richelieu's chief aims. We know how he intervened in the Grisons and in Italy against the all-devouring power of Spain. The subjugation of Savoy, the occupation of Pignerol, and the maintenance of Nevers in Mantua were the brilliant results of the campaigns of 1629 and 1630. At the same time, Richelieu supported Gustavus Adolphus in his strife against the Hapsburgs, regardless of the injury that he thereby inflicted upon Catholic interests.

Thus the threads of his policy stretched over all Europe. But this very policy stirred up for him in the interior of France new difficulties that nearly caused his overthrow. Maria de' Medici, originally the zealous patron of the cardinal, was enraged on account of his proceeding with so little regard for the church, and made several attempts, by her personal influence over her son, to get rid of the minister. But, as the king's brothers, so also his mother was made to recognize the terrible power that Richelieu exercised over the monarch. When Maria in passionate words gave to the king the choice between his mother and his minister, Louis, after a short delay—during which Maria and her adherents thought that all was already won—was discriminating and cool enough to prefer a Richelieu to one of the Medici.

November 11, 1630, the day of this defeat of the queen-mother's party, is known as the "day of the dupes." Maria was banished from the king's presence, and compelled to flee to the Spanish Netherlands. In July, 1631, she went to Brussels, and never saw France again. Richelieu, who never forgave a foe, revenged himself on Maria by denying her all support from home. The widow of Henry IV., the former regent of France, lived and died, poor and deserted, at Cologne, because she had dared to set herself in opposition to the monarchical principle. The heir-presumptive to the throne, Gaston, who had been in alliance with Maria, felt that he was no longer safe at Orleans, and fled to one of the most implacable foes of his country, Duke Charles of Lorraine.

But the spirit of freedom and independence was not yet so thoroughly stifled in France, that such extreme measures could be borne quietly. A great and dangerous coalition of all the disaffected was formed. The Parlements—i. e., the highest courts of justice of the land—as well as the



CHARLES IIIDVC DE LORRAINE Marchis Duc de Cal Bar &c. Fils de François Comte de Vaudemont et de Chrestienne de Salm. Ses prem. armes furent employées au secours de la Religion et de l'Empereur Ferdin. II à la Bataille de Prague. contre le Roy de Bohême ou il mena 4500. hommes. Après la 1^{re} Bataille de Leipsic ce Duc passa le Rhin. et arresta le cours des progresz des Suedois. commandant l'armée Imperiale confederée contre eux. Il contribua beaucoup au gain de la batail. de Nortlinguen. et prit les Generaux Horn et Gratz prisonniers. Deffut le Wurtemberg, combattit le Duc de Weimar aux bords du Mein, l'empescha d'assiéger Besançon, fit lever le siege de Dole, combattit beures aux atakes de Poliony. et de Brisac; et mit en route l'armée Francoise à Dutlinguen. Ayant commandé en Allemagne et en Flandre plusieurs armées pour l'emp. et le Roy d'Espagne avec beaucoup de valeur. Il a espousé la Duchesse Nicole de Lorraine sa cousine germaine, fille aînée de Henry Duc de Lorraine et de Bar. et de Marguerite de Gonzague.

A Paris chez Davet avec priu. du Roy 1652

FIG. 71.—Charles IV., Duke of Lorraine. Reduced facsimile of a contemporary anonymous engraving.

magistrates of the larger cities, were unwilling to submit without resistance to despotism, and the nobility eagerly joined them. Even the most loyal wavered; for, after the cardinal's procedure against the king's mother and brother, men began to see in Richelieu no longer a servant of the crown, but a madman, who in his nefarious ambition sought only to establish his own supremacy on the ruins of the royal and of every noble house.

The malcontents were assured of strong support from abroad, for Gaston had entered into alliance with the restless Charles IV. of Lorraine (Fig. 71), always devoted to the emperor and to Spain, and with Duke Henry of Montmorency, governor of the populous, independence-loving province of Languedoc. Henry saw no crime in opposing, in close union with the estates of his province and with the mother and brother of the king, the despotism of an upstart from the petty nobility. While he unfurled the standard of revolt in the south of the kingdom, Gaston of Orleans, at the head of Spanish and Lorraine troops, invaded it from the east (June, 1632).

Richelieu's situation was most perilous; but he set himself to work promptly and with the fixed resolution of annihilating without mercy every foe who fell into his hands. It was fortunate for him and for the authority of the monarchy that the various elements of the opposition were so little in harmony. As the nobility had formerly left the Huguenots to their fate, so now the Huguenots would have nothing to do with this undertaking. The high nobility itself was split up by coteries and petty interests, and some of its chiefs still supported the cardinal.

Had the insurgents gained a few successes, the revolt would have spread far and wide. But the royal troops were everywhere on hand. A French army entered the duchy of Lorraine, conquered it in eight days, and forced Charles IV. to accept the Peace of Liverdun, which left him little more than the name of duke. The Spaniards in the electorate of Treves were next attacked and prevented from affording any direct aid to the insurgents. Meanwhile Gaston had found in Burgundy so great awe of the royal authority that he was forced to evacuate that province and to betake himself to Montmorency, for whom the militia of Languedoc had entered the field. The royal marshal, Schomberg, with his insignificant forces, found it necessary to entrench himself in a strong position near Castelnaudary. When on September 1, 1632, the insurgents appeared before these works, Montmorency did not wait until his artillery had done its work, but threw himself madly, with the nobles around him, upon the well-protected enemy. He soon fell severely wounded, and was taken prisoner.

The foolhardy attack on Castelnau-dari decided the fate of the insurrection. After the fall of the popular governor, the refractory party in Languedoc broke up of itself, and the militia hastily threw away their arms. Gaston had now no other thought than that of becoming reconciled with the king, and of waiting until a better opportunity should present itself. Therefore he made peace with his brother, expressly betraying his unhappy companions to the severity of the law, in order to save himself and his rich appanage.

Richelieu resolved to give the nobility a terrible example of severity. Condemned to death by the Parlement of Toulouse, the last scion of the house of Montmorency ended his life on the scaffold (October 30, 1632). Extraordinary commissions then traversed the provinces and spread terror on all sides; without any formal procedure, even without so much as hearing the accused, many sentences of death were imposed. The resistance offered by the Parlements, the legal supreme tribunals, to such illegal and unconstitutional procedure, was crushed down by force. All officials who were not entirely devoted to the cardinal were replaced by his creatures.

Abroad, too, Richelieu's aggressive policy encountered serious obstacles. His main object in interfering with German affairs was the acquisition of the left bank of the Rhine, which from the days of Charles VII. had been the constant object of French rapacity. But the Hapsburgs defended themselves resolutely. After the Peace of Prague had set them free from their German adversaries, they fought against their other foes, the Dutch, without any very great loss.

King Philip III. of Spain had died on March 31, 1621, after a reign that had hastened on the decline of his authority in all directions. His unworthy favorite, Lerma, had been hurled from power in 1618 by the general indignation of all classes of the people, with the help of his own son, the Duke of Uzeda, who became his successor, but managed matters yet more miserably and incapably than his father. The new king, Philip IV., son of Philip III., now sixteen years old, was greeted with loud acclamations by all the inhabitants of the broad empire, since abundant reforms, a milder and wiser government, and a more moderate and sensible policy were expected from him. Uzeda and his unworthy associates were removed from office and punished. Lerma paid the penalty for his acts of embezzlement by a large money-fine, and died in retirement (1625). A new favorite was placed at the head of the kingdom, Gasparo de Guzman, Count Olivarez, who was soon provided with the title of duke, and was usually designated as the count duke (*conde-duque*).

Olivarez, now thirty-eight years of age, was not unworthy of his high

position, and strove to remedy the evils in the social and political life of his country. The immoderate number of royal officials, who consumed the marrow of the nation, he reduced by two-thirds. The taste for ostentatious extravagance, which had seized upon all classes, he opposed by sumptuary laws and by the removal of the nobles from the capital. He encouraged the increase of the population by offering premiums for early marriages and for begetting children. But there were two circumstances which brought all his efforts to naught: he did not venture to set bounds to the intolerance and measureless wealth of the Spanish church; and, in the second place, he continued the policy of aggression, to which the strength of Spain was no longer equal.

Philip IV. cherished the ambition of preserving the ancient supremacy of Spain in Europe. Personally little disposed to war, he nevertheless wished his armies constantly to win new laurels. In his vanity, he assumed the surname of "the Great." The consequence was that Spain's poverty in men and money increased in a frightful ratio through her uninterrupted wars. No reform measure could be of avail against this. She fought at the same time in Italy, in Germany, and in the Netherlands.

In the Netherlands, the war had been renewed immediately after the accession of Philip IV., since the Twelve Years' Truce had expired in 1621. On the Spanish side, the command was held by the Marquis Ambrogio di Spinola, that remarkable Genoese banker, who twenty years before had, at his own expense, enlisted an army for the service of the Catholic king, and had at once transformed himself from a merchant into the foremost commander of the age. Even now, in failing health and surrounded by unpaid and mutinous troops, he showed himself the superior of his adversary, Maurice of Orange. He took Jülich from the Dutch, and then, after a protracted siege, on which the eyes of all Europe were fixed, the strongly fortified town of Breda.

Next year (1625), both commanders disappeared from the field. Increasing sickness compelled Spinola to withdraw from military activity; he died in 1629. Maurice of Orange was also overtaken by death. As he died unmarried, he was succeeded, in the stadtholdership of nearly all the provinces and in the command of the army, by his brother, Frederick Henry. Born at Delft a few months before the murder of his illustrious father (1584), Frederick Henry had learned the art of war under the leadership of his elder brother, and had early distinguished himself by his courage and military ability. Of a mild and conciliatory disposition, he had exerted himself to protect as much as possible the Remonstrants from the persecuting fury of the Gomarists. Under him the United Provinces attained the highest point of their prosperity and power.

Frederick Henry gave at once a new impulse to military operations, especially as he received aid also from France and England. His admiral, Peter Hein, crippled the military resources of the Spaniards by the capture in 1628 of the American silver-fleet. Thus encouraged, Frederick besieged the important fortress of Hertogenbosch, the bulwark of North Brabant, which, in spite of the efforts of both Spanish and imperial generals to relieve it, was forced to capitulate in September, 1629. The prince's efforts were favored by the fact that, after the death of Archduke Albert in 1621, his consort, Isabella (daughter of Philip II.), a woman who plunged deeper and deeper into bigotry and superstition, carried on alone the government of the Spanish Netherlands. Thus Frederick was able, although the imperialists came repeatedly to their aid, to drive back the Spaniards little by little and to take from them Venlo, and, in August, 1632, the extremely important fortress of Maestricht.

Meanwhile Richelieu, in pursuing his schemes of conquest, had, in 1633, under certain pretexts, made himself master of the whole duchy of Lorraine. Treves was already in the power of France. The Duke of Würtemberg admitted French troops into his county of Montpellier, and most of the cities of Alsace did the same, in order to protect themselves from the attack of the imperialists. The connection of the three Lorraine bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun with the Roman empire was finally broken by the establishment of a sovereign Parlement for these districts in Metz. The Elector of Cologne also had to put himself under French protection. Richelieu was in earnest in his plans for taking possession of the left bank of the Rhine.

But the Spaniards now roused themselves to successful resistance, not only in Germany, but also in the Netherlands and on the Lower Rhine. In the Low Countries, the energetic Cardinal Infant, Ferdinand, brother of Philip IV., carried on the government after the death of Isabella (1633). Again he understood how to secure for himself the alliance of the vacillating Gaston of Orleans, who for the third time appeared in Brussels, and from that place threatened the French frontier. Charles IV. of Lorraine had renounced the government of his land—which was occupied by the French—in favor of his brother, Cardinal Francis, who now granted himself dispensation from his ecclesiastical vows and married. Charles, however, collected an army and joined the Spaniards, who in the beginning of 1635 again entered into the closest alliance with the emperor. The Swedes in Germany were greatly weakened by the defection of their German allies. Finally a Spanish army-corps from the Spanish Netherlands invaded the archbishopric of Treves and took it from the French—a stinging blow for Richelieu's projects.

The cardinal now saw that, in order to avoid further losses, it was high time for him to act with energy and decision against the Hapsburgs. Already in February, 1635, he had concluded an offensive alliance with the States-General for the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, which were to be divided between the two powers in such a way that France should receive the southern and the United Provinces the northern half. The attack of the Spaniards on the Elector of Treves, an ally of France, gave Richelieu his pretext for formally declaring war on Spain (May 19, 1635).

Richelieu's plan was to call out 132,000 men and begin the war in all quarters simultaneously. With 7000 men, Rohan was dispatched to the Grisons in order to secure the Valtelline and to attack the territory of Milan from the north. On the Upper Rhine, La Force was entrusted with the defence of Lorraine, while Cardinal La Valette was to form a junction with Bernhard of Weimar (Fig. 72), cross the Rhine, and prevent the further extension of the Peace of Prague. The main force, 35,000 strong, under Marshals Chatillon and Brezé, was to advance into the Spanish Netherlands—where communications had been opened with discontented nobles and estates—and form here a junction with the Dutch, who were to approach from the north.

But not one of these attacks was successful. The French army, unused to fighting, consisting for the most part of fresh levies, showed itself unwarlike, cowardly, and given to plunder; its commanders were incapable, greedy, and quarrelsome. In the Netherlands, the French forfeited all the sympathies of the inhabitants by their atrocities, and, after they had united their forces with the Dutch, they were forced by the imperialists under Octavio Piccolomini to retreat into Holland, and thus were cut off from their native land. In Germany, the Elector of Saxony had forced back the Swedes to the coast of the Baltic, and thus the whole force of the imperialists and of the League—for, as the prospect became more favorable, Maximilian of Bavaria had again gone over to Ferdinand II.—was enabled to throw itself on the armies of La Valette and Bernhard.


Nothing could be more wretched than the generalship of La Valette and the conduct of his troops. Had not Bernhard's brave little corps protected them, they would never again have gone back across the Rhine; and even as it was, they had to flee until they were within range of the cannons of Metz. At the same time, Charles IV. appeared in Lorraine, where he was received by the populace with shouts of joy, and established himself firmly. By the end of 1635, Germany was freed from foreigners, except in some fortresses on the Baltic and in Alsace.



Serenissimo fortissimog. Principi ac Dñō Dñō BERNHARDO Duci Saxoniae Inuicē Caeſarum Montiumq.
Landgrauo Thuringiae Marchioni Misniae Comiti Marcae et Ravensbergae. Domino Rheni Renu et
Dño suo Clementissimē hūc ipsius Serenitatis ad vivum depicti atq. aetate etq. C. P. T. M. C.
VICTORIAE humilime adprecantur pictor et caelator Aulae Vnicuersitatis Saxoniae.
Cum Præſenti totius Serenissima Electorali ac Ducali Domui Saxoniae. A. D. MDCXXXV. Joannes Rheni Præſentia
Caelator Dñi Augustini.

FIG. 72.—Bernhard of Weimar. Reduced facsimile of an engraving by Johannes Dürr.

In Italy and in the Grisons, Richelieu's prospects were not more favorable. On all sides the French attack had been repelled, and now the Hapsburgs on their side were preparing to take the offensive against



HIC EST IOANNES DE WERTH VIR CVIVS VIRTVS
 NVLLOS TITVLOS AMBIT. OMNES MERETVR MAR.
 TI MILES. HOSTI TERROR. EXEMPLVM MAGNIS DVCIBVS .

*Pulchrior est miles duro in Certamine cæsus,
 Quàm salvus Voluit qui dare lerga fugæ .*

Paulus Fürst Excudit A. 1637.

FIG. 73.—General John von Werth. Reduced facsimile of an engraving by P. Fürst, 1637.

French territory (1636). One Spanish corps landed in Brittany, another invaded Gascony and took some strong places there. But most decisive of all were the events in the north. A Spanish-imperial army, some 30,000 strong, under the Cardinal Infant, invaded Picardy. La Capelle and Le Catelet were taken; and the dreaded cavalry leader, John von Werth (Fig. 73), ranged with his Croats and Poles close up to the gates of Paris (July, 1636).

This mishap, and the peril threatening the capital, endangered anew the position of the prime minister. On him, above all others, was laid the responsibility for these events. The people were embittered against him; the king himself was ready to desert him; but Richelieu and his system were equal to this fearful test. Fifty years earlier, nobles and folk would have risen, driven forth or even murdered the minister, and forced the ruler to an immediate peace with the victorious foe. But, thanks to the government of Henry IV. and of Richelieu himself, national feeling and political intelligence had made considerable progress in France. When the cardinal appealed directly to the people of Paris and summoned them to defend their city, and, with it, all France, the momentary despondency and ill-humor soon gave way to universal enthusiasm. All the legal, learned, and civic corporations offered liberal contributions in money, and numerous volunteers hastened to join the newly formed regiments. Thus the immediate danger passed by; and, as the enemy did not follow up their advantage, they were forced back at least from the immediate neighborhood of the capital. Defeated in conflict with external foes, with the finances in disorder, strenuously opposed by the highest courts of justice, surrounded by court intrigues, distracted by popular revolts, Richelieu, in these gloomy first years of the war, still remained unshaken.

Even then there was no end to misfortune. A strong imperial army had in the meantime conquered nearly all Lorraine, and had then (October, 1636) invaded the duchy of Burgundy, which was only rescued by Bernhard of Weimar. So long as possible, this gallant prince had struggled against sinking into the position of a mere servant of France; but, since he was finally deserted, not only by the Swedes, who had retreated to the Baltic, but also by the German Protestants, who had made peace with the emperor, no other course remained open to him, unless he chose to submit to the hated Hapsburgs. Therefore, driven by necessity, he concluded, in October, 1635, a treaty with the French, and promised to maintain an army of 18,000 men, on condition of receiving four million livres yearly. He was to exercise the sole command over this army, but under the authority of the King of France and according to his instructions. As a personal reward for his services,

he was promised not only a considerable yearly allowance, but also Alsace—and this, too, independent of French suzerainty. These conditions, so favorable to the duke, can be accounted for only by the grievous situation of France.

But the beginning of Bernhard's career as a French mercenary was far from favorable. The enemy's superiority in force, as well as the deplorable incapacity of the French generals, compelled him to evacuate Alsace and Lorraine. Only with difficulty, by his astonishing mastery of the art of war, was he able to drive by his manoeuvres the far more numerous imperialists out of Burgundy and to hold the line of the Saône (autumn, 1636).

The year 1637 was marked by repeated misfortunes for France. In Italy, the Spaniards had so far the upper hand that they forced the Duke of Parma to give up the French alliance. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the Grisons, the old friends of France, were indignant because Rohan, at the command of Richelieu, had actually made himself lord of the Valtelline, which he professed to defend. The imperialists and Spaniards fomented secretly this bad feeling, and, in April, 1637, it broke out openly. Rohan, besieged in a little fort near Coire, had to promise to evacuate their territories forthwith. In Mantua also, and in Savoy, the Hapsburg party triumphed. Thus Italy and the important passes of the Grisons were lost to France.

The situation in the south and north of France was somewhat more favorable. In the south, the advance of the Spaniards into Languedoc was averted by the victory of Leucate (September, 1637); in the north, La Capelle was recovered, and, in addition, a number of places in Luxemburg were taken. These were, indeed, small successes; but encouraging, nevertheless, amid all the misery at home and abroad. Proudly Richelieu rejected the proposal of the enemy to conclude a peace on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*. With the foresight of genius, he recognized the fact that the star of France was rising, while that of her foes was sinking. The near future was to confirm his forecast.

Meanwhile only the German troops under Bernhard were earning laurels. While it was yet winter, he outflanked the imperialists' defensive position on the Upper Rhine, and, marching through Swiss territory, surprised and scattered the imperial army at Rheinfelden, March 3, 1638. The imperial commander-in-chief, Savello (Fig. 74), and John von Werth, who a year and a half before had alarmed Paris, were taken prisoners, Werth being presented like some strange animal to the curious gaze of the Parisians. Bernhard now conquered the Breisgau and invested

Friedrich / Herzog von Savello ꝛ.

Römischer Baro, Röm: Kayf: May: Hoff Kriegs Rath / Lämmerer / General Feldt Marschall und bestellter Obrister / geben hiemit zuvernehmen : Demnach mit sonderbahrem Schwaden / der Röm: Kayf: May: unsers Allergnädigsten Herrns ꝛ und des gantzen H. Röm: Reichs diensten / im Werck leydet nur zuviel erfahren müssen / daß von unterschiedlichen Regimentern des Herrn General Feldt Marschall / Grauen von Odh ꝛ. unterhabender Armada, an vielen Orten off dieß H. Reichs boden starck die partien sich vernemen lassen, die Straßen unsicher machen, betauben, und die Leuth, zwar ohne ansehen plündern, die nothwendigen Commercien, gänglich verhindern und vffheben, Auch sonst alle abschräliche insolentien, wider alle was Kriegsdisciplin, in dem schwang treiben:

Wird derowegen hiemit diesem/allen des H. Röm: Reichs/ und andern Städten, Märckchen, Schloßern, Dörffern/ und dergleichen, wie die Namen haben / Auch derselben Commandanten und Soldatesca vnter unserm Commando, inn Schwaben/ Francken und Württemberg/ auch andern Orten und Landen / zu einer Nachrichtung angefügt / und zwar alles ernstes anbesohlen / andere aber gebühlich hiemit ermahnet / Alle die Jenige/ von obbesagter Armada, so off der Straßen/ oder sonst in andern Orten herretten würden/ und von den Herrn General Feldt Marschall/ Grauen von Odh ꝛ. von den Herrn Gen: Bachmeistern/ Hoff/ und Schuetter/ oder von Uns keinen feilschen Paß, Als nach dem Ziehen dieß Monats darit, fürzuweisen haben, verarrestirt, eingezoget, Die Widerspänstige aber hierinnen abgestrafft/ und sonst für Vogelfrey gehalten und tractirt werden. Wornach man sich zu richten. sig: Hellbron/ den Zwölfften Junij, Anno 1638.

Friedrich/ Herzog von Savello

L. S.

Erst: Constantin Ernst.

Fig. 74.—Facsimile of a mandate of the Duke of Savello, imperial field-marshal, against marauders, 1638.

Breisach, then one of the strongest fortresses in Europe and one of the chief bulwarks of Germany against the west. In vain did the court of Vienna strain every nerve to relieve this outpost of the remote Austrian territory.

After defeating a second imperial army at Wittenweiler (August, 1638), dispersing a corps of Lorrainers, and finally driving out a third imperial army which had forced its way even into his entrenchments, Bernhard compelled the brave defenders, through hunger, to surrender (December, 1638). The hero of Weimar and his gallant German troops here won undying fame for themselves. Only 15,000 strong, they had defeated and partly destroyed four armies and captured a fortress reckoned impregnable. As a result, the Upper Rhine and Austrian Swabia fell finally into Bernhard's hands. What a misfortune for Germany, that all this German skill and German bravery ultimately benefited only its rapacious foes!

At no other points was the outlook so favorable for France as where Germans fought for her. In Italy, she suffered new defeats. In the Netherlands, the Cardinal Infant defended himself ably against the Dutch, who attacked Antwerp, and against three French armies, finally driving all of them with great loss out of the land. Still more ingloriously did the campaign end which Richelieu undertook with a large force against Spain. The French could not even capture the weak frontier fortress of Fontarabia, and were finally scattered in flight before an attack of hastily assembled provincial militia.

All the greater value did Richelieu attach to the capture of Breisach. This seemed to him the best method of celebrating another joyous event, that set him and the king free from any further regard for Gaston of Orleans. This was the birth of a dauphin—Louis XIV.—on September 5, 1638. In this event, Richelieu saw a prospect for the continuance of his supremacy beyond the lifetime of the sickly king. We can understand, then, how vexed the cardinal was when Duke Bernhard absolutely refused to deliver over his conquest to France. Not for foreigners but for himself he had worked, as the treaty of 1635 gave him the right to do. He established in Alsace and in the Breisgau his own government, dependent only upon himself, and did not allow the slightest French influence. The relations between him and Richelieu therefore became more and more strained. When the French threatened Bernhard with the withdrawal of the stipulated subsidy, he declared that he would not give up to them his conquests in Franche-Comté until they had given him satisfaction and had recognized him as a sovereign prince of Alsace and the Breisgau: never, he said, would

he bear the reproach of having been the first to dismember the empire. Finally the duke decided to break wholly with France, and, with the aid of the Swedes and Hessians, to fight on his own account against the Catholics in Germany east of the Rhine.

But while Richelieu was preparing to oppose Bernhard with force, if necessary, the latter died suddenly on July 18, 1639, at Neuenburg on the Rhine, not, as was then falsely reported, because of French poison, but rather from the effects upon a weak constitution of the exertion and excitement of the last few years. It was France that profited by his death. The duke had bequeathed his conquests to his brothers; but they hesitated to enter upon the dangerous inheritance, and were, besides, owing to their accession to the Peace of Prague, little loved by the army. Thus that which could easily be foreseen happened. The three "directors," to whom Bernhard before his death had entrusted the command of his army, had, on October 9, 1639, to deliver over the army and its conquests to its paymaster, the King of France. Alsace, conquered by German troops, passed over to France.

And as France here gained a most important acquisition without any effort on her part, so elsewhere the fortune of the war turned more and more in her favor. The sea-power of Spain was by this time completely broken. Putting forth her last maritime resources, Spain had fitted out a fleet of seventy ships of the line, designed to transport 12,000 soldiers to the Netherlands for an attack upon Flanders—a new Invincible Armada! But the heroic admiral, Martin Tromp, annihilated this great squadron in a four hours' fight in the Channel (1639), and from that time Spain ceased to be a great naval power.

For a time, Spain made a better resistance by land. While everything else took a downward course—wealth, population, intelligence, physical strength—the admirably organized Spanish army, inspired by a high feeling of honor and the proud memory of a thousand victories, maintained its ancient excellence. Nothing could have been more unfortunate for France than the campaign of 1639 in Flanders. Feuquières, abler as a diplomat than as a general, was totally defeated at the siege of Thionville by a Spanish-imperial army under Piccolomini, and his whole infantry slain, wounded, or captured (June, 1639). Still greater were the successes of the Spaniards in Italy. The young Victor Amadeus I. of Savoy died in 1637, leaving a minor son, Charles Emmanuel II., for whom his mother, Christine, conducted the regency. This lady, a daughter of Henry IV. of France, was devoted heart and soul to the land of her birth, in the exclusive interest of which she administered the duchy, to the great dissatisfaction of her subjects and of the

ducal family. Two princes of Savoy—the daring soldier, Thomas, and Cardinal Maurice—preferred to go over to the Spaniards. With the help of the governor of Milan, the former conquered almost all Piedmont, and, late in July, 1639, Turin also, the capital. The people and garrison of Nice arose against the French and opened this important seaport to the Spaniards.

But this was the end of their successes. The decisive change began with the year 1640. The process of decomposition that had long been at work in the body of the Spanish realm now threatened to cause its complete dissolution. The burdens of the war weighed intolerably upon the impoverished population of the Iberian peninsula. No decisive victory, no world-dominating grandeur compensated its people for their ever-growing sufferings. In addition to this, the non-Castilian provinces regarded the Castilians, who alone ruled and plundered them, as aliens and enemies, and often cherished more bitter anger against them than against the foes of the kingdom. Portugal especially could not forget that for sixty years it had been forced to renounce its glorious past and to become a subject-land of its rival, Castile; and also the industrious, vigorous Catalonians, in many respects allied to the people of the south of France, hated the lazy, silent, despotic, arrogant Castilians.

As late as 1639, the Catalonians had with great courage repelled the French attack on Roussillon. The court of Madrid showed its gratitude by attempting to take advantage of the military situation for the annihilation of the provincial privileges, by oppressing the inhabitants by illegally quartering troops upon them, and by introducing the equally illegal conscription. All complaints were rejected with contempt and cruelty. The disaffection and exasperation of the Catalonians reached such a height, that bloody conflicts soon took place between the country-people and the royal officials and soldiers.

In this state of feeling, an accidental occurrence kindled a general conflagration. The arrest in Barcelona of a man from the country, on an occasion when thousands of his fellows were present in the city, gave the signal for an insurrection in which the whole province, with the exception of a few fortresses held by the troops, participated (June, 1640). The deputation of Catalonia met and decided to ask aid from France. The cause of freedom and provincial independence was to be defended by a despotic and centralizing government!

Such an inconsistency troubled Richelieu as little as similar inconsistencies had troubled Francis I. and Henry II., who, while sending the Reformers at home to the stake, undertook the defence of the Protestant cause in Germany. A French army-corps under Marshal Schomberg

entered Catalonia, and the province concluded at Barcelona, in December, 1640, a formal league with Louis XIII. At the same time, the flame of insurrection burst forth at the opposite end of the peninsula.

In Portugal, the Castilian rule had been borne with dislike. For a long time, Richelieu had maintained secret negotiations with the national party there, which comprised men of the highest rank; the chancellor of Portugal himself was in collusion with him. As early as 1637, serious disturbances, which are known under the name of the "tumults of Evora," had taken place. Now the excitement was considerably increased by the news from Catalonia. Duke John of Braganza, whose vast possessions embraced nearly a third of the soil of Portugal, and who was related on the female side to the former native royal house, was by general consent designated as the national ruler. As soon as he gave his consent, he was proclaimed everywhere as King John IV. (December 1, 1640). The weak Spanish detachments were overpowered by the people. England and Sweden, France and Holland recognized him at once, and the last two powers promised him support.

However these revolts might end, it was certain that the resources of Spain were considerably diminished by them and divided, and that France had obtained a firm footing in the hitherto inviolable Pyrenean peninsula.

In every field of operations, this state of affairs soon had its effect. The subjugation of the Spanish Netherlands by France, which Louis XIV. so zealously carried forward, was begun by the capture of Arras, the strong and populous capital of Artois, in August, 1640. The death of the Cardinal Infant (November, 1640), whose place was very unsatisfactorily filled by Francisco de Melo, relieved the French of a dangerous adversary on this side. In Italy the Spaniards were driven entirely out of Piedmont, and the southwestern part of the duchy of Milan was taken. In Germany the excellent French general, Guébriant, at the head of the Weimar troops, won repeated victories and occupied the archbishopric of Cologne. Against Portugal, Spain could scarcely defend its own frontiers. In January, 1641, the Catalonians, in the assembly of their estates, chose Louis XIII. as Count of Barcelona. The conflict there fluctuated hither and thither, without decisive results; but the French conquered the county of Roussillon, with its capital, Perpignan (1642), that had been in the possession of Spain for one hundred and fifty years. The power of France seemed irresistible.

And yet even these successes could not secure Richelieu's position at home. A new revolt of powerful nobles, led by the Count of Soissons, a prince of the blood, broke out in 1641. The nobles defeated a royal

army at the forest of Marfée, but the Count of Soissons fell in this fight, and with him disappeared all hopes of the conspirators for the success of their cause.

Richelieu was next threatened in the very foundation of his power—the royal confidence. We know that Louis tolerated his minister only with reluctance. The latter thought that he had done a clever thing in giving to the weak monarch, as his companion, the young Henry of Cinq-Mars, the scion of a family allied to the cardinal, and a young man of the most pleasing intellectual and bodily accomplishments. Cinq-Mars knew how to win completely the king's favor, and rose to the highest office in the household—that of grand-master of the horse.

But the ambitious youth was not satisfied with this brilliant position. He, the creature, the servant, would himself play the master, and boldly demanded political and military influence, which Richelieu flatly refused him. Enraged on this account, Cinq-Mars sought to destroy Richelieu's influence with the king, and, deceived by the evidences of personal dislike against the minister, to which Louis often enough gave expression, he considered his cause as won, and believed himself safe in proceeding to the most daring measures. By means of the parliamentary counselor, de Thou, son of the renowned historian, he placed himself in communication with the disaffected nobles and with Gaston of Orleans. Nothing less than the murder of Richelieu was their aim.

In order to be sure of help under all circumstances, Cinq-Mars's envoy, in March, 1642, even entered into a secret compact with the enemies of the realm, the Spaniards, in accordance with which the latter promised to the conspirators money and troops, and they promised to the Spaniards a friendly policy and the restoration of all conquests. Was any more convincing proof needed to show that the cause of Richelieu was the cause of the monarchy and the cause of France? The cardinal knew how to obtain a copy of this compact, and, by laying it before the king, he not only brought the monarch completely over to his own side, but also induced him to deliver up the unsuspecting favorite and his friends (June, 1642).

Richelieu was already very ill, but the nearness of his own death did not mitigate the terrors of his revenge. Cinq-Mars and de Thou died as traitors on the scaffold; the Duke of Bouillon, who had likewise been arrested, received his freedom again only by ceding to France his independent possession of Sedan—a prize which France had long coveted.

Richelieu's triumph was complete. He had, in the words of Madame de Motteville, "out of his master made a slave, and out of this slave the greatest king in the world." Such of the distinguished nobles as had not

been executed lived in exile or were banished to their remote estates. The clergy and Parlement retained their former privileges only in so far as these were not inconvenient to royal absolutism. The lower nobility gradually gave up the personal independence in which they had lived like little princes on their estates, to devote themselves with zeal and ambition to the service of their sovereign in his army and fleet. The privileged position of the higher classes, however, in regard to all beneath them, Richelieu guarded most zealously, inasmuch as he believed that he thus averted those perils which an absolute monarchy would call forth against itself by placing all on a dead level.

But his provisions in this regard proved too weak. Since the nobility retained no longer any power of their own, and exercised scarcely any magisterial functions, their privileges appeared to the people so much the more arbitrary, unnatural, and oppressive, in proportion as the pretensions of the nobles were without corresponding duties. Such an aristocracy, whose superiority depended solely on the good-will of the crown, left the latter immediately confronting the enthralled mass of the people, without those intermediate members that in other unfree states prevent or at least lessen the force of a direct collision between the highest authority and the masses.

The revolts of recent years had been no longer directed, as in earlier times, against the nobility or against a dominant faction at court, but against the king's ordinances and officials. The rapid increase of the national debt under Richelieu's administration had also undermined the solidity of the monarchical structure. In this way Richelieu has been regarded—and not unjustly—as the forerunner, and, in a certain sense, the original cause, of the Revolution of 1789.

Richelieu was as liberal in religious matters as he was tyrannical in administrative matters. He even defended liberty of conscience. But the church at that time was thoroughly united with the state; upon the state she conferred a large part of her moral and material power, in order to be, in turn, supported by it and to look to it, the "temporal arm," for the execution of her decrees and sentences. In such a condition of affairs (PLATE XXI.), Richelieu intended that the state should carry off the lion's share in the alliance and dominate its partner. But he did not employ his power over the church to her injury. She possessed a fourth part of all the land in the whole kingdom, and her gross incomes amounted to more than a hundred million livres annually.

Richelieu sought, so far as possible, to prevent this enormous wealth from leading the church to moral degeneracy. By royal edict he put an end to the intolerable abuse by which the higher ecclesiastical digni-

PLATE XXI.



Cardinal Richelieu.

Reduced facsimile of a copper-plate engraving, 1657, by Robert Nanteuil (1630–1678), from a painting by Philippe de Champaigne (1602–1674).

History of All Nations, Vol. XII., page 286.

taries reveled in riches, while the priests, especially in the country, were sunk in bitter poverty. Henceforth each priest was to receive a fixed stipend sufficient to support him respectably. To remedy the shocking disorders in the monasteries, Richelieu sent to them royal commissioners, who restored in them discipline, peace, and obedience to the rules of the order. In this he was powerfully supported by a revival of piety and virtue among the clergy themselves, which directed itself less to useless contemplation than to works of mercy, charity, care for the sick, and instruction.

Meanwhile the reformed Benedictine congregation of Saint-Maur called to life the sciences of diplomatics and of paleography, and thus laid the foundation for real historical investigation. In all these things Richelieu took part, promoting them and favoring them. In return he claimed complete sway over the French church. The proud bishops, who formerly could and dared stir up risings against the king, trembled now before the minister who deprived them of their incomes, imprisoned them, and banished them. Only with the consent of the state did they hold their assemblies, and, if they showed the slightest opposition to the wishes of the cardinal, they were at once repressed by unscrupulous force. On the other hand, all discontent with the official church directed itself in the end against the state and its administrative centre, the monarchy.

The administration also was completely centralized and transformed by Richelieu into that ideal bureaucracy, in which a few ministers, in the name of the king, arbitrarily decide the fate of millions. Richelieu was the creator of that omnipotent official class, which was the principal cancer consuming the political and social life of the French people. He annihilated the independence of the provinces, and centred the political life of France in Paris, whose restless, impulsive population gradually came to rule the whole land. The administration of the provinces was conducted with absolute power by Richelieu's *intendants*. This institution dates from the middle of the sixteenth century, from the reign of Charles IX.; but it did not become permanent until 1635, in the second half of Richelieu's administration.

These *intendants* were clothed with police, judicial, and financial authority, were responsible only to the prime minister, and were bound by no other rule than his and their own pleasure. The nobly-born *gouverneur* of the province was now nothing more than a figure-head, useful only for ceremonial occasions. Richelieu and his successors intentionally chose these terrible *intendants* exclusively from young persons of the *bourgeoisie*, or middle class, who had no other power and support

than the favor of the all-powerful minister. The powers of the regular courts of law, especially of the Parlements, were systematically limited to the domain of private and of criminal law. So it came about that in France there was no longer any protection against the will of the administration.

Not only in the domain of politics, but also in intellectual matters, Richelieu sought to establish the greatness of France. Extremely fond himself of the works of literature, he considered it necessary for the fame of his country that they should flourish in it. He cherished the idea—quickly realized—of replacing Latin as the universal language by French. In order to adapt the French language for this purpose, in order to purify it and to polish it, he founded in 1635 the French Academy, which was destined to fix and to develop the form of the language and to teach rhetoric and the art of poetry. This body of literary magistrates, approved by the government, encouraged and stimulated French literature, and contributed to prevent even its less important works from sinking below a certain level of outward finish; but at the same time it stifled originality and gave to the so-called “classical period” a uniformity far different from the popular power which is manifested in the French literature of the sixteenth century.

Besides this state institution for the promotion of literature, there had already appeared—for the first time in the last years of Henry IV.—those distinguished social circles which for two centuries were to exercise so great an influence on cultivated society. In the *salon* of the Marquise of Rambouillet, prominent writers met for the first time on equal terms with the nobles who affected a taste for polite literature. The influence of these high social circles saved literature from rudeness and want of taste, but made originality impossible. Richelieu himself held in his palace—the Palais Cardinal (Fig. 75), to-day the Palais Royal—literary circles which were thronged: at which, among others, Pierre Corneille and Voiture used to appear. Voiture’s elegant “Letters” are an example of the unnatural gallantry and affectation which prevailed in these *salons*, and of the tendency to formal rhetoric (*éloquence*), which is praised in Richelieu’s letters-patent for the establishment of the French Academy as the great object of literary art.

In this society ruled by the court, there was no room for such an original and deep mind as that of the great philosopher, René Descartes (1596–1650). Like so many of his contemporaries, this bold investigator was deeply impressed with the defects and unreliability of the knowledge of those times. He did not, however, as Montaigne, Charron, and so many others, take refuge in fruitless skepticism, but in a fixed

aprioristic principle, elevated above all doubts, from which it was possible to proceed with assurance to the reorganization of all human knowledge. Not until after long years of study and travel, after he had withdrawn from the fetters of French life to the free Netherlands, did he publish his first philosophical works. He found the starting-point for the creation of a positive philosophy in the certainty of existence based on consciousness—*cogito, ergo sum*—and upon this he constructed his system.

In the period immediately following, the greatest souls were deeply



FIG. 75.—Richelieu's palace (Palais Cardinal) in Paris.

moved and carried away by Descartes's proclamation of the exclusive sovereignty of reason, as against all tradition and authority. The best metaphysicians, religious philosophers, and lovers of esthetics in the seventeenth century followed with enthusiasm the way prescribed by him: Pascal, Arnauld, Bossuet, Fénelon, Boileau, and La Fontaine. And also on the development of the French language Descartes exercised an important influence. He gave to it clearness, the exact designation of each idea by a word expressly and forever assigned to it—qualities by which

the French writers of the epoch immediately following distinguished themselves.

This stamp of grace and polish was now also, after the model of Malherbe, impressed on poetry, which, as a result, became more and more forced, unnatural, and conventional. That which is an advantage for prose is an oppressive chain for the free play of the poet's fancy. Therefore all the poets of Richelieu's time are unimportant, except the dramatic poets. But in this domain also, the tragic poets Rotrou and Mairet declared for the models of antiquity, so little suited to the French language and to French methods of thought. The great cardinal himself spoke the authoritative word by declaring himself in favor of antiquity and even of the famous "three unities" of Aristotle. In literature as well as in politics, his will was law.

The classic character of the French drama was thus determined—and that, too, not to its benefit. It fettered even Pierre Corneille (Fig. 76) (1606–1684), a poet of energetic mind, much good sense, and refined judgment, who nevertheless was forced to pay homage to a misunderstood antiquity and to an unnatural "eloquence." What he might have accomplished under more favorable circumstances, we see with astonishment in his "Horace," "Cinna," "Polyeucte," his masterpieces, to which the "Cid" is far inferior. But here, too, the differences among the characters disappear before the uniformity of the conception, and the powerful language of genius often falls into formal rhetoric. It was impossible to hear a true expression of the feelings among people who, while representing Romans, Greeks, and Arabs, yet addressed one another as Madame and Seigneur, and made use of the finest phrases of the Palais Cardinal and of the Salon Rambouillet; it was impossible to unite true dramatic life with the requirements of the "three unities." In this hopeless undertaking, Corneille's genius was soon completely paralyzed.

Not otherwise was it with art. By the example of Nicolas Poussin (1594–1665), painting, like poetry, was led to an artificial imitation of the antique. Eustace Lesueur (1617–1655) is a good example of this evil influence. Still more did sculpture degenerate; and in architecture also the life of the Renaissance died out.

These were the results of the successful efforts of absolute monarchy in France, founded by a great minister, to make of service to itself all branches of the life of the nation. Everywhere there was intellectual activity and high talents, the effects of a period of greater freedom; but these were everywhere reduced by the centralization and despotism that swayed the whole people to cold, uniform regularity.

In spite of the great services which Richelieu rendered in establishing



FIG. 76.—Pierre Corneille. Engraving by Droyer, from the painting by Charles Le Brun (1619-1690).

the power of France, the weight of the taxes, the severity and mercilessness of his rule, and his opposition to all popular movements deprived him completely of his early popularity. So long as he lived, men refrained because of fear from giving expression to this feeling. Scarcely, however, had he died (December 4, 1642), when their antipathy broke out in satirical sayings and verses and in the reviling of the relatives whom he had loaded with favors. The king did nothing to defend the memory of his great minister. This is the lot of the genius that works only for political ends, without thinking of humanity and human aspirations. It is not mourned even by those in whose service it has toiled.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE END OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR.

THE longer the conflict that had devastated Germany since 1618 lasted, the more barbarism increased, and the more natural did the soldier find it to regard himself as master of all that came within his reach. The emperor's soldiers in particular had been from the first accustomed to regard their enemies as detestable rebels and heretics, for whom no treatment was too bad. The Swedes, on being relieved from the iron discipline of Gustavus Adolphus, acted not much better. The troops of Bernhard, the French, and the Spaniards were alike driven to plunder, through lack of pay and provisions. Terrible was the misery in the winter of 1635-1636, which, following a bad harvest, was very severe and long. Rhenish villages, formerly flourishing, now counted only some twenty poor and enfeebled inhabitants, in place of six or seven hundred. Not only dogs, but even human flesh was eaten.

After the peace with Poland, fresh troops came to the help of the Swedes. They were now as much superior in numbers to the emperor's allies, the Saxons, as their new commander, Banér, was superior to the Elector John George in the art of war. Banér laid waste Brandenburg as well as North Saxony. Imperial troops came to the aid of the elector and gave him a considerable numerical superiority; but, notwithstanding this, Banér gained a complete victory over them all at Wittstock (October 4, 1636). In the eager pursuit of the beaten foe, he destroyed their whole infantry. The effects of this battle were disastrous for Germany. It elevated the spirits of the discouraged Swedes and made more remote the prospects of a general peace. The claims of Sweden for large acquisitions of territory in Germany were considerably strengthened by these events.

However, in the next year (1637), the imperialists united all their forces against this adversary, and, 60,000 strong, drove him back into Pomerania. But there he knew how to maintain himself, and this was now of double importance for the Swedes; for in March, 1637, the last Duke of Pomerania, Boguslaw XIV., had died without leaving direct heirs. According to ancient and often renewed treaties, Pomerania should now have fallen to Brandenburg, and George William prepared to take possession of it. But the Swedes were in no wise disposed to

give up a district so indispensable for their Baltic plans, especially now that Brandenburg stood on the side of their foe.

Shortly before the battle of Wittstock, in September, 1636, Ferdinand II. had assembled the electoral college at Ratisbon, in order to secure the German crown for his son Ferdinand, who was already King of Hungary. Although Pope Urban opposed as far as possible the interests of the Hapsburgs, the emperor carried the day. At the end of December, 1636, Ferdinand III. was elected King of the Romans.

His father did not long enjoy this important success. Scarcely had he returned to Vienna, when he died, February 15, 1637, in his sixtieth year, after a most disastrous reign of eighteen years. The evil seeds which had been sown under his predecessors produced, under this most Roman of all German emperors, bloody and poisonous fruit.

Ferdinand III. immediately succeeded him in the hereditary lands and in the empire. All these Hapsburgs in Spain and Germany, the Philips and the Ferdinands, are characterized by a rigid uniformity, such as is seldom seen in other ruling families. They appear less as distinct individualities than as stronger or weaker impressions from one common type. Thus in nature, views, efforts, and speech, Ferdinand III. reminds us of his father, except that he was a little less obstinate. A prince of limited intelligence and of weak character, he did not control circumstances, but allowed himself to be driven by them.

The first years of his reign were marked by the brilliant achievements of Bernhard of Weimar, who wrested Alsace permanently and the Breisgau temporarily from the house of Austria. While Bernhard was thus with German troops conquering German lands for the foreigner and attracting the best part of the imperial troops to himself, the Swedes were enabled to maintain themselves in North Germany and to extend themselves more and more widely. Banér drove the incapable Gallas before him until he had scarcely any troops at his disposal, overran electoral Saxony, and punished the unhappy land severely for the accession of its prince to the Peace of Prague. At Chemnitz (April, 1639), he annihilated the Saxon army. He then invaded Bohemia, in the hope of once more awakening the national Protestant spirit against Austrian rule. In this hope, he was wholly disappointed. Systematic oppression during two decades had here broken the once defiant spirit of Protestantism, and the shameful devastation wrought by the Swedes was little calculated to attract the Bohemians to their side. An attempt on Prague failed.

Nevertheless, the situation of affairs at that time was bad enough for the emperor and his party. The Weimar troops under their new general,

the Duke of Longueville, invaded the districts of the Lahn and the Wetterau. They were thus approaching Hesse-Cassel; and the energetic landgravine, Amelia Elizabeth, who in the meanwhile had collected about herself in Westphalia the troops of her late husband, availed herself of this opportunity to drive her Darmstadt cousin out of her land. In February, 1640, in return for rich subsidies, she concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with France. Then Banér with rare insight, instead of turning toward the wasted regions of Brandenburg and Pomerania, adopted the plan of turning toward the northwest and forming a junction with the Weimar and Hessian forces. Besides, his approach enabled George of Lüneburg to ally himself again with the Swedes.

With one blow, the political and military conditions in the German theatre of war were changed: the political conditions, because once more two powerful German Protestant princes were united with the foreigners in the war against the emperor; the military conditions, because the Swedes, who had been weakened and discouraged, were now supported by 16,000 soldiers of Weimar, Hesse, and Lüneburg. It was almost exclusively German troops who advanced under the command of a Swede and a Frenchman against the army of the German emperor. The conduct of the Landgravine of Hesse and of the Duke of Lüneburg was the more deplorable in that no higher interest, and in particular no religious interest, forced at that time the weapons into their hands. Their confession was sufficiently secured by the Peace of Prague and by Ferdinand III.'s urgent need of peace. It was only the particularist spirit of opposition and the greed for French gold that induced both these princes to renew the war.

For a while, the union with the foreigner brought these princes as little good-fortune as it had the Duke of Weimar. Dissensions over the purpose and conduct of the war separated the leaders. They were compelled to retire to the Werra, while imperial emissaries induced many of their soldiers to desert their proscribed standards. In addition to this, the men of Weimar mutinied, refusing to serve longer under a French commander. Hesse was now the scene of the war, which had been again called into life by its princess. Piccolomini, the imperial commander-in-chief, devastated it to the best of his ability. He then entered the well-to-do land of George of Lüneburg, and thus he too was punished for his faithless breach of the Peace of Prague.

But these successes of the imperialists in Germany were more than offset by the misfortunes which now befell the Spanish Hapsburgs on all sides. The more closely the interests of the two branches of the

house of Hapsburg were united, the more threatening must the defeats of the Catholic king appear to the emperor. In Germany, men already ventured to work openly for the abolition of the imperial power. In 1640, the well-known publicist Chemnitz issued, under the pseudonym of Hippolitus a Lapide, a polemical treatise entitled "*De ratione status in Imperio nostro Romano-Germanico*," which, in opposition to Ferdinand II.'s attempt to bring about the victory of military Caesarism in Germany, advocated with bitterness and passion the opposite system of separate powers, the development of particularism, and imperial impotence. Bitter complaints were directed against the house of Hapsburg—and not merely against this dynasty, but against the imperial power itself.

How much all feeling of unity, all patriotism, and all political insight had deserted Germany, was made clear at the diet of the empire, which was summoned to meet in Ratisbon in September, 1640, for the purpose of restoring peace. Although Ferdinand showed himself ready to yield to a degree scarcely consistent with his imperial dignity, yet the ambassadors spent their time in questions of forms and did not reach serious negotiations. Soon the insolence of the foreigners taught both emperor and estates to what a humiliating pass Germany had been brought by their disunion, self-seeking, and folly.

In order to draw his enemies away from the northwest of Germany, Banér resolved to venture upon a daring *coup de main* against Ratisbon, and, although already attacked by a mortal illness, he actually, with part of his own troops and some Weimar regiments, forced his way up to the walls of the city. He found it, however, so well guarded that he had only the satisfaction of firing a few hundred cannon-shots against the meeting-place of the diet. But his bravado did not go unpunished. Imperial and Bavarian troops hurried up from all quarters, and Banér (Fig. 77) was forced to retreat in hot haste and with great loss to Halberstadt. These forced marches, the painful uncertainty about the eventual fate of his army, and the incessant conflicts hastened his end. He died at Halberstadt, May 20, 1641.

The Swedish cause was strengthened, however, by the crowns of France and Sweden renewing, on June 29, 1641, their alliance of 1638, that was now to last until the establishment of a general "honorable" peace—i. e., a peace to the disadvantage of Germany. Thus the foreign foes of the imperial power were bound to one another in firm alliance; and men of high endowments appeared at the head of their armies, while on the imperial side skilful leaders became more and more difficult to find. The conditions which had prevailed in the beginning of the war,



FIG. 77.—Field-marshal Banér. Reduced facsimile of the engraving by Lucas Schnitzer.

when intellectual superiority was so decidedly on the side of the imperial-Leaguist commanders, had now been completely changed.

Ferdinand III. felt this deeply, and the contemporaneous defeats of the Spaniards increased his desire for peace. In October, 1641, he sought to induce his German adversaries to lay down their arms by closing the diet with a general amnesty, from which he excluded only his hereditary lands, the Administrator of Magdeburg, and the house of the Elector Palatine, while he extended it even to the German allies of Sweden. With the envoys of this country and of France, the emperor caused a preliminary treaty to be signed at Hamburg, on December 25, 1641, according to which, in March of the following year, negotiations for peace should begin with the French in Münster and with the Swedes in Osnabrück. Here also the emperor showed his conciliatory disposition by conceding to the insurgent states of the empire the right to take part in these negotiations on equal terms with the loyal states. Afflicted Germany now cherished the hope of a speedy termination of her miseries; but for seven more terrible years she was doomed to disappointment. The demands of the foreigners were too insolent, and such as only the complete subjugation and disarming of the emperor could force him to accept.

In October, 1641, Lennart Torstenson took command of the Swedish army. Born in 1603, at the age of fifteen he entered the service of his sovereign, Gustavus Adolphus, and so distinguished himself that as early as 1628 he was colonel. During the German campaigns he received the position of grand master of artillery, but was taken prisoner at Nuremberg, and confined for six months by the Elector of Bavaria in a narrow, damp dungeon, where he contracted an incurable disease. After his ransom, he lived sometimes at home, sometimes in the field. He now undertook the difficult task of leading a weakened, discouraged, and mutinous army to victory, and of keeping the wavering German allies faithful to Sweden—all this without much aid from home. From Sweden he brought with him from six to seven thousand of his countrymen, reinforcements that gave him a reliable body of troops. With these he held in check the turbulent German mercenaries. The disaffected colonels he quieted by payments in money, by promises, and finally also by beheading one of the ringleaders. Torstenson decided to leave North Germany, which was exhausted by the campaigns of seventeen years, and to transfer the war to the rich hereditary lands of Austria, where alone the decision lay.

Torstenson deceived the imperial commander, Piccolomini, by making him believe that he too would march toward the Lower Rhine. With

this view he turned toward Lusatia, and there formed a junction with the Silesian corps of Swedes under the gallant *Stahlhandske*. *Piccolomini* thought that *Torstenson* was about to attack *Meissen* and *Thuringia*; but suddenly the latter's army, 20,000 strong, rushed like a devastating torrent into *Silesia*. The imperialists there were defeated (June 6, 1642), near *Schweidnitz*. Their leader, Duke *Francis Albert* of *Saxe-Lauenburg*, who had formerly served with the Swedes and was falsely designated as the murderer of *Gustavus Adolphus*, ended his life soon afterward as a prisoner of the Swedes.

After capturing a number of Silesian fortresses, *Torstenson* pressed forward far into *Moravia* and even took *Olmütz*. His horsemen scoured the country to within a few miles of *Vienna*. With surprising ease and expedition, he had made his way into the heart of the Austrian lands. When the imperialists, with a superior force, under the Archduke *Leopold William* and *Piccolomini*, advancing from *Saxony*, threatened his line of retreat, the indefatigable Swede hastened to give them battle. The opposing forces met on November 2, 1642, some four miles north of *Leipsic*, on the field of *Breitenfeld*, so glorious for the Swedes. The cowardice of the imperial cavalry, who in the very beginning of the fight rode from the field, delivered to the Swedes the valiant imperial infantry. After a desperate resistance, they were entirely destroyed.

The loss of the Swedes, too, was serious. But they received welcome succor. *Guébriant*, who commanded French troops and what was left of *Bernhard* of *Weimar*'s force, being threatened on the Lower Rhine by superior forces, had set out in the autumn of 1642 for the east, to form a junction with the Swedes. He had the Hessians with him, the last German Protestant contingent that was still under arms. After the death of Duke *George* of *Lüneburg*, his widow, who conducted the regency, was forced to renounce further participation in the conflict on account of the complete exhaustion of her land; and even the Elector of *Saxony* was no longer able to put an army in the field. At *Buttstädt* near *Weimar*, *Guébriant* joined *Torstenson*, who had just now forced *Leipsic* to capitulate. They agreed upon a united campaign against *Bavaria*; but this promising plan came to nothing on account of *Torstenson*'s aversion to the French. Instead of proceeding, according to the plan, from *Saxony* to *Franconia* and the Upper Palatinate, he began, in the early days of 1643, the siege of *Freiberg* in the *Erzgebirge*, a city that had already successfully resisted the impetuous *Banér*. Here *Torstenson* wasted his strength week after week, while *Piccolomini* reorganized his army in *Moravia*, and inexorably decimated the cavalry regiments which had proved themselves such cowards at *Leipsic*. After he had

collected 15,000 men, he resolved to relieve Freiberg. Prudently he avoided any engagement with the superior commander and the superior troops; but, by establishing a strong camp on the neighboring heights and preventing the Swedes from foraging, he attained the same end as if he had gained a formal victory. In the middle of February, Torstenson had to raise the siege of Freiberg, and, with the imperialists swarming around him, to withdraw to Lower Lusatia.

Under such circumstances, it was impossible for Guébriant to attack Bavaria, as he and Torstenson had agreed. The foremost generals of the Catholic-Hapsburg party were opposed to him—John von Werth, recently ransomed from a French prison, and especially the Belgian, Francis von Mercy, an extraordinarily capable and circumspect strategist, who had just now been appointed to the command of the Bavarian and imperial army. To such generals and their superior forces, Guébriant could offer no adequate resistance. He was forced farther away from the Swedes—to Würtemberg and Baden—with continual losses. For two months, he wandered helplessly, deep snow covering the ground, until he finally reached the right bank of the Rhine, with almost no infantry (March, 1643). Only a reinforcement of 5000 French made it possible for him to maintain himself there. Mercy and Werth were thus so far superior to the reduced army of Guébriant, that he was now compelled to cross over to the left bank of the Rhine, into Lower Alsace, and even here the Bavarians gave him no rest. All the results of the long years of French effort were imperiled.

The cabals and disturbances in France that followed the death of Louis XIII. (May 14, 1643) prevented any adequate support of Guébriant. Only when Mazarin had completely triumphed in Paris, could he send to the aid of Guébriant 6000 men, under Lieutenant-General Josias, Count of Ranzau. With an army now numbering 20,000 men, Guébriant began a new campaign late in the year, along with Ranzau. In the beginning of November, he crossed the Rhine and marched through the Black Forest to the Upper Neckar. His first resolve was to take the strong fortress of Rottweil, which in summer had defied all his efforts. While examining a breach which had been made in the walls of Rottweil, Guébriant's arm was shattered by a cannon-ball. He was carried into Rottweil as a victor, but died in five days (November 24, 1643).

Guébriant's death had a demoralizing effect on the French army. Ranzau was in no respect qualified to replace him. Precisely at this time, by the accession of imperial and Lorraine contingents, the Bavarians became much superior in numbers to the French, who ought with-

out delay to have retired to the Rhine. But Ranzau was unwilling to begin his command with a flight, and, against the counsel of all his generals, advanced southeastward to Tuttlingen. To this act of imprudence he added another by dispersing his troops widely among the villages around Tuttlingen. Mercy made the best use of his adversary's overconfidence, first by strengthening his feeling of security through artifice, and then suddenly falling upon the French troops in an admirably organized attack. Before the French could take any measures for their defence, John von Werth had captured their artillery and shut the infantry up in Tuttlingen and Möringen. The cavalry, who were out foraging, for the most part saved themselves, although in a state of complete disorganization. The infantry, however, 7000 in number, veteran regiments of Weimar and of the French, had to lay down their arms the next day, after 4000 had fallen. The booty in guns, accoutrements, money, and valuables was immense. Almost the whole French staff, Ranzau at the head, was captured (November 25, 1643).

The Bavarian and imperial generals forthwith followed up their success by compelling the garrison of Rottweil, 2500 strong, to surrender. During the winter, all the French conquests on the right bank of the Rhine, except Freiburg, fell once more into the hands of the Germans.

But how did it happen that during all this time Torstenson had given not the least help to the French? True to his plan of carrying on the war in the emperor's hereditary lands, he had for the second time forced his way deep into Moravia. Although Gallas had twice as large an army, he was so incapable that he could not have prevented Torstenson from holding Silesia at least. At this moment, however, the Swedish commander received the surprising order from his government to withdraw instantly to Holstein.

Denmark had before this looked askance at the successes of Gustavus Adolphus, and, since the Peace of Prague, had been especially active in her intrigues against Sweden. Therefore, in September, 1643, the Swedish diet declared war against Denmark, without possessing any other army than that which was fighting, far away in Silesia, against the emperor. This daring undertaking showed an utter lack of regard for the French allies of Sweden, who had counted on Torstenson's co-operation in South Germany.

It was, indeed, no easy problem for Torstenson to conduct a march of nearly four hundred miles in late autumn, through exhausted countries and with a superior enemy in his rear; yet he solved it with masterly skill. By adroit cross-marches he deceived Gallas in regard to his real purpose, and, while garrisoning and provisioning his Silesian fortresses,

amused him with peace negotiations, until at last (October 18) he set out in earnest for Holstein—not directly, but in a wide circuit toward the west, in order to give the appearance of aiming at Bavaria, and in order to march through more fertile regions. Suddenly he turned sharply



FIG. 78. General Torstenson. Reduced facsimile of a contemporary anonymous engraving.

northward and marched down the right bank of the Elbe upon the astonished Holstein.

Once more the Hapsburgs were in a position to end the war by a few

vigorous moves. The Rhine and the Lower Elbe separated Germany proper from any hostile army worthy of notice. But this favorable opportunity was allowed to pass unimproved. Instead of using their advantages for the energetic pursuit of the foe or the reduction of the fortresses which he had left, the armies of the emperor went indolently into winter-quarters, as if in the following spring the political and military situation would still be exactly the same. This delay of several months in winter-quarters (1643-44) is in a great measure responsible for the collapse of the imperial power in the Thirty Years' War.

Torstenon (Fig. 78) knew better how to improve his time. Like a storm-wind, the bands of the field-marshal passed over the fertile fields of Holstein, that had not known war for fifteen years. Christmas they celebrated in Kiel. Glückstadt still held out against them, but they pressed forward to Schleswig and Jutland. At Kolding, Torstenon cut down 1500 Danish cavalry and took 4500 infantry prisoners. By the end of February, 1644, the peninsula of Jutland was conquered. Meanwhile Horn with some hastily levied troops had invaded Skåne (at that time belonging to Denmark), while Flemming with his Swedish men-of-war found employment for the Danish fleet, which was under the personal command of the seventy-year-old King Christian IV.

While Torstenon with astonishing energy had brought two campaigns in widely remote countries to a successful close, the French court had recovered from the first alarm occasioned by the defeat at Tuttlingen. It was no longer a question of making new conquests in Germany, but of saving Alsace. For this purpose, Mazarin ordered a commander from Italy to Germany, who, notwithstanding his youth—he was only thirty-two—had already proved his worth: Henry de La Tour d'Auvergne, Viscount of Turenne.

Turenne (Fig. 79) found his army demoralized and part of it mutinous. But, after he had brought it again with great difficulty up to 12,000 combatants, he crossed boldly over to the Breisgau, where Mercy had just begun the siege of Freiburg. The garrison defended itself heroically until the end of July, 1644, when it was forced to capitulate. It was not an hour too soon, for, two days after the fall of Freiburg, Duke Louis of Enghien, the famous conqueror of Rocroi, better known later as the "Great Condé," joined Turenne with 10,000 men. With two such generals opposed to him, Mercy, whose army was weakened by the siege of Freiburg, was in a dangerous situation. But he showed much judgment and skill, and made his troops secure in an extremely strong position on the fortified spurs of the Black Forest to the south of Freiburg.

On August 3, Enghien let his French troops mount to the assault, with the purpose of taking the works of the enemy, cost what it might; and he actually captured, with the loss of 3000 men, the Schönberg on



*Henricus de la Tour d'Avvergne, Vice-Comes
de Turenne Mareschalis Franciæ.*

FIG. 79.—Marshal Turenne. Reduced facsimile of a contemporary anonymous engraving.

Mercy's right wing. It is as creditable to the Bavarian army as to its general, that, after such a day, he was able in the night to withdraw his troops without disorder from their untenable position and take up an

entrenched position nearer to the city of Freiburg. When the sun rose on the morning of August 4, the French commanders saw with astonishment the Bavarians in a new and formidable position. On August 5 they began the attack. Mercy had improved the interval to make his position almost impregnable. For eight hours, the French rushed again and again to the assault; but, after losing to no purpose 4000 men, the stubborn Enghien was compelled to desist from the attempt.

The battle was a drawn one, or rather it was won by the Bavarians, who had here gloriously resisted a much more numerous army. But Mercy had at most only 11,000 men, and could look for no reinforcements, while Enghien was soon reinforced up to 16,000 men, and cut off from his adversary all supplies from the fruitful plain. Thus Mercy was driven to evacuate his position in sight of the French and take refuge behind the protecting mountain-wall.

The advantage rested with the French. The whole Rhine lay open to them. Spires, Philippsburg, Mannheim, and the Rhine Palatinate fell into their hands. On their approach, the Elector of Mayence hastily abandoned his capital, which, in spite of its large population and strong works, surrendered without any resistance (September, 1644). Here, as later in the wars against Louis XIV. and against the French republic, the ecclesiastical princes, to whom an adverse fate had entrusted the defence of Germany on the left bank of the Rhine, showed themselves completely unfit for the task. With one blow the whole situation was changed; the Upper Rhine was completely in the power of the French, furnishing them with an admirable basis of operations for pushing on into the heart of Germany.

In the spring of 1644, the incapable Gallas slowly set himself in motion with the imperial main army. His design was to rescue Denmark from complete ruin, to shut up Torstenson in the peninsula of Jutland, and there to annihilate him. The tidings of his approach hindered the field-marshal from embarking with his army on the Swedish fleet for the Danish islands, and from striking the last decisive blow against Christian IV. Without opposition, Gallas marched from Bohemia to the Lower Elbe. Torstenson, with his weaker and divided forces, had to evacuate Kiel and withdraw into Schleswig. Gallas hoped to crush him between himself and the sea. But, since he timidly avoided every opportunity for a decisive battle, his whole plan failed. Torstenson, more adroit than he, made the strong town of Rendsburg the starting-point for his movements, collected at that place all his scattered detachments and garrisons, and then marched past at his ease, close to the entrenched camp of the imperialists, to Lauenburg (August, 1644).

Gallas followed him. He had indeed by his intervention saved Denmark, but he had brought the war once more into Germany.

In Lower Saxony, the imperial general allowed himself for two months to be constantly assailed by the Swedes, and finally—having no hope of withstanding Torstenson in the open field—took refuge behind the walls of Magdeburg. The shutting up of a field-army in a confined fortress has ever had the most disastrous results. One has only to think of the fate of Mack in Ulm, and Bazaine in Metz. Torstenson invested Magdeburg, whither he summoned Königsmark and the Hessians.

This was the ruin of the imperial army. The cavalry sought to escape from the impending destruction, and, on the night of December 1, stole forth from the walls in the hope of reaching Bohemia. Torstenson, after a ride of nearly sixty miles, overtook them near Jüterbog and destroyed 4000 men. Only a few dispersed bands were able to reach Bohemia. While Königsmark and the Hessians continued the investment of Magdeburg, Torstenson, for the fourth time, scoured the unfortunate Saxon land, devastating and plundering. In the meantime, the imperial infantry, in the city (three-fourths of which was still in ruins), was reduced through hunger and wholesale desertions to 3000 men. On January 2, 1645, Gallas was able to escape with them from the fatal ramparts and to gain the open country; but, harassed on the march by Königsmark, he was able to bring back to Bohemia hardly 2000 debilitated and despondent fighting-men.

Torstenson was now free to enter Bohemia with 16,500 tried veterans. From garrisons and all available troops, as well as with 3000 Bavarians, the emperor had hastily formed a new army, that was somewhat superior in numbers to the Swedish, but in quality far inferior. The business of the imperialists was clearly to temporize, to strengthen their force by unremitting recruiting, and to wait until the Swedes had diminished their strength by sieges and by remaining in desolate Northern Bohemia, and not until then to fall upon them. But, as Gallas had failed through dilatoriness, so now the new imperial general, Hatzfeld, failed through undue haste. On March 5, 1645, a battle was fought near Jankau, which ended in the complete overthrow of Hatzfeld's army. Hatzfeld himself was taken prisoner, and the Austrian states again lay open to the conqueror.

While Prague trembled before Torstenson, he turned eastward toward Moravia, his plan being to subdue this province, and, from it as a basis, to strike a blow at the heart of the Austrian monarchy, Vienna. The danger came now near enough to the imperial court.

Torstenson scoured the country as far as the Danube, and even captured the redoubt on the bridge of Vienna. Moreover, he allied himself with George I., Rákóczy, Prince of Transylvania, the successor of Bethlen-Gabor, who advanced as far as Presburg.

But once more it became evident how inexhaustible were the resources of the broad and populous Austrian monarchy. An able general, the Archduke Leopold William, was entrusted with the organization of an army of defence; and garrisons from all quarters, as well as the fugitives from Jankau, were collected in Prague. While such numerous forces were being organized against Torstenson, he lay month after month before Brünn, which defended itself with the greatest resolution. The fickle and incapable Rákóczy made peace with the emperor. At last, pestilence and dysentery broke out in his own army, and he saw that he must renounce his sweeping plans. Leaving, therefore, garrisons in the places which he had captured in Moravia and Austria, he withdrew with only 10,000 men into Northern Bohemia. On the whole, in spite of some successes, his attempt at the complete humiliation of the Austrian state had failed. At the end of 1645, Torstenson, disappointed and ill, laid down his command.

Torstenson contributed more than any other leader, save Gustavus Adolphus, to determining the issue of the Thirty Years' War. By repeatedly destroying the armies of the emperor, he compelled the latter to have recourse to inexperienced and unwarlike troops. By his chain of captured fortresses stretching through Silesia, Lusatia, and Moravia, close up to Vienna, he had established a formidable basis for future offensive operations against Austria; and he had also deprived the emperor of all his allies, except the Bavarians. Already in 1641 he had concluded a treaty of neutrality with Frederick William, the young Elector of Brandenburg. His rapid march to Jutland forced the Danes to accept the Peace of Brömsebro (July, 1645), in which they ceded to Sweden the Norwegian districts of Jemtland and Herjedal, the island of Gotland, and the Livonian island of Ösel. Two months later (September, 1645), his enterprising assistant, Königsmark, forced the Elector of Saxony, by fearfully devastating and at last by almost entirely conquering his lands, to enter into an armistice, which in military matters handed Saxony over to Sweden. Austria had to look forward to the next campaign isolated and threatened on all sides.

The Bavarians had at first fought with better success. Turenne had broken into Franconia, but, with careless overconfidence, had divided his little army in the valley of the Tauber, near Mergentheim, and Mercy and Werth took advantage of this to repeat the events of Tuttlingen.

On May 5, 1645, they fell upon the French. Within an hour the French infantry was totally, and the cavalry partly annihilated. More than 5000 men fell or were made prisoners. Scarcely 2000 of the whole French host reached the Rhine. It was the severest defeat that Turenne ever suffered. But again it was Germans who saved France from the disastrous consequences of the defeat at Mergentheim. Turenne proceeded to Upper Hesse, where Landgravine Amelia Elizabeth placed her brave troops at his disposal; and Königsmark, too, with his German mercenaries, soon appeared. But soon afterward a new and formidable danger threatened the Bavarians. Enghien conducted from the Netherlands a numerous and excellent army-corps, so that with the German contingents he had 30,000 men under his command. Mercy opposed resolutely the superior forces of the allies, and on August 3, 1645, joined battle with them at Allersheim, not far from Nördlingen. The advantage lay with the Bavarians, when the gallant Mercy was mortally wounded, and thereupon all competent leadership of his troops came to an end. The Hessians and the former mercenaries of Weimar—that is, German soldiers—won the obstinately contested victory.

On the Bavarian side, the loss of Mercy was most deeply felt; for he was the equal, at least, of Turenne or Enghien. Otherwise the French, who had been hardly dealt with, derived no advantage from the battle; but turned back in a hasty retreat, which soon resembled a flight, to Philippsburg on the Rhine. Thus, at the end of the campaign in Upper Germany, affairs were again in very much the same state as at its beginning; all the bloodshed had been in vain. The only result was increase of glory for the German arms, but alas! this had been won in fraternal strife.

With these events and with the retirement of Torstenson, the war on a grand scale came to an end. The negotiations for peace, which now went forward more rapidly, attracted the attention of the world. The new Swedish commander-in-chief, Charles Gustavus Wrangel, although he had grown up under arms and was an able soldier, was by no means the equal of Banér or Torstenson. He allowed himself to be driven out of Austria and a part of Moravia, as well as Bohemia, by the Archduke Leopold William (to whom Werth had brought 8000 Bavarians), and withdrew to Thuringia.

Obviously it was the duty of the Swedish and French generals to put an end to the lack of definite plans that, in spite of their numerical superiority, prevented them from attaining any decisive success—that is, to their separation as contrasted with the concentration of their adversaries. Wrangel was now made the supreme head of the French and

Swedish forces, and decided to give up entirely for a time the attack on the eastern hereditary lands of the emperor and to march to the Rhine, to unite there with the French, and, in common with them, to force the Bavarian elector to submission. With the whole Swedish force, he advanced in the spring of 1646 to Hesse.

Turenne, with 10,000 French troops, joined Wrangel at Fritzlar (August, 1646). The latter resolved to march upon Bavaria with his army, which now numbered 40,000 combatants. He cleverly turned the enemy's camp, and, before anyone dreamed of it, appeared on the west frontier of Bavaria, where he seized the most important passes and fortresses.

With dismay Maximilian saw the demon of war once more approach his land, as fifteen years before. First of all, he secured his own personal safety by withdrawing to Braunau. Archduke Leopold William, the imperial general, showed neither zeal nor skill in his efforts for the rescue of Bavaria; and, while he was fighting with the brave garrisons of the frontier fortresses which had been captured by Wrangel (Fig. 80), the latter pressed forward, burning and plundering, to the very gates of Munich. The unfortunate land was systematically devastated in order to force its ruler to submission. The object of the Swedes was simply to overcome completely the Bavarian, to punish him for his persistent hostility to the Protestants, and to compel him to restore the electoral dignity and the Upper Palatinate to the family of the Count Palatine. The French, on the other hand, cared nothing for the Protestant interests or for the family of the Count Palatine. Their one aim was to weaken the Hapsburgs. For this reason, they wished to force Bavaria to separate itself from Austria; but at the same time they wished so to spare the elector, that he might be gradually attracted to the French side and employed as an important ally of France on the Austrian frontier—a plan in which they were later successful.

Accordingly Turenne, immediately after the beginning of peace negotiations, wished to withdraw to the left bank of the Lech, while Wrangel wished to continue the devastation and conquest of Bavaria. In such difference of opinion, Turenne was sure to carry the day, since Wrangel alone was not strong enough to maintain himself in the hostile territory against the united armies of the emperor and of Bavaria. The Swedes, while giving vent to their wrath on the unfortunate electorate, withdrew with the French (November, 1646) to Swabia.

Wrangel had given up his base of operations and all the special Swedish interests, in order to strengthen the little French army with a force three times as great; and, in return for this, France alone now

ILLVSTRIS ET FORTISS.^{mus} DD. CAROLVS GVSTAVVS VRANGEL, DOMI-
NVS IN SCHOGGLOSTER, ET ROSTORE REG. MAIEST. ET REGNI SVEDIAE.
CONSILIARIVS, GENERALIS MILITIAE DVX, ET MARESCALLVS PER GERMANIAM, NECCIAM POMERANIAM, GVBERNATOR. A.



Hæc gñ Wrangelij nova bellatoris Imago,
Hæris veras apta referre notas
Cujus magnanimas virtutij robore pugnas
Tama per Eòos, Hesperiosq., cecidit



Namq; per Imperij sua niver Jelitoms oron
Giglar us fort Rex tulit arma manu
Hæmodi Wrangelius, latus succubus auctum
In igni finem Dexterrate dedit

Hanc Ejus Excell.^{te} ad vivum ære repræ-

sentatam Effigiem Submisit DD.

Matthæus Merian Juniores

FIG. 80.—General Charles Gustav Wrangel. Reduced facsimile of the engraving by Matthæus Merian the younger (1621-1687).

reaped the fruits of the victory. More than that, another Swedish corps was still obliged to threaten Moravia, in order that Bavaria might receive no support from the emperor and be surely driven into the arms of France.

The plenipotentiaries of the belligerent nations—also of the emperor, Cassel, and the electorate of Cologne—met in Ulm in January, 1647, to consult about the conclusion of a general armistice. But such a result could not be attained. Not only did Sweden and France oppose it, but the emperor also, who, now that his hereditary lands were almost entirely free from the foe, wished to continue the war in the hope of some fortunate turn in political matters. The consequence was that the Elector Maximilian became utterly exasperated against Ferdinand III., and declared himself favorably inclined to a separate armistice. The Swedes had in the end to yield to the wish of Mazarin for such an arrangement, in order not to be exposed alone to the hostility of the emperor and of Bavaria.

On March 14, 1647, the treaty was signed which deprived Austria of her last ally. In order to free his land from the enemy, Maximilian promised not only full neutrality, but even some advantages for the allies, such as the giving up of the Swabian free cities of the empire, in which there were Bavarian garrisons—a wholly illegal measure. No entreaties of Ferdinand were of avail to prevent the elector from carrying out a treaty which was his only hope for the deliverance of his land. The Elector of Cologne also gave his adhesion to this agreement. Full of indignation, John von Werth and his brave friend Sporek (Fig. 81) went over to the emperor; but their attempt to carry the Bavarian troops along with them failed.

The Austrian army stood at this time under the command of another deserter. After the death of Gallas in the spring of 1647, Melander von Holzapfel became his successor. He had formerly led the troops of the Landgrave of Hesse, but had gradually turned aside toward the imperialists. It is significant, as showing the complete extinction of religious motives at the end of the Thirty Years' War, that a Protestant became Ferdinand III.'s commander-in-chief.

The French for a time remained quiet. Through the armistice of Ulm they had gained their object, the separation of Bavaria from the emperor. To help the Swedes to further progress was not at all a part of their plans. Besides, Mazarin had to direct his gaze from the Upper Rhine to the Netherlands, where the Spaniards were making advances, almost unmolested by the Dutch. Turenne himself went thither.



FIG. 81.—Black armor worn by John, Count Spork, as imperial general of cavalry.
(Vienna.) Specimen of the armor worn in the Thirty Years' War.

Meanwhile the two electors of the house of Wittelsbach, the Elector of Bavaria and the Elector of Cologne, saw themselves grossly deceived in the hopes which they had placed in the armistice. The Swedes and Hessians plundered the lands of the latter as if there were no armistice. Maximilian's subjects, who had been stripped of everything, had now to maintain their own numerous army, that had hitherto lived at the cost of other territories. Moreover, the daily increasing arrogance of the foreigners in Münster and Osnabrück pained the aged Bavarian prince, and therefore, in the summer of 1647, he denounced the Treaty of Ulm and concluded in September a new alliance with the emperor, by which the latter was recognized as absolute commander-in-chief of the forces of the empire.

By this sudden change in political and military relations, Wrangel found himself in a most unfavorable situation. The Bavarian army, 10,000 picked soldiers, united with the imperial army, the two together being almost double the strength of the Swedes. Wrangel therefore saw no other way of escape except the complete surrender of the positions conquered during the last few years, and his withdrawal to North Germany, in order to approach the Baltic coast and Königsmark and the Hessians. Moravia and Silesia were thus entirely recovered by the imperialists, while Wrangel marched to Corvei, on the Weser.

If the Bavarian-imperial army had now made a determined attack on the Swedes, the latter would have been lost. But the Elector Maximilian, true to his faithless policy, forbade his general, Gronsfeld, to lead the Bavarians across the Weser, while the emperor wished first of all to chastise his only German adversary, the Landgravine of Hesse-Cassel. Melander, also, was not unwilling to take vengeance on his former mistress. Thus Wrangel was not pursued, and had leisure to refresh and reinforce his troops.


The imperialists and Bavarians now invaded Hesse, but here they were not able to accomplish anything of consequence. The country was desolate, crossed by inhospitable mountains and forests, and thinly inhabited by a vigorous peasantry true to their mistress and resolved to defend themselves against the hostile soldiery. Their movements were hindered by numerous strong forts and cities. As often as Melander proposed to advance through Hesse northward, Gronsfeld refused to follow, and finally he separated himself entirely from the imperialists in order to take up his winter-quarters in good season in the Franconian bishoprics. Only jealousy of the emperor could have prescribed such a course to the elector. If he imagined that he had in this way secured his land against new attacks from the French, he bitterly deceived himself.

Mazarin saw that, if he would not forfeit all that France had gained in twelve years in Germany by such great sacrifices, he must lend a hand to the Swedes, and therefore sent Turenne with 8000 men to their help. The favorable moment for Austria slipped away forever. Wrangel now had an opportunity to demonstrate his superior talents and the superior resources of the coalition, as contrasted with the emperor and Bavaria. He had brought his own army into an excellent condition through French subsidies and contributions from Lüneburg. His plan was to collect about himself all the Swedish and allied troops and to punish Maximilian thoroughly for his breach of the Treaty. In the autumn of 1647, strife was renewed in Swabia between the Bavarians and French, the latter expressly declaring the armistice at an end.

In the beginning of 1648, Wrangel with little trouble drove the imperialists out of Hesse, where they had suffered both in numbers and discipline by the guerilla warfare of the inhabitants. He then joined the French, and, in company with them, plundered Franconia and Swabia. In the middle of May he entered Bavaria with nearly 30,000 men, driving the enemy helplessly before him. Wrangel and Turenne felt so secure of victory that they sent Königsmark with a considerable part of the Swedish army on an expedition to the Upper Palatinate and Bohemia, while they themselves pressed forward into Bavaria, which lay defenceless before them. Among their enemies, incredible bewilderment prevailed. The elector had cast his general, Grönsfeld, into prison, on account of his senseless and cowardly leadership of the army; but, after this, matters were no better. Without firing a shot or striking a blow, the retreat was continued from the Lech to the Isar, from the Isar to the Inn. Maximilian fled to Salzburg; his people wandered in crowds from the country and towns to the districts beyond the Inn. The French and Swedes overran Bavaria.

But the Catholic troops had time to rally behind the Inn, which was swollen by incessant rains, and gradually to recover courage. Numerous skirmishes took place between the two armies. But the war was decided neither here nor on the Lower Rhine, where the Hessians conquered the electorate of Cologne, but in Bohemia, where Königsmark won the glory of having finally forced a peace.


John Christian von Königsmark was a Brandenburger, of an old but impoverished noble family. He was dissolute, daring, rash, and adventurous, qualities that descended to his sons and grandsons—men who served a great variety of masters on all the battlefields of Europe—and also to his granddaughter, Aurora, the well-known favorite of Augustus the Strong of Saxony. In June, 1648, he was marching,



P R

Schloß

Die kleine Seite



Wien, bey der K. K. Hof- und Landes-Druck- und Verlags-Handlung, bey der K. K. Hof- und Landes-Druck- und Verlags-Handlung, bey der K. K. Hof- und Landes-Druck- und Verlags-Handlung.

Přeměnyjměním některých míst.

1. Královský Polovr
2. Václav a kancelářský Lzeš
3. Kosti dvorní dvorní d. Vlna
4. Slupnice na Jamel
5. Káňanský Malostranský
6. Dům Malostranský k. z. Křesťanský
7. Malostranský Malostranský
8. Malostranský Malostranský
9. Křesťanský
10. Malostranský Křesťanský

11. Malostranský Křesťanský
12. Malostranský Křesťanský
13. Malostranský Křesťanský
14. Malostranský Křesťanský
15. Malostranský Křesťanský
16. Malostranský Křesťanský
17. Malostranský Křesťanský
18. Malostranský Křesťanský
19. Malostranský Křesťanský
20. Malostranský Křesťanský

Annotationes

1. Curia Regia hinc Aula
2. Sala cum Cancellario Bohem.
3. Coelestis Archiepiscopatus ad. V.
4. Clericus de gradibus ad Arcem.
5. Curia in minori Urbe.
6. Domus olim Wallensteinj Ducis.
7. Porta Pontis ex parva parte
8. Porta Pontis ex Veteri Urbe.
- 9.
10. Curia Veteris Urbe.

Vies

Part of the engraving



Die Alte Statt



Verzeichnis etlicher örter.	
1. Des Königs Hoff und Zimmer,	11 New (tetter) Rathauß,
2. Der Saal lumbt der Cantzeley,	12 Alt (tetter) Wälderthurn und mih.
3. Die Archibischöfliche Kirche,	13 New (tetter) Wälderthurn,
4. die Stiegen auf das Schlos,	14 Porzger thor
5. Rathauß auf der kleine Seite	15 Berg thor
6. des Wäldensteins von Fridland haus	16 Roß thor,
7. der Brücken thurn auf der Kleinseite	17 Schwein thor
8. der Brücken thurn in der alte Statt	18 die Juden Statt,
9. Zollhaus,	19 Groß Venedig,
10. Alt (tetter) Rathauß,	20 Klein Venedig

separated from the main army, through the Upper Palatinate, when an officer in the imperial service, who had been unjustly degraded, presented himself and earnestly advised him to make an attack on Prague at a weak point which he pointed out to him (PLATE XXII.).

Although Königsmark had but 800 infantry at his disposal, he resolved to carry out the bold undertaking. Adroitly deceiving the enemy in regard to his real object, late in the evening of July 25 he appeared suddenly before the Kleinseite, a suburb of Prague on the right bank of the Moldau, since he did not think himself strong enough as yet to attack the city proper, on the left bank of the river. Early on the morning of the following day, this section of the city fell without resistance into his hands, and with it the imperial castle, the Hradschin, and an immense quantity of jewels. The whole booty was valued at twelve million gulden.

But Königsmark with his 3000 men could not capture the old city, where the whole population—a race with very different sentiments from those of 1620—rose as one man for the defence. Both parties received reinforcements, and the contest continued week after week, although the Swedes were able to cannonade effectively from the heights of the Kleinseite the lower-lying old city.

The loss of his royal castle and the impending fall of the Bohemian capital were the chief factors which determined Ferdinand III. to enjoin upon his envoys at Münster and Osnabrück the speedy signing of a peace on any terms. And yet, had Ferdinand held out only a little while longer, the revolution that was again slowly taking place on all the theatres of war and in the general political conditions might have saved for Germany much that was lost to the foreigners. For everywhere military events took a turn very favorable to the emperor. A relieving force of 8000 men, that had been organized at Budweis, compelled Königsmark to leave Prague in October and withdraw across the Elbe. In Western Germany the imperial commander, Lamboy, reinforced by Lorraine troops, had again won the upper hand. And also in Bavaria the outlook was completely changed. Better generals had been placed at the head of the armies: at the head of the imperialist, Piccolomini and John von Werth; at the head of the Bavarian, a gallant Netherlander, Adrian von Enkevort.

In the beginning of October, Wrangel and Turenne were compelled by Werth's bold attacks to evacuate Bavaria, leaving it a dreary desert. The further advance of the Catholic army toward the west was then interrupted by the news of the peace, which, after thirty years of misery beyond measure, at last came to the rescue of Germany.

The preliminaries of Hamburg in 1641 had fixed the beginning of the peace-negotiations proper for July 11, 1643. The representatives of the emperor were to negotiate with the French and Spanish in Münster, and with the Swedes and their Protestant allies in Osnabrück. The representatives of the emperor arrived in good season, but the other powers did not show the same punctuality. The Swedish envoy, John Oxenstiern, a son of the chancellor, did not arrive until December, 1643, and the French plenipotentiaries not until March, 1644. A month later, the peace congress was opened. The States-General, the Swiss confederation, the pope, and the republic of Venice had all sent their representatives.

But week after week and month after month passed by in miserable wranglings over formalities and precedence. While bloodshed, fire, and pillage were desolating Germany, the diplomacy of that time was busy investigating to whom the title of "highness" or "most serene highness" was due, whether the precedence belonged to the French or the Spanish envoy, and whether every word in the credentials of each of the members was in the right place and properly chosen.

Only one question of real importance was discussed during all this time: namely, whether the emperor should appear as the sole representative of the empire, or whether the states of the empire should be represented at the congress by their own special delegates. The decision of this question was fraught with the weightiest consequences for the position of the head of the empire in the future. According to the former view, the emperor was recognized as the sole representative of Germany as against foreigners; according to the latter, the complete sovereignty of the princes of the empire was recognized.

Ferdinand III.'s own wish was to communicate only with a committee of the German states concerning peace, without permitting these to appear individually in Münster and Osnabrück. But against this Sweden and especially France protested, playing their favorite rôle of defenders of German "liberty" (i. e., of disunion), and urged the states to send their plenipotentiaries to the congress, so that they might not lose their Old-German "liberties," as well as their "right of deciding on peace and war." At last, these powers carried their point; the emperor had to give way and consent to as many states as wished appearing at Münster.

Finally, after a year had passed, the negotiations began in earnest in the summer of 1645. The imperial head-commissioners—Count von Trauttmansdorff in Münster, and Count Nassau-Hadamar in Osnabrück—were in a difficult position in the face of the exorbitant demands of the foreigners. France demanded, in addition to the full suzerainty

over the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which had been in her possession since 1552, the whole of Alsace with the Sundgau, and, on the right bank of the Rhine, the Breisgau with Breisach and Freiburg, the Swabian forest cities, and Philippsburg. Still more considerable were the claims of Sweden: namely, the whole of Pomerania with the bishopric of Kammin, Silesia, the archbishopric of Bremen and the bishopric of Verden as secular duchies, the city of Wismar with its territory, and, still further, Magdeburg, Halberstadt, Minden, and Osnabrück—in short, half of North Germany.

Such demands, especially when put forward by heretics, incensed the representatives of the emperor, while the overbearing and imperious language of John Oxenstiern and his colleague Salvius, as well as their absolute rejection, out of fidelity to their allies, of the emperor's offer of an advantageous separate peace, exasperated them still further. The French, on the other hand, made use of complimentary and flattering formalities, and were the less inclined to support the claims of the Swedes because Mazarin, indignant at their presumption and cupidity, was seeking to dissolve his relations with them. Therefore it was not difficult for the emperor to make concessions to these Catholics, and in this way to separate them completely from the Swedes. The Elector of Bavaria, who expected to rely mainly on France after the conclusion of peace, worked with the same end in view.

The imperial and French envoys were soon in harmony on general points. The latter renounced their claims to the forest cities and the Breisgau, but received the landgraviate of Alsace, the Sundgau, and, on the right bank of the Rhine, the important fortresses of Breisach and Philippsburg, two keys to the interior of Germany. France had not purposed to separate these districts entirely from the empire, but rather to hold them as fiefs of the empire. But nothing of this sort would be listened to in Vienna. The emperor was more ready to consent to a dismemberment of Germany than to the admission of France to the diet, where she would certainly have made all possible opposition to Austrian influence; therefore the French finally agreed to take them unconditionally, and were thus spared the necessity of recognizing the emperor as suzerain.

Only one question, but that an extremely important one, was still unsettled. Did Alsace mean merely the Austrian landgraviate of this name, or was it to be understood in its geographical sense as including also the imperial cities, princely territories, and knights of the empire in that district? As a matter of course, the Germans maintained the former view; the French, the latter.

But this question would not have made a final agreement difficult. Much longer was the discussion in regard to the Swedish claims. And here the French paid the debt of thanks which they owed to the emperor, by urging Oxenstiern to accept the imperial proposition of a money-compensation, and, besides this, to be satisfied with Further Pomerania. But to this the Stockholm government would not consent. Besides Bremen, Verden, and Wismar, it still demanded the whole of Hither Pomerania, together with Stettin, Rügen, and a strip of land on the right bank of the Oder. Its aim was to hold possession of the mouths of the Oder, and, by means of the archbishopric of Bremen, of the mouth of the Weser.

But this limitation of Sweden's claims, and her renunciation of her earlier demands, was attained only after Chancellor Oxenstiern and his son had fallen into disfavor with the young Queen Christina and had been replaced by Magnus de la Gardie, the leader of the French party at the Swedish court. The Swedes then showed themselves more inclined to yield to the peaceful pressure of the French, and finally, after much bargaining and haggling, consented to accept a compensation of five million thalers, which the empire was to raise, and to hold the ceded provinces as fiefs of the empire and for them to have a seat and vote in the diet—a clause that threatened to perpetuate Swedish influence in Germany. Probably the government of Stockholm would not have obtained even these advantages, if the defection of Holland from France had not forced the latter again to seek an alliance with the leading northern power.

The next matter was the indemnification of the princes who suffered by the Swedish acquisitions. With Mecklenburg and Brunswick-Lüneburg there was no difficulty. The former received in place of Wismar the bishoprics of Schwerin and Ratzeburg; the latter, for the lost right of reversion of Bremen and Verden, the right of appointing in the see of Osnabrück a Protestant bishop of the family of Brunswick-Lüneburg alternately with a Catholic one. Much more difficult was it to arrange matters with the Elector of Brandenburg, to whom the whole of Pomerania would have descended by inheritance.

The young Elector Frederick William insisted on his rights, in order that Sweden might not acquire a military base in Eastern Germany and the mastery of the Baltic, and also because Pomerania would have united his Brandenburg and Prussian lands and would have given him a number of good harbors. He found some support in France, who was jealous of her Swedish ally, and with the Dutch, after he had married Henrietta Louise, the sister of their stadtholder, Frederick Henry. Finally, how-

ever, since the acquisition of all Pomerania would have been possible only at the expense of a war with Sweden, Frederick William accepted, by way of compensation for Hither Pomerania and Stettin, the archbishopric of Magdeburg as a duchy, the bishoprics of Halberstadt and Minden as principalities (all three with a right to vote in the diet), and the Pomeranian bishopric of Kammin—in all, a territory larger and more populous than Hither Pomerania.

Brandenburg thus, from a third-rate power, became one of the second rank. Electoral Saxony also gained permanent possession of Upper and Lower Lusatia, which had previously been made over to John George by the emperor as security for his expenses in assisting in the suppression of the Bohemian revolt. Hesse-Cassel had no just claims for compensation; but both Sweden and France interested themselves for this land, which had been their faithful and zealous ally when all other German princes had forsaken them, and it received the secularized abbey of Hersfeld, four Schaumburg districts, and 600,000 thalers in money.

A peculiar difficulty was offered by the case of the dispossessed house of the Palatinate, which was persecuted by the Hapsburgs with implacable resentment, but was zealously defended by Sweden and by the German Protestants. Ultimately France succeeded in bringing about an accommodation that in no wise affected the acquisitions of Bavaria, which Mazarin desired to attach to himself. Bavaria retained therefore the electoral dignity as well as the Upper Palatinate; Charles Louis, the son of the unfortunate Frederick V., received the Lower Palatinate (the Rhine Palatinate), and an eighth electorate was established in his favor. Thus, to the satisfaction of Mazarin, the Catholics maintained their majority in the college of electors by four votes to three—Bohemia exercising its electoral rights only in the election of the emperor.

Besides Alsace, the empire lost two extensive territories, which, however, had long been associated with it only in name—the Swiss confederation and the republic of the United Netherlands. The complete independence of these two countries was now expressly recognized.

The Netherlands had meanwhile concluded at Münster a peace with Spain, which ended their eighty years' war with the Catholic king. We have seen that the Dutch had, in 1635, entered into a treaty of alliance with France in regard to the joint conquest and partition of the Spanish Netherlands. But the contest in this country had not fulfilled the expectations of the Dutch statesmen. The progress made by the allies was insignificant, and France was more eager to make conquests in Germany, Lorraine, and Catalonia, from which the Netherlands could derive no advantage. D'Avaux, indeed, on February 29 and March 1,

1644, had concluded a new alliance with the States-General, but on a more modest basis than that of the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands for the benefit of both parties. Indeed it was soon evident that the change had been preferred by France because she desired to win the whole of the Spanish Netherlands for herself, without allowing her ally to receive any share of the brilliant prize.

Mazarin offered to the Spaniards to sacrifice to them, without more ado, the insurgent Catalonians and Portuguese, if they would give up their possessions in the Netherlands to France. This project filled the Dutch with the greatest anxiety. The situation had changed very much since 1635. Spain had suffered defeat, and showed symptoms of incurable weakness and decay. France, on the other hand, was victorious, aspiring, strong, and much more to be dreaded as a neighbor than Spain. In vain did Mazarin seek to win them over to his plan by the offer of Antwerp and the adjoining country. Such an acquisition could not compensate the Dutch for the loss of a Spanish province which served as a barrier between themselves and France. They maintained, and with considerable justice, that the latter power by its latest projects was violating the compact of 1635, and that therefore they were no longer bound by it. The States-General entered into negotiations with Spain at Münster, which soon made promising progress.


Frederick Henry, who opposed these negotiations, died in 1647. In vain did France appeal to the treaty of 1644, which allowed the Dutch to conclude no peace apart from France. In spite of all efforts of the French to the contrary, a "perpetual peace" between Spain and the States-General was concluded at Münster in January, 1648 (PLATE XXIII.). Philip IV. acknowledged the United Netherlands, in their actual extent of territory at that time, with the colonies conquered by them in both the Indies, as a free and independent state. He also conceded to them considerable commercial privileges in the Spanish seaports, while by the closing of the Schelde he destroyed the maritime trade of the Spanish Netherlands and especially the competition of Antwerp with the cities of Holland. This treaty was indeed a brilliant triumph for the little commonwealth of the Netherlands, which had actually succeeded in wresting its independence from the vast monarchy of Charles V. and Philip II., and—something greater still—in binding that monarchy in commercial fetters. Only perhaps in the Swiss struggles for freedom do we find so glorious a victory on the part of a handful of daring, resolute men over a power twenty times as strong.

Spain had made these great concessions to the United Provinces mainly with the purpose of separating them from France, of isolating



Treaty of Peace between Spain and

Reduced facsimile of the engraving by Jonas Suijderhoef, after the painting by Gerard Terburg, 1608. The Dutch representative lays his hand upon the gospels and upon a crucifix.



the Netherlands at Münster.

in the National Gallery, London. The Spanish Ambassador, Count Seneranda, in taking the oath
 extreme left stands the Commandant of Münster.

the latter, and of fighting her with greater success. On this account, the "perpetual peace" was in a peculiar way regarded as a victory for Spain and as a defeat for France. The Catholic king now showed but little inclination to make peace with the latter state, for because of the withdrawal of the Dutch from the war and because of the internal disorders in France he hoped that the war would now take a turn more favorable to himself.

This made the prospects for the conclusion of peace in Germany darker. The imperial commissioners declared that they would not sign a treaty of peace unless France and Spain came to an agreement at the same time. But in June and July, 1648, the military events already described took place, and Ferdinand III.'s weak heart was filled with despair. He gave orders to conclude peace without regard to Spain and without regard to Franche-Comté, which as a part of the Burgundian circle belonged to the empire, but was claimed and had been in part already conquered by France.

The vexed question about the meaning of the term Alsace was not settled. For the present, France contented herself with the hitherto Austrian landgraviate of that name, but the expressions in the instrument of peace were so ambiguous that a pretext was always at hand for the French to claim all the territories of the empire in Alsace. Now at last, on October 24, 1648, the Peace of Westphalia was signed both at Münster and Osnabrück. The papal nuncio protested against it in the name of the pope, who would not sanction the secularization of so many bishoprics and abbeys. The treaties were drawn up in the Latin language and became the foundation for the whole structure of international law and the balance of power among the states of Europe. But the war between Spain and France still went on.

Germany breathed once more with relief on being delivered at last from this terrible conflict of thirty years. But what sacrifices did this peace impose upon the empire! It lost over 30,000 square miles of territory and four and a half millions of inhabitants, as well as its military frontier on the west, so that it lay exposed to every attack from France. In the north, the Swedes had gained strong positions that enabled them at any time to penetrate into the very heart of the empire. Since France and Sweden were recognized as sureties for the maintenance of the Peace of Westphalia, both had a constant pretext for intervening in the internal affairs of Germany, in which they soon possessed more influence and power than the emperor himself.

For the authority of the emperor, and with it the unity of the empire, were finally borne to their grave at Münster and Osnabrück. The

struggles of the former imperial officers, the princes of the empire, for the acquisition of full sovereignty in their territories—struggles which had begun in the eleventh century—had at last reached their goal. The emperor and the imperial officials now lost the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the separate states. Germany resembled henceforth a confederacy of independent states, which surrendered to the decision of the authorities of the empire only certain matters common to all.

This fact was expressed by leaving to the emperor some few reserved rights, but even these he had to share with the diet. Without the consent of this body, he could neither enact nor interpret a law, decide on war, levy recruits, conclude a peace or alliance, nor impose taxes. But any decision in common was rendered difficult by the cumbrous composition of the diet. And if such a decision was really reached, how could its execution be secured? The unity of Germany as against the foreigner no longer existed. All the states of the empire were free to make alliances not only with one another, but also with foreign powers.

A clause limiting this right by declaring that such alliances might not be formed against the emperor, the empire, or the peace of the land was so general and indefinite as to have not the slightest practical effect. In point of fact, each state was now free to adopt whatever foreign policy it pleased, in opposition and even in open hostility to the official authorities of the empire; for excuses, the ingenuity of official jurists was never at a loss. In this way, Germany became the puppet of all the nations of Europe, and the scene of their intrigues. Henceforth there were no patriotic and national policies, but only the selfish plans of the larger states of the empire, each of which in European complications took its own stand, without any regard to the interests of Germany as a whole.

This was the final result of the attempt of the Hapsburgs to aid the fanatical schemes of the Counter-reformation. The issue of the Thirty Years' War gave the death-blow to the ancient Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. For almost two centuries longer, the process of decomposition went on; but even then, from out of the corrupt mass, a new and sound political body was being developed, rich in promise for the future—a state that was destined to draw to itself from the decaying empire all the forces that were still living, and finally to take the place of the ancient system. For it was at this very epoch that the Great Elector was laying the foundations of the Brandenburg-Prussian power.

A general amnesty for all that had taken place in the last thirty years was proclaimed by the emperor, who, however, in his narrow-minded thirst for revenge, excepted his own hereditary lands from the amnesty.

The religious projects of the Hapsburgs, as well as their political plans, had completely failed, except in their hereditary lands. But it was not as if the Peace of Westphalia had especially favored the Protestants. An extension of the new doctrine was no longer possible. On the contrary, it had suffered serious loss at two points: first, in the Upper Palatinate, which by its cession to Bavaria was once for all delivered over to Catholicism; and next (and this was the most important point), by its complete exclusion from the Austrian hereditary lands, with the single exception of Silesia, where—in theory at least—the Protestants were to enjoy their earlier rights and privileges.

And yet, when we reflect on the progress which the Counter-reformation had made from 1560 up to the breaking out of the war, and how, before and during the progress of the contest, it had threatened the very existence of Protestantism, we must admit that Protestantism gained at least a negative advantage by the confirmation of the *status quo*. Moreover, the treaty of 1648 put an end to a state of affairs that worked great evil to a large section of the adherents of the new faith. In this instrument the Reformed confession was for the first time recognized and included in the peace of the empire, being put on an equal footing with Catholics and Lutherans. The Lutherans, especially electoral Saxony, opposed with all their might this important concession, but it was at last made, chiefly by the efforts of Frederick William of Brandenburg, who thus did a work of the highest value for the whole future of Germany.

Other conditions of this treaty, specially designed to enable the different confessions within the empire to live together in harmony, served to bind the Lutherans and the members of the Reformed church still more closely to one another. Whenever religious-political questions came up in the diet, the decision was not to be given by an absolute majority, but by the agreement of two corporate bodies of different religious views—the Catholic estates (*Corpus Catholicorum*), and the Protestant (*Corpus Evangelicorum*). The latter body—the leadership of which was, five years later, entrusted once for all to the strongly orthodox electoral Saxony—was composed, without distinction, of Calvinists and of Lutherans. Thus any oppression of one of these sects by the other, or of both by the Catholics, was effectually prevented.

In like manner it was ordained that not merely religious controversies, but also secular ones in which Protestants were interested should be decided in the imperial court of chancery by assessors belonging in equal numbers to both faiths. Here also the Reformed were inseparably associated with the Lutherans. Finally, in all affairs of the

empire, these two Protestant confessions, taken together, were to be on a footing of complete equality with Catholicism; so that, in filling the highest offices of the empire, Protestants and Catholics should either be nominated alternately, or one of either faith simultaneously. In this way, in spite of occasional jars and bickerings, serious conflicts between the various religious parties no longer occurred in Germany. The era of the wars of religion was at an end, so far as the empire was concerned.

Most difficult to arrange was the compromise in the question of the territorial extent of the various religious confessions; the unfortunate Ecclesiastical Reservation and the strife for the bishoprics were once more brought under discussion. The emperor had been willing to concede at the most the *status* of the year 1630 (i. e., that after the execution of the Edict of Restitution had begun) as the *status* of the chief religious confessions; but Sweden demanded that of 1618 (i. e., that before the outbreak of the war). After long contentions, the proposition of the envoys of electoral Saxony was agreed to, by which the year 1624 was taken as the normal year, which should determine whether each individual state of the empire should belong to one or the other confession. The right of the Protestant bishops to marry and their emancipation from the papal confirmation was recognized, and a seat and a vote in the diet were expressly conferred upon them.

For the future, it is true, the territorial rulers retained the *jus reformandi*; but many regulations were made for the purpose of securing freedom of conscience for subjects whose belief differed from that of their rulers. No one was to be disturbed in his devotions at home, and everyone had the right of migrating from a land of a different religion into one of the same religion which he himself professed. Finally, those evangelical and Catholic subjects of a ruler of the opposite confession who in 1624 had possessed the privilege of public worship were to retain this privilege for the future.


From all these regulations, only the hereditary lands of the emperor—apart from Silesia—were excepted; in these, only the Catholic religion was tolerated, and those who had been deprived of their property and driven into exile on account of their religion received not the slightest compensation. The religious unity of its hereditary lands and the strengthening of the princely authority in them formed for the imperial house of Hapsburg the only favorable results of the fearful struggle, in which it had lost the last remnants of imperial power (PLATE XXIV.).

Politically the Peace of Westphalia marks the beginning of a sorrowful epoch for Germany. Austria was driven back from the heart of the empire into its own hereditary states and torn away from political and

Dieses Fried- und Freuden-Mahl
hielt hier auf dem Rathhaus-Saal

Carol Gustav von Schweden,
als die Bluthrenten Feder

Anfangs wurden ab
und der Fried gefangen



Eigentliche abbildung des Fried- und Freuden-Mahls, welches der Durchlauchtigste Hochgeborne Fürst und Herr: Herr: Carol- Gustav Pfaltz-grav bey Rhein etc. nach abh
dem Rathhaus-Saal den 25. Septembris. Anno 1649. gehalten: und seind die dabey sich befindene Höchste hoch und wohlanschenliche Herren D

2. Des Herrn Pfaltzgraven und Curs Carl Ludwigs Durchl.
1. Wegen Chur-Mainzer Herr Sebastian Wilhelm Heel
 2. Chur-Cöln Herr Graf Franz Egon von Fürstenberg
 3. Chur-Bayern Herr Johann Georg Otzel
 4. Chur-Sachsen Herr Augustus Adolph von Brandt
 5. Chur-Brandenburg Herr Albrecht Wilhelm von Gell
 6. Oldenburg Herr Wilhelm von Gell
 7. Salsburg Herr Johann Adam Knecht
 8. Salsburg Herr Andreas Star
 9. Magdeburg Herr Johann Knoll
 10. Magdeburg Herr Gebhard von Alvensleben
 11. Wegen Tübingen Herr Georg Wilhelm von Elckenshausen ge-
nans Lünge
 12. Wegen Tübingen Herr Johann von Giebel
 13. Bamberg Herr Johann Christoph Götterdörffer
 14. Eysach Herr Johann Heinrich Schütz
 15. Herr Graf Georg Ludwig von Nassau Dillenburg
 16. Herr Georg Adolphs Graf von Hohenlohe
 17. Herr Wilhelm Heinrich Graf von Hohenlohe
 18. Nassau-Saarbrück Herr Carl Heide von Thierberg
 19. Graf von Hohenlohe, Lorenz Hofmann
 20. Graf von Schwarzenburg Herr Johann Adam Sengel
 21. Herr Obrste Lamm
 22. Herr General Gießhagen
 1. Herr Georg Ludwig von Lützen hoh. Rath. Ehrenrathmann
 2. Blatzgrat Bräuer, hoh. Rath. Gerd
 3. Landgraf Friedrich, in Neffen. Gerd
 4. Blatzgrat von Lützen, hoh. Rath. Gerd
 5. Blatzgrat von Lützen, hoh. Rath. Gerd
 6. Herr General, hoh. Rath. Gerd
 7. Herr General, hoh. Rath. Gerd
 8. Blatzgrat, hoh. Rath. Gerd

Banquet at Nuremberg, September 23, 1649, to celebrate the Tréaty of Peace (P

intellectual connection with Germany, while France and Sweden gained a footing in Germany. The empire was ruined and divided, and became the plaything of innumerable selfish intrigues, both native and foreign. The dissensions of the German princes among themselves, the indifference of most of them to the honor and welfare of the nation, the servility and the want of personal independence and initiative in the people had brought about this miserable situation. But, on the general relations of Europe, the Peace of Westphalia had a more salutary effect.

Not without reason did the pope protest against the peace, in the bull *Zelo domus Dei*, of November 26, 1648, and refuse to recognize it. At the price of its best blood, its unity, its well-being, its independence and greatness, the German people, by the Thirty Years' War and the peace that closed it, purchased for Europe and for the world the most precious acquisition of modern times—liberty of conscience.

This, however, was not the intention of those who framed the treaties; for, according to the terms of the peace, no religion except that of the Catholic church, the Lutheran church, and the Reformed church was to be allowed or tolerated in the Holy Roman Empire. But, in actual fact, freedom of conscience gradually grew out of the Westphalian arrangements. Religious schism, the very thing which men had striven to abolish by this giant struggle, was sanctioned by the peace. At heart the Protestants were at that time no more tolerant than their opponents; but, inasmuch as in this fearful conflict neither confession, although it put forth all its powers, had been able to become master of the adherents of the other, the men of the old faith and of the new learned to tolerate one another. By force men were brought to recognize the fact that, even without ecclesiastical unity, states can exist in peace side by side and have intercourse with one another.

With this compromise, the question of religion lost much of its exciting interest. It was provided in the articles of the peace that its validity should be impaired by no papal decrees nor by general or special decrees of councils nor by any other ecclesiastical counter-resolutions.

Religion had at that time in no way lost its eternal power over the deepest emotions of the individual; but of its influence on the life of the state, and especially on the relation of states to one another, men, taught by terrible experiences, would hear nothing more. This, then, is the distinctive mark of the period since the middle of the seventeenth century, by which it is distinguished from all the earlier epochs since the elevation of Christianity to be the religion of the Roman state—the banishment of religious influence from the life of the state, and especially from the higher regions of politics. No longer did agreement or disagreement in

faith regulate the relation of states to one another, but territorial interests. And more and more this indifference to religious differences extended also to the internal administration of the state, in which a man's religious faith came to be looked upon as a wholly irrelevant matter. Within the state, all creeds were to have equal rights.

The Peace of Westphalia, in recognizing equally the three great Christian confessions and in placing them side by side with the same claims and authority, destroyed forever that ecclesiastical unity which for thirteen centuries men had sought to maintain. Lutheranism and Calvinism, as well as Rome, had urged their claims to be regarded each as the one true and universal church. Each of them, with absolute certainty, had maintained that it possessed a monopoly of truth, and had branded all who thought otherwise as criminals, as disciples and servants of Antichrist. But now there was no longer any mention of such monopoly. It was now plainly only a question of time when this ecclesiastical unity would be set aside in the interior of the individual states also. Politicians who were accustomed to regard a religion in a friendly state as having equal claims and worth with their own could not long continue to look upon the same religion at home as godlessness and as an enormity to be extirpated. It was reserved for the eighteenth century to draw these last consequences from the principles sanctioned in the Peace of Westphalia.

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